

2009 CASE REPORT

(and cumulative report of Illinois statutes held unconstitutional)



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To the Honorable Members of the General Assembly:

This is the Legislative Reference Bureau's annual review of decisions of the Federal Courts, the Illinois Supreme Court, and the Illinois Appellate Court as required by Section 5.05 of the Legislative Reference Bureau Act, 25 ILCS 135/5.05.

The Bureau's staff attorneys screened all court decisions and prepared the individual case summaries. A cumulative report of statutes held unconstitutional, prepared by the Bureau's staff attorneys, is included. The entire report was edited and compiled by senior attorney Jean McCay.

Respectfully submitted,

Richard C. Edwards
Executive Director

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INTRODUCTION TO PART 1

Part 1 of this 2009 Case Report contains summaries of recent court decisions and is based on a review of court decisions published since the summer of 2008 in advance sheets through the following:

1. Illinois Official Reports advance sheet No. 15 (July 29, 2009).
2. Federal Reporter advance sheet No. 31 (August 3, 2009).
3. Federal Supplement advance sheet No. 26 (June 29, 2009).
4. Supreme Court Reporter advance sheet No. 18 (July 15, 2009).

PART 1
SUMMARIES OF RECENT COURT DECISIONS

ILLINOIS PUBLIC LABOR RELATIONS ACT – EMPLOYEE MAJORITY INTEREST

The Illinois Public Labor Relations Board need consider only dues deduction authorizations or other evidence, rather than both authorizations and other evidence, when ascertaining majority employee interest in an organization seeking certification as the exclusive bargaining representative.

In *County of DuPage v. Illinois Public Labor Relations Board*, 231 Ill.2d 593 (2008), the county disputed the Illinois Public Labor Relations Board’s certification of the exclusive bargaining representative of the county’s law enforcement employees. As an alternative to certification through a secret ballot election, subsection (a-5) of Section 9 of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/9 (West 2004)) permits certification when a labor organization demonstrates that the majority of employees is interested in representation by that organization. If the demonstration is alleged to be fraudulent, the statute authorizes the Board to ascertain an employee’s interest on the basis of his or her dues deduction authorization “and other evidence”. The Board considered that phrase ambiguous and by rule required dues deduction authorization cards *or* other evidence, rather than both. The subsection’s subsequent sentence refers to “dues deductions authorizations, and other evidence upon which the Board would otherwise rely . . . “. The court agreed that the phrase “the Board would *otherwise* rely” makes sense only if the other evidence is an alternative to dues deduction authorizations. In addition to deferring to the Board’s interpretation of the laws it implements, the court noted that subsection (a-5) was modeled on an identically-worded New York statute with the same administrative construction. Legislative history indicated the intent to offer a streamlined “card check” method of representative certification, which the General Assembly would not have wanted to encumber by requiring both dues deduction authorization cards and another form of evidence. A dissenting opinion objected to finding a statutory ambiguity where none exists. To specify dues deduction authorizations “and” other evidence plainly means that both are required; the evidence upon which the Board would “otherwise” rely does not mean optional evidence, it means the evidence the Board would rely upon in the absence of the alleged fraud. That the General Assembly was aware of an ambiguity in the model statute but enacted the subsection in the hope that the Board would resolve the inconsistency in the same manner as the New York administrative body is incredible, the dissent suggested.

ELECTION CODE – QUALIFIED PRIMARY VOTER

A voter at a political party’s primary is ineligible for nomination by a second party as a candidate at the election because he or she is not a qualified primary voter of the second party, as required by the statement of candidacy.

In *Cullerton v. DuPage County Officers Electoral Board*, 384 Ill.App.3d 989 (2nd Dist. 2008), the court addressed the Election Code’s use of, but failure to define, the term

“qualified primary voter”. The plaintiff voted a Republican ballot at the February 2008 primary, as he had done in the 2004 and 2006 primaries. The Democratic Party failed to nominate a candidate for the Senate from the 23rd Legislative District at the February 2008 primary, and so the plaintiff in April 2008 agreed to be nominated by the Democratic Party to fill that vacancy. His nomination was challenged, and the county officers electoral board ruled against his nomination. The court upheld the board’s determination that the plaintiff was disqualified because he voted in the 2008 Republican primary. A candidate for nomination must swear in his or her statement of candidacy, required by Section 7-10 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 2006)), that the candidate is a qualified primary voter of the party whose nomination he or she seeks. Section 7-10 provides that a “qualified primary elector” of a party may not sign the petitions for or be a candidate in the primary of more than one party. The Section previously defined a qualified primary elector of a party, for purposes of eligibility to sign partisan petitions or serve as a party’s candidate, as a person who had not voted the primary ballot of another party within the preceding 2 years. That 2-year restriction was held unconstitutional with respect to persons seeking to vote at a primary or sign a candidate’s nominating petition. The General Assembly subsequently removed the 2-year restriction but has not displayed an intent to permit eligibility for partisan candidacy by a person who participated in the most recent primary of another party. A primary voter retains party affiliation until he or she affirmatively discards it through participation in another party’s primary; the plaintiff’s earliest opportunity to become a qualified primary voter of the Democratic Party would be voting in the 2010 Democratic primary.

ELECTION CODE – WRITE-IN CANDIDATES

The deadline for filing a declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate at a consolidated election should be extended when judicial review of a sustained objection to a consolidated primary nominating petition is pending.

In *Nelson v. Qualkinbush*, 389 Ill.App.3d 79 (1st Dist. 2009), a municipal officers electoral board sustained objections to 2 candidates’ nominating petitions for the 2009 consolidated primary. The candidates sought judicial review of the board’s decision, and the trial court dismissed their suit. While the appeal of that dismissal was pending, the candidates filed with the election authority their declarations of intent to be write-in candidates at the 2009 consolidated election. The electoral board argued that the appeal was rendered moot by the filing of those declarations because the candidates could not appear both on the primary ballot and as write-ins on the election ballot. Because the deadline for filing declarations of write-in candidacy occurred before the appellate court would decide their case, the candidates contended that they were forced to file the declarations in order to preserve the opportunity to appear on the election ballot on a write-in basis. Section 17-16.1 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/17-16.1 (West Supp. 2007)) requires that a person file a declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate no later than 61 days before the election; however, a declaration may be filed as late as the 7th day before the election if the person had filed a primary nominating petition and an objection to that petition was sustained after the 61-day deadline for filing the declaration. A defeated primary candidate may not file a declaration of write-in candidacy for the election. Although the appellate court dismissed the candidates’ appeal on other grounds,

it chose to address the mootness issue due to the frequent “frustration and confusion engendered by the Code”. The State’s policy of favoring ballot access, coupled with the statute’s special deadline when an electoral board’s decision is pending, suggests that Section 17-16.1 should be read as permitting the filing of a write-in declaration after the 61-day deadline when the person is pursuing judicial review of a sustained objection to a primary nominating petition. The court urged the General Assembly to clarify the write-in provision.

SECRETARY OF STATE ACT - CERTIFICATION OF GUBERNATORIAL APPOINTMENTS

The Governor’s appointment of a United States Senator is not a commission that must be signed and sealed by the Secretary of State.

In *Burris v. White*, 232 Ill.2d 1 (2009), Secretary of State Jesse White registered but refused to sign and affix the State seal to the document issued by Governor Rod R. Blagojevich appointing Roland Burris to fill the United States Senate seat vacated by President-elect Obama. Subsection (1) of Section 5 of the Secretary of State Act (15 ILCS 305/5 (West 2006)) requires the Secretary of State to sign and affix the State seal to “commissions required by law to be issued by the Governor”. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Secretary of State had no duty to sign and affix the State seal to Roland Burris’ appointment papers because no provision of Illinois law requires the Governor to issue a commission to fill a vacancy in the United States Senate. The appointment to fill a vacant United States Senate seat is a general appointment. In the case of a general appointment, subsection (2) of Section 5 of the Secretary of State Act requires only that the Secretary register the appointment. Because the Secretary already registered the certificate of appointment, no further action was required by the Secretary to validate the appointment of Roland Burris.

CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION ACT - EXPUNGEMENT

The provision that a petitioner “may” have a court enter an order of expungement of the petitioner’s criminal record does not require the court to order expungement, even if a gubernatorial pardon authorizes that expungement.

In *People v. Howard*, 233 Ill.2d 213 (2009), the Illinois Supreme Court considered the consolidated appeals of 2 criminal defendants who, after being granted gubernatorial pardons specifically authorizing the expungement of their criminal records, petitioned circuit courts to have those records expunged under subsection (c) of Section 5 of the Criminal Identification Act (20 ILCS 2630/5 (West 2004)). In each case, the circuit courts denied the defendants’ expungement petitions. Subsection (c) provided that if the governor grants a person a pardon that specifically authorizes expungement, then that person “may, upon verified petition to the chief judge of the circuit where the person had been convicted, any judge of the circuit designated by the Chief Judge, or in counties of less than 3,000,000 inhabitants, the presiding trial judge at the defendant’s trial, may [*sic*] have a court order entered expunging the record of arrest from the official records”. After determining that the inclusion of the second “may” was a typographical error, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the phrase “may . . . have a court order entered” gave

circuit courts discretion to deny petitions for expungement under subsection (c). A dissenting opinion asserted that the phrase “may . . . have a court order entered” simply vested the petitioners with the right to have an expungement order automatically entered by the circuit court once a gubernatorial pardon authorizing expungement is granted and a verified petition is filed.

Section 5 of the Criminal Identification Act was amended subsequently by Public Act 96-328, effective August 11, 2009, Public Act 96-409, effective January 1, 2010, and Public Act 96-707, effective January 1, 2010. The typographical error identified by the Illinois Supreme Court has been cured, but the phrase “may . . . have a court order entered” has been retained within Section 5 or relocated to Section 5.2 of the Act (20 ILCS 2630/5.2).

PROPERTY TAX CODE - REFUND OF OVERPAYMENTS

The Code’s provision permitting the refund of overpaid taxes, and the statute of limitations on an action seeking that refund, apply regardless of whether the overpayment is based on an erroneous assessment.

In *Alvarez v. Pappas*, 229 Ill.2d 217 (2008), the plaintiffs were owners of various parcels of real estate in Cook County who inadvertently made duplicate property tax payments, both directly and through their lenders. In 2005, the plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against the county treasurer, seeking a return of the overpaid amounts. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the 5-year statute of limitations in Section 20-175 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/20-175 (West 2006)) had expired. The plaintiffs argued that Section 20-175 did not apply because their payments were not “tax payments,” but rather mistaken or inadvertent payments. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected that argument and characterized the payments as “overpayments”, which are included under Section 20-175. The plaintiffs also argued that Section 20-175 applies only to tax payments made due to erroneous assessments. The court found that the language of Section 20-175 on this point is unclear and ambiguous, and it looked to the legislative history of the statute. In examining the legislative history, the court found that, when the General Assembly added the “overpaid” language to the Section in 1975, it intended to allow taxpayers the right to claim refunds of overpaid taxes regardless of whether any erroneous assessment occurred. Therefore, because the plaintiffs’ request for a refund fell under Section 20-175, and because the plaintiffs’ complaint was not timely filed under that Section, the complaint was properly dismissed. A dissenting opinion reasoned that the plain language of the statute is limited to refunds of erroneously assessed taxes.

ILLINOIS PENSION CODE – FORFEITURE OF BENEFITS

Forfeiture of benefits due to a service-related felony is intended to discourage malfeasance and is not negated by allowing a participant to keep that part of his pension untainted by his or her felony conviction.

In *Ryan v. Board of Trustees of the General Assembly Retirement System*, 388 Ill.App.3d 161 (1st Dist. 2009), the board of trustees of the General Assembly Retirement System terminated all of former Governor George Ryan’s pension benefits as a result of

his felony convictions based on his conduct during his service as Secretary of State and Governor. Section 2-156 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/2-156 (West 2006)) prohibits payment of benefits to “any person convicted of any felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with his or her service as a member”. Ryan’s pension credits were earned as a county officer, General Assembly member, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, and Governor, and he argued that the statute required forfeiture only of that portion attributable to the service to which the felony related. The appellate court held that the Code’s forfeiture provision is meant to discourage malfeasance and the purpose would not be negated by allowing Ryan to keep that part of his pension untainted by his felony convictions. Based on this public policy rationale, the court reinstated Ryan’s pension benefits earned while a member of the General Assembly and the Lieutenant Governor.

ILLINOIS PENSION CODE – COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENTS

A police officer’s survivor must be awarded the officer’s entire line-of-duty disability pension, but that award does not include the cost-of-living adjustments to which the officer would have been entitled.

In *Roselle Police Pension Board v. Village of Roselle*, 232 Ill.2d 546 (2009), the village of Roselle disputed the police pension board’s inclusion of an annual cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) in the pension awarded to a police officer’s widow. At the time of the police officer’s death, he was receiving a line-of-duty disability pension; he was also receiving COLAs authorized by Section 3-111.1 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/3-111.1 (West 2004)) because he had attained the age of 60. Because Section 3-112 of the Code (40 ILCS 5/3-112 (West 2004)) requires that the recipient of a survivor’s retirement pension also receive COLAs to which the deceased retiree had been entitled, the pension board analogized that the recipient of a survivor’s disability pension must have the same COLA rights. The court disagreed, pointing out that subsection (b) of Section 3-114 (40 ILCS 5/3-114 (West 2004)) authorizes the award of a deceased officer’s disability pension but remains silent as to COLAs. Many of the Code’s Articles governing other pension funds and retirement systems expressly authorize the award of COLAs to recipients of survivor disability pensions, indicating that the General Assembly is capable of doing so when it wishes. The General Assembly has chosen to ameliorate this discrepancy by permitting a police officer’s survivor to receive the officer’s entire disability pension, rather than the percentage of a disability pension authorized for survivors under other Articles of the Code.

COUNTIES CODE - PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION FEE

A State’s Attorney’s fee for “preliminary examinations” pertains to proceedings at which a trial court determines whether to hold a defendant on bail or recognizance.

In *People v. Ellison*, 383 Ill.App.3d 146 (1st Dist. 2008), the trial court imposed on the defendant a \$20 preliminary hearing fee pursuant to subsection (a) of Section 4-2002.1 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/4-2002.1 (West 2006)). That subsection entitles a State’s Attorney to fees for “preliminary examinations for each defendant held to bail or recognizance”. The defendant argued that the term “preliminary examination” has the

same meaning as in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, a probable cause hearing. The appellate court held that defining a “preliminary examination” as a probable cause hearing disregards the requirement that the defendant be held to bail or recognizance. The appellate court interpreted “preliminary examination” to mean the proceedings at which a trial court determines whether or not to hold a defendant on bail or recognizance.

SILENT REFLECTION AND STUDENT PRAYER ACT - CONSTITUTIONALITY

The Act’s mandatory period of silence violates the United States Constitution’s guarantees of freedom of religion and due process of law.

In *Sherman v. Township High School Dist. 214*, 594 F.Supp.2d 981 (N.D. Ill. 2009), a student, through her father, challenged the constitutionality of Section 1 of the Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act (105 ILCS 20/1). Section 1 requires public school students to participate in the observation of a brief period of silence, for prayer or reflection, conducted by their teachers at the beginning of the school day. The plaintiff argued that the statute violates the United States Constitution because it is an establishment of religion prohibited by the First Amendment (U.S. Const., Amend. I) and is so vague as to implementation as to contravene the due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (U.S. Const., Amends. V and XIV). The federal district court agreed, finding that Section 1 is an endorsement of religion lacking any clearly secular purpose. The court also held that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it affords school districts discretion on how to enforce and observe the mandated period of silence.

PUBLIC UNIVERSITY ENERGY CONSERVATION ACT - REIMBURSEMENT

The Act’s reimbursement requirement for energy savings shortfalls is enforceable at the conclusion of the contract term, not annually.

In *People ex rel. Board of Trustees of Chicago State University v. Siemens Building Technologies, Inc.*, 387 Ill.App.3d 606 (1st Dist. 2008), the defendant, Siemens, agreed to provide Chicago State University with various energy conservation measures in accordance with the Public University Energy Conservation Act. Under Section 20 of that Act (110 ILCS 62/20 (West 1998)), the contract guaranteed that the measures’ energy cost savings would meet or exceed the measures’ cost within 10 years and required Siemens to reimburse the university for any shortfall in savings. The university sued Siemens for reimbursement of a savings shortfall before the end of the 10-year agreement, claiming that Section 35 of the Act (110 ILCS 62/35 (West 1998)) implicitly requires annual reimbursement of annual savings shortfalls. Siemens contended that its reimbursement obligation was incurred only at the end of the 10 years and only with respect to a shortfall in cumulative energy savings. The court agreed with Siemens, explaining that while Section 35 requires a university to annually reserve its energy savings for annual payments under the contract, the Section does not envision annual reimbursement. The policy of the Act foresees that energy savings may not occur each year but will be achieved over a longer period. Relying on that policy, the court also determined that the Act does not prohibit inclusion in the contract of a commercially

standard “hell or high water” clause, under which the university had to make an annual payment despite an energy savings shortfall that year.

PUBLIC UTILITIES ACT – ALTERATION OF ORDER

A non-substantively corrected Illinois Commerce Commission order is not a new order that extends the deadline for filing a rehearing petition.

In *People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Commission*, 231 Ill.2d 370 (2008), the Illinois Commerce Commission on August 30, 2006 issued an order partially approving an AT&T service reclassification request and served the order upon AT&T and the Attorney General. On September 7, 2006, the Commission served those parties with a second document, dated August 30, 2006, that was identical to the August 30th order except for the correction of a clerical error in the title. Section 10-113 of the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/10-113 (West 2006)) permits parties to file a petition for rehearing within 30 days after service of a Commission order. The Attorney General electronically filed a petition for rehearing with the Commission after the Commission’s business hours on October 2, 2006, the last day for filing with respect to the Commission’s first August 30th document. The Commission denied the petition as untimely filed On October 3, 2006. The Attorney General argued that the Commission’s September 7th document was a new order, and that the filing period began September 7, because Section 10 -113 specifies how the Commission may alter or amend its orders and that an alteration or amendment shall be given the same effect as the original order. The court held that a clerical correction of an order’s title is an immaterial change and does not constitute the sort of substantive alteration or amendment anticipated by Section 10-113. The Commission clearly did not consider the second document as a new order because it did not follow the procedures required for issuing an order and its docket did not list the second document as another order. The court, however, found that the Attorney General had timely filed the petition because the Commission’s filing rules did not limit the electronic transmission of petitions to business hours.

ILLINOIS PUBLIC AID CODE - FAMILYCARE PROGRAM

Implementation of the FamilyCare program as an expansion of the medical assistance program was in direct contradiction to the requirements of the Code because it did not require FamilyCare participants to comply with certain noneconomic requirements necessary to receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).

In *Caro v. Blagojevich*, 385 Ill.App.3d 704 (1st Dist. 2008), taxpayers sought an injunction prohibiting the Governor and certain State agencies from implementing the FamilyCare program as an expansion of the medical assistance (Medicaid) program. Subdivision 2(b) of Section 5-2 of the Illinois Public Aid Code (305 ILCS 5/5-2 (West 2006)) provides for medical assistance eligibility for persons who would be determined eligible for basic maintenance under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program by disregarding the maximum income permitted by federal law. Other provisions of the Code impose additional, noneconomic, conditions on eligibility for TANF. The court held that the FamilyCare program as implemented by the defendants

was in direct contradiction to the requirements of the Code because it did not require its participants to comply with those noneconomic requirements necessary to receive TANF.

Public Act 95-1055, effective April 10, 2009, amended Section 5-2 of the Illinois Public Aid Code to add subdivision 15, providing for “Family Care eligibility” for medical assistance for persons whose countable income is at or below 185% of the Federal Poverty Level.

Public Act 96-20, effective June 30, 2009, (i) amended subdivision 2(b) of Section 5-2 of the Illinois Public Aid Code to add a provision excluding eligibility requirements that are inconsistent with federal law or regulations and prohibiting the Department of Healthcare and Family Services from expanding eligibility for the FamilyCare program to cover persons whose income exceeds 185% of the Federal Poverty Level unless expressly authorized by statute and (ii) added Section 12-4.38 to the Code (305 ILCS 5/12-4.38) to set forth “Special FamilyCare provisions” to deal with persons already enrolled in the FamilyCare program.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT - LOCAL SITING REVIEW

A local siting authority must take final action on a request for local siting approval within 180 days after receiving the request, but the authority is not required to issue a written decision on the request during that period.

In *Peoria Disposal Co. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board*, 385 Ill.App.3d 781 (3rd Dist. 2008), a waste disposal company asserted that its request for local siting approval should be deemed approved by operation of law because the local siting authority failed to issue its written decision within the time period set forth in subsection (e) of Section 39.2 of the Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS 5/39.2 (West 2006)). Subsection (e) requires the local siting authority considering a request for local siting approval to take final action and issue a written decision on that request, and it also imposes a 180-day time limit. The company asserted that the 180-day limit applied not only to the final action requirement but also to the written decision requirement. However, after calling attention to the grammatical separation of the written decision requirement and the final action requirement and noting that the 180-day limit appears in the same sentence as the final action requirement, the appellate court held that the 180-day limit applies to only the final action requirement and concluded that, despite the absence of a written decision within the 180-day limit, the local siting authority met its statutory deadline for final action by taking a timely vote on the request at one of its board meetings.

WATER POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ACT – OWNER LIABILITY

The Waukegan port district is not an owner of certain PCB-contaminated, submerged harbor lands for purposes of liability under the Act.

In *City of Waukegan v. National Gypsum Co.*, 560 F.Supp.2d 636 (N.D. Ill. 2008), the city of Waukegan sought reimbursement from and a declaratory judgment against a port district and several private defendants for costs related to the removal of PCB-contaminated sediment from a harbor. The city asserted that the port district was an owner of contaminated harbor land for the purposes of Sections 3 and 5 of the Water

Pollutant Discharge Act (415 ILCS 25/3 and 25/5) and Section 9607(a) of the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C. §9607(a)), which impose upon owners or operators of facilities that discharge pollutants the financial responsibility for response to and removal of the contaminants. The city claimed that the port district was an owner because Sections 3 and 4.5 of the Waukegan Port District Act (70 ILCS 1865/3 and 1865/4.5) establish the port district's territorial boundaries (which encompass some of the contaminated lands) and authorize the port district to lease areas under its jurisdiction. The court ruled that the port district was not an owner under CERCLA, finding that the Waukegan Port District Act does not convey title to the submerged land too the port district and that Section 11-92-2 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-92-2) would otherwise vest title in the city or State. Finally, the court concluded that the port district was not an owner for purposes of the Water Pollutant Discharge Act because there is no reason to believe that the phrase "owner or operator", as used in that Act, should be construed any differently than under CERCLA.

ILLINOIS VEHICLE CODE - MANDATORY INSURANCE

The required omnibus clause in an automobile insurance policy does not apply to a vehicle rented by the insured because rented vehicles are subject to other enhanced insurance requirements of the Code.

In *State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago*, 386 Ill.App.3d 945 (1st Dist. 2008), the renter of an automobile from a rental company let a driver who was not listed on the rental agreement drive the rented vehicle, and the driver negligently crashed the vehicle. The rental company sued the renter, the driver, and the renter's insurance company, claiming that the renter's insurance company was liable for damages pursuant to the renter's insurance policy's omnibus clause, a statutorily required provision in an insurance policy extending liability coverage to persons who use the named insured's vehicle with the insured's permission. The appellate court held that the legislature did not intend the renter's insurance policy's omnibus clause, which is required by subsection (b) of Section 7-317 of the Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/7-317 (West 2002)), to apply to rental vehicles because rental vehicles are subject to the enhanced insurance requirements of another chapter of the Code (625 ILCS 5/9-101 *et seq.*).

ILLINOIS VEHICLE CODE - VEHICLE INSPECTION

The prohibition against a law enforcement officer inspecting a vehicle stopped solely for a seatbelt violation does not preclude the officer from performing a warrant check on the vehicle's driver or passengers.

In *People v. Bailey*, 232 Ill.2d 285 (2009), the defendant was initially stopped by a law enforcement officer for a seatbelt violation, and the officer ran a warrant check on the defendant that showed an outstanding warrant. The officer arrested the defendant and subsequently performed a search of the vehicle that uncovered cocaine. The defendant argued that the search of the vehicle was an impermissible "inspection" under 2 Illinois

statutes, Section 12-603.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/12-603.1 (West 2004)) and Section 108-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/108-1 (West 2004)), that similarly provide that a “law enforcement officer may not search or inspect a motor vehicle, its contents, the driver, or a passenger solely because of a [seatbelt] violation...”. The Illinois Supreme Court found the term “inspect” ambiguous and looked to legislative debates to determine that a warrant check does not fall into the definition of an inspection in the context of the 2 statutes.

JUVENILE COURT ACT OF 1987 – WAIVER OF JURISDICTION

The requirement that a party to an adjudication may object to the lack of service, or lack of proper service, upon a necessary party only before the adjudicatory hearing begins is not unconstitutional.

