HB1155ham011 98TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Rep. Ann Williams

Filed: 2/25/2013

09800HB1155ham011 LRB098 08475 MRW 41646 a

AMENDMENT TO HOUSE BILL 1155

AMENDMENT NO. ______. Amend House Bill 1155, AS AMENDED, by inserting the following in its proper numeric sequence:

"Section 120. Firearm carry prohibition; establishments that serve alcohol.

(a) No person may knowingly carry a firearm into any establishment that dispenses alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises, or any adjacent property or parking lot area under control of or owned by the establishment where carry is prohibited under this Section.

(b) The exemptions and provisions in subsections (a), (b), (f), (g-6), (g-10), (h), and (i) of Section 24-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 apply to this Section.

(c) The United States Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008) has recognized that the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution does not confer an unlimited right and that states may prohibit the carrying of firearms in sensitive places. The Supreme Court stated in the Heller decision: "Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings . . ." The Supreme Court also noted in a footnote referencing this statement in the Heller decision that: "We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive." This recognition was reiterated by the U. S. Supreme Court in McDonald v. the City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 3025, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010), which incorporated the Second Amendment against state action. The Supreme Court again stated: "We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as "prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill," "laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings . . . We repeat those assurances here." Further, the federal 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d. 933 (7th Cir., 2012) cited the "sensitive place" statement of the Supreme Court in both the Heller and McDonald decisions and concluded: "That a legislature can forbid the carrying of firearms in schools and government buildings means that any right to possess a gun for self-defense outside the home is not absolute, and it is not absolute by the Supreme Court's own terms." Therefore, the General Assembly finds that the place or location set forth in subsection (a) of this Section is a sensitive place and the prohibition on the carrying of firearms will promote public safety in this sensitive place.".