In *In re M.W.*, 232 Ill.2d 408 (2009), the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the issue of the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the delinquency adjudication of a minor when the State failed to serve the minor’s father with notice of the hearing. In its opinion, the Supreme Court overruled its prior decision that subsection (b) of Section 1-15 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-15 (West 1992)) is unconstitutional. Under subsection (b), a party to an adjudication under the Act who wishes to object to the court’s jurisdiction because another, necessary party has not been served or has not been properly served with notice of the proceeding may raise that claim only before the adjudicatory hearing begins, and failure to do so waives that claim. *In re C.R.H.*, 163 Ill.2d 263 (1994), held that this mandatory waiver infringed upon the objecting party’s due process right and interfered with the power of the reviewing court in violation of Section 2 of Article I and Section 1 of Article II, respectively, of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. I, Sec.2 and Art. II, Sec.1). Here, the court ruled that *In re C.R.H.* mischaracterized subsection (b)’s waiver. The General Assembly by statute has created the justiciable matter of a minor’s status; because the court derives its jurisdiction solely from that statutory creation, the General Assembly may impose conditions upon the jurisdiction. A minor’s forfeiture of an objection to the court’s jurisdiction based on lack of service, or lack of proper service, will trigger plain error review, which is an adequate safeguard of the minor’s due process right.

JUVENILE COURT ACT OF 1987 - TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

There is not a “best interest of the child” exception to the prohibition against termination of parental rights when a child is adjudicated a dependent minor.

In *In re E.B.*, 231 Ill.2d 459 (2008), the State sought to terminate the parental rights of a mother whose child was adjudicated a dependent minor. Paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of Section 2-4 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-4 (West 2006)) provides that “no order may be made terminating parental rights, nor may a minor be removed from the custody of his or her parents for longer than 6 months, pursuant to an adjudication as a dependent minor under this subdivision (c), unless it is found to be in his or her best interest by the court or the case automatically closes under Section 2-31 of this Act”. The State argued that the prohibition against termination of parental rights is modified by the paragraph’s “best interest” of the child language. The court determined

that the paragraph creates an ambiguity that cannot be resolved by application of the rules of statutory construction. After examining the statute's legislative history, the court held that the phrase "unless it is found to be in his or her best interest" applies to only the prohibition against the removal of a child "from the custody of his or her parents for longer than 6 months. The phrase was not intended to modify the prohibition against termination of parental rights and so does not create an exception to that prohibition.

CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961 - DANGEROUS WEAPON

Possession of pepper spray proves the dangerous weapon element of the offense of armed robbery.

In *People v. Lampton*, 385 Ill.App.3d 507 (4th Dist. 2008), the defendant was convicted of armed robbery of a bank. In a post-conviction petition, he argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the State's contention that his possession of pepper spray during the robbery proved his use of a dangerous weapon, an essential element of the crime of armed robbery under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of Section 18-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 2002)). The court held that pepper spray is a "dangerous weapon" under the armed robbery statute and that the statute does not require that the dangerous weapon actually be used or even seen during the robbery. As a result, appellate counsel was not ineffective.

CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961 - POISONOUS GASES

The term "poisonous gas" includes anhydrous ammonia.

In *People v. Davison*, 233 Ill.2d 30 (2009), the Illinois Supreme Court held that anhydrous ammonia, which the defendant possessed in order to manufacture methamphetamine, is a "poisonous gas" within the meaning of subsection (a) of Section 20.5-6 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/20.5-6 (West 2004)). Subsection (a) makes it a Class 1 felony to possess, manufacture, or transport any poisonous gas, deadly biological or chemical contaminant or agent, or radioactive substance with the intent to use the substance to commit a felony. The appellate court had found the term "poisonous gas" ambiguous, used statutory construction aids to determine that the term included only substances used in chemical warfare, and determined that anhydrous ammonia is not a substance used in chemical warfare. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's interpretation. Although the term "poisonous gas" is not defined in the statute, the term is not ambiguous because the meaning can be ascertained easily from dictionary references to include substances that can be harmful or fatal in sufficient quantities.

CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961 - ARMED VIOLENCE

A subsequent offense of driving while the defendant's license is revoked may not serve as a predicate felony to support a charge of armed violence.

In *People v. Lucas*, 231 Ill.2d 169 (2008), the defendant was convicted of armed violence based upon a subsequent offense of driving while his license was revoked. The Illinois Supreme Court held that a conflict exists among Section 33A-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 2004)), the armed violence statute that requires

the State to prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a predicate felony, subsection (d) of Section 6-303 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6-303 (West 2004)), which makes the offense of driving while a person's license is revoked a Class 4 felony, and subsection (c) of Section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/111-3 (West 2004)), which prevents the State from proving a defendant guilty of a felony by using a predicate felony such as the subsequent offense of driving while a person's license is revoked. The court held that the subsequent offense of driving while a person's license is revoked may not serve as a predicate felony to support a charge of armed violence. The court ruled that the jury found the defendant guilty of armed violence based on misdemeanor driving while his license was revoked, a crime that does not exist in Illinois.

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF 1963 – SPEEDY TRIAL

Proceedings under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act suspend the running of the Code's speedy trial term in the underlying criminal case.

In *People v. Spurlock*, 388 Ill.App.3d 365 (5th Dist. 2009), the appellate court considered whether the filing of a petition under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/) stays the underlying criminal proceeding for purposes of the speedy trial period in Section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2006)). The defendant was charged with criminal sexual assault and intimidation, and, before he was brought to trial, the State filed a petition under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. The defendant's attorney stated that he was ready to proceed to trial on the criminal matter but that he needed more time to conduct discovery with respect to the civil petition. After several delays caused by the defendant and other parties, the trial court dismissed the criminal complaint on speedy trial grounds and dismissed the sexually dangerous person petition because there was no longer an underlying criminal complaint. The State appealed the dismissal. The appellate court held that the legislature intended the statutory speedy trial period to be tolled upon the filing of a sexually dangerous person petition. The court also held that the legislature did not intend for the criminal proceeding and the sexually dangerous person commitment proceeding to go forward simultaneously. Although the legislature did not include the filing of a sexually dangerous person petition in the list of enumerated exceptions that toll the speedy trial term, the court looked to the overall statutory scheme and the legislative history in making its determination.

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF 1963 – DEPORTATION ADVISEMENT

Administration of the Code's deportation advisement when a defendant enters a plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill, or nullo contendere is mandatory, regardless of the defendant's citizenship.

In *People v. Delvillar*, 383 Ill.App.3d 80 (1st Dist. 2008), the trial court did not administer an advisement concerning the possibility of deportation to the defendant upon entering a guilty plea, as provided in Section 113-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/113-8 (West 2006)), because the defendant had stated that he was a

United States citizen. The trial court later denied defendant's subsequent motion to withdraw his guilty plea after the defendant claimed he was not a United States citizen and argued that the advisement in question was mandatory rather than discretionary. The appellate court held that the advisement is mandatory, not discretionary, regardless of whether the defendant states that he or she is a United States citizen because the General Assembly used the word "shall" to indicate that "the court shall give the following advisement to the defendant in open court".

UNIFIED CODE OF CORRECTIONS - CLEMENCY

The absence of a deadline by which the Governor must act upon a clemency petition does not violate the petitioner's due process right.

In *Bowens v. Quinn*, 561 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2009), the plaintiffs had filed petitions for executive clemency between 2003 and 2005. The plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the Governor to act on their petitions within a reasonable time. They argued that the failure of the Governor to act on their petitions in a reasonable time violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The federal appellate court disagreed, holding that the petitioners did not have a property or liberty interest in obtaining pardons. The court also held that the Governor's power of pardon is plenary, with no limitation imposed by State law. The court characterized the clemency provisions of Section 3-3-13 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-3-13) as "steps in the sequence of procedures in clemency matters" and noted that the statute does not specify a time limit for acting on such matters. The court also declined to impose a "reasonable" time limit on gubernatorial pardons, reasoning that executive clemency is a "classic example of executive discretion" stemming from traditional royal prerogatives. The court noted that it would be difficult to determine what a reasonable time for deciding upon clemency petitions would be and what sanctions would be imposed if a Governor fails to make a decision within a reasonable time.

UNIFIED CODE OF CORRECTIONS – COURT SUPERVISION FOR DUI

A plea agreement that results in a conviction for reckless driving precludes a sentence of court supervision for a subsequent DUI conviction, whether or not the plea agreement reduced a previous DUI charge.

In *People ex rel. Madigan v. Kinzer*, 232 Ill.2d 179 (2009), the defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and in 2007 pleaded guilty. Item (3) of subsection (d) of Section 5-6-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-6-1 (West 2006)) prohibits court supervision for a DUI conviction if the defendant previously has pleaded guilty to reckless driving as the result of a plea agreement. In 2002, the defendant had been charged with DUI and reckless driving and had pleaded guilty to reckless driving as part of a plea agreement; the DUI charge had then been dismissed. The trial court in the 2007 case nonetheless sentenced the defendant to court supervision because it interpreted *People v. Eckhardt*, 127 Ill.2d 146 (1989), and *People v. Kuhn*, 126 Ill.2d 202 (1988), as construing item (3) to preclude court supervision only when the previous plea agreement reduced a DUI charge to the lesser offense of reckless driving because, without that distinction, item (3) creates an unconstitutional irrebuttable

presumption that the first DUI charge had been provable. Here, the record of the 2002 conviction was unclear whether the DUI charge was dismissed because of insufficient evidence or dismissed as part of the plea agreement. The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's interpretation of its earlier cases and held that under the plain language of item (3) a plea agreement that results in a conviction for reckless driving precludes a sentence of court supervision for a subsequent DUI conviction, whether or not that plea agreement reduced a DUI charge. Consequently, the defendant was not eligible for supervision.

A concurring opinion agreed with the trial court's interpretation of the previous decisions but determined that the defendant's plea agreement had reduced the DUI charge and thus precluded court supervision. The opinion argued that the majority's interpretation of item (3) may render the provision unconstitutional based on equal protection grounds. The constitutionality of the statutory preclusion can be upheld only if the defendant's prior plea to reckless driving was part of an agreement to avoid a conviction for DUI.

UNIFIED CODE OF CORRECTIONS – FEES AND FINES

The sum of money a court may require a person sentenced to probation to contribute to a local anti-crime program is a fine and not a fee.

In *People v. Dowding*, 388 Ill.App.3d 936 (2nd Dist. 2009), the defendant pleaded guilty to reckless homicide and aggravated driving while under the influence of a controlled substance and was sentenced to probation. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to a probation violation based on testing positive for cocaine. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a concurrent 10-year term of imprisonment for the probation violation. The court additionally sentenced the defendant to pay a \$10 fee to Crime Stoppers. On appeal, the defendant asserted that, because the trial court revoked his probation and imposed a sentence of incarceration, it had no authority to require the defendant to pay a local anti-crime program fine on each conviction. The appellate court disagreed. Clause (13) of subsection (b) of Section 5-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3 (West 2006)) provides that, as a condition of probation, the court may require that the person contribute a reasonable sum of money, not to exceed the maximum amount of the fine authorized for the offense for which the defendant was sentenced, to a local anti-crime program. The appellate court held that the trial court's subsequent revocation of probation did not warrant vacation of the fines. Citing *People v. Jones*, 223 Ill.2d 569 (2006), and *People v. Littlejohn*, 338 Ill.App.3d 281 (2003), the court analyzed the difference between fines and fees and held that a fine is a pecuniary punishment imposed as part of a sentence on a person convicted of a criminal offense. A fee is a charge for labor or services, especially professional services. A fine is a part of the punishment for conviction, whereas a fee or cost seeks to recoup expenses incurred by the State in prosecuting the defendant. Nothing in the statutory provision authorizing the contribution suggests that money will be used to reimburse a local anti-crime program for costs associated with criminal prosecution or as restitution for any loss suffered by the program. The Crime Stoppers contribution was a fine because the mandatory donation more closely resembled a punishment of the defendant in addition to the sentence he received.

UNIFIED CODE OF CORRECTIONS – SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT

A sentence enhancement for committing an offense with a firearm applies to a defendant who was unarmed but aided and abetted an armed co-defendant.

In *People v. Rodriguez*, 229 Ill.2d 285 (2008), the defendant argued that he should not have received a 15-year enhancement of his sentence because he was convicted under a theory of accountability and was not in physical possession of a firearm during the offense. Subdivision (a)(1)(d)(i) of Section 5-8-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1 (West 2006)) provides for a 15-year enhancement “if the person committed the offense while armed with a firearm”. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the 15-year enhancement provision applied to the defendant because he aided and abetted another person in committing first degree murder, which rendered him accountable for all of the other person’s criminal acts done in furtherance of that crime, including being armed with a firearm. The court presumed that the legislature was aware that the accountability statute has been interpreted to hold that when a defendant aids or abets another in committing a crime, he or she is accountable, and may be punished, for any act of his or her co-defendant done in furtherance of the crime. The court also noted that other enhancement provisions apply to a defendant who “personally discharged” a firearm, while the provision in question does not contain such a limitation.

UNIFIED CODE OF CORRECTIONS - CREDIT FOR TIME IN CUSTODY

Time served in a sheriff’s day reporting program for pre-trial, non-violent participants is time spent in custody for the purpose of credit against a criminal sentence.

In *People v. Beachem*, 229 Ill.2d 237 (2008), the defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and was sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed his conviction and argued that he was entitled to credit for time served under Section 5-8-7 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-7 (West 2004)) for the time he spent in the Sheriff’s Day Reporting Center program. The program is an intensive supervision program that reduces overcrowding in Cook County Jail while providing services and direction for pre-trial, non-violent participants. Every participant is subject to mandatory daily attendance and drug testing. The Illinois Supreme Court held that “custody” is not defined in Section 5-8-7 or any other relevant statute. The court held that time spent in the Center constitutes time spent in custody. The sheriff maintained complete legal authority over the defendant and physical custody of the defendant for a period of time every workday. The fact that the sheriff chose to make the defendant’s confinement less onerous did nothing more to deprive the defendant of credit for time he served than the sheriff’s decision to hold the defendant in solitary confinement would have entitled him to extra credit for time served.

SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT - JUVENILES

The Act’s registration requirement is not an ex post facto law when applied retroactively and does not trigger a juvenile’s right to a jury trial.

In *People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski*, 233 Ill.2d 185 (2009), a minor defendant was adjudicated delinquent for committing the offenses of criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual abuse. The trial court placed the defendant on probation and informed him that he was not required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/ (West 2006)). The State disagreed with the trial court's interpretation of the Act. While the case was pending, the Sex Offender Registration Act was amended. Public Act 95-658, effective October 11, 2007, removed a requirement that a juvenile sex offender register as an adult at the age of 17 years and allows a juvenile to petition for termination of registration after 5 years. In Section 3-5 of the Act (730 ILCS 150/3-5 (West Supp. 2007)), the legislature explicitly provided for the retroactive application of the provisions to "adjudicated juvenile delinquents who registered or were required to register before the effective date of the amendatory Act". Public Act 94-168, effective January 1, 2006, redefined "sexual predator" to include any person convicted of criminal sexual assault after July 1, 1999. The defendant claimed that the retroactive application of the Act, as amended by Public Act 95-658 and Public Act 94-168, violates the prohibition against *ex post facto* laws in Section 10 of Article I of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec.10) and Section 16 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. I, Sec. 16). The Illinois Supreme Court found that the legislature specifically intended Public Act 95-658 and Public Act 94-168 to apply retroactively, and the retroactive application does not violate the constitutional prohibitions against *ex post facto* laws because registration is not a punishment. The defendant also argued that registration under the Act triggers a juvenile's right to a jury trial. The court held that registration does not trigger a right to a jury trial because a juvenile may petition for termination of registration after 5 years and there is a limited release of registration information.

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE – OBJECTION TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION

A party's waiver of all objections to the court's personal jurisdiction over the party applies both prospectively and retroactively to a prior judgment in the proceeding that was entered before any appearance by the party.

In *GMB Financial Group, Inc. v. Marzano*, 385 Ill.App.3d 978 (2nd Dist. 2008), the court in a foreclosure action addressed Section 2-301 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-301 (West 2006)). Section 2-301 provides that if an objecting party files a responsive pleading or a motion (other than a motion for an extension of time to answer or otherwise appear) prior to filing a motion objecting to the court's personal jurisdiction over the party, the party waives all objections to the court's personal jurisdiction over the party. The court held that this Section applies both prospectively and retroactively to a prior judgment in the proceeding that was entered before any appearance by the party. The court called the legislative history "sparse" and stated that the transcript of the debate on the Senate floor (that described the bill as "a cleanup . . . designed to prevent an unknowing waiver") neither confirmed nor denied that this was the *sole* purpose of the provision.

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

Public Act 90-579, through inclusion of text that was not underscored, did not re-enact a medical malpractice provision previously held unconstitutional.

In *O'Casek v. Children's Home and Aid Society of Illinois*, 229 Ill.2d 421 (2008), the court determined whether the General Assembly re-enacted a statute that had been held unconstitutional, thus making the statute applicable to a medical malpractice action brought after that possible re-enactment. Section 2-622 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-622 (West 2002)) provides for a 90-day extension within which a plaintiff may file a certificate of merit supporting the malpractice action. Public Act 89-7, effective March 9, 1995, added the requirement that the plaintiff's attorney's affidavit state that the action or a substantially similar action was not previously voluntarily dismissed. The "civil justice reforms" of Public Act 89-7 were held unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court in *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997), and the Act's change to Section 2-622 was invalid due to its inseverability. Weeks after the *Best* decision, the 90th General Assembly used Public Act 89-7's version of Section 2-622 when it made unrelated changes to that Section in Public Act 90-579, effective May 1, 1998 but did not use underscoring to indicate the "prior dismissal" text as new. The Illinois Fourth District Appellate Court in *Cargill v. Czelatdko*, 353 Ill.App.3d654 (4th Dist. 2004), ruled that Public Act 90-579 re-enacted the "prior dismissal" text. The 94th General Assembly next amended Section 2-622 in Public Act 94-677, effective August 25, 2005, specifically re-enacting the pre-Public Act 89-7 version that did not contain the "prior dismissal" text. Here, the appellate court found that its *Cargill* interpretation of Public Act 90-579 was mistaken; the 94th General Assembly, through Public Act 94-677, had clarified that Public Act 90-579 was not intended as a re-enactment of the "prior dismissal" language, and that language did not apply to this medical malpractice action. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the "prior dismissal" language, indeed, did not apply but disagreed with the lower court's reasoning. Whether the 94th General Assembly could assert the intent of the 90th General Assembly was irrelevant. The Supreme Court determined that the inclusion of the "prior dismissal" language in Public Act 90-579 was inadvertent. Public Act 90-579 was not, and was not intended to be, a re-enactment of Public Act 89-7's version of Section 2-622. A dissenting opinion argued that the 90th General Assembly must have known of the *Best* decision when it passed Public Act 90-579, and so its inclusion of the "prior dismissal" text was an intentional re-enactment.

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - FRIVOLOUS LAWSUIT BY PRISONER

The Code's assessment of fees and court costs against a prisoner for filing a frivolous pleading applies even when leave to file a post-conviction petition is denied.

In *People v. Conick*, 232 Ill.2d 132 (2009), a prisoner objected to the fees and costs assessed against him in connection with a post-conviction pleading that the trial court found to be frivolous. Section 22-105 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/22-105 (West 2006)) provides for assessment of fees and court costs against a prisoner in a Department of Corrections facility who "files" a frivolous pleading. The trial court had reviewed the prisoner's post-conviction petition, denied the prisoner leave to file his post-conviction petition under Section 122-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

(725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2006)), and assessed the fees and costs under Section 22-105. The Illinois Supreme Court held that while a post-conviction petition might not be deemed to be filed for purposes of Section 122-1 if the trial court denied leave to file it, the petition would still be deemed to have been filed for purposes of Section 22-105 as long as it had been delivered to and accepted by the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record. To hold otherwise would thwart the legislature's intent in enacting legislation designed to curb the large number of frivolous collateral pleadings filed by prisoners.

SURETIES ACT - GUARANTORS

The term "surety" includes a guarantor.

In *JP Morgan Chase Bank, N. A. v. Earth Foods, Inc.*, 386 Ill.App.3d 316 (2nd Dist. 2008), guarantors of a commercial loan argued that Section 1 of the Sureties Act (740 ILCS 155/1 (West 2004)) should be interpreted as protecting guarantors as well as sureties. Section 1 provides that if a surety learns that its principal is likely to become insolvent, then that surety may demand that its creditor bring suit within a reasonable time. The court agreed with the guarantors and held that the term "surety", as used in Section 1, includes guarantors as well as sureties because "the legislature's plain use of the word . . . unadorned by explanation, definition, or detail indicates . . . that the legislature . . . used the word in its general sense" (i.e., inclusive of suretyships and guarantees) and because to afford the protections of the Act to sureties, who are primarily liable, but not to guarantors, who are secondarily liable, would defeat the purpose of the Act.

WRONGFUL DEATH ACT - IN VITRO FERTILIZATION

The Act does not authorize recovery for the loss of an embryo created by in vitro fertilization that has not been implanted into the mother.

In *Miller v. American Infertility Group*, 386 Ill.App.3d 141 (1st Dist. 2008), the plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against a fertility center for failure to properly preserve the plaintiff's blastocyst, an early stage embryo. The plaintiff argued that Section 2.2 of the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/2.2 (West 2006)) creates a cause of action for the loss of an embryo created by in vitro fertilization that has not been implanted into the mother. After reviewing the legislative history of Section 2.2, the court determined that the purpose of Section 2.2 is to extend a wrongful death action to a pregnancy in the mother's body, regardless of whether or not the fetus is viable. The Section eliminates the viability requirement for a wrongful death cause of action from *Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenburg*, 55 Ill.2d 368 (1973). The court held that the Wrongful Death Act does not allow a cause of action or recovery for the loss of an embryo created by in vitro fertilization that has not been implanted into the mother, because in vitro fertilization falls outside the scope of Section 2.2.

ILLINOIS MARRIAGE AND DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE ACT – INCOME

For purposes of calculating an individual's child support obligation, the individual's withdrawal of money from an IRA is not "income" to the individual.

In *In re Marriage of O'Daniel*, 382 Ill.App.3d 845 (4th Dist. 2008), the appellant argued that her former husband's withdrawals from his IRA while he was unemployed should have been considered income for purposes of calculating the child support due from him. Section 505 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/505 (West 2006)) sets forth guidelines for calculating child support based on a percentage of the supporting party's net income, which the statute defines as "the total of all income from all sources", minus certain specified deductions. The court held that, except for the tax benefits involved and the penalties for early withdrawals, an IRA is basically no different than a savings account. The money an individual places in an IRA already belongs to that individual, so that a withdrawal of money from the IRA is not a gain for the individual and therefore is not "income" for purposes of Section 505. The only portion of an IRA that would constitute a gain for the individual would be the interest or appreciation earnings on the money in the IRA. The court disagreed with a 2005 decision of the Illinois Second District Appellate Court holding that IRA disbursements constitute "income" for purposes of Section 505.

ILLINOIS MARRIAGE AND DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE ACT - LIFE INSURANCE

The court may order a payor to maintain a life insurance policy as security for maintenance payments.

In *re Marriage of Walker*, 386 Ill.App.3d 1034 (4th Dist. 2008), concerned a petition for dissolution of marriage. The trial court awarded permanent maintenance to the wife and ordered the husband to maintain a life insurance policy to secure the maintenance payments. The husband argued that (i) the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act does not expressly authorize a court to order security for maintenance and (ii) the life insurance policy amounted to a "payment after death", which is prohibited because subsection (c) of Section 510 of that Act (750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2006)) provides that the death of either party terminates the obligation to pay future maintenance. The appellate court found that the trial court did not err when it required the husband to maintain life insurance, reasoning that the Act gives the court wide discretion in awarding maintenance and dividing marital property. The court must liberally construe the Act in order to make reasonable provisions for spouses. Moreover, payment with respect to a life insurance policy does not equate to a payment after death but rather is a payment made during life that has an effect after death.

CONDOMINIUM PROPERTY ACT – ASSOCIATION BOARD DUTIES

Before a condominium association elects its first board of managers, the condominium developer is responsible for the performance of the board's duties.

In *Glickman v. Teglia*, 388 Ill.App.3d 141 (1st Dist. 2009), a condominium owner sued her condominium association after falling on an ice-covered common stairway. The association argued successfully that it owed no duty to the owner under Section 18.3 of the Condominium Property Act (765 ILCS 605/18.3 (West 2006)) because, at the time of

the owner's fall, the association did not have a duly elected board of managers. Section 18.3 places responsibility for the care and maintenance of common areas of condominium properties in condominium associations acting through their duly elected boards of managers. The appellate court, however, offered a more expansive interpretation of Section 18.3. Instead of merely analyzing Section 18.3 in isolation, the appellate court looked to 2 additional portions of the Act: subsection (a) of Section 18.2 (765 ILCS 605/18.2 (West 2006)), which provides that until an association elects its first board of managers the rights and obligations of the board of managers are vested in the developer, and Section 18.4 (765 ILCS 605/18.4 (West 2006)), which provides that the board of managers "shall exercise for the association all powers, duties and authority vested in the association by law or the condominium instruments". The appellate court reasoned that, when read together, these provisions lead to the conclusion that a condominium association, once formed, is responsible for the administration of its common areas and that, prior to the association's election of its first board of managers, the developer of the condominium is responsible for performing, on behalf of the association, the duties that the duly elected board of managers would otherwise perform.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT – TORT IMMUNITY

A potential conflict exists between the Act's authorization of judicial relief from the enactments, policies, and actions of the State or a local government and the immunity afforded by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act.

In *Family Life Church v. City of Elgin*, 561 F.Supp.2d 978 (N.D. Ill. 2008), a church brought suit against the city of Elgin after its application for a permit to operate a homeless shelter was delayed by several months. The church claimed the city's permit requirement substantially burdened the church's exercise of religion in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Under subsection (a) of Section 25 of the Act (775 ILCS 35/25), a person is entitled to recover specified relief from the State or a local government whose "laws, ordinances, policies, procedures, practices, and governmental actions and their implementation, whether statutory or otherwise and whether adopted before or after the effective date of this Act" are found by a court to substantially burden the person's exercise of religion. The federal district court dismissed the church's claim, finding that the church failed to meet the "substantially burden" test. However, before reaching its holding, the court noted a potential conflict between the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Section 2-104 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-104), under which local entities are granted civil immunity for injuries sustained by "the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit . . . [the entity is] authorized by enactment" to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke. The court refused to determine whether the more recently enacted Religious Freedom Restoration Act trumps the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, reasoning that it is a "novel question of state law" outside the jurisdiction of the federal district court.

MINIMUM WAGE LAW - OVERTIME

The federal Railway Labor Act preempts the Law's overtime provisions as applied to interstate railways.

In *Wisconsin Central, Ltd. v. Shannon*, 539 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2008), the plaintiff, an interstate railroad company, sought declaratory and injunctive relief after the Illinois Department of Labor began investigating claims that the plaintiff had violated overtime rules under Section 4a of the State's Minimum Wage Law (820 ILCS 105/4a). The plaintiff claimed that Illinois' overtime provisions are preempted by federal law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the federal Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. §§151 through 188) preempts Illinois' overtime regulations as applied to interstate railways. Congress' intent (i) that railroad employers and employees negotiate the issues of wages, including overtime pay beyond the 8-hour mark, free from regulation and (ii) to leave the matter of wages to private negotiations, when placed against the backdrop of Congress' pervasive regulation of the railways and its clear intent that much of the regulation allow for no state supplement, led the court to its conclusion.

ONE DAY REST IN SEVEN ACT – HOTEL ROOM ATTENDANTS

Required workplace conditions and enforcement provisions applicable only to Cook County hotel room attendants are preempted by federal law.

In *520 South Michigan Ave. Associates v. Shannon*, 549 F.3d 1119 (7th Cir. 2008), the federal court of appeals held that Section 3.1 of the One Day Rest In Seven Act (820 ILCS 140/3.1) is implicitly preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (29 U.S.C. §151 *et. seq.*). Under Section 3.1, hotel establishments located in a county with a population greater than 3,000,000 are required to meet certain conditions concerning workplace breaks for their full-time hotel room attendants and are subject to private actions and specified penalties for retaliation. NLRA's overall objective is to establish "an equitable bargaining process" between labor and management; NLRA does not preempt state laws of "general application" that impose "minimum labor standards . . . that form the backdrop for negotiations". In defining what constitutes a "minimum labor standard", the court noted that the state law must (i) equally affect union and non-union employees, (ii) neither encourage or discourage collective bargaining processes protected under NLRA, and (iii) have only an indirect effect on the right to self-organization as established under NLRA. Short of labeling the statute special legislation, the court found that Section 3.1 does not qualify as a minimum, low-threshold standard law because it is too narrow in its scope and contains employment terms difficult to bargain for. Section 3.1 applies exclusively to hotel room attendants within the hotel industry (rather than labor in general) and only in Cook County (rather than throughout Illinois). Such specificity ultimately renders Section 3.1 a "benefit to a bargaining unit [rather] than an individual protection" of general applicability. Likewise, Section 3.1 is a disincentive to collective bargaining because its enactment enabled bargaining points applicable only to a specific industry, occupation, and locality to be obtained through legislative lobbying rather than through labor-management negotiations. Section 3.1 creates a higher labor standard for Cook County hotels (in contrast to the minimal standards generally required elsewhere under the Act) and requires employers to rebut an automatic presumption of retaliation in a wrongful-discharge suit and to pay treble the amount in back pay (employment terms normally difficult to bargain for). In light of such terms, Section 3.1

does not serve as a backdrop to negotiations, but rather interferes with “the local bargaining process” by controlling conduct NLRA implicitly reserves for “the free play of economic forces”.

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT - ALIENS

An undocumented alien is not precluded from receiving workers’ compensation benefits.

In *Economy Packing Co. v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission*, 387 Ill.App.3d 283 (1st Dist. 2008), an employer appealed a court order awarding permanent total disability benefits to an undocumented worker pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act. Under the Act, employers are liable for the work-related injuries of their employees. Section 1 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/1 (West 2002)) defines the term “employee” as “[e]very person in the service of another under any contract of hire . . . including aliens . . .”. The appellate court dismissed the employer’s argument that an award of disability benefits to undocumented aliens is inconsistent with federal law prohibiting the employment of undocumented aliens. Noting that federal law does not preempt undocumented aliens from receiving workers’ compensation benefits, the court held that, absent explicit language indicating otherwise, it would apply the plain meaning of the term “aliens” and interpret the Act to grant workers’ compensation benefits to foreign-born citizens, both those legally authorized to work in the United States and those who are not.

INTRODUCTION TO PART 2

Part 2 of this 2009 Case Report contains all the Illinois statutes that LRB research has found that have been held unconstitutional and remain in the Illinois Compiled Statutes without having been changed in response to the holding of unconstitutionality.

PART 2
CUMULATIVE REPORT OF STATUTES HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
NOT AMENDED OR REPEALED IN RESPONSE TO THE HOLDING OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

GENERAL PROVISIONS

5 ILCS 315/ (West 1992). **Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.** Application of the Act by the State Labor Relations Board to employees of the Illinois Supreme Court violated the separation of powers doctrine by infringing upon the court’s administrative and supervisory powers granted under the Illinois Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 18. *Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts v. State and Municipal Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union, Local 726, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO*, 167 Ill.2d 180 (1995).

5 ILCS 350/2 (P.A. 89-688). **State Employee Indemnification Act.** Provision amended by P.A. 89-688 is unconstitutional because P.A. 89-688 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. *People v. Foster*, 316 Ill.App.3d 855 (4th Dist. 2000), and *People v. Burdunice*, 211 Ill.2d 264 (2004). (These cases are also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Criminal Procedure” and “Corrections”.)

ELECTIONS

10 ILCS 5/2A-1 and 5/2A-9 (P.A. 89-719). **Election Code.** (See *Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Chapman*, 181 Ill.2d 65 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Courts”, concerning the inseparability of unconstitutional provisions of the Judicial Redistricting Act of 1997 enacted by P.A. 89-719.)

10 ILCS 5/7-10. **Election Code.** Provision (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, par. 7-10) that requires candidates for ward committeeman in the city of Chicago to meet higher nomination petition signature requirements than candidates for township committeeman in Cook County violates the equal protection clause by burdening the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs and the right of voters to cast their votes effectively by creating a geographical classification substantially injuring the voters and candidates of the city of Chicago despite less burdensome alternatives. *Smith v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago*, 587 F.Supp. 1136 (N.D.Ill. 1984) and *Gjersten v. Board of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago*, 791 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1986).

10 ILCS 5/7-10.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 46, par. 7-10.1). **Election Code.** In the Article concerning nominations by political parties, the form for a petition or certificate of

nomination contains a loyalty oath. The loyalty oath provision was held unconstitutional as vague and overly broad, violating the U.S. Constitution, Amendments I and XIV. *Communist Party of Illinois v. Ogilvie*, 357 F.Supp. 105 (N.D.Ill. 1972).

10 ILCS 5/7A-1 (West 2004). **Election Code.** The statutory deadline for Illinois Supreme, Appellate, and Circuit Judges to file declarations of candidacy to succeed themselves in office (the first Monday in December before the general election preceding the expiration of their terms of office) impermissibly conflicts with the deadline for filing those declarations to seek judicial retention established in Section 12 of Article VI of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. VI, Sec. 12), which is 6 months before the general election preceding the expiration of their terms of office. *O'Brien v. White*, 219 Ill.2d 86 (2006).

10 ILCS 5/10-2. Election Code. In the Article concerning the making of nominations in certain other cases, a provision (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, ch. 46, par. 291) prohibits a political organization or group from being qualified as a political party and assigned a place on the ballot if the organization or group is associated, directly or indirectly, with Communist, Fascist, Nazi, or other un-American principles and engages in activities or propaganda designed to teach subservience to the political principles and ideals of foreign nations or the overthrow by violence of the federal or State constitutional form of government. The provision is unconstitutionally vague, lacking the definiteness required in a statute affecting the rights of a political group to appeal to the electorate. Identical language is used in a similar context in 10 ILCS 5/7-2 and 5/8-2. *Feinglass v. Reinecke*, 48 F.Supp. 438 (N.D.Ill. 1942).

Provision (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 46, par. 10-2) regarding establishment of a new political party is invalid to the extent it requires more signatures to form a new political party in a multidistrict subdivision than it does for a statewide new political party. Violates the U.S. Constitution, Amendments I and XIV. *Norman v. Reed*, 112 S.Ct. 698 (1992).

10 ILCS 5/10-5 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 46, par. 10-5). **Election Code.** Prohibition against new party candidates in one political subdivision from using the same party name as that of a party in a different subdivision is broader than necessary to protect the State's interest in prohibiting candidates from adopting the name of a political party with which they are not affiliated. Violates Amendments I and XIV of the U.S. Constitution. *Norman v. Reed*, 112 S.Ct. 698 (1992).

EXECUTIVE BRANCH

20 ILCS 505/5 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, par. 5005). **Children and Family Services Act.**

225 ILCS 10/2.05 and 10/2.17 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, pars. 2212.05 and 2212.17). **Child Care Act of 1969.**

Provisions of the Children and Family Services Act and the Child Care Act of 1969 that deny AFDC-FC (foster care) payments to foster parents who are related to the foster children they care for conflict with the Social Security Act and are unconstitutional as violating that Act and therefore the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution. *Youakim v. Miller*, 431 F.Supp. 40 (N.D.Ill. 1976).

The transition schedule provided by Section 5 of the Children and Family Services Act for discontinuing foster care payments to any foster family homes other than licensed foster family homes violates the due process rights of pre-approved and approved foster family homes guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, Amend. XIV. *Youakim v. McDonald*, 71 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 1995).

LEGISLATURE

25 ILCS 115/1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 63, par. 14). **General Assembly Compensation Act.** Amendatory changes made to this Section by P.A. 86-27 provide for annual, lump sum additional payments to certain legislators in leadership positions. Because P.A. 86-27 further provided that the pay raises were to be effective retroactively, the legislation is unconstitutional to the extent it allowed for a change in a legislator's salary during the term for which he or she was elected. *Rock v. Burris*, 139 Ill.2d 494 (1990).

25 ILCS 120/5.5 (West 2002). **Compensation Review Act.** Section denying the fiscal year 2003 cost-of-living adjustment to the salaries of State officials (previously recommended by the Compensation Review Board and not disapproved by the General Assembly) is unconstitutional with respect to salaries of State judges because it violates the Illinois Constitution's separation of powers clause (ILCON Art. II, Sec. 1) and prohibition against decreasing a judge's salary during his or her term (ILCON Art. VI, Sec. 14). *Jorgensen v. Blagojevich*, 211 Ill.2d 286 (2004).

FINANCE

30 ILCS 5/3-1 (West 2000). **Illinois State Auditing Act.** Requirement that the Auditor General perform compliance and management audits of various Chicago airports exceeds the Auditor General's authority under subsection (b) of Section 3 of Article VIII of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. VIII, Sec. 3) to audit public funds of the State, because the airports' funds are not appropriated by the General Assembly but are derived from user fees and federal grants. *City of Chicago v. Holland*, 206 Ill.2d 480 (2003).

30 ILCS 105/5.400 (P.A. 88-680). **State Finance Act.** Provision added by P.A. 88-680 is unconstitutional because P.A. 88-680 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A.s 91-54, 91-155, 91-404, 91-690, 91-691, 91-692, 91-693, 91-694, 91-695, and 91-696 re-enacted portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-680. *People v. Dainty*, 299 Ill.App.3d 235 (3rd Dist. 1998), *People v. Williams*, 302 Ill.App.3d 975 (2nd Dist. 1999), *People v. Edwards*, 304 Ill.App.3d 250 (2nd Dist.

1999), and *People v. Cervantes*, 189 Ill.2d 80 (1999). (These cases are also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Courts” and “Corrections” and in Part 3 of this Case Report under “Criminal Offenses”.)

30 ILCS 560/ (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 269 *et seq.*). **Public Works Preference Act.** Act is completely unconstitutional because it requires that only Illinois laborers may be used for building public works, which violates the privileges and immunities clause of the U.S. Constitution. *People ex rel. Bernardi v. Leary Construction Co., Inc.*, 102 Ill.2d 295 (1984).

30 ILCS 805/8.18 (P.A. 88-669). **State Mandates Act.** Provisions added by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, are unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-1074 re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Revenue” and “Special Districts”.)

REVENUE

35 ILCS 5/203 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, par. 2-203). **Illinois Income Tax Act.** Department of Revenue’s construction of provision that any corporation which is a member of an affiliated group of corporations filing a consolidated federal income tax return, incurring a net operating loss on a separate Illinois income tax return basis, be deemed to have made the election provided in the Internal Revenue Code (that is, to relinquish the entire carryback period and only carry forward the loss) violates the uniformity of taxation clause of Article IX, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution as to corporate taxpayers of an affiliated group which files a consolidated federal income tax return reflecting a net operating loss, which operating loss the parent company does not elect to carry forward. *Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Revenue*, 117 Ill.2d 454 (1987).

35 ILCS 200/20-180 and 200/20-185. Property Tax Code. Provisions (formerly part of the Uncollectable Tax Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, pars. 891 and 891.1) that allow a municipality to cancel bonds and use moneys collected for similar projects after revenues that were specified to secure the bonds are deemed uncollectable are an unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations. *George D. Hardin, Inc. v. Village of Mt. Prospect*, 99 Ill.2d 96 (1983).

35 ILCS 520/ (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 120, par. 2151 *et seq.*). **Cannabis and Controlled Substances Tax Act.** Statute is invalid and cannot be applied if the defendant has been convicted of criminal charges involving the same contraband. Violates the double

jeopardy provisions of the U.S. and Illinois constitutions. *Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth*, 114 S.Ct. 1937 (1994).

35 ILCS 520/9, 520/10, 520/14.1, 520/15, 520/16, 520/19, and 520/23 (P.A. 88-669). **Cannabis and Controlled Substances Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, are unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-1074 re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Finance” and “Special Districts”.)

35 ILCS 635/20 (West 1998). **Telecommunications Municipal Infrastructure Maintenance Fee Act.** Application of the Act’s municipal infrastructure maintenance fee, imposed upon telecommunications providers to compensate a municipality for access to public rights-of-way, equally to wireless telecommunications providers that do not own or operate equipment on public rights-of-way as to landline telecommunications providers that do own or operate equipment on public rights-of-way violates the uniformity clause of Section 2 of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution. *Primeco Personal Communications, L. P. v. Illinois Commerce Commission*, 196 Ill.2d 70 (2001).

PENSIONS

40 ILCS 5/5-128 and 5/5-167.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 108 1/2, pars. 5-128 and 5-167.1). **Illinois Pension Code.** Amendatory changes in P.A. 86-272, which fix a police officer's pension as of the date of withdrawal from service rather than attainment of age 63, result in a taking of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when applied to retired police officers whose pensions consequently decreased. *Miller v. Retirement Board of Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago*, 329 Ill.App.3d 589 (1st Dist. 2002).

TOWNSHIPS

60 ILCS 1/65-35 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 53, par. 55.6). **Township Code.** Provision that allows a 2% commission on all moneys collected by a township collector to be deposited into the township treasury and to be used for local, rather than countywide, purposes is an unconstitutional violation of the uniformity of taxation clause of the Illinois Constitution. *Flynn v. Kucharski*, 45 Ill.2d 211 (1970).

MUNICIPALITIES

65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-6 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 24, par. 10-2.1-6). **Illinois Municipal Code.** Provision that prohibits appointing a person with a limb amputated to the police or fire department for anything but clerical or radio operator duties violates the

Illinois Constitution, which prohibits discrimination against persons with a physical handicap. *Melvin v. City of West Frankfort*, 93 Ill.App.3d 425 (5th Dist. 1981).

65 ILCS 5/11-13-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 24, par. 11-13-1). **Illinois Municipal Code.** Statute authorizing a municipality to exercise zoning powers extraterritorially (that is, within a 1½-mile area contiguous to the municipality) was amended by P.A. 77-1373 (approved August 31, 1971) to add, as a permitted purpose of zoning regulation, the preservation of historically, architecturally, or aesthetically important features. P.A. 77-1373 also provided: “This amendatory Act of 1971 does not apply to any municipality which is a home rule unit.”. Because a municipality has extraterritorial zoning authority only as granted by the legislature and not under its home rule powers, that added sentence, if valid, creates the incongruous situation of non-home rule municipalities being able to zone extraterritorially while home rule municipalities cannot. The sentence creates an unconstitutional classification and is void. (The court apparently read “this amendatory Act of 1971” to refer to the entire Section rather than to just the statement of purpose added by P.A. 77-1373.) *City of Carbondale v. Van Natta*, 61 Ill.2d 483 (1975).

SPECIAL DISTRICTS

70 ILCS 705/14.14 (West 1992). **Fire Protection District Act.** Provision permitting disconnection of territory in a non-home rule municipality in a county with a population between 500,000 and 750,000 is unconstitutional as special legislation because the population limit is an arbitrary classification. *In re Petition of Village of Vernon Hills*, 168 Ill.2d 117 (1995).

70 ILCS 705/19a (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983 Supp., ch. 127½, par. 38.2a). **Fire Protection District Act.** Provision permitting transfer of territory in counties with a population of more than 600,000 but less than 1,000,000 is special legislation because the population limit is an arbitrary classification. *In re Belmont Fire Protection District*, 111 Ill.2d 373 (1986).

70 ILCS 805/18.6d (P.A. 88-669). **Downstate Forest Preserve District Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, are unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-1074 re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Finance” and “Revenue”.)

SCHOOLS

105 ILCS 5/1B-20 (West 1994). **School Code.** Provision that authorizes a State Board of Education-appointed financial oversight panel to remove members of a local school board from office and does not require that the members be given notice of or a hearing on the removal charges is unconstitutional as applied to members who were not given notice or a hearing because that lack of notice or hearing violates the members' procedural due process rights. *East St. Louis Federation of Teachers v. East St. Louis School District*, 178 Ill.2d 399 (1997).

105 ILCS 5/3-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 122, par. 3-1). **School Code.** Provision requiring candidate for office of regional superintendent to have taught at least 2 of previous 4 years in Illinois is unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause because the statute is not rationally related to the State's interest of ensuring that candidates be familiar with the School Code and other Illinois school regulations. *Hammond v. Illinois State Board of Education*, 624 F.Supp. 1151 (S.D.Ill. 1986).

105 ILCS 5/24-2. **School Code.** This Section provides that Good Friday is a legal school holiday and that teachers and other school employees shall not be required to work on legal holidays. The Good Friday provision promotes one religion over another and violates the establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution. *Metzl v. Leininger*, 57 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 1995).

105 ILCS 20/1 (P.A. 95-680). **Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act.** Provision requiring public school students to participate in the observation of a brief period of silence, for prayer or reflection, conducted by their teachers at the beginning of each school day violates the freedom of religion and due process guarantees of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution because it is an endorsement of religion without a clearly secular purpose and is vague as to its implementation. *Sherman v. Township High School Dist. 214*, 594 F.Supp.2d 984 (N.D. Ill. 2009).

HIGHER EDUCATION

110 ILCS 310/1 (P.A. 89-5, eff. 1-1-96). **University of Illinois Trustees Act.** A portion of Section 1 removing elected trustees from office midterm in order to create an appointed board violates the right to vote guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 18. *Tully v. Edgar*, 171 Ill.2d 297 (1996).

FINANCIAL REGULATION

205 ILCS 105/1-6 and 105/1-10.10 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, ch. 32, pars. 706 and 710). **Illinois Savings and Loan Act.** Provisions authorizing a savings and loan association to obtain and maintain insurance on its withdrawable capital by the FSLIC or another federal instrumentality or federally chartered corporation violates the Illinois Constitution because it deprives both savings and loan associations and private insurance

companies of their freedom to contract and it deprives private insurance companies of property without due process. There is no indication that a federally chartered corporation is more financially sound or better able to insure the accounts than a private corporation authorized to do business in Illinois and under the supervision of the Director of Insurance. (P.A. 86-137 amended the Act to add the FDIC as an eligible insurance corporation; P.A. 93-271 removed the FSLIC; but neither P.A. mentioned private insurers.) *City Savings Association v. International Guaranty and Insurance Co.*, 17 Ill.2d 609 (1959).

INSURANCE

215 ILCS 5/143.01 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 73, par. 755.01). **Illinois Insurance Code.** Subsection (b) of Section 143.01 prohibits the invocation of a vehicle insurance policy provision excluding coverage for bodily injury to members of the insured's family when the driver is not a member of the insured's household and further provides that the prohibition shall apply to any action filed on or after the effective date of the subsection (that is, the effective date of P.A. 83-1132, which added Section 143.01 to the Code). Retroactive application of the subsection to insurance policies issued before the effective date of P.A. 83-1132 constitutes an impairment of the obligation of contracts in violation of Section 10 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution. *Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Scott*, 161 Ill.App.3d 372 (4th Dist. 1987).

UTILITIES

220 ILCS 5/8-402.1. Public Utilities Act. Requirements that Illinois utilities, in complying with federal Clean Air Act amendments, take into account the need to use Illinois coal, preserve the Illinois coal industry, and install pollution control devices in order to burn Illinois coal are too great a burden on interstate commerce. *Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig*, 840 F.Supp. 554 (N.D.Ill. 1993).

220 ILCS 5/10-201 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111 2/3, par. 10-201). **Public Utilities Act.** Provisions relating to review of decisions by the Illinois Commerce Commission are unconstitutional to the extent that the procedures for direct review conflict with Supreme Court Rule 335 (for instance, subsection (e)(i) gives priority over other cases before the court and is an unwarranted intrusion into the court's power to control its docket). *Consumers Gas Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm.*, 144 Ill.App.3d 229 (5th Dist. 1986).

PROFESSIONS AND OCCUPATIONS

225 ILCS 10/2.05 and 10/2.17 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, pars. 2212.05 and 2212.17). **Child Care Act of 1969.** Provisions that deny AFDC-FC (foster care) payments to foster parents who are related to the foster children they care for conflict with the Social Security Act and are unconstitutional as violating that Act and therefore the supremacy clause of the U. S. Constitution. *Youakim v. Miller*, 431 F.Supp. 40

(N.D.Ill. 1976). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”.)

225 ILCS 25/31 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111, par. 2332). **Illinois Dental Practice Act.** Provision stating that, during review of a suspension under the Administrative Review Law, the suspension shall remain in full force and effect prohibits courts from exercising their inherent equitable powers to issue stays. To this extent, the Section is unconstitutional. (P.A. 88-184 limits the provision to acts or omissions related to direct patient care and states that as a matter of public policy suspension may not be stayed pending final resolution.) *Ardt v. Ill. Dept. of Professional Regulation*, 154 Ill.2d 138 (1992).

225 ILCS 60/26 (West Supp. 1999). **Medical Practice Act of 1987.** Ban on a licensee’s use of testimonials to entice the public violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by disproportionately prohibiting all truthful speech for the State’s goal of regulating the medical profession. *Snell v. Department of Professional Regulation*, 318 Ill.App.3d 972 (4th Dist. 2001).

LIQUOR

235 ILCS 5/6-16 (West 2000). **Liquor Control Act of 1934.** Subsection (c), which makes it a Class A misdemeanor if a person knowingly permits the departure of an intoxicated minor from a gathering at the person’s residence of which the person has knowledge and at which the person knows a minor is illegally possessing or consuming liquor, is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because it fails to provide a person with notice as to how to avoid violating the subsection. *People v. Law*, 202 Ill.2d 578 (2002).

235 ILCS 5/7-5 and 5/7-9 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 43, pars. 149 and 153). **Liquor Control Act of 1934.** Provision permitting liquor licensees in a municipality of less than 500,000 inhabitants whose licenses are revoked by the local liquor control commissioner and who appeal the revocations to the Illinois Liquor Control Commission to resume the operation of their businesses pending decisions by the Commission but not affording licensees in municipalities of 500,000 or more inhabitants who appeal revocations of their licenses to the License Appeal Commission a similar privilege is unconstitutional as a violation of the special legislation provision of the 1870 Illinois Constitution. (Article IV, Section 13 of the 1970 Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from passing special legislation when a general law can be made applicable.) There is no rational basis for the different treatment of licensees based upon differences in the population of the municipalities where the licensed premises are located. Absent legislative modification of the offending provision, licensees in all municipalities must be permitted to resume operation during the pendency of an administrative appeal from the

order of a local liquor control commissioner. *Johnkol, Inc. v. License Appeal Commission*, 42 Ill.2d 377 (1969).

235 ILCS 5/8-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 43, par. 158). **Liquor Control Act of 1934.** The Department of Revenue taxed wine coolers and certain low-alcohol drinks at different rates pursuant to its interpretation of the Section 8-1 tax classification system. Because there is no real and substantial difference between wine coolers made by adding wine to fruit juices and the low-alcohol drinks made by adding distilled alcohol, the provision violates the uniformity clause of Section 2 of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution to the extent the provision does not provide for the equal taxation of wine coolers and the low-alcohol drinks. *Federated Distributors, Inc. v. Johnson*, 125 Ill.2d 1 (1988).

235 ILCS 5/9-2. Liquor Control Act of 1934. Provision (Ill. Ann. Stat. 1990, ch. 43, par. 167) permitting a precinct in a city with a population exceeding 200,000 to vote a single “licensed establishment” dry is an unconstitutional violation of due process because the procedural safeguards inherent in an election to vote the entire precinct dry (also permitted under the statute) are not present. P.A. 88-613 subsequently amended the provision to substitute “street address” for “licensed establishment”. *87 So. Rothschild Liquor Mart v. Kozubowski*, 752 F.Supp. 839 (N.D.Ill. 1990).

Provision permitting a precinct in a city with a population exceeding 200,000 to prohibit by referendum the sale of alcoholic beverages at a particular street address is an unconstitutional deprivation of the liquor licensee’s property without due process because due process forbids voters passing judgment on an existing business. *Club Misty, Inc. v. Laski*, 208 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2000).

PUBLIC AID

305 ILCS 5/5-13 (West 2002). **Illinois Public Aid Code.** Provision permitting the State to recover the amount of medical assistance payments to an individual from the estate of the individual’s surviving spouse violates the supremacy clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution because the federal Social Security Act prohibits such recovery unless a state expands the definition of the individual’s estate beyond its probate law concept, which Illinois has done only with respect to medical assistance recipients who have long term care insurance. *Hines v. Department of Public Aid*, 221 Ill.2d 222 (2006).

MENTAL HEALTH

405 ILCS 5/3-806 (West Supp. 1995). **Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code.** Provisions allowing a civil commitment hearing to take place without the respondent when the respondent has not voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived his or her right to be present violate the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution. *In re Barbara H.*, 288 Ill.App.3d 360 (2nd Dist. 1997). While affirming in

part and reversing in part on other grounds, the Illinois Supreme Court declined to review the provision's constitutionality in *In re Barbara H.*, 183 Ill.2d 482 (1998).

NUCLEAR SAFETY

420 ILCS 15/ (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 111½, par. 230.1 *et seq.*). **Spent Nuclear Fuel Act.** Act is unconstitutional because (i) by banning the storage and shipment for storage of spent nuclear fuel in Illinois merely because the spent fuel or its shipment originated out of State, the Act arbitrarily burdens interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause (U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8) and (ii) the federal Atomic Energy Act preempts state regulation of the storage and shipment for storage of spent nuclear fuel, and Illinois' Spent Nuclear Fuel Act therefore violates the supremacy clause (U.S. Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2). *People of the State of Illinois v. General Electric Co.*, 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982).

PUBLIC SAFETY

430 ILCS 70/ (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 85-1 *et seq.*). **Illinois Public Demonstrations Law.** The entire Act is unconstitutional because the term “principal law enforcement officer”, used throughout the Act, is impermissibly vague. *People v. Bossie*, 108 Ill.2d 236 (1985).

VEHICLES

625 ILCS 5/4-102 (West 1996). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provisions punishing unauthorized tampering with or damaging, moving, or entry of a vehicle, without requiring a criminal mental state, impose absolute liability for unintended conduct in violation of the due process guarantees of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Art. I, Sec. 2 of the Illinois Constitution. *In re K.C.*, 186 Ill.2d 542 (1999).

625 ILCS 5/4-103.2 (West 2000). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Subsection (b)'s inference that a person exercising unexplained possession of a stolen or converted automobile is presumed to know the car is stolen or converted, regardless of the remote date of its theft or conversion, violates the due process guarantee of Section 2 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution as applied to the possessor of special mobile equipment because the same extensive ownership records and procedures that justify the presumption for automobile possession do not exist for special mobile equipment. *People v. Greco*, 204 Ill.2d 400 (2003).

625 ILCS 5/4-209 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 95½, par. 4-209). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision for post-tow notice by U.S. mail to owner of impounded abandoned vehicle more than 7 years old is unconstitutional. Due process requires notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, for all vehicles. *Kohn v. Mucia*, 776 F.Supp. 348 (N.D.Ill. 1991).

625 ILCS 5/6-208.1 (P.A. 89-203). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision amended by P.A. 89-203 is unconstitutional because P.A. 89-203 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. (Although P.A. 89-203 also amended Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501), those changes to Section 11-501 were removed by Public Act 93-800, effective January 1, 2005.) *People v. Wooters*, 188 Ill.2d 500 (1999). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Criminal Offenses”, “Corrections”, and “Civil Procedure”.)

625 ILCS 5/8-105. **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision of 1923 motor vehicle law that surety bond of owner of motor vehicle used for transportation of passengers becomes a lien on real estate scheduled in the bond, without providing for discharge of the lien, is unconstitutional because arbitrarily discriminatory and unreasonable. The provision is continued in the Illinois Vehicle Code. *Weksler v. Collins*, 317 Ill. 132 (1925).

625 ILCS 5/18c-7402 (West 2004). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Subsection (1)(b), which prohibits a rail carrier from permitting a train, railroad car, or engine to block a road-highway grade crossing for more than 10 minutes unless the train, car, or engine is moving or the circumstances causing the obstruction are beyond the carrier’s control, is preempted by federal railroad law and violates the commerce clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8). *Eagle Marine v. Union Pacific R.R.*, 227 Ill.2d 377 (2008).

COURTS

705 ILCS 21/ (West 1996). **Judicial Redistricting Act of 1997.** Entire Act, enacted by P.A. 89-719, is unconstitutional because (i) provisions dividing the First Judicial District into 3 subdistricts for election of Supreme Court judges and splitting judicial circuits between 2 or more judicial districts violate Article VI of the Illinois Constitution and (ii) other provisions, despite inclusion of a severability clause, are inseverable. *Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Chapman*, 181 Ill.2d 65 (1997).

705 ILCS 25/1 (P.A. 89-719). **Appellate Court Act.** (See *Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Chapman*, 181 Ill.2d 65 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Courts”, concerning the inseverability of unconstitutional provisions of the Judicial Redistricting Act of 1997 enacted by P.A. 89-719.)

705 ILCS 205/6 (West 1992). **Attorney Act.** Provision that allows a circuit court judge to suspend an attorney from the practice of law is an unconstitutional encroachment on the Supreme Court’s exclusive authority to regulate and discipline attorneys in Illinois. *In re General Order of March 15, 1993*, 258 Ill.App.3d 13 (1st Dist. 1993).

705 ILCS 405/5-4, 405/5-14, 405/5-19, 405/5-23, 405/5-33, and 405/5-34 (P.A. 88-680). **Juvenile Court Act of 1987.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-680 are unconstitutional because P.A. 88-680 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A.s 91-54, 91-155, 91-404, 91-690, 91-691, 91-692, 91-693, 91-694, 91-695, and 91-696 re-enacted portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-680. *People v. Dainty*, 299 Ill.App.3d 235 (3rd Dist. 1998), *People v. Williams*, 302 Ill.App.3d 975 (2nd Dist. 1999), *People v. Edwards*, 304 Ill.App.3d 250 (2nd Dist. 1999), and *People v. Cervantes*, 189 Ill.2d 80 (1999). (These cases are also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Finance” and “Corrections” and in Part 3 of this Case Report under “Criminal Offenses”.)

CRIMINAL OFFENSES

720 ILCS 5/9-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1). **Criminal Code of 1961.** P.A. 84-1450, which amended the homicide statute, provides that “this amendatory Act of 1986 shall only apply to acts occurring on or after January 1, 1987”. Because P.A. 84-1450 does not contain an effective date provision, however, it did not take effect until July 1, 1987, and its retroactive application to January 1, 1987 is a violation of the constitutional prohibitions against *ex post facto* laws. P.A. 84-1450 may be applied only prospectively from the date it became effective, July 1, 1987. *People v. Shumpert*, 126 Ill.2d 344 (1989).

720 ILCS 5/10-2 (West 2000). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Subsection (b), which authorizes a 15-year sentence enhancement for committing the offense of aggravated kidnapping while armed with a firearm, violates the proportionate penalties clause of Section 11 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. I, Sec. 11) because the resulting penalty is harsher than the penalty for armed violence, which contains the same elements. *People v. Baker*, 341 Ill.App.3d 1083 (4th Dist. 2003).

720 ILCS 5/10-5 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 10-5). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Child abduction statute is unconstitutional as applied to the natural father of a child. The parents were not married and there was no paternity action, but the parents had lived together 4½ years and the father had supported the child. Applying the statute to the natural father would deprive him of equal protection of the law. *People v. Morrison*, 223 Ill.App.3d 176 (3rd Dist. 1991).

720 ILCS 5/10-5 (West 1998). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Under the child abduction statute (intentionally luring or attempting to lure a child under 16 years of age into specified locations without the consent of the child’s parent or guardian for other than a lawful purpose), subsection (b)(10)’s provision that such a luring or attempted luring is prima facie evidence of other than a lawful purpose creates a *per se* unconstitutional, but

severable, mandatory presumption that denies due process by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. *People v. Woodrum*, 223 Ill.2d 286 (2006).

720 ILCS 5/11-6, 5/11-6.5, and 5/32-10 (P.A. 89-203). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provisions amended by P.A. 89-203 are unconstitutional because P.A. 89-203 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. *People v. Wooters*, 188 Ill.2d 500 (1999). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Vehicles”, “Corrections”, and “Civil Procedure”.)

720 ILCS 5/11-20.1 (West Supp. 2001). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Clause (f)(7) of Section 11-20.1 violates the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by including within the definition of “child”, for child pornography purposes, computer generated images of children that are not depictions of actual children. *People v. Alexander*, 204 Ill.2d 472 (2003).

720 ILCS 5/12-6 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 12-6). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provision of intimidation statute making it an offense to threaten to commit any crime no matter how minor or insubstantial is unconstitutional as being overbroad in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. *U.S. ex rel. Holder v. Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit*, 624 F.Supp. 68 (N.D.Ill. 1985).

720 ILCS 5/12-21.6 (West 2002). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Subsection (b)’s mandatory rebuttable presumption that leaving a child age 6 years or younger unattended in a motor vehicle for more than 10 minutes endangers the life or health of the child violates the due process clauses of the federal and State constitutions (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV and ILCON Art. I, Sec. 2). *People v. Jordan*, 218 Ill.2d 255 (2006).

720 ILCS 5/12A-1, 5/12A-5, 5/12A-10, 5/12A-15, 5/12A-20, 5/12A-25, 5/12B-1, 5/12B-5, 5/12B-10, 5/12B-15, 5/12B-20, 5/12B-25, 5/12B-30, and 5/12B-35 (P.A. 94-315). **Criminal Code of 1961.** The Violent Video Games Law and the Sexually Explicit Video Games Law, which establish criminal penalties for (i) selling or renting violent or sexually explicit video games to minors, (ii) allowing such games to be purchased using a self-check-out electronic scanner, and (iii) failing to label such games in a specified manner, violate the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const., Amend I) because (1) the definition of a violent video game is vague and there is no showing that the violent content is directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action and (2) the statutes do not provide for consideration of the whole content of a sexually explicit video or for consideration of the value of that video. *Entertainment Software Association v. Blagojevich*, 404 F.Supp.2d 1051 (N.D.Ill. 2005). The State appealed the decision with respect to only the Sexually Explicit Video Games Law (720 ILCS 5/Art. 12B); the

ruling of unconstitutionality was upheld in *Entertainment Software Association v. Blagojevich*, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006).

720 ILCS 5/16-7 (West 2004). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Subdivision (a)(2), the unlawful use of recorded sounds or images, is preempted by Section 301 of the federal Copyright Act of 1976 (17 U.S.C. 301) because the State statute does not require any additional element that qualitatively distinguishes it from the federal copyright infringement provision. *People v. Williams*, 376 Ill.App.3d 875 (1st Dist. 2007).

720 ILCS 5/16A-4 (West 2000). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Retail theft provision that a person who conceals and removes merchandise from a retail store without paying for it “shall be presumed” to do so intentionally creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption that denies the trier of fact the discretion of determining that an item was removed inadvertently or thoughtlessly. *People v. Taylor*, 344 Ill.App.3d 929 (1st Dist. 2003), and *People v. Butler*, 354 Ill.App.3d 57 (1st Dist. 2004).

720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 2000). **Criminal Code of 1961.** The 25-year to natural life sentence enhancement required under subsection (b) of the Class X felony penalty for armed robbery based on discharging a firearm and causing great bodily harm violates the proportionate penalty requirement of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. I, Sec. 11) when compared to the lesser sentence for the equivalent offense of armed violence predicated on robbery with a category I weapon (which includes a firearm) under Section 33A-2 of the Code (720 ILCS 5/33A-2). *People v. Harvey*, 366 Ill.App.3d 119 (1st Dist. 2006).

720 ILCS 5/18-4 (West 2002). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Sentencing range of 21 to 45 years’ imprisonment for aggravated vehicular hijacking while carrying a firearm under subsection (a)(2) is harsher than the sentencing range of 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment for armed violence with a category I weapon predicated upon vehicular hijacking, an offense with identical elements, and thus violates the proportionate penalties clause of Section 11 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. I, Sec. 11). *People v. Andrews*, 364 Ill.App.3d 253 (2nd Dist. 2006).

720 ILCS 5/33A-2 and 5/33A-3. **Criminal Code of 1961.** Penalties for armed violence predicated on certain offenses are unconstitutionally disproportionate to penalties for other offenses.

Armed violence predicated on unlawful restraint. Penalty (a Class X felony) is disproportionate to penalty for aggravated unlawful restraint (a Class 3 felony) under 720 ILCS 5/10-3.1 (West 1992). *People v. Murphy*, 261 Ill.App.3d 1019 (2nd Dist. 1994).

Armed violence predicated on robbery committed with a category I weapon. Minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years is disproportionate to minimum term of

imprisonment (6 years) for robbery committed with a handgun under 720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 1994). *People v. Lewis*, 175 Ill.2d 412 (1996).

Armed violence predicated on aggravated vehicular hijacking and armed robbery. Minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years is disproportionate to minimum terms of imprisonment (7 years and 6 years, respectively) for aggravated vehicular hijacking under 720 ILCS 5/18-4 (West 1994) and armed robbery under 720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 1994). Public Act 95-688, effective October 23, 2007, amended 720 ILCS 5/33A-2 to remove from the definition of armed violence any offense that makes possession or use of a dangerous weapon an aggravated version of the offense, thus eliminating armed robbery under 720 ILCS 5/18-2. Aggravated vehicular hijacking, however, may be committed under 720 ILCS 5/18-4 with aggravating factors other than possession or use of a dangerous weapon. *People v. Beard*, 287 Ill.App.3d 935 (1st Dist. 1997).

720 ILCS 5/37-4 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 37-4). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Defining as a public nuisance any building used in the sale of obscene material and permitting injunctive relief against use of a building for one year is unconstitutional in its application to adult bookstores that sell sexually explicit materials. These provisions create a system of prior restraint but do not define the length of the period during which an alleged nuisance can be restrained prior to full judicial review and make no provision for prompt final determination of the matter. *People v. Sequoia Books, Inc.*, 127 Ill.2d 271 (1989).

720 ILCS 250/16 (West 2002). **Illinois Credit Card and Debit Card Act.** Provision that possession of 2 or more counterfeit credit or debit cards by someone other than the purported card issuer is prima facie evidence of the possessor's intent to defraud or of the possessor's knowledge that the cards are counterfeit creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption of the intent or knowledge that is an element of a violation of the Act. *People v. Miles*, 344 Ill.App.3d 315 (2nd Dist. 2003).

720 ILCS 510/2 and 510/11 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 83, pars. 81-22 and 81-31). **Illinois Abortion Law of 1975.** Provisions making nonprescription sale of abortifacients and prescription or administration of abortifacients without informing the recipient a misdemeanor are unconstitutional because they incorporate a definition of "fetus" in which a fetus is classified as a human being from fertilization until death and thus intrude upon the medical discretion of the attending physician and impose the State's theory of when life begins upon the physician's patient, impermissibly infringing upon a woman's right of private decision-making in matters relating to contraception. *Charles v. Daley*, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984).

720 ILCS 513/10. Partial-birth Abortion Ban Act. Act's prohibition against the performance of partial-birth abortions unconstitutionally violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it lacks an exception for preservation of the

health of the mother and unduly burdens a woman's right to choose an abortion. *Hope Clinic v. Ryan*, 249 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2001).

720 ILCS 570/315. Illinois Controlled Substances Act. Prohibition against advertising controlled substances to the public by name violates the commercial speech protection of the First Amendment and the commerce clause of Art. I, Sec. 8 of the U.S. Constitution when applied to the federally approved national advertising campaign of the developer of a Schedule IV controlled substance. *Knoll Pharmaceutical Co. v. Sherman*, 57 F.Supp.2d 615 (N.D.Ill. 1999).

720 ILCS 590/1. Discrimination in Sale of Real Estate Act. Prohibition against person knowingly soliciting an owner of residential property to sell or list the property after the person has been given notice that the owner does not desire to be solicited unconstitutionally restricts a real estate broker's freedom of speech. *Pearson v. Edgar*, 153 F.3d 397 (7th Cir. 1998).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

725 ILCS 5/106D-1 (West 2000). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Section authorizing the court to allow a defendant to personally appear at a pre-trial or post-trial proceeding via closed-circuit television violates an accused person's right under Section 8 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. I, Sec. 8) to appear at criminal proceedings, as applied to a defendant who appeared at his guilty plea proceeding via closed-circuit television without his written consent. *People v. Stroud*, 208 Ill.2d 398 (2004).

725 ILCS 5/110-4 (West 2000). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Subsection (b), which prohibits bail for a person charged with a capital offense or an offense for which a sentence of life imprisonment may be imposed until the person demonstrates at a hearing that proof of his or her guilt is not evident and presumption of his or her guilt is not great, violates the due process clauses of Section 2 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution by depriving the accused of a presumption of innocence. *People v. Purcell*, 201 Ill.2d 542 (2002).

725 ILCS 5/110-6.2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 110-6.2). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Bail provision permits a court, after a hearing, to deny bail if the court determines that certain facts exist, such as proof evident or presumption great that the defendant committed the offense, the offense requires imprisonment, or the defendant poses a real threat to others. Provision is unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution because it limits the court's authority to set bail and imposes conditions not found in Supreme Court Rule 609 concerning bail. *People v. Williams*, 143 Ill.2d 477 (1991).

725 ILCS 5/114-9 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 114-9). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Subsection (c) of Section 114-9, which provides that the State is not required to include rebuttal witnesses in lists of prosecution witnesses given to the defense, is unconstitutional. Previously, Section 114-14, which required the defense to provide notice of an alibi defense to the prosecution upon request, was held unconstitutional by *People v. Fields*, 59 Ill.2d 516 (1974). These rulings came after the U.S. Supreme Court, in *Wardius v. Oregon*, 412 U.S. 470 (1973), held that the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution forbids enforcement of alibi disclosure rules unless the defense has reciprocal discovery rights. Subsection (c) of Section 114-9 has not been amended since these decisions. (Section 114-14 was repealed in 1979 by P.A. 81-290.) *People ex rel. Carey v. Strayhorn*, 61 Ill.2d 85 (1975).

725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 2000). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Provision allowing the hearsay testimony of a non-testifying child under age 13 about sexual assault and abuse violates the defendant's right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, despite the statute's requirement that the court must find the statements reliable. *In re E.H.*, 355 Ill.App.3d 564 (1st Dist. 2005), and *In re Rolandis G.*, 352 Ill.App.3d 776 (2nd Dist. 2004).

725 ILCS 5/115-15 (West 1998). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Provision granting prima facie evidence status to laboratory tests of controlled substances in certain criminal prosecutions unless the defendant, within 7 days after receiving the test report, demands the testimony of the person who signed the report violates the confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Art. I, Sec. 8 of the Illinois Constitution. *People v. McClanahan*, 191 Ill.2d 127 (2000).

725 ILCS 5/122-8 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 122-8). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Provision requiring that all post-conviction proceedings be conducted by a judge who was not involved in the original proceeding that resulted in conviction violates the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution and also is contrary to a Supreme Court Rule concerning judicial administration and therefore violates Article VI, Section 16 of the Illinois Constitution. *People v. Joseph*, 113 Ill.2d 36 (1986).

725 ILCS 207/30 (West 1998). **Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act.** Subsection (c), which prohibits a person who is the subject of a commitment petition under the Act from presenting his or her own expert testimony if the person failed to cooperate with a State-conducted evaluation but which does not prohibit the State from presenting expert testimony based upon an examination of the person's records, violates the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 2 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution as applied to a person against whom the State does

present testimony. *In re Detention of Kortte*, 317 Ill.App.3d 111 (2nd Dist. 2000), and *In re Detention of Trevino*, 317 Ill.App.3d 324 (2nd Dist. 2000).

725 ILCS 240/10 (P.A. 89-688). **Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act.** Provision amended by P.A. 89-688 is unconstitutional because P.A. 89-688 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. *People v. Foster*, 316 Ill.App.3d 855 (4th Dist. 2000), and *People v. Burdunice*, 211 Ill.2d 264 (2004). (These cases are also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “General Provisions” and “Corrections”.)

CORRECTIONS

730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Provisions added by P.A. 88-311 making certain inmates, previously eligible to receive good-conduct credit toward early release increased by a multiplier, ineligible for the credit multiplier because they were convicted of criminal sexual assault, felony criminal sexual abuse, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, or aggravated battery with a firearm, as well as related inchoate offenses, violates the *ex post facto* provisions of Section 10 of Article I of the United States Constitution and Section 16 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution by curtailing the opportunity for an earlier release. *Barger v. Peters*, 163 Ill.2d 357 (1994).

730 ILCS 5/3-7-2, 5/5-5-3, 5/5-6-3, 5/5-6-3.1, and 5/5-7-1 (P.A. 89-688). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Provisions amended by P.A. 89-688 are unconstitutional because P.A. 89-688 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. (Although Public Act 89-688 also amended Sections 3-2-2, 3-5-1, 3-7-6, and 3-8-7 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-2-2, 5/3-5-1, 5/3-7-6, and 5/3-8-7), identical changes were made to Sections 3-2-2 and 3-5-1 by Public Act 89-689, effective December 31, 1996, Section 3-7-6 was completely rewritten by Public Act 90-85, effective July 10, 1997, and the changes to Section 3-8-7 were re-enacted by Public Act 93-272, effective July 22, 2003.) *People v. Foster*, 316 Ill.App.3d 855 (4th Dist. 2000), and *People v. Burdunice*, 211 Ill.2d 264 (2004). (These cases are also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “General Provisions” and “Criminal Procedure”.)

730 ILCS 5/3-10-11 (P.A. 88-680). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Provision amended by P.A. 88-680 is unconstitutional because P.A. 88-680 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A.s 91-54, 91-155, 91-404, 91-690, 91-691, 91-692, 91-693, 91-694, 91-695, and 91-696 re-enacted portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-680. *People v. Dainty*, 299 Ill.App.3d 235 (3rd Dist. 1998), *People v. Williams*, 302 Ill.App.3d 975 (2nd Dist. 1999), *People v. Edwards*, 304 Ill.App.3d 250 (2nd Dist. 1999), and *People v. Cervantes*, 189 Ill.2d 80 (1999). (These cases are also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Finance” and “Courts” and in Part 3 of this Case Report under “Criminal Offenses”.)

730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2 (West 1998). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Subdivision (b)(4)(i), which authorizes a sentencing court to increase the punishment for a felony based upon the victim's age, violates the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to the extent the jury was not specifically charged with finding the victim's age. *People v. Thurow*, 318 Ill.App.3d 128 (3rd Dist. 2001); although the appellate court's decision was reversed in part, the holding of unconstitutionality was affirmed in *People v. Thurow*, 203 Ill.2d 352 (2003).

730 ILCS 5/5-5-6, 5/5-6-3.1, and 5/5-8-1 (P.A. 89-203). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Provisions amended by P.A. 89-203 are unconstitutional because P.A. 89-203 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. *People v. Wooters*, 188 Ill.2d 500 (1999). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Vehicles", "Criminal Offenses", and "Civil Procedure".)

730 ILCS 5/5-5-7 (P.A. 89-7). **Unified Code of Corrections.** (See *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Civil Procedure" and "Civil Liabilities", concerning the inseparability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act enacted by P.A. 89-7.)

730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005-6-3.1). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Provision concerning incidents and conditions of supervision that provides that a disposition of supervision is a final order for the purposes of appeal is unconstitutional and void as an attempt to regulate appellate court jurisdiction. *People v. Tarkowski*, 100 Ill.App.3d 153 (2nd Dist. 1981).

730 ILCS 5/5-8-1 (West 1996) **Unified Code of Corrections.** Subsection (a)(1)(c)(ii), which mandates life imprisonment for multiple murder, violates the proportionate penalty clause of Section 11 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution when applied to a juvenile convicted on a theory of accountability whose only participation was to serve as lookout because the statute does not consider the defendant's age or extent of culpability. *People v. Miller*, 202 Ill.2d 328 (2002).

730 ILCS 140/3 (P.A. 88-680). **Private Correctional Facility Moratorium Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-680 are unconstitutional because P.A. 88-680 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A.s 91-54, 91-155, 91-404, 91-690, 91-691, 91-692, 91-693, 91-694, 91-695, and 91-696 re-enacted portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-680. *People v. Dainty*, 299 Ill.App.3d 235 (3rd Dist. 1998), *People v. Williams*, 302 Ill.App.3d 975 (2nd Dist. 1999),

People v. Edwards, 304 Ill.App.3d 250 (2nd Dist. 1999), and *People v. Cervantes*, 189 Ill.2d 80 (1999). (These cases are also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Finance” and “Courts” and in Part 3 of this Case Report under “Criminal Offenses”.)

730 ILCS 175/ (P.A. 88-680). **Secure Residential Youth Care Facilities Licensing Act.** Provisions enacted by P.A. 88-680 are unconstitutional because P.A. 88-680 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A.s 91-54, 91-155, 91-404, 91-690, 91-691, 91-692, 91-693, 91-694, 91-695, and 91-696 re-enacted portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-680. *People v. Dainty*, 299 Ill.App.3d 235 (3rd Dist. 1998), *People v. Williams*, 302 Ill.App.3d 975 (2nd Dist. 1999), *People v. Edwards*, 304 Ill.App.3d 250 (2nd Dist. 1999), and *People v. Cervantes*, 189 Ill.2d 80 (1999). (These cases are also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Finance” and “Courts” and in Part 3 of this Case Report under “Criminal Offenses”.)

CIVIL PROCEDURE

735 ILCS 5/2-402, 5/2-604.1, 5/2-621, 5/2-623, 5/2-624, 5/2-1003, 5/2-1107.1, 5/2-1109, 5/2-1115.05, 5/2-1115.1, 5/2-1115.2, 5/2-1116, 5/2-1117, 5/2-1205.1, 5/2-1702, 5/2-2101, 5/2-2102, 5/2-2103, 5/2-2104, 5/2-2105, 5/2-2106, 5/2-2106.5, 5/2-2107, 5/2-2108, 5/2-2109, 5/8-802, 5/8-2001, 5/8-2003, 5/8-2004, 5/13-213, 5/13-214.3, and 5/13-217 (P.A. 89-7). **Code of Civil Procedure.**

P.A. 89-7, a comprehensive revision of the law relating to personal injury actions, is unconstitutional in its entirety because (i) provisions limiting compensatory damages for noneconomic injuries, changing contribution by joint tortfeasors, abolishing joint and several liability, and mandating unlimited disclosure of a plaintiff’s medical records during discovery are arbitrary, are special legislation in violation of Section 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution, or violate the separation of powers doctrine of Section 1 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution and (ii) other provisions, despite inclusion of a severability clause, are inseverable. The provisions of 735 ILCS 5/2-622 and 5/8-2501, amended by Public Act 89-7, were re-enacted and changed by Public Act 94-677, effective August 25, 2005. *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997).

735 ILCS 5/2-1003 (West 1996). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Provision waiving a party’s privilege of confidentiality with health care providers when he or she alleges a claim for bodily injury or disease is unconstitutional because, by requiring disclosure of all information, it encroaches upon the authority of the judiciary (Supreme Court Rule 201 requires disclosure of only relevant information) and is an unreasonable invasion of privacy. *Kunkel v. Walton*, 179 Ill.2d 519 (1997).

735 ILCS 5/3-103 (West 1994). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Provision allowing amendment of a complaint for administrative review of a police or firefighter disciplinary decision of a municipality of 500,000 or less population in order to add a police or fire chief as a defendant, while not allowing similar amendment of a similar complaint against a

municipality of more than 500,000 population, is special legislation in violation of Section 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. *Lacny v. Police Board of the City of Chicago*, 291 Ill.App.3d 397 (1st Dist. 1997).

735 ILCS 5/12-1006 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, par. 12-1006). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Enforcement of judgments provisions concerning exemption for retirement plans is completely unconstitutional as preempted by the federal Bankruptcy Code. *In re Kazi, Bkrcty*, 125 B.R. 981 (S.D.Ill. 1991), and others.

735 ILCS 5/13-202.1 (West 1992). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Limitations provision, added by P.A. 87-941, which purports to revive a damage suit by the murder victim's estate against the murderer after the 2-year statute of limitations had run, violates due process protections afforded to defendants in civil tort cases. *Sepmeyer v. Holman*, 162 Ill.2d 249 (1994).

735 ILCS 5/15-1508 and 5/15-1701 (P.A. 89-203). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Provisions amended by P.A. 89-203 are unconstitutional because P.A. 89-203 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. *People v. Wooters*, 188 Ill.2d 500 (1999). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

735 ILCS 5/20-104 (West 1998). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Section authorizing a private citizen to recover damages from someone who has defrauded a governmental unit when the appropriate governmental official has been notified and has declined to act violates Section 1 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution to the extent it purports to confer standing upon a private citizen to initiate action in a case in which the State is the real interested party because neither the legislature nor the judiciary may deprive the Attorney General of his or her inherent power to direct the legal affairs of the State. *Lyons v. Ryan*, 201 Ill.2d 529 (2002), and, when a unit of local government was the real interested party, *County of Cook ex rel. Rifkin v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc.*, 215 Ill.2d 466 (2005).

735 ILCS 5/21-103 (West 1998). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Subsection (b), which requires notice by publication of a petition to change a minor's name, is unconstitutional as applied to a noncustodial parent who was not given actual notice of a petition by the custodial parent to change their child's surname. *In re Petition of Sanjuan-Moeller*, 343 Ill.App.3d 202 (2nd Dist. 2003).

CIVIL LIABILITIES

740 ILCS 100/3.5, 100/4, and 100/5 (P.A. 89-7). **Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act.** P.A. 89-7, a comprehensive revision of the law relating to personal injury actions, is

unconstitutional in its entirety because (i) provisions limiting compensatory damages for noneconomic injuries, changing contribution by joint tortfeasors, abolishing joint and several liability, and mandating unlimited disclosure of a plaintiff's medical records during discovery are arbitrary, are special legislation in violation of Section 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution, or violate the separation of powers doctrine of Section 1 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution and (ii) other provisions, despite inclusion of a severability clause, are inseverable. *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997).

740 ILCS 110/9 and 110/10 (P.A. 89-7). **Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act.** (See *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Civil Procedure" and under "Civil Liabilities", concerning the inseverability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act enacted by P.A. 89-7.)

740 ILCS 110/10 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 91½, par. 810). **Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act.** Provisions concerning what records of a patient or therapist may be disclosed is unconstitutional to the extent that the Section provides that "any order to disclose or not disclose shall be considered a final order for purposes of appeal and shall be subject to interlocutory appeal". This provision usurps the Supreme Court's rule-making power with respect to appealability of nonfinal judgments. *Almgren v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center*, 162 Ill.2d 205 (1994).

740 ILCS 130/2 and 130/3 (P.A. 89-7). **Premises Liability Act.** (See *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Civil Procedure" and under "Civil Liabilities", concerning the inseverability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act enacted by P.A. 89-7.)

CIVIL IMMUNITIES

745 ILCS 10/6A-101 and 10/6A-105 (P.A. 89-7). **Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act.** (See *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Civil Procedure" and under "Civil Liabilities", concerning the inseverability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act enacted by P.A. 89-7.)

745 ILCS 25/2, 25/3, and 25/4 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 122, pars. 822, 823, and 824). **Tort Liability of Schools Act.** Provisions concerning notice of injury and limitation period for commencing action are invalid as to both public and nonprofit private schools. Enactment of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act eliminated the unconstitutional discrepancy between notice-of-injury

provisions applicable to various units of local government (see *Lorton v. Brown County School Dist.*, 35 Ill.2d 362 (1966), reported in Part 3 of this Case Report under “Civil Immunities”), but because that Act does not apply to private schools, the notice and limitation provisions of the Tort Liability of Schools Act (which groups public schools and nonprofit private schools together in the same classification) could not be fairly applied to nonprofit private schools. *Cleary v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria*, 57 Ill.2d 384 (1974).

745 ILCS 25/5 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959 and 1965, ch. 122, par. 825). **Tort Liability of Schools Act.** Provision of subsection (A) limiting recovery in each separate cause of action against a public school district to \$10,000 is unconstitutional because it is arbitrarily formulated. *Treece v. Shawnee Community School District*, 39 Ill.2d 136 (1968).

Provision of subsection (B) limiting recovery in each separate cause of action against a nonprofit private school to \$10,000 is unconstitutional because it is purely arbitrary as compared with the liability of other governmental units and institutions. *Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago*, 41 Ill.2d 336 (1968).

FAMILIES

750 ILCS 5/501.1 (West 1992). **Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.** “Dissolution action stay” provision is an unconstitutional violation of substantive due process because, in providing for a stay on disposing of any property by either party in a divorce, the statute unfairly restrains the disposition of non-marital property as well as marital property. *Messenger v. Edgar*, 157 Ill.2d 162 (1993).

750 ILCS 5/607 (West 2002). **Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.** Paragraph (1.5) of subsection (b), which authorizes a court to grant petitions for step-parents’ visitation privileges when in the child’s best interests or welfare, unconstitutionally places the petitioner on equal footing with the parent in the determination of those interests. *In re Marriage of Engelkens*, 354 Ill.App.3d 790 (3rd Dist. 2004).

750 ILCS 50/1 (West 1998). **Adoption Act.** Subdivision D(m-1)’s presumption of parental unfitness based on a judicial finding that a child has spent at least 15 of 22 consecutive months in foster care violates due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 2 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution by failing to consider periods of foster care unattributable to the parent’s inability to care for the child. *In re H.G.*, 197 Ill.2d 317 (2001).

750 ILCS 50/1 (West 1998). **Adoption Act.** Failure to appoint legal counsel for an indigent person for an adoption proceeding that would terminate his or her parental rights violates the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution and Section 2 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution when the State had chosen not to seek unfit parent status against an indigent woman but had achieved its goal through an adoption proceeding brought by the parties awarded custody of the child. *In re Adoption of K.L.P.*, 198 Ill.2d 448 (2002).

PROPERTY

765 ILCS 1025/15 (West 1998). **Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.** Provision that the State Treasurer “may” return to the owner of unliquidated stock the dividends earned on that stock while held by the State as abandoned property is a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Section 15 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution. *Canel v. Topinka*, 212 Ill.2d 311 (2004).

BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS

815 ILCS 205/4.1a (West 2004). **Interest Act.** Provision that limits a lender’s non-interest mortgage charges to 3% when the mortgage’s interest rate exceeds 8% is preempted by the federal Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and thus violates the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2). *U.S. Bank National Association v. Clark*, 216 Ill.2d 334 (2005).

815 ILCS 505/. **Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.** The Act’s application to cigarette manufacturers for failure to warn of the hazards of smoking is preempted by the federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. *Espinosa v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.*, 500 F.Supp.2d 979 (N.D.Ill. 2007).

815 ILCS 505/4 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 121½, par. 264). **Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.** Provision authorizing Attorney General to issue subpoenas is unconstitutional as applied to person compelled to travel 350-mile round trip without reimbursement because it is arbitrary and unduly burdensome. *People v. McWhorter*, 113 Ill.2d 374 (1986).

815 ILCS 505/10a (P.A. 87-1140 and P.A. 89-144). **Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.** Subsections (a), (f), (g), and (h) constitute special legislation in violation of Section 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution because they limit and restrict consumers’ claims with respect only to automobile dealers (penalties for a consumer’s failure to settle a claim, limitation on punitive damages, and notice to a dealer before filing suit). *Allen v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc.*, 208 Ill.2d 12 (2003).

815 ILCS 505/10b (P.A. 89-7). **Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.** (See *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Civil Procedure” and under “Civil Liabilities”, concerning the inseparability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act enacted by P.A. 89-7.)

815 ILCS 515/3 (West 1994). **Home Repair Fraud Act.** The statute creates a mandatory rebuttable presumption of intent or knowledge upon the finding of certain predicate facts. The presumption relieves the State of the burden of persuasion on the element of intent or knowledge in violation of due process guarantees of the U.S. and Illinois constitutions. *People v. Watts*, 181 Ill.2d 133 (1998).

EMPLOYMENT

820 ILCS 10/1 **Collective Bargaining Successor Employer Act.** Act is preempted by the federal Labor Management Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Act and therefore violates the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution. *Commonwealth Edison Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers*, 961 F.Supp. 1169 (N.D.Ill. 1997).

820 ILCS 30/. **Employment of Strikebreakers Act.** Act, which imposes criminal penalties upon an employer who knowingly contracts with a day and temporary labor service agency for the provision of replacement workers in the event of a strike or lockout, is preempted by the federal National Labor Relations Act and thus violates the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2). *Caterpillar Inc. v. Lyons*, 318 F.Supp.2d 703 (C.D.Ill. 2004).

820 ILCS 30/2 (P.A. 93-375). **Employment of Strikebreakers Act.** Provision prohibiting an employer from contracting with day and temporary labor service agencies for replacement labor during a strike or lockout is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, which permits employment of day and temporary workers at such times, and thus violates the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2). *520 Michigan Ave. Associates v. Devine*, 433 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2006).

820 ILCS 105/4a. **Minimum Wage Law.** Section 4a’s overtime provisions, as applied to interstate railways, are preempted by the federal Railway Labor Act. *Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. Shannon*, 539 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2008).

820 ILCS 135/2.1 and 135/2.2 (P.A. 87-1174). **Burial Rights Act.** Provisions concerning religiously required interments during labor disputes are preempted by the federal National Labor Relations Act because they infringe on the right of cemetery

workers to strike and authorize injunctions and fines against striking unions. *Cannon v. Edgar*, 33 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 1994).

820 ILCS 140/3.1. One Day Rest in Seven Act. Required workplace conditions and enforcement provisions applicable only to hotel room attendants working in a county with a population greater than 3,000,000 are preempted by the federal National Labor Relations Act. *520 South Michigan Ave. Associates v. Shannon*, 549 F.3d 1119 (7th Cir. 2008).

820 ILCS 240/2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, ch. 48, par. 252). **Industrial Home Work Act.** Provision prohibiting the processing of metal springs by home workers is unconstitutional as an unreasonable restraint on and regulation of business, not being in the interest of the public welfare as required for the proper exercise of the State's police power. *Figura v. Cummins*, 4 Ill.2d 44 (1954).

820 ILCS 305/5 (P.A. 89-7). **Workers' Compensation Act.** (See *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Civil Procedure" and under "Civil Liabilities", concerning the inseverability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act enacted by P.A. 89-7.)

820 ILCS 310/5 (P.A. 89-7). **Workers' Occupational Diseases Act.** (See *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Civil Procedure" and under "Civil Liabilities", concerning the inseverability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act enacted by P.A. 89-7.)

820 ILCS 405/602 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 602). **Unemployment Insurance Act.** The "held in abeyance" provision of paragraph B, which postpones payment of unemployment benefits to people in legal custody or on bail for a work-related felony or theft until the charges are resolved, violates the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution because the provision conflicts with sections of the federal Social Security Act that require administrative methods "reasonably calculated" to ensure prompt payment and an opportunity for a fair hearing for individuals whose claims for unemployment compensation are denied. *Jenkins v. Bowling*, 691 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1982).

INTRODUCTION TO PART 3

Part 3 of this 2009 Case Report contains Illinois statutes that are representative of (i) statutes that were held unconstitutional and then changed in response to the holding of unconstitutionality or (ii) statutes that were construed in a particular way in order to avoid a holding of unconstitutionality. Part 3 does not include every such statute. Part 3 includes statutes that (i) currently appear or formerly appeared in the Illinois Compiled Statutes or appeared in an Act that was replaced by an Act that currently appears in the Illinois Compiled Statutes and (ii) may have some instructional value concerning the requirement that statutes not violate the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution.

PART 3
EXAMPLES OF
STATUTES HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND THEN AMENDED OR REPEALED

GENERAL PROVISIONS

5 ILCS 420/4A-106 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971 Supp., ch. 127, par. 604A-106). **Illinois Governmental Ethics Act.** Provisions of Act authorizing the Secretary of State to render advisory opinions on questions concerning the Article of the Act relating to the disclosure of economic interests and to hire legal counsel for those purposes were unconstitutional because they encroached upon duties and powers of the Attorney General that are inherent in that office under Article V, Section 15 of the Illinois Constitution. The unconstitutional provisions were subsequently deleted by P.A. 78-255. *Stein v. Howlett*, 52 Ill.2d 570 (1972).

ELECTIONS

10 ILCS 5/1A-3, 5/1A-5, and 5/1A-7.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 46, pars. 1A-3, 1A-5, and 1A-7.1). **Election Code.** Method used to select members of State Board of Elections, involving appointments by the Governor from nominees designated by the General Assembly, violated Illinois Constitution prohibition against legislative appointment of executive branch officers. Method used to resolve a tie vote of the State Board of Elections, involving disqualification of one Board member whose name was selected by lot, violated due process and the Illinois Constitution prohibition against a political party having a majority of members of the Board. P.A. 80-1178 deleted the provisions concerning legislative nominees for Board membership and repealed the provision concerning resolution of a tie vote. *Walker v. State Board of Elections*, 65 Ill.2d 543 (1976).

10 ILCS 5/7-5 and 5/7-12 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, pars. 7-5 and 7-12). **Election Code.** Provisions directing that no primary election be held if, for each office to be filled by election, the election would be uncontested were unconstitutional because they violated the equal protection clause by preventing electors from voting for write-in candidates. P.A. 84-698 amended the provisions to provide that a primary election shall be held when a person who intends to become a write-in candidate for an uncontested office files a written statement or notice of intent with the proper election official. *Lawlor v. Chicago Board of Election Com'rs*, 395 F.Supp. 692 (N.D.Ill. 1975).

10 ILCS 5/7-10 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 46, par. 7-10). **Election Code.** Provisions prohibiting a person from signing a nominating petition or being a candidate of a political party for public office if the person had requested a primary ballot of

another political party at a primary election held within 2 years of the date on which the nominating petition must be filed were held to violate the right of free political association under the U.S. Constitution, Amendments I and XIV. Standards governing party changes by candidates may and should be more restrictive than those relating to voters generally, but the restrictions on candidates were not severable from the invalid provisions. P.A. 86-1348 deleted the 2-year restriction on changes of party by persons signing nominating petitions and by candidates. *Sperling v. County Officers Electoral Board*, 57 Ill.2d 81 (1974).

10 ILCS 5/7-10 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, par. 7-10). **Election Code.** (See *People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. State Bd. of Elections*, 136 Ill.2d 513 (1990), reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Courts”, concerning legislation subdividing the First Appellate District and the Circuit of Cook County.)

10 ILCS 5/7-42 (Laws 1910 Sp. Sess., p. 50). **Election Code.** Provision of 1910 Act that allowed an employee to leave work for 2 hours without any deduction in salary or wages to vote in a primary election was unconstitutional because it deprived an employer of his or her property without due process. The provision prohibiting a deduction in salary or wages was not continued in the 1927 Act that replaced the 1910 Act, and the current Election Code does not contain such a provision. *McAlpine v. Dimick*, 326 Ill. 240 (1927).

10 ILCS 5/7-43 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, par. 7-43). **Election Code.** Provision prohibiting a person from voting in a political party primary if the person voted in another political party's primary in the preceding 23 months was held to substantially burden that person's right to vote in derogation of Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. The court also found the “23 month rule” to be a significant incursion on a person's right of free association and declared the provision null and void. Public Act 95-699, effective November 9, 2007, removed the offending provision. *Kusper v. Pontikes*, 94 S.Ct. 303 (1973).

10 ILCS 5/7-43, 5/10-3, and 5/10-4. **Election Code.** Provisions prohibiting a person who signed an independent candidate's nominating petition from voting in the primary, requiring more petition signatures for an independent candidate than for a partisan candidate for the same office, and requiring independent and partisan candidates to file petitions at the same time to appear on the ballot at different elections so severely restricted an independent candidate's ballot access as to burden the right to political association of the candidate and his petition signers under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Public Act 95-699, effective November 9, 2007, amended Sections 7-43, 10-3, and 10-6 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7-43, 5/10-3, and 5/10-6) to remove the prohibition against an independent candidate petition signer voting in the primary, decrease the number of signatures required on an

independent candidate's petition, and move the deadline for filing an independent candidate's petition closer to the general election. *Lee v. Keith*, 463 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2006).

10 ILCS 5/7-59 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, par. 7-59). **Election Code.** Provision excluding from office a write-in candidate in a primary election who received a majority of the votes cast because he or she did not receive at least as many write-in votes as the number of signatures required on a petition for nomination for that office was an unconstitutional violation of the right to freedom of association as expressed by voting. P.A. 84-658 and P.A. 86-867 changed the statute to bar from office only a write-in candidate in a primary election who receives less votes than any person on the ballot. *Foster v. Kusper*, 587 F.Supp. 1194 (N.D.Ill. 1984).

10 ILCS 5/8-10. Election Code. Provision granting incumbents priority in ballot positions violated the 14th Amendment to U.S. Constitution. A subsequent amendment completely removed the offending provision. *Netsch v. Lewis*, 344 F.Supp. 1280 (N.D.Ill. 1972).

10 ILCS 5/10-3 (Ill. Ann. Stat. 1978 Supp., ch. 46, par. 10-3). **Election Code.** Provision requiring more than 25,000 petition signatures for an independent candidate for less than statewide office, when 25,000 was the number needed for statewide office, was unconstitutional as a violation of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. P.A. 81-926 lowered the number of signatures needed. *Socialist Workers Party v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners*, 99 S.Ct. 983 (1977).

10 ILCS 5/17-15 (Hurd's Statutes 1917, p. 1350). **Election Code.** Provision that required employers to pay employees for the 2 hours employers were required to allow employees to be absent from work to vote on election day was void as an unreasonable abridgment of the right to contract for labor. Although a citizen has a constitutional right to vote, he or she does not have a constitutional right to be paid to exercise the right to vote. The requirement to pay employees during their absence while voting was removed by Laws 1963, p. 2532. *People v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Co.*, 306 Ill. 486 (1923).

10 ILCS 5/19-9 and 5/19-10. Election Code. Code's failure to provide an absent voter with timely notice of and a hearing on the rejection of his or her absentee ballot denied due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Public Act 94-1000, effective July 3, 2006, repealed Section 19-9 and amended Section 19-8 of the Code (10 ILCS 5/19-8) to require that an election authority, before the close of the period for counting provisional ballots, notify an absentee voter that his or her ballot was rejected, why it was rejected, and that the voter may appear

before a panel of election judges to show cause why the ballot should not be rejected. *Zessar v. Helander*, 2006 WL 573889, Docket No. 05C 1917, opinion filed March 13, 2006.

10 ILCS 5/23-1.4 and 5/23-1.10 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 46, pars. 23-1.4 and 23-1.10). **Election Code.** Provisions granting a 3-judge panel authority to hear election contests violated the Illinois Constitution because it altered the basic character of the circuit courts by creating a new court. P.A. 86-873 repealed the offending provisions. *In re Contest of Election for Governor*, 93 Ill.2d 463 (1983).

10 ILCS 5/25-11 (Ill. Rev Stat. 1973, ch. 46, par. 25-11). **Election Code.** Provision added by P.A. 79-118 for filling vacancies on the county board and in other county offices that transferred the authority to fill the vacancies from the county board to the county central committee of the political party of the person creating the vacancy was an unconstitutional delegation of power because the power to appoint was delegated to private citizens not accountable to the public. P.A. 80-940 changed the provision to provide that vacancies shall be filled by appointment by the county board chairman with the advice and consent of the county board. *People ex rel. Rudman v. Rini*, 64 Ill.2d 321 (1976).

10 ILCS 5/29-14 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 46, par. 29-14). **Election Code.** Provision that prohibited publication of unattributed political literature was a violation of the First Amendment. P.A. 90-737 repealed Section 29-14 but replaced it with Section 9-9.5 (10 ILCS 5/9-9.5), a similar prohibition against publication and distribution of unattributed political literature. *People v. White*, 116 Ill.2d 171 (1987).

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

15 ILCS 335/14B (West 1998). **Illinois Identification Card Act.** The Class 4 felony penalty for the offense of knowingly possessing a fraudulent identification card, which includes a mandatory minimum fine or community service, was disproportionate to the Class 4 felony penalty for the more serious offense of knowingly possessing a fraudulent identification card with aggravating elements, which did not include mandatory minimums, in violation of the proportionate penalties requirement of Section 11 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. I, Sec. 11). P.A. 94-701, effective June 1, 2006, reclassified the offense of knowingly possessing a fraudulent identification card with aggravating elements as a Class 3 felony. *People v. Pizano*, 347 Ill.App.3d 128 (1st Dist. 2004).

15 ILCS 520/22.5 and 520/22.6. **Deposit of State Moneys Act.** Public Act 94-79, effective January 27, 2006 and known as the “Sudan Act”, which prohibited the investment of State moneys in relation to Sudan, was preempted by federal law and violated the

foreign commerce clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8). Public Act 95-521, effective August 28, 2007, repealed the Sudan Act. *National Foreign Trade Council, Inc. v. Giannoulis*, 523 F.Supp.2d 731 (N.D.Ill. 2007). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Pensions”.)

EXECUTIVE BRANCH

20 ILCS 1128/ (P.A. 88-669). Illinois Geographic Information Council Act. Act created by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, was unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-961, effective June 27, 2006, re-enacted the Illinois Geographic Information Council Act. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-1074 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Finance”, “Revenue”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

20 ILCS 3505/. Illinois Development Finance Authority Act. Provision of a former Act, the Illinois Industrial Development Authority Act, that required \$500,000 to be transferred to a special fund and that the sum should be considered “always appropriated” for the purpose of guaranteeing repayment of bonds violated the constitutional prohibition against pledging the credit of the State and was an unconstitutional continuing appropriation. P.A. 81-454 repealed the Illinois Industrial Development Authority Act and enacted what became the Illinois Development Finance Authority Act without continuing the offending provision in the new Act. *Bowes v. Howlett*, 24 Ill.2d 545 (1962).

20 ILCS 3850/ (P.A. 88-669). Illinois Research Park Authority Act. Act created by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, was unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 93-205, effective January 1, 2004, repealed the Illinois Research Park Authority Act. P.A. 92-790, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-1074 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Finance”, “Revenue”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

FINANCE

30 ILCS 340/0.01, 340/1, 340/1.1, 340/2, and 340/3 (P.A. 88-669). Casual Deficit Act. Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 93-1046, effective October 15, 2004, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 94-794, 94-

961, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-1074 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Revenue”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”).)

REVENUE

35 ILCS 5/203, 5/502, 5/506.5, 5/917, and 5/1301 (P.A. 88-669). **Illinois Income Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”).)

35 ILCS 105/2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 120, par. 439.2). **Use Tax Act.**

35 ILCS 120/1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 120, par. 440). **Retailers’ Occupation Tax Act.** Provisions that persons in the business of repairing items of personal property by adding or incorporating other items of personal property shall be deemed to be in the business of selling personal property at retail and not in a service occupation violated the uniformity of taxation provisions of the Illinois Constitution because they attempted to include within a class persons who in fact were not within the class. Laws 1963, pages 1582 and 1600 deleted the offending provisions. *Central Television Service v. Isaacs*, 27 Ill.2d 420 (1963).

35 ILCS 105/2 and 105/9 (P.A. 88-669). **Use Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”).)

35 ILCS 105/3-5 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 120, par. 439.3). **Use Tax Act.**

35 ILCS 120/2-5 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 120, par. 441). **Retailers’ Occupation Tax Act.**

Provisions that exempted from use tax and retailers' occupation tax all money and medallions issued by a foreign government except those issued by South Africa were unconstitutional because the disapproval of foreign political and social policies was not a reasonable basis for a tax classification and the power to conduct foreign affairs belonged exclusively to the federal government. The offending provisions were subsequently removed by P.A. 85-1135. *Springfield Rare Coin Gallery v. Johnson*, 115 Ill.2d 221 (1986).

Provisions that made proceeds of sales to the State or local governmental units exempt from use tax and retailers' occupation tax violated the uniformity of taxation requirement of the Illinois Constitution because they discriminated against the federal government. Laws 1961, pages 2312 and 2314 deleted the offending provisions. *People ex rel. Holland Coal Co. v. Isaacs*, 22 Ill.2d 477 (1961).

35 ILCS 105/3-40 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 120, par. 439.3). **Use Tax Act.** Definition of gasohol, which applied to the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act as well, that provided for a sales tax preference to gasohol containing ethanol distilled in Illinois violated the commerce clause. The preference was deleted by P.A. 85-1135. *Russell Stewart Oil Co. v. State*, 124 Ill.2d 116 (1988).

35 ILCS 110/2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 120, par. 439.32). **Service Use Tax Act.**

35 ILCS 115/2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 120, par. 439.102). **Service Occupation Tax Act.**

1967 amendments, which designated 4 limited subclasses of servicemen who were subject to the tax, were an unconstitutional denial of due process and equal protection because there was no reasonable difference between the 4 subclasses of servicemen subject to the tax and those servicemen not subject to the tax. Several Sections in each Act were held unconstitutional because the court found the provisions of the amendatory Acts inseverable. Subsequent amendments corrected the problem. *Fiorito v. Jones*, 39 Ill.2d 531 (1968).

35 ILCS 110/9 (P.A. 88-669). **Service Use Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under "Executive Branch", "Finance", "Gaming", "Liquor", "Public Health", "Vehicles", "Criminal Offenses", and "Corrections".)

35 ILCS 115/9 (P.A. 88-669). **Service Occupation Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because

P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”).)

35 ILCS 120/3 and 120/11 (P.A. 88-669). **Retailers’ Occupation Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”).)

35 ILCS 120/5a, 120/5b, and 120/5c (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 120, pars. 444a, 444b, and 444c). **Retailers’ Occupation Tax Act.** Provisions (i) permitting the Department of Revenue to file with the circuit clerk a final assessment or jeopardy assessment and requiring the clerk to immediately enter judgment for that amount and (ii) affording the taxpayer an opportunity to be heard only after entry of the judgment violated due process and attempted to circumvent the courts in violation of the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. Subsequent amendments corrected the problem. *People ex rel. Isaacs v. Johnson*, 26 Ill.2d 268 (1962).

35 ILCS 130/1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, ch. 120, par. 453.1). **Cigarette Tax Act.** Provision that an individual who in any year brought more than 10 cartons of cigarettes into the State for consumption was a “distributor” of cigarettes was unconstitutional as violative of due process and the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The definition of “distributor” was subsequently changed to remove the unconstitutional text. *Johnson v. Daley*, 403 Ill. 338 (1949).

35 ILCS 130/10b (P.A. 88-669). **Cigarette Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A.

88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

35 ILCS 135/20 (P.A. 88-669). **Cigarette Use Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

35 ILCS 200/9-185. Property Tax Code. Provision of prior Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 120, par. 508a) that indirectly required the owner of real property taken by eminent domain to pay the real estate taxes for the period after the petition for condemnation was filed until the compensation award was deposited was an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation. The Property Tax Code, which succeeded the repealed Revenue Act of 1939, now provides that real property is exempt from taxation as of the date the condemnation petition is filed. *Board of Jr. College District 504 v. Carey*, 43 Ill.2d 82 (1969).

35 ILCS 200/15-85. Property Tax Code.

Tax exemption for property used for “mechanical” purposes (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 120, par. 500.10) was unconstitutional because it exceeded the scope of exemptions permitted under Article IX, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 88-455 repealed the Revenue Act of 1939 and replaced it with the Property Tax Code, and the offending provision was not continued in the Code. *Bd. of Certified Safety Professionals of the Americas, Inc. v. Johnson*, 112 Ill.2d 542 (1986).

Tax exemption for property used for “philosophical” purposes (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, ch. 120, par. 500) was unconstitutional because it exceeded the scope of exemptions permitted under the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 88-455 repealed the Revenue Act of 1939 and replaced it with the Property Tax Code, and the offending provision was not continued in the Code. *International College of Surgeons v. Brenza*, 8 Ill.2d 141 (1956).

35 ILCS 200/15-172 (P.A. 88-669). **Property Tax Code.** Provisions added by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-794, effective May 22, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-

1074 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

35 ILCS 250/20 (P.A. 88-669). **Longtime Owner-Occupant Property Tax Relief Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

35 ILCS 505/1.16, 505/13a.3, 505/13a.4, 505/13a.5, 505/13a.6, 505/15, and 505/16 (P.A. 88-669). **Motor Fuel Tax Law.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

35 ILCS 610/11 (P.A. 88-669). **Messages Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

35 ILCS 615/11 (P.A. 88-669). **Gas Revenue Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-

1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

35 ILCS 620/11 (P.A. 88-669). **Public Utilities Revenue Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

35 ILCS 630/15 (P.A. 88-669). **Telecommunications Excise Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

PENSIONS

40 ILCS 5/1-110.5. Illinois Pension Code. Public Act 94-79, effective January 27, 2006 and known as the “Sudan Act”, which prohibited the investment of State moneys in relation to Sudan, was preempted by federal law and violated the foreign commerce clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8). Public Act 95-521, effective August 28, 2007, repealed the Sudan Act. *National Foreign Trade Council, Inc. v. Giannoulis*, 523 F.Supp.2d 731 (N.D.Ill. 2007). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Officers”.)

40 ILCS 5/6-210.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 108 ½, par. 6-210.1). **Illinois Pension Code.** Requiring Chicago fire department paramedics transferred from Chicago municipal pension fund to Chicago firemen’s fund to tender refunds from the Chicago municipal fund, plus interest, to Chicago firemen’s fund in order to retain service credits diminished vested pension rights of paramedics unable to produce refund money plus interest and violated the Illinois Constitution’s prohibition against diminishing pension rights. P.A. 89-

136 amended Section 6-210.1 to permit payment of refunds plus interest through payroll deductions. *Collins v. Board of Trustees of Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago*, 226 Ill.App.3d 316 (1st Dist. 1992).

40 ILCS 5/18-125 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 108½, par. 18-125). **Illinois Pension Code.** Amendment of Judicial Article provision that changed the definition of salary base used to compute retirement benefits from the salary on the last day of service to the average salary over the last year of service unconstitutionally reduced or impaired retirement benefits of judges in service on or before effective date of amendment. P.A. 86-273 rewrote the provision to define "final average salary" according to the date of termination of service. *Felt v. Board of Trustees of Judges Retirement System*, 107 Ill.2d 158 (1985).

COUNTIES

(See *People ex rel. Rudman v. Rini*, 64 Ill.2d 321 (1976), reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under "Elections", in relation to filling vacancies on the county board and in other county offices.)

55 ILCS 5/4-5001. Counties Code. Provision of predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 53, par. 37) in relation to compensation of sheriffs and other county officers that allowed the sheriff of a first or second class county a percentage commission on all sales of real and personal property made by virtue of a court judgment violated the Illinois Constitution prohibition against basing fees of local governmental officers on funds collected. P.A. 82-204 replaced the percentage commission provisions with a schedule of fees in dollar amounts. *Cardinal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kramer*, 99 Ill.2d 334 (1984).

55 ILCS 5/4-12001. Counties Code. Provision of predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 53, par. 71) in relation to compensation of sheriffs and other county officers that allowed the sheriff of a third class county a percentage commission on all sales of real and personal property made by virtue of an execution or a court judgment violated the Illinois Constitution prohibition against basing fees of local governmental officers on funds collected. P.A. 81-473 replaced the percentage commission provisions with a schedule of fees in dollar amounts. *DeBruyn v. Elrod*, 84 Ill.2d 128 (1981).

55 ILCS 5/4-12003. Counties Code. Successive amendments to predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 53, par. 73; now Section 4-12003 of the Counties Code), which increased the fee for issuance of a marriage license to \$25 from \$15 and thereafter to \$40 from \$25 and which required the county clerk who collected the fee to pay the amount of the increase into the Domestic Violence Shelter and Service Fund for use in funding the administration of domestic violence shelters and service programs, violated the due process guarantees of Article I, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution

because the increased portion of the fee (i) constituted an arbitrary tax on the issuance of marriage licenses that bore no reasonable relation to the public interest in sheltering and serving victims of domestic violence and (ii) imposed a direct impediment to the exercise of the fundamental right to marry without supporting a sufficiently important State interest warranting that intrusion. P.A. 84-180 deleted the unconstitutional provisions from the Section that is now Section 4-12003 of the Counties Code, as well as identical provisions (affecting counties of the first and second class) that formerly were contained in a section of the law that is now Section 4-4001 of the Counties Code. *Boynton v. Kusper*, 112 Ill.2d 356 (1986).

55 ILCS 5/5-1002. Counties Code. Provision of predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 34, par. 301.1) immunizing counties from liability for personal injuries, property damage, and death caused by the negligence of its agents was a violation of the Illinois Constitution prohibition against special legislation because it made legislative classifications based on the form of a governmental unit instead of making the classifications based on the similarity of functions. The provision was repealed by Laws 1967, p. 3786. *Hutchings v. Kraject*, 34 Ill.2d 379 (1966).

55 ILCS 5/5-1120 (P.A. 89-203). **Counties Code.** Provision added by P.A. 89-203 was unconstitutional because P.A. 89-203 violated the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. Public Act 94-154, effective July 8, 2005, re-enacted the provision of Section 5-1120 added by P.A. 89-203. *People v. Wooters*, 188 Ill.2d 500 (1999). (This case is also reported in Part 2 of this Case Report under “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, “Corrections”, and “Civil Procedure”.)

MUNICIPALITIES

65 ILCS 5/11-13-3. Illinois Municipal Code. Provision of predecessor Zoning Act authorizing a local zoning board of appeals to vary or modify application of zoning regulations or provisions of zoning ordinances in the case of “practical difficulties” or “unnecessary hardships” was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority because the statute offered no guidance to the board in determining what constituted practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships. Laws 1933, p. 288 deleted the offending provision. *Welton v. Hamilton*, 344 Ill. 82 (1931).

65 ILCS 5/11-31-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 24, par. 11-31-1). **Illinois Municipal Code.** Provision that excepted home rule units from the application of a power granted to certain county boards to demolish hazardous buildings was unconstitutional special legislation because the legislative classification did not provide a reasonable basis for differentiating between the types of governmental units that could benefit from the application of the demolition powers. The provision was subsequently removed by P.A. 84-1102. *City of Urbana v. Houser*, 67 Ill.2d 268 (1977).

SPECIAL DISTRICTS

70 ILCS 915/6 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 111½, par. 5009). **Medical Center District Act.** Provision authorizing the Medical Center Commission to conduct a hearing and make a finding as to whether restrictions on property use had been violated so as to cause property to revert to the Commission was an unconstitutional violation of due process because the Commission had an interest in the outcome of the proceeding. P.A. 83-858 changed the provision to provide that the Commission must file suit for a determination of whether the property should revert to it. *United Church of the Medical Center v. Medical Center Commission*, 689 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1982).

70 ILCS 2205/1, 2205/5, 2205/7, 2205/8, 2205/17, 2205/27b, 2205/27c, 2205/27d, 2205/27e, 2205/27f, and 2205/27g (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973 Supp., ch. 42, pars. 247, 251, 253, 254, 263, 273b, 273c, 273d, 273e, 273f, and 273g). **Sanitary District Act of 1907.** P.A. 77-2819 (i) added Sections 27b through 27g to the Act to provide that a sanitary district lying in 2 counties and having an equalized assessed valuation of \$100,000,000 or more on the effective date of the amendatory Act was divided “for more effective administrative and fiscal control” into 2 separate districts and (ii) made related changes in other Sections of the Act. P.A. 77-2819 was unconstitutional special legislation because there was no reason for not extending the same advantages of “more effective administrative and fiscal control” to those 2-county districts that reached the minimum valuation level at a time after the effective date of the amendatory Act. Sections 27b through 27g were repealed by P.A. 81-290, and the related provisions added to other Sections of the Act by P.A. 77-2819 were subsequently deleted. *People ex rel. East Side Levee and Sanitary District v. Madison County Levee and Sanitary District*, 54 Ill. 442 (1973).

SCHOOLS

105 ILCS 5/7-7 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 122, par. 7-7). **School Code.** Provision of the School Code requiring that an appeal from an administrative decision of a county board of school trustees had to be filed within 10 days after the date of service of a copy of the board’s decision, while all other administrative review actions under the Code had to be filed within 35 days, violated the Illinois Constitution because there was no reasonable basis for the distinction. The period was changed to 35 days by Laws 1963, p. 3041. *Board of Education of Gardner School District v. County Board of School Trustees of Peoria County*, 28 Ill.2d 15 (1963).

105 ILCS 5/14-7.02 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 122, par. 14-7.02). **School Code.** Provision that the school district in which a handicapped child resided must pay the actual cost of tuition charged the child by a non-public school or special education facility to which the child was referred or \$2,500, whichever was less, deprived the child of a tuition-free education through the secondary level in violation of Section 1 of Article X of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 80-1405 amended the statute to increase the dollar

limit to \$4,500 and to provide for the school district's payment of costs in excess of that amount if approved by the Governor's Purchased Care Review Board. *Elliot v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago*, 64 Ill.App.3d 229 (1st Dist. 1978).

105 ILCS 5/17-2.11a (P.A. 86-4, amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 122, par. 17-2.11a). **School Code.** After the appellate court interpreted a provision concerning the maximum allowable interest rate on school bonds, P.A. 86-4 amended that provision to retroactively provide for a maximum rate greater than that construed by the appellate court. The amendment violated the separation of powers principle of the Illinois Constitution. The legislature may prospectively change a judicial construction of a statute if it believes that the judicial interpretation was at odds with the legislative intent, but it may not effect a change in the judicial construction by a later declaration of what it had originally intended. (The legislature also may pass a curative Act to validate bonds that a court has found were issued in a manner not authorized by the legislature.) P.A. 87-984 repealed Section 17-2.11a. *Bates v. Bd. of Education*, 136 Ill.2d 260 (1990).

105 ILCS 5/Art. 34 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 122, par. 34-1.01 *et seq.*). **School Code.** 1988 amendments concerning Chicago school reform were unconstitutional because the voting scheme for the election of the local school councils violated equal protection guarantees (one-person-one-vote principles). Subsequent amendments corrected the voting scheme problem and were upheld in federal court. *Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education*, 142 Ill.2d 54 (1990).

HIGHER EDUCATION

110 ILCS 947/105. Higher Education Student Assistance Act. Provision of predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 122, par. 30-15.12) requiring the Illinois State Scholarship Commission (the predecessor of the Illinois Student Assistance Commission) to file all lawsuits on delinquent and defaulted student loans "in the County of Cook where venue shall be deemed to be proper" was so arbitrary and unreasonable as to deprive defendants of their property or liberty in violation of the due process guarantees of the U.S. and Illinois constitutions. The provision was amended by P.A. 86-1474, which added language authorizing a defendant to request and a court to grant a change of venue to the county of defendant's residence and requiring the Commission to move the court for a change of venue if a defendant, within 30 days of service of summons, files a written request by mail with the Commission to change venue. *Williams v. Ill. State Scholarship Comm'n*, 139 Ill.2d 24 (1990).

110 ILCS 1015/17 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 144, par. 1317). **Illinois Educational Facilities Authority Act.** Provision that authorized political subdivisions to loan public money to finance construction for religious educational institutions was unconstitutional because it created too much potential for a subdivision's excessive entanglement with

religion. P.A. 78-399 removed the unconstitutional provision. *Cecrle v. Educational Facilities Authority*, 52 Ill.2d 312 (1972).

FINANCIAL REGULATION

205 ILCS 405/1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, ch. 16½, par. 31). **Currency Exchange Act.** Provision that exempted American Express Co. money orders from the regulation of the Act was an unconstitutional violation of equal protection guarantees. The provision was deleted by Laws 1957, p. 2332. *Morey v. Doud*, 77 S.Ct. 1344 (1957).

205 ILCS 405/4. Currency Exchange Act. Provision of a predecessor Act required that an application for a license to do business as a community currency exchange contain certain specified information and “such other information as the Auditor [of Public Accounts] may require”. The provision was unconstitutionally vague because it did not prescribe the actual qualifications necessary for licensure and left the Auditor without any restraint in interpreting the phrase. The current Act does not contain the offending provision. *McDougall v. Lueder*, 389 Ill. 141 (1945).

205 ILCS 645/3 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 17, par. 2710). **Foreign Banking Office Act.** Provision that imposed an annual nonreciprocal license fee of \$50,000 on foreign banks that did not provide reciprocal licensing authority to Illinois State or national banks violated the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution because it conflicted with the federal International Banking Act and the National Bank Act. P.A. 88-271 deleted the nonreciprocal license fee provision. *National Commercial Banking Corp. of Australia v. Harris*, 125 Ill.2d 448 (1988).

INSURANCE

215 ILCS 5/. Illinois Insurance Code. Former Section 401a of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 73, par. 1013a) regulating medical malpractice insurance rates on policies in existence on a certain date but not on policies written after that date was unconstitutional special legislation because it was as important to regulate the initial rate for a new medical malpractice insurance policy as to regulate the rate for an existing policy. P.A. 81-288 repealed the Section. *Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Ass’n*, 63 Ill.2d 313 (1976). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Civil Procedure”.)

215 ILCS 5/409 (West 1992). **Illinois Insurance Code.** Premium-based tax imposed upon foreign insurance companies for the privilege of doing business in Illinois but not imposed upon similar companies incorporated in Illinois violated the uniformity of taxation clause of Section 2 of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 90-583 imposes the premium-based privilege tax upon all companies doing business in Illinois

regardless of where incorporated. *Milwaukee Safeguard Insurance v. Selcke*, 179 Ill.2d 94 (1997).

215 ILCS 5/Art. XXXV (repealed) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 73, pars. 1065.150 through 1065.163). **Illinois Insurance Code.** Provisions of former Article XXXV of the Code were unconstitutional. Provision limiting damages recoverable in actions for accidental injuries arising out of use of motor vehicles but requiring that only insurance policies for private passenger automobiles must provide coverage affording benefits to certain injured persons was impermissible special legislation because it resulted in different legislative treatment of persons injured by different vehicles. Provision requiring arbitration of certain cases arising out of auto accidents violated constitutional right to trial by jury. Provision for *de novo* review of arbitration award by the circuit court violated constitutional provision that circuit courts have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters and the power to review administrative actions as provided by law. Provision requiring losing litigant in compulsory arbitration to pay arbitrator's fees violated constitutional prohibition against fee officers in the judicial system. P.A. 78-1297 repealed Article XXXV. *Grace v. Howlett*, 51 Ill.2d 478 (1972).

UTILITIES

220 ILCS 10/9 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111 2/3, par. 909). **Citizens Utility Board Act.** Provisions requiring a utility to include in its billing statements information provided by the Citizens Utility Board with which the utility disagreed infringed upon the utility's freedom of speech in violation of the U.S. Constitution, Amendment I. P.A. 85-879 replaced the entire Section with provisions requiring State agencies to include in their mailings information furnished by the Citizens Utility Board. *Central Illinois Light Co. v. Citizens Utility Bd.*, 827 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1987).

PROFESSIONS AND OCCUPATIONS

225 ILCS 41/. Funeral Directors and Embalmers Licensing Code. Provision of the Funeral Directors and Embalmers Licensing Act of 1935 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, ch. 111 ½, par. 73.4) requiring a funeral director to be a holder of a certificate of registration as a registered embalmer violated the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution because the interest of the public did not justify the partial merger of their activities by requiring that a funeral director have the knowledge, skill, and training of an embalmer before he or she can direct a funeral. The provision was deleted by Laws 1959, p.1518. The 1935 Act was repealed by P.A. 87-966, which created the Funeral Directors and Embalmers Licensing Code. Article 10 of the new Code (225 ILCS 41/Art. 10) creates a combined funeral director and embalmer license. *Gholson v. Engle*, 9 Ill.2d 454 (1956).

225 ILCS 100/21. Illinois Podiatric Medical Practice Act of 1987. Provision that limited advertising by a podiatric physician to certifications approved by the Council on Podiatric Medical Education violated the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as

applied to a podiatric physician who advertised that he had been certified by a board other than the Council on Podiatric Medical Education if the physician's statements were not actually or potentially misleading and served the public interest and the certification originated from a bona fide certifying board. P.A. 90-76 changed the provision to limit advertising to certifications approved by the Podiatric Medical Licensing Board in accordance with the rules for the administration of the Act. *Tsatsos v. Zollar*, 943 F.Supp. 945 (N.D.Ill. 1996).

225 ILCS 446/75 (225 ILCS 445/14 (West 1992)). **Private Detective, Private Alarm, Private Security, and Locksmith Act of 1993.** Provision that required an applicant for a private alarm contracting license to have worked as a full-time supervisor, manager, or administrator at a licensed private alarm contracting agency for 3 years out of the 5 years immediately preceding the application for a license was invalid because it conferred upon the regulated industry monopolistic control over entry into the private alarm contracting trade. P.A. 88-363 recodified the Act and added a provision that 3 years of work experience at an unlicensed entity which satisfies standards of alarm industry competence shall meet the requirements for eligibility for licensing as an alternative to working for 3 years at a licensed private alarm contracting agency. P.A. 89-85 added language giving partial credit toward the 3-year employment requirement to applicants who have met certain educational requirements. *Church v. State of Illinois*, 164 Ill.2d 153 (1995).

225 ILCS 455/18. Real Estate License Act of 1983. Provision of predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 111, par. 5732), continued in 1983 Act, that prohibited real estate brokers from offering inducements to potential customers was unconstitutional as violating free speech guarantees and because it did not advance the State's interest in consumer protection. P.A. 84-1117 deleted the offending provision. *Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services v. Clayton*, 105 Ill.2d 389 (1985).

GAMING

230 ILCS 30/2, 30/4, 30/5, 30/5.1, 30/6, 30/7, 30/8, 30/10, 30/11, and 30/12 (P.A. 88-669). **Charitable Games Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-986, effective June 30, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-1017, and 94-1074 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under "Executive Branch", "Finance", "Revenue", "Liquor", "Public Health", "Vehicles", "Criminal Offenses", and "Corrections".)

LIQUOR

235 ILCS 5/7-9 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 43, par. 153). **Liquor Control Act of 1934.** In Section concerning appeals from orders of local liquor commissions, provisions denying *de novo* review by the State Commission in the case of appeals from municipalities with a population between 100,000 and 500,000 but requiring *de novo* review in the case of other municipalities violated the Illinois Constitution's prohibition against special legislation. There was no rational basis for the difference in treatment accorded municipalities with a population between 100,000 and 500,000 (of which there were only 2 in the State) and municipalities with a population less than 100,000. P.A. 77-674 deleted the provision denying *de novo* review in the case of appeals from municipalities with a population between 100,000 and 500,000 and provided instead that in the case of appeals from home rule municipalities with a population under 500,000 (rather than municipalities with a population between 100,000 and 500,000) the appeal was limited to a review of the official record of the local proceedings. *Shepard v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n*, 43 Ill.2d 187 (1969).

235 ILCS 5/8-9 (P.A. 88-669). **Liquor Control Act of 1934.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under "Executive Branch", "Finance", "Revenue", "Gaming", "Public Health", "Vehicles", "Criminal Offenses", and "Corrections".)

WAREHOUSES

240 ILCS 40/. Grain Code. Provisions of former Grain Dealers Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111, par. 306) and former Illinois Grain Insurance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 114, par. 704) requiring federally licensed grain warehousemen located in Illinois to either join the Illinois Grain Insurance Fund or provide financial protection for claimants equal to the protection afforded under the Illinois Grain Insurance Act violated the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution because they were in conflict with and preempted by the United States Warehouse Act. Subsequently, P.A. 87-262 removed the unconstitutional language from the Grain Dealers Act. Thereafter, both that Act and the Illinois Grain Insurance Act were repealed by P.A. 89-287 and replaced by the Grain Code (under which participation by federal warehousemen in the Illinois Grain Insurance Fund is made permissive under cooperative agreements that are permitted by federal law). *Demeter, Inc. v. Werries*, 676 F.Supp. 882 (C.D.Ill. 1988).

PUBLIC AID

305 ILCS 5/10-2 (West 1992). **Illinois Public Aid Code.** Provision (i) requiring parents to contribute to the support of a child age 18 through 20 who receives aid and resides with the parents and (ii) exempting parents of a child in the same age group who receives aid but does not live with his or her parents was unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. The court, while voiding the parental support provision, upheld the remainder of the Section regarding liability for support between spouses and the responsibility for support by other relatives. P.A. 92-876 replaced the provision with the requirement that parents are severally liable for an unemancipated child under age 18, or an unemancipated child age 18 or over who attends high school, until the child is 19 or graduates from high school, whichever is earlier. *Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid*, 171 Ill.2d 314 (1996).

305 ILCS 5/11-30. Illinois Public Aid Code. Provision that a public aid applicant who received public aid within the previous 12 months in another state in a lower amount than the aid Illinois would provide was ineligible for public aid in Illinois for the first 12 months of residency beyond the amount received in the former state violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution for an aid applicant who had received a lower amount in her former state of Alabama. P.A. 92-111 repealed the provision. *Hicks v. Peters*, 10 F.Supp.2d 1003 (N.D.Ill. 1998).

PUBLIC HEALTH

410 ILCS 230/4-100 (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 111½, par. 4604-100). **Problem Pregnancy Health Services and Care Act.** Provision prohibiting the Department of Public Health from making grants to nonprofit entities that provide abortion referral or counseling services was unconstitutional: (i) it violated due process because it disqualified entities that agreed not to use the State funds for those particular services and (ii) it violated the First Amendment by imposing a content-based restriction on the information available for a woman's childbirth decision. P.A. 83-51 amended the statute to enable the entities to receive the grants if they did not use the funds for abortion referral or counseling services. *Planned Parenthood Association v. Kempiners*, 568 F.Supp. 1490 (N.D.Ill. 1983).

410 ILCS 315/2c (P.A. 88-669). **Communicable Diseases Prevention Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 92-790, effective August 6, 2002, repealed the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-1074 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under "Executive Branch", "Finance", "Revenue", "Gaming", "Liquor", "Vehicles", "Criminal Offenses", and "Corrections".)

ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY

415 ILCS 5/4 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 111½, par. 1004). **Environmental Protection Act.** Provision that it was the duty of the EPA to investigate violations of the Act and to prepare and present enforcement actions before the Pollution Control Board violated Article V, Section 15 of the Illinois Constitution, which provides that the Attorney General is “the legal officer of the State” and thus is the only officer empowered to represent the people in any proceeding in which the State is the real party in interest. P.A. 81-219 deleted the offending provision and limited the EPA’s duty to investigating violations of the Act and regulations and issuing administrative citations. *People ex rel. Scott v. Briceland*, 65 Ill.2d 485 (1976).

415 ILCS 5/25 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 111½, par. 1025). **Environmental Protection Act.** Provision exempting a motor racing event from noise standards if the event was endorsed by one of several designated private organizations was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to a private group. P.A. 82-654 deleted the offending provision. *People v. Pollution Control Board*, 83 Ill.App.3d 802 (1st Dist. 1980).

415 ILCS 5/33 and 5/42 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 111½, pars. 1033 and 1042). **Environmental Protection Act.** Provisions allowing the Pollution Control Board to impose money penalties not to exceed \$10,000 for a violation of the Act or regulations or an order of the Board were an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because the provisions failed to provide the Board with any standards to guide it in imposing penalties. The provisions also were an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power because the Board could impose discretionary fines, a distinctly judicial act. P.A. 78-862 amended the statute to allow the Board to impose “civil penalties” instead of “money penalties”. *Southern Illinois Asphalt Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency*, 15 Ill.App.3d 66 (5th Dist. 1973).

PUBLIC SAFETY

430 ILCS 65/2 (West 1994). **Firearm Owners Identification Card Act.** (See *People v. Davis*, 177 Ill.2d 495 (1997), reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Corrections”, concerning the disproportionality of penalties for possession of a firearm in violation of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act and unlawful use of a firearm by a felon.)

ROADS AND BRIDGES

605 ILCS 5/9-112 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 121, par. 9-112). **Illinois Highway Code.** Provision authorizing local authorities to permit advertising on public highways with no guidelines was an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. P.A. 76-793 deleted the provision. *City of Chicago v. Pennsylvania R. Co.*, 41 Ill.2d 245 (1968).

VEHICLES

625 ILCS 5/. **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision in former Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-theft Act (repealed) providing for an increased registration fee for certain cars purchased in another state was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Laws 1957, p. 2706 repealed the former Act. *Berger v. Barrett*, 414 Ill. 43 (1953).

625 ILCS 5/4-107 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95½, par. 4-107). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision that a vehicle was considered contraband if the vehicle ID number could not be identified was an unconstitutional denial of due process when applied to a buyer who bought a vehicle from a dealer and the title to the vehicle had an ID number that matched the ID number on the dashboard, but the number was false and it was impossible to determine the confidential vehicle ID number. P.A. 83-1473 added an exception for a person who acquires a vehicle without knowledge that the ID number has been removed, altered, or destroyed. *People v. One 1979 Pontiac Grand Prix Automobile*, 89 Ill.2d 506 (1982).

625 ILCS 5/5-401.2. **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95½, par. 5-401) authorizing warrantless administrative searches of records and business premises of auto parts dealers was unconstitutional because it did not provide for the regularity and neutrality required by the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. P.A. 83-1473 repealed Section 5-401 of the Code and replaced it with new Section 5-401.2, which does not contain the offending provision. *People v. Krull*, 107 Ill.2d 107 (1985).

625 ILCS 5/5-401.2 (West 1996). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision that made the knowing failure by certain licensees to maintain records of the acquisition and disposition of vehicles a Class 2 felony was an unconstitutional violation of due process because the criminalization of an innocent record-keeping error was not a reasonable means of preventing the trafficking of stolen vehicles and parts. P.A. 92-773 reduced the failure to a Class B misdemeanor and made the failure with intent to conceal the identity or origin of a vehicle or its essential parts or with intent to defraud the public in the transfer or sale of vehicles or their essential parts a Class 2 felony. *People v. Wright*, 194 Ill.2d 1 (2000).

625 ILCS 5/6-107 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 95½, par. 6-107). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision requiring parent's or guardian's consent for driver's license for an unmarried emancipated minor under age 21 but not for a married emancipated minor under that age was arbitrary discrimination against unmarried emancipated minors. P.A. 77-2805 reduced the age limit to 18 but kept the distinction. Without expressing an opinion as to the validity of the amended provision, the court noted that there may be justifications for applying such a classification to minors under age 18. *People v. Sherman*, 57 Ill.2d 1 (1974).

625 ILCS 5/6-205 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, par. 6-205). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision requiring the Secretary of State to revoke a sex offender's driver's license denied the offender due process because there was no relationship to the public interest when a vehicle was not used in the offense. P.A. 85-1259 deleted the offending provision. *People v. Lindner*, 127 Ill.2d 174 (1989).

625 ILCS 5/6-301.2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 95½, par. 6-301.2). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision that punished distribution of a fraudulent driver's license as a Class B misdemeanor but punished the lesser included offense of possessing a fraudulent driver's license as a Class 4 felony violated the Illinois Constitution's due process and proportionality of penalties clauses. P.A. 89-283, effective January 1, 1996, retained the penalties and changed the offense from distributing fraudulent driver's licenses to distributing information about the availability of fraudulent driver's licenses. *People v. McGee*, 257 Ill.App.3d 229 (1st Dist. 1993).

625 ILCS 5/7-205 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1970 Supp., ch. 95½, par. 7-205). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision of "Safety Responsibility Law" within the Code that permitted the suspension of a driver's license without a pre-suspension hearing violated due process. P.A. 77-1910 replaced the offending provision with a requirement that the Secretary of State cause a hearing to be held to determine whether a driver's license should be suspended. P.A. 83-1081 deleted the requirement that the Secretary of State cause a hearing to be held and instead provided that a driver be given an opportunity to request a hearing before suspension of his or her driver's license. *Pollion v. Lewis*, 332 F.Supp. 777 (N.D.Ill. 1971).

625 ILCS 5/11-1419.01, 5/11-1419.02, and 5/11-1419.03 (P.A. 88-669). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under "Executive Branch", "Finance", "Revenue", "Gaming", "Liquor", "Public Health", "Criminal Offenses", and "Corrections".)

625 ILCS 5/12-612 (West 2004). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Statute that made it unlawful for a person to own or operate a motor vehicle that the person knows to contain a false or secret compartment, and that provides that the person's intent to use the compartment to conceal its contents from a law enforcement officer may be inferred from the nature of the contents, violated the due process guarantees of the federal and State

constitutions (U.S. Const., Amends. V and XIV and ILCON Art. I, Sec.2) because it was too broad and potentially punished innocent behavior. Public Act 96-202, effective January 1, 2010, amended Section 12-612 to require that the person (i) own or operate the vehicle with criminal intent and (ii) know that the compartment is or has been used to conceal specified, prohibited firearms or controlled substances. *People v. Carpenter*, 228 Ill.2d 250 (2008).

COURTS

705 ILCS 25/1 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 25). **Appellate Court Act.**
705 ILCS 35/2 and 35/2e (repealed) (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, pars. 72.2 and 72.2e (repealed)). **Circuit Courts Act.**

705 ILCS 40/2 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 72.42). **Judicial Vacancies Act.**
705 ILCS 45/2 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 160.2). **Associate Judges Act.**
 P.A. 86-786 amendatory provisions were unconstitutional because (i) the subdividing of the First Appellate District for judicial elections beyond the divisions made by the Illinois Constitution violated the Constitution and (ii) the subdividing of the Circuit of Cook County, while not unconstitutional by itself, was inseverable from the invalid appellate court provisions. P.A. 86-1478 deleted the offending changes made by P.A. 86-786 and restored the law as it existed before P.A. 86-786, stating that its purpose was to conform the law to the Supreme Court's opinion. *People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. State Bd. of Elections*, 136 Ill.2d 513 (1990).

705 ILCS 35/2c (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 72.2c). **Circuit Courts Act.**
 Provision requiring a circuit judge to be a resident of a particular county within a (multiple-county) circuit and yet be elected at large from within that circuit violated subsection (a) of Section 7 and Section 11 of Article VI of the Illinois Constitution by creating a hybrid variety judgeship that was not contemplated by the Constitution's drafters. The Section was amended by P.A. 87-410 to remove the provision in question, as well as a similar provision relating to the election of judges in another circuit. *Thies v. State Board of Elections*, 124 Ill.2d 317 (1988).

705 ILCS 105/27.1 and 105/27.2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 25, par. 27.1 and Ill. Rev. Stat. 1982 Supp., ch. 25, par. 27.2). **Clerks of Courts Act.** Provisions requiring circuit clerks to collect a special \$5 filing fee from petitioners for dissolution of marriage to fund shelters and services for domestic violence victims unreasonably interfered with persons' access to the courts, were an arbitrary use of the State's police power, and made an unreasonable or arbitrary classification for tax purposes by imposing a tax to fund a general welfare program only on members of a designated class. P.A. 83-1539 deleted the offending provision from Section 27.1, and P.A. 83-1375 deleted the offending provision from Section 27.2. *Crocker v. Finley*, 99 Ill.2d 444 (1984).

705 ILCS 405/2-28 (West 1998). **Juvenile Court Act of 1987.** Portion of subsection (3) that granted an automatic appeal of a court order changing a child's permanency goal violated Section 6 of Article VI of the Illinois Constitution, which assigns to the Illinois Supreme Court the power to establish procedures for appealing non-final judgments. Public Act 95-182, effective August 14, 2007, deleted the offending provision. *In re Curtis B.*, 203 Ill.2d 53 (2002), *In re D.D.H.*, 319 Ill.App.3d 989 (5th Dist. 2001), *In re C.B.*, 322 Ill.App.3d 1011 (4th Dist. 2001), and *In re T.B.*, 325 Ill.App.3d 566 (3rd Dist. 2001).

705 ILCS 405/5-33 (repealed) (West 1996). **Juvenile Court Act of 1987.** Act's silence as to a jury trial for a minor at least 13 years old adjudicated delinquent for first degree murder and committed to the Department of Corrections until age 21 without parole for 5 years was an unconstitutional denial of equal protection guarantees as applied to a 13-year-old whose jury trial request was denied. P.A. 90-590 repealed the offending Section and added Section 5-810, which allows a jury trial in certain circumstances. *In re G.O.*, 304 Ill.App.3d 719 (1st Dist. 1999).

CRIMINAL OFFENSES

720 ILCS 5/10-5.5 (West 1994). **Criminal Code of 1961.** The provision of the unlawful visitation interference statute prohibiting the imposition of civil contempt sanctions under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act after a conviction for unlawful visitation interference was an undue infringement on the court's inherent powers under the separation of powers provision of Article II, Section 1 of the Illinois Constitution. Public Act 96-710, effective January 1, 2010, removed the offending provision. *People v. Warren*, 173 Ill.2d 348 (1996).

720 ILCS 5/11-20.1 (P.A. 88-680). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-680 were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-680 violated the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 91-54 re-enacted the changes in Section 11-20.1 made by P.A. 88-680. *People v. Dainty*, 299 Ill.App.3d 235 (3rd Dist. 1998), *People v. Williams*, 302 Ill.App.3d 975 (2nd Dist. 1999), and *People v. Edwards*, 304 Ill.App.3d 250 (2nd Dist. 1999). (These cases are also reported in Part 2 of this Case Report under "Finance", "Courts", and "Corrections".)

720 ILCS 5/12-18 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 12-18). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provision that a person may not be charged by his or her spouse with the offense of criminal sexual abuse or aggravated criminal sexual abuse was an unconstitutional violation of equal protection and due process. P.A. 88-421 deleted the offending provision. *People v. M.D.*, 231 Ill.App.3d 176 (2nd Dist. 1992).

720 ILCS 5/16-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 16-1). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Theft provision that prohibited obtaining control over property in custody of law enforcement agency that was explicitly represented as being stolen was unconstitutional on its face because it did not require a culpable mental state. P.A. 89-377 rearranged the list of elements of the offense to make it clear that the offense requires that a person “knowingly” obtain control over the property. *People v. Zaremba*, 158 Ill.2d 36 (1994).

720 ILCS 5/17B-1, 5/17B-5, 5/17B-10, 5/17B-15, 5/17B-20, 5/17B-25, and 5/17B-30 (P.A. 88-680). **Criminal Code of 1961.** WIC Fraud Article added by P.A. 88-680 was unconstitutional because P.A. 88-680 violated the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 91-155 re-enacted the WIC Fraud Article of the Code. *People v. Dainty*, 299 Ill.App.3d 235 (3rd Dist. 1998), *People v. Williams*, 302 Ill.App.3d 975 (2nd Dist. 1999), and *People v. Edwards*, 304 Ill.App.3d 250 (2nd Dist. 1999). (These cases are also reported in Part 2 of this Case Report under “Finance”, “Courts”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 2000). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Subsection (b)’s 15-year sentence enhancement for armed robbery committed under subsection (a)(2) with a firearm resulted in a penalty greater than that for armed violence predicated on robbery with a dangerous weapon (720 ILCS 5/33A-2), in violation of the proportionate penalty requirement of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. I, Sec.11) for offenses with identical elements. Public Act 95-688, effective October 23, 2007, redefined armed violence to exclude as a predicate any offense that carries a mandatory sentence enhancement for use of a firearm. *People v. Hauschild*, 226 Ill.2d 63 (2007).

720 ILCS 5/20-1.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 20-1.1). **Criminal Code of 1961.**

Item (1) of subsection (a) provided that a person committed aggravated arson when the person knowingly damaged a structure by means of fire or explosive and the person knew or reasonably should have known that someone was present in the structure. This provision was unconstitutional because the underlying conduct that was supposed to be enhanced by the aggravated arson statute was not necessarily criminal in nature. *People v. Johnson*, 114 Ill.2d 69 (1986).

Item (3) of subsection (a) provided that a person committed aggravated arson when the person damaged a structure by means of fire or explosive and a fireman or policeman was injured. This provision was unconstitutional because it failed to require a culpable intent. *People v. Wick*, 107 Ill.2d 62 (1985).

P.A. 84-1100 amended the statute to add “in the course of committing arson” after “A person commits aggravated arson when”, thereby adding the requirement of a criminal purpose or intent.

720 ILCS 5/21.1-2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 21.1-2). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provision making peaceful picketing of “a place of employment involved in a labor dispute” exempt from general prohibition against picketing a residence was a denial of equal protection because it accorded preferential treatment to the expression of views on one particular subject: dissemination of information about labor disputes was unrestricted, but discussion of other issues was restricted. P.A. 81-1270 deleted the exception for picketing at “a place of employment involved in a labor dispute”. *Carey v. Brown*, 100 S.Ct. 2286 (1980).

720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 1994). **Criminal Code of 1961.** (See *People v. Davis*, 177 Ill.2d 495 (1997), reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Corrections”, concerning the disproportionality of penalties for possession of a firearm in violation of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act and unlawful use of a firearm by a felon.)

720 ILCS 5/24-5 (West 2002). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Subsection (b), which provided that possession of a firearm with a defaced identification mark was prima facie evidence that the possessor committed the offense of knowingly or intentionally defacing identification marks on a firearm, created an unconstitutional mandatory rebuttable presumption of guilt. P.A. 93-906, effective August 11, 2004, eliminated the language conveying prima facie evidentiary status to possession of a defaced firearm. *People v. Quinones*, 362 Ill.App.3d 385 (1st Dist. 2005).

720 ILCS 5/25-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, par. 25-1). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provision of mob action offense that prohibited the assembly of 2 or more persons to do an unlawful act was unconstitutional for violating due process and the First Amendment because it (i) was too vague to give reasonable notice of the prohibited conduct or adjudicatory standards and (ii) was so overbroad as to allow the arbitrary suppression of non-criminal conduct. Public Act 96-710, effective January 1, 2010, changed the offense to prohibit the knowing assembly of 2 or more persons with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony or misdemeanor. *Landry v. Daley*, 280 F.Supp. 938 (N.D.Ill. 1968).

720 ILCS 5/26-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 26-1). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provision that a person commits disorderly conduct when he or she makes a telephone call with the intent to annoy another was impermissibly broad because it applied to any call made with the intent to annoy, including those that might not provoke a breach of the peace. P.A. 80-795 deleted the offending provision. *People v. Klick*, 66 Ill.2d 269 (1977).

720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1 and 5/31A-1.2 (P.A. 89-688). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provisions amended by P.A. 89-688 were unconstitutional because P.A. 89-688 violated

the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. (Although Public Act 89-688 also amended Section 8-1.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/8-1.1), identical changes were made to that Section by Public Act 89-689, effective December 31, 1996.) P.A. 94-1017, effective July 7, 2006, re-enacted the changes made to Section 31A-1.1 by P.A.s 89-688 and 94-556 and to Section 31A-1.2 by P.A.s 89-688, 90-655, 91-357, and 94-556. *People v. Foster*, 316 Ill.App.3d 855 (4th Dist. 2000), and *People v. Burdunice*, 211 Ill.2d 264 (2004). (These cases are also reported in Part 2 of this Case Report under “General Provisions”, “Criminal Procedure”, and “Corrections”.)

720 ILCS 5/33A-1, 5/33A-2, and 5/33A-3 (P.A. 88-680). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-680 were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-680 violated the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 91-404 provided that should P.A. 88-680 be declared unconstitutional as violative of the single-subject rule, it was the General Assembly’s intent that P.A. 91-404 re-enact the changes made by P.A. 88-680 in Article 33A of the Code. *People v. Dainty*, 299 Ill.App.3d 235 (3rd Dist. 1998), *People v. Williams*, 302 Ill.App.3d 975 (2nd Dist. 1999), and *People v. Edwards*, 304 Ill.App.3d 250 (2nd Dist. 1999). (These cases are also reported in Part 2 of this Case Report under “Finance”, “Courts”, and “Corrections”.)

720 ILCS 5/33A-2 and 5/33A-3. Criminal Code of 1961. Penalties for armed violence predicated on certain offenses were unconstitutionally disproportionate to penalties for other offenses.

Penalty for armed violence (a Class X felony) was disproportionate to penalty for aggravated kidnapping other than for ransom under 720 ILCS 5/10-2 (a Class 1 felony) because the elements for both offenses are the same. P.A. 89-707 amended Section 10-2 to provide that aggravated kidnapping, whether or not for ransom, is a Class X felony. *People v. Christy*, 139 Ill.2d 132 (1990).

Armed violence predicated on robbery committed with a category I weapon. Minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years was disproportionate to minimum term of imprisonment (6 years) for robbery committed with a handgun under 720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 1994). *People v. Lewis*, 175 Ill.2d 412 (1996).

Armed violence predicated on aggravated vehicular hijacking and armed robbery. Minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years was disproportionate to minimum terms of imprisonment (7 years and 6 years, respectively) for aggravated vehicular hijacking under 720 ILCS 5/18-4 (West 1994) and armed robbery under 720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 1994). *People v. Beard*, 287 Ill.App.3d 935 (1st Dist. 1997).

Public Act 95-688, effective October 23, 2007, amended 720 ILCS 5/33A-2 to remove from the definition of armed violence any offense that makes possession or use of a dangerous weapon an element of the offense or an aggravated version of the offense, thus eliminating robbery committed with a handgun under 720 ILCS 5/18-2, armed robbery under 720 ILCS 5/18-2, and some forms of aggravated vehicular hijacking. Aggravated vehicular hijacking, however, may be committed under 720 ILCS 5/18-4 with aggravating factors other than possession or use of a dangerous weapon.

720 ILCS 5/36-1 (P.A. 88-669). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1017, effective July 7, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1074 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Revenue”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, and “Corrections”.)

720 ILCS 125/2 (West 1996). **Hunter Interference Prohibition Act.** Prohibition against disrupting a person engaged in lawfully taking a wild animal for the purpose of preventing the taking was a content-based regulation of speech in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. P.A. 90-555 eliminated the offending subsection. *People v. Sanders*, 182 Ill.2d 524 (1998).

720 ILCS 150/5.1 (West 1992). **Wrongs to Children Act.** Provision creating the offense of permitting the sexual abuse of a child, one element of which was the failure to take reasonable steps to prevent the abuse, violated the due process guarantees of Amendments V and XIV of the U.S. Constitution and Art. I, Sec. 2 of the Illinois Constitution by failing to warn as to what was prohibited and failing to provide clear guidelines for enforcement. P.A.s 89-462 and 91-696 amended the provision to add to the list of persons subject to the statute, to add to the list of acts by which a person committed the offense, and to change the penalty from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 1 felony. P.A. 92-827 rewrote the entire Section, replacing the offending element with having actual knowledge of and permitting sexual abuse of the child or permitting the child to engage in prostitution. *People v. Maness*, 191 Ill.2d 478 (2000).

720 ILCS 510/2, 510/3, 510/5, 510/7, 510/8, 510/9, 510/10, and 510/11 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1976, ch. 38, pars. 81-22, 81-23, 81-25, 81-27, 81-28, 81-29, 81-30, and 81-31). **Illinois Abortion Law of 1975.** Substantial portions of the Act were unconstitutional because they violated the due process clause of the U. S. Constitution. The definition of “criminal abortion” was vague; physicians were not given fair warning of what information they had to provide to pregnant women; spousal and parental consent requirements unduly infringed on a pregnant woman’s rights; the requirement for additional physician consultations bore no relationship to the needs of the patient or fetus; there was no provision for notice and an opportunity to contest the termination of parental rights; the ban on saline abortions removed a necessary alternative procedure; and required reports of abortions as fetal deaths failed to preserve a woman’s right to confidentiality. P.A. 81-1078 made numerous changes in the Act in response to the findings of unconstitutionality. *Wynn v. Carey*, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).

720 ILCS 515/3, 515/4, and 515/5 (repealed) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1978, ch. 38, pars. 81-53, 81-54, and 81-55). **Illinois Abortion Parental Consent Act of 1977.** Provision defining “abortion” was unconstitutionally vague, and criminal penalty provision based on that definition was therefore also unconstitutional. Provision for a 48-hour waiting period and parental consent were unconstitutional violations of the federal equal protection clause because they were underinclusive in that they excluded married minors and overinclusive in that they included mature, emancipated minors. P.A. 89-18 repealed the Illinois Abortion Parental Consent Act of 1977 (as well as the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983) and replaced them with the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 (750 ILCS 70/), which excludes married or emancipated minors. Enforcement of the 1995 Act is presently restrained by a federal court. *Wynn v. Carey*, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).

720 ILCS 520/4 (repealed) (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, par. 81-64). **Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983.** Requirement of a 24-hour waiting period after notifying parent of minor’s decision to have an abortion was unconstitutional as unduly burdening the minor’s right to an abortion in the absence of a compelling state interest. P.A. 89-18 repealed the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983 (as well as the Illinois Abortion Parental Consent Act of 1977) and replaced them with the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 (750 ILCS 70/), which provides for a 48-hour waiting period. Enforcement of the 1995 Act is presently restrained by a federal court. *Zbaraz v. Hartigan*, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985).

720 ILCS 570/201 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 56½, par. 1201). **Illinois Controlled Substances Act.** Provision authorizing the Director of Law Enforcement to add or delete substances from the schedules of controlled substances by issuing rules having the immediate effect of law failed to provide constitutionally required due notice to persons affected by such a rule. P.A. 79-454 added provisions requiring publication of a determination to add or delete a substance, allowing time for filing objections to such a determination, and requiring a hearing before issuance of a rule. *People v. Avery*, 67 Ill.2d 182 (1977).

720 ILCS 600/2 and 600/3 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 56½, pars. 2102 and 2103). **Drug Paraphernalia Control Act.** Provisions were unconstitutionally vague because they required scienter on the part of a retailer in the definition Section but allowed for constructive knowledge on the part of the retailer in the penalty Section. P.A. 86-271 amended the penalty Section to delete the constructive knowledge provision. *People v. Monroe*, 118 Ill.2d 298 (1987).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

725 ILCS 5/108-8 (West 1994). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Subsection authorizing a “no-knock” search warrant based on the mere existence of firearms on the premises resulted in an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the

United States and Illinois constitutions. P.A. 90-456 amended the Code to base issuance of “no-knock” warrants on the reasonable belief that weapons may be used or evidence may be destroyed if entry is announced. *People v. Wright*, 183 Ill.2d 16 (1998).

725 ILCS 5/109-3 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 38, par. 109-3). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Provision that an order of suppression of evidence entered at a preliminary hearing was not an appealable order violated provision of Illinois Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power to provide by rule for appeals. P.A. 79-1360 deleted the offending provision. *People v. Taylor*, 50 Ill.2d 136 (1971).

725 ILCS 5/110-7 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 110-7). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Provision that required the cost of appointed legal counsel to be reimbursed from a defendant’s bail deposit violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. and Illinois constitutions because other defendants who did not post bail were not required to reimburse the costs of their appointed counsel. P.A. 83-336 removed the provision. *People v. Cook*, 81 Ill.2d 176 (1980).

725 ILCS 5/115-10 (P.A. 89-428). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** P.A. 89-428 included a provision amending the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 permitting, in a prosecution for a physical or sexual act perpetrated on a child under age 13, the admission of certain out-of-court statements by the child victim. The entire Public Act was unconstitutional because it violated the single-subject requirement of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 90-786 amended Section 115-10 to allow such statements provided they are made before the victim attains age 13 or within 3 months after commission of the offense, whichever occurs later. *Johnson v. Edgar*, 176 Ill.2d 499 (1997).

725 ILCS 150/9 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 56½, par. 1679). **Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act.** Provision depriving a claimant in a forfeiture proceeding of a jury trial was unconstitutional. P.A. 89-404 deleted the language that required forfeiture hearings to be heard by the court without a jury. *People ex rel. O'Malley v. 6323 North LaCrosse Ave.*, 158 Ill.2d 453 (1994).

CORRECTIONS

730 ILCS 5/. Unified Code of Corrections. Former provision of Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005-2-1) requiring a criminal defendant to bear the burden of proof that he or she was unfit to stand trial was a denial of due process in violation of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 81-1217 repealed the offending provision. *People v. McCullum*, 66 Ill.2d 306 (1977).

730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (P.A. 89-404). **Unified Code of Corrections.** P.A. 89-404, including amendments to the Code’s “truth-in-sentencing” provisions, violated the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A.’s 89-462, 90-592, and 90-593 re-enacted the Code’s “truth-in-sentencing” provisions. *People v. Reedy*, 186 Ill.2d 1 (1999).

730 ILCS 5/3-7-6, 5/3-12-2, and 5/3-12-5 (P.A. 88-669). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1017, effective July 7, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1074 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Revenue”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, and “Criminal Offenses”).

730 ILCS 5/5-4-1 and 5/5-8-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars 1005-4-1 and 1005-8-1). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Two provisions providing that, in imposing a sentence for a felony conviction, a judge “shall” specify reasons for his or her sentencing determination were constitutional, as held here, when “shall” is construed in that context to be permissive rather than mandatory. By contrast, if “shall” were interpreted to reflect a mandatory intent, the provisions would unconstitutionally infringe upon the inherently separate power of the judiciary. Public Act 95-1052, effective July 1, 2009, removed the offending provision from Section 5-8-1. *People v. Davis*, 93 Ill.2d 155 (1982).

730 ILCS 5/5-4-3 (West 1994). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Requirement that an incarcerated sex offender, ordered by the court to provide a blood specimen, must be punished with contempt when the prisoner is deliberately uncooperative violated the separation of powers doctrine of Section 1 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 90-793 punishes the deliberate actions as a Class A misdemeanor. *Murneigh v. Gainer*, 177 Ill.2d 287 (1997).

730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 (West Supp. 1995). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Designation of possession of a firearm in violation of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act as a nonprobationable Class 3 felony, as compared to the designation of unlawful use of a firearm by a felon as a probationable Class 3 felony, violated the prohibition against disproportionate penalties in Section 11 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution. Public Act 94-72, effective January 1, 2006, amended Section 5-5-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections to designate unlawful use of a firearm by a felon as a nonprobationable Class 3 felony. *People v. Davis*, 177 Ill.2d 495 (1997).

730 ILCS 5/5-4.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-4.1). **Unified Code of Corrections.** The statute purported to alter the standard of review of a sentence imposed by a trial judge and authorized a court of review to enter any sentence that the trial judge could have entered. This conflicted with Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4). The statute was invalid because it constituted an undue infringement by the legislature on the powers of the judiciary. Although the legislature may enact laws governing judicial practice that do not unduly infringe on inherent judicial powers, if a Supreme Court Rule conflicts with a statute, the Rule prevails. Subsequently, P.A. 83-344 removed the offending language. *People v. Cox*, 82 Ill.2d 268 (1980).

730 ILCS 150/2 (West 2000). **Sex Offender Registration Act.** Including a conviction of aggravated kidnapping among the sex offenses that trigger registration as a sex offender unconstitutionally violated the substantive due process rights of an offender when applied to a defendant without a history of sex offenses whose crime was without sexual motivation or purpose. P.A. 94-945, effective June 27, 2006, added the requirement that the offense was sexually motivated. *People v. Johnson*, 363 Ill.App.3d 356 (1st Dist. 2006).

CIVIL PROCEDURE

735 ILCS 5/. Code of Civil Procedure. Provision of “An Act to revise the law in relation to medical practice” (P.A. 79-960; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 70, par. 101) that limited recovery in cases involving injuries arising from medical, hospital, or other healing art malpractice to \$500,000 permitted or denied recovery on an arbitrary basis, thus granting a special privilege in violation of Article IV, Section 13 of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 81-288 repealed the offending provision.

Provision of predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, pars. 58.2 through 58.10) establishing medical review panels to hear malpractice claims unconstitutionally delegated judicial functions to non-judicial personnel. Provision establishing malpractice claim review procedure as a condition to a jury trial violated the constitutional right to a trial by jury. P.A. 81-288 repealed the offending provisions. *Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Ass’n*, 63 Ill.2d 313 (1976). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Insurance”.)

735 ILCS 5/. Code of Civil Procedure. Former provisions of Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, pars. 2-1012 through 2-1020) requiring, as a prerequisite to trial in a healing art malpractice case, that a panel composed of a circuit judge, a practicing attorney, and a health-care professional convene and make a determination regarding liability and, if liability is found, damages violated the Illinois Constitution’s grant of judicial power solely to the courts because the statute was an attempt by the legislature to create new courts. The offending provisions were repealed by P.A. 86-1028. *Bernier v. Burris*, 113 Ill.2d 219 (1986).

735 ILCS 5/2-622 and 5/8-2501. (P.A. 89-7). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Provisions concerning physician affidavits and expert witnesses in healing arts malpractice actions were unconstitutional due to their inseverability, despite inclusion of a severability clause, from P.A. 89-7, which is unconstitutional in its entirety. P.A. 90-579, effective May 1, 1998, in amending 735 ILCS 5/2-622, included language added by P.A. 89-7 without specifying an intentional re-enactment. Public Act 90-579 was deemed a valid resurrection of P.A. 89-7 in *Cargill v. Czelatdko*, 353 Ill.App.3d 654 (4th Dist. 2004); *Cargill* was overruled by *O'Casek v. Children's Home and Aid Society of Illinois*, 229 Ill.2d 421 (2008). Public Act 94-677, effective August 25, 2005, specifically re-enacted and changed 735 ILCS 5/2-622 and 5/8-2501. *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997).

735 ILCS 5/12-701 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 12-701). **Code of Civil Procedure.** The statute required the court clerk to issue a summons to a person commanding the person to appear in court as a nonwage garnishee after a judgment creditor filed an affidavit. The statute violated due process because it did not require a judgment debtor to be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. P.A. 87-1252 added the requirement that a garnishment notice be provided to the judgment debtor and gave a judgment debtor the right to request a hearing. *E.J. McKernan Co. v. Gregory*, 268 Ill.App.3d 383 (2nd Dist. 1994); *Jacobson v. Johnson*, 798 F.Supp. 500 (C.D.Ill. 1991).

735 ILCS 5/13-208. **Code of Civil Procedure.** Pre-Code limitations provision (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 83, par. 19) concerning the effect an absence from the State had on personal actions was an unconstitutional violation of equal protection guarantees because the statute applied only to Illinois residents. The unconstitutional provision was not continued in the Code of Civil Procedure in 1982. *Haughton v. Haughton*, 76 Ill.2d 439 (1979).

CIVIL LIABILITIES

740 ILCS 10/. Illinois Antitrust Act. The 1893 antitrust Act was unconstitutional because of a discrimination in favor of agricultural products or livestock in the hands of the producer or raiser exempting them from the prohibition against recovery of the price of articles sold by any trust or combination in restraint of trade or competition in violation of the Act. In 1965, the 1893 Act was repealed by the Illinois Antitrust Act, which did not contain a provision such as that which had been held unconstitutional. *Connolly v. Union Server Pipe Co.*, 22 S.Ct. 431 (1902).

740 ILCS 180/1 and 180/2 (P.A. 89-7). **Wrongful Death Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 89-7, a comprehensive revision of the law relating to personal injury actions that was unconstitutional in its entirety, despite inclusion of a severability clause, were inseverable. P.A. 91-380 re-enacted the changes made in the Wrongful Death Act by P.A. 89-7. *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997). (This case is also

reported in Part 2 of this Case Report under “Civil Procedure” and “Civil Liabilities”, concerning the inseparability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act enacted by P.A. 89-7.)

CIVIL IMMUNITIES

745 ILCS 25/3 and 25/4 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 122, pars. 823 and 824). **Tort Liability of Schools Act.** Provisions requiring that written notice of injury be filed with the proper school authority within 6 months after the date of the injury and requiring dismissal of an action for failure to file the notice were unconstitutional special legislation. There was no reason why a failure to file such a notice in relation to an injury on school property should bar a recovery while a failure to file such a notice in relation to an injury on property of another governmental unit would not bar a recovery. Enactment of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act eliminated the discrepancy between notice-of-injury provisions applicable to various units of local government. *Lorton v. Brown County School Dist.*, 35 Ill.2d 362 (1966). (See also *Cleary v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria*, 57 Ill.2d 384 (1974), reported in Part 2 of this Case Report under “Civil Immunities”.)

FAMILIES

750 ILCS 5/203 and 5/208 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 89, pars. 3, 3.1, and 6). **Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.** The statute allowed males to marry without parental consent at age 21 and females at age 18. The age requirement for males and females was also different for marriage with parental consent and marriage by court order. This was held to be a violation of Section 18 of Article 1 of the Illinois Constitution prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex. Subsequently, the statute was amended by P.A. 78-1297 to make the ages the same for males and females. *Phelps v. Bing*, 58 Ill.2d 32 (1974).

750 ILCS 5/401 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 401). **Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.** Amendatory language in P.A. 82-197 that retroactively validated all judgments for dissolution of marriage reserving questions of child custody or support, maintenance, or disposition of property, regardless of whether appropriate circumstances existed for the reservation of those questions, violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. The legislature was attempting to retroactively alter or overrule the appellate court’s interpretation of the statute (that is, that appropriate circumstances must exist before a trial court may reserve those questions). The legislature may alter only for future cases the appellate court’s interpretation of statutes. P.A. 83-247 deleted the offending provisions and provided that a trial court may enter a judgment for dissolution of marriage reserving certain issues upon agreement of the parties or upon the motion of either party and a finding by the court that appropriate circumstances exist. *In re Marriage of Cohn*, 93 Ill.2d 190 (1982).

750 ILCS 5/607 (West 1998). **Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.** Authorization to grant grandparent visitation when that visitation is in the best interest of the child was unconstitutional as applied to a child both of whose parents objected to grandparent visitation. P.A. 93-911, effective January 1, 2005, amended the provision to condition the visitation petition upon the parent's unreasonable denial of visitation and to establish a rebuttable presumption that a fit parent's visitation decisions are not harmful to the child's mental, physical, or emotional health. *Lulay v. Lulay*, 193 Ill.2d 455 (2000).

750 ILCS 5/607 (West 2000). **Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.** Paragraphs (1) and (3) of subsection (b), which authorized reasonable visitation to a minor child's grandparents, great-grandparents, or siblings when it is in the child's best interest and (i) the child's parents do not permanently or indefinitely co-habit or (ii) one of the child's parents is dead, violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by interfering with a parent's fundamental right to determine the care, custody, and control of his or her child. P.A. 93-911, effective January 1, 2005, removed the offending paragraphs and added language to condition the visitation petition upon the parent's unreasonable denial of visitation (and the existence of other factors such as one parent being deceased or parental non-co-habitation) and to establish a rebuttable presumption that a fit parent's visitation decisions are not harmful to the child's mental, physical, or emotional health. *Wickham v. Byrne*, 199 Ill.2d 309 (2002).

750 ILCS 45/8. Illinois Parentage Act of 1984. Provision of predecessor Paternity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 1354) that, with certain exceptions, no action could be brought under the Act later than 2 years after the birth of the child violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment because it did not afford illegitimate children a reasonable opportunity to bring an action and secure child support. P.A. 83-1372 repealed the Paternity Act and replaced it with the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, which provides that an action under the Act must be brought within 2 years after the child reaches the age of majority. *Jude v. Morrissey*, 117 Ill.App.3d 782 (1st Dist. 1983).

750 ILCS 45/11. Illinois Parentage Act of 1984. Provisions of predecessor Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity and Paternity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 106^{3/4}, pars. 1, 55, and 56) that contemplated that the decision to submit to a blood test was within a defendant's discretion were an invalid exercise of the legislative power because they conflicted with a court's power under Supreme Court Rules to order discovery and to compel compliance with discovery orders. P.A. 83-1372 repealed the Paternity Act and replaced it with the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, which provides that if a party refuses to submit to ordered blood tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity against that party or otherwise enforce its order. *People ex rel. Coleman v. Ely*, 71 Ill.App.3d 701 (1st Dist. 1979).

750 ILCS 45/. Illinois Parentage Act of 1984.**750 ILCS 50/8** (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 4, par. 9.1-8). **Adoption Act.**

Provision of predecessor to Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Paternity Act; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 106³/₄, par. 62) and provision of Adoption Act that (i) denied the putative father of an illegitimate child the custody of his child absent his attempt to legally adopt the child and (ii) allowed an adoption to be finalized without the consent of the father of an illegitimate child were unconstitutional. P.A. 78-854 deleted the offending provision of the Adoption Act, and P.A. 81-290 repealed the offending provision of the Paternity Act. *People ex rel. Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home*, 52 Ill.2d 20 (1972).

750 ILCS 50/1 (West 1998). **Adoption Act.** Subdivision D(f)'s mandatory irrebuttable presumption of parental unfitness due to a criminal conviction resulting from the death of a child due to physical abuse, while allowing the State to present evidence as to the best interests of the child in question, unconstitutionally denied equal protection of the law to a mother in an action to terminate her parental rights because of her first degree murder of her other child. P.A. 94-939, effective January 1, 2007, made the presumption rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence. *In re S.F.*, 359 Ill.App.3d 63 (1st Dist. 2005).

750 ILCS 50/1 (West 2002). **Adoption Act.** Subsection (D)(q)'s irrebuttable presumption of the unfitness of a parent convicted of aggravated battery, heinous battery, or attempted murder of any child:

(1) Violated State and federal constitutional equal protection guarantees (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV and ILCON Art. I, Sec. 2) because subsection (D)(i) of the same Section created only a rebuttable presumption of the unfitness of a parent who commits first or second degree murder of any person, which are no less serious offenses. *In re D.W.*, 214 Ill.2d 289 (2005).

(2) Violated State and federal constitutional equal protection and due process guarantees (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV and ILCON Art. I, Sec. 2) because it too broadly affected parents who, due to the time or circumstances of their offense or their rehabilitation, may not threaten the State's interest in the safety and welfare of children. *In re Amanda D.*, 349 Ill.App.3d 941 (2nd Dist. 2004).

P.A. 94-939, effective January 1, 2007, amended Section 1 of the Adoption Act by removing subsection (D)(q) and by changing subsection (D)(i) to include predatory sexual assault of a child, heinous battery of a child, and aggravated battery of a child among a parent's crimes that create a rebuttable presumption of his or her parental unfitness.

750 ILCS 65/1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1980, ch. 40, par. 1001). **Rights of Married Persons Act.** Provision prohibiting a husband or wife from suing the other for a tort to the person committed during the marriage denied equal protection in violation of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it was not rationally related to the purpose of maintaining marital harmony. P.A.'s 82-569, 82-621, 82-783, and 84-1305 amended the offending provision by adding an exception for intentional torts. P.A. 85-625 deleted

the exception and provided instead that a husband or wife may sue the other for a tort committed during the marriage. *Moran v. Beyer*, 734 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1984).

ESTATES

755 ILCS 5/2-2 (West 1994). **Probate Act of 1975.** Provision permitting mothers but not fathers to inherit by intestate succession from their illegitimate children unlawfully discriminated on basis of gender in violation of equal rights clause of Illinois Constitution. P.A. 90-803 changed Section 2-2 to permit eligible parents to inherit by intestate succession from their illegitimate children; an eligible parent is one who, during the child's lifetime, acknowledged the child, established a parental relationship with the child, and supported the child. *In re Estate of Hicks*, 174 Ill.2d 433 (1996).

PROPERTY

765 ILCS 705/1. Lessor's Liability Act. Provision in predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 80, par. 15) that prohibited the enforcement of a lease provision that exempted a non-governmental landlord from liability for the landlord's negligence as a violation of public policy was held unconstitutional as special legislation because of the exclusion of governmental landlords. The Act was subsequently replaced with the Lessor's Liability Act, which contained similar provisions but without the governmental exemption. *Sweney Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Toledo P. & W. R. Co.*, 42 Ill.2d 265 (1969).

765 ILCS 1025/14 and 1025/25 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 141, pars. 114 and 125). **Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.** Provision that required an insurance company to pay to State of Illinois unclaimed amounts payable under insurance policies to persons whose last known address was in Illinois failed to protect the company from multiple payments to other states and denied the company its property without due process. The Act was amended in 1963 to add provisions concerning proceedings in another state with respect to unclaimed property that has been paid or delivered to the State of Illinois. *Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Knight*, 210 F.Supp. 78 (S.D.Ill. 1962).

HUMAN RIGHTS

775 ILCS 5/. Illinois Human Rights Act. Provision of predecessor Act creating a Commission on Human Relations (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 127, par. 214.4-1) required the Commission to cause lists of homeowners in an "area" who did not wish to sell their homes to be mailed to realtors "known or believed" to be soliciting homeowners in that "area". The provision was an unconstitutional delegation of arbitrary powers to an administrative agency because (i) "area" was not defined and no standards were given for the agency to follow in designating "areas" and (ii) no standards were given for establishing a basis on which a "belief" concerning a realtor's solicitation activities may be formed. P.A. 81-1216 repealed the Act creating a Commission on Human Relations and replaced it with the Illinois Human Rights Act without continuing the offending provision in the new Act. (P.A. 80-920 had previously deleted related provisions,

concerning notice from the Human Relations Commission, from what is now the Discrimination in Sale of Real Estate Act, 720 ILCS 590/.) *People v. Tibbitts*, 56 Ill.2d 56 (1973).

775 ILCS 5/9-102 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1980 Supp., ch. 68, par. 9-102). **Illinois Human Rights Act.** Provision creating new cause of action for a charge of an unfair employment practice that was properly filed with the Fair Employment Practices Commission prior to March 30, 1978 and that was barred by lapse of time, and not similarly favoring those whose claims were filed after March 30, 1978, violated the special legislation provision of Article IV, Section 13 of the Illinois Constitution and the due process and equal protection clauses of Article I, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 84-1084 repealed this provision. *Wilson v. All-Steel, Inc.*, 87 Ill.2d 28 (1981).

BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

805 ILCS 5/15.65. Business Corporation Act of 1983. Provision of predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, ch. 32, par. 157.138) allowing imposition of franchise tax on foreign corporation authorized to do business in Illinois that was engaged exclusively in interstate business within Illinois violated the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The provision was amended by Laws 1959, p. 25 and Laws 1959, p. 2123 to provide that the franchise tax shall be imposed on a business for the privilege of exercising its authority to transact business in Illinois rather than for simply being authorized to transact business in this State. *Sinclair Pipeline Co. v. Carpentier*, 10 Ill.2d 295 (1957).

BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS

815 ILCS 350/. Fraudulent Sales Act. Provision of predecessor Act (Smith's Stat. 1931, p. 2602) authorizing municipal clerk to issue a license to hold a sale covered by the Act if the clerk was satisfied from the license application that the proposed sale was of the character the applicant desired to conduct and advertise was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to an administrative official. It did not define or describe the different types of sales designated as requiring a license and gave the clerk unwarranted discretion in determining whether the facts set out in a license application brought the proposed sale within the terms of the statute. The Act was subsequently repealed. The Fraudulent Sales Act specifies the information that must be contained in an application for a license to conduct a sale covered by the Act and provides that the clerk shall issue a license "upon receipt of an application giving fully and completely the [required] information". *People v. Yonker*, 351 Ill. 139 (1932).

815 ILCS 710/4 and 710/12 (West 1992). **Motor Vehicle Franchise Act.** Provision allowing a court to be the initial arbiter of the propriety of establishing an additional or relocated franchise violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois

Constitution because it delegated to the courts matters that are for legislative or administrative determination. P.A. 89-145 deleted the offending provision. *Fields Jeep-Eagle v. Chrysler Corp.*, 163 Ill.2d 462 (1994).

EMPLOYMENT

820 ILCS 40/ (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1984 Supp., ch. 48, par. 2001 *et seq.*). **Personnel Record Review Act.** The Act was held unconstitutionally vague because it was not clear with reasonable certainty which records were exempt from inspection by an employee and which records were subject to inspection. The Section concerning records exempt from inspection was subsequently amended by P.A. 85-1393 and P.A. 85-1424 to specify certain employee-related materials. The Attorney General issued an opinion (Ill. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 92-005) that the Act is now constitutional. *Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical Congregation*, 118 Ill.2d 389 (1987).

820 ILCS 130/2 and 130/10a (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 48, pars. 39s-2 and 39s-10a). **Prevailing Wage Act.** Provision prohibiting allocation of motor fuel tax funds to public bodies if a certificate of compliance with the Act is not filed by the public body requesting approval of a public works project violated the Illinois Constitution's prohibition against amending a Section of a law (in this case, certain Sections of the Motor Fuel Tax Act and the Illinois Highway Code) without inserting the full text of the Section amended. The Section of the Act containing that provision was subsequently repealed by Laws 1965, p. 3508. Another Section of the Act extending application of the Act to employees of public bodies when engaged in new construction (as opposed to maintenance work) violated the equal protection clauses of the federal and Illinois constitutions. That and other Sections of the Act were thereafter substantially rewritten to correct the problem. *City of Monmouth v. Lorenz*, 30 Ill.2d 60 (1963).

820 ILCS 130/2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, ch. 48, par. 39s-2). **Prevailing Wage Act.** Provision defining the "prevailing rate of wages" in a locality as the wages under a collective bargaining agreement in effect in the locality and covering wages for work of a similar character was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to private parties. Laws 1957, p. 2662 deleted the offending provision. *Bradley v. Casey*, 415 Ill. 564 (1953).

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