725 ILCS 5/ Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.

(725 ILCS 5/115-16)

Sec. 115-16. Witness disqualification. No person shall be disqualified as a witness in a criminal case or proceeding by reason of his or her interest in the event of the case or proceeding, as a party or otherwise, or by reason of his or her having been convicted of a crime; but the interest or conviction may be shown for the purpose of affecting the credibility of the witness. A defendant in a criminal case or proceeding shall only at his or her own request be deemed a competent witness, and the person's neglect to testify shall not create a presumption against the person, nor shall the court permit a reference or comment to be made to or upon that neglect.

In criminal cases, husband and wife may testify for or against each other. Neither, however, may testify as to any communication or admission made by either of them to the other or as to any conversation between them during marriage, except in cases in which either is charged with an offense against the person or property of the other, in case of spouse abandonment, when the interests of their child or children or of any child or children in either spouse's care, custody, or control are directly involved, when either is charged with or under investigation for an offense under Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 and the victim is a minor under 18 years of age in either spouse's care, custody, or control at the time of the offense, or as to matters in which either has acted as agent of the other.

(Source: P.A. 96-1242, eff. 7-23-10; 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-17)

Sec. 115-17. Clerk; issuance of subpoenas. It is the duty of the clerk of the court to issue subpoenas, either on the part of the people or of the accused, directed to the sheriff or coroner of any county of this State. An attorney admitted to practice in the State of Illinois, as an officer of the court, may also issue subpoenas in a pending action. A witness who is duly subpoenaed who neglects or refuses to attend any court, under the requisitions of the subpoena, shall be proceeded against and punished for contempt of the court. Attachments against witnesses who live in a different county from that where the subpoena is returnable may be served in the same manner as warrants are directed to be served out of the county from which they issue.

(Source: P.A. 96-485, eff. 1-1-10.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-17a)

Sec. 115-17a. Subpoenas to crime victims. In a post conviction proceeding, before the crime victim may be subpoenaed by the defendant, the defendant must first petition the court and give notice to the victim. At the hearing on the petition, the victim shall be given the opportunity to appear and object to the requested subpoena. At the request of the victim, the State's Attorney shall represent the victim in the proceeding. The court shall grant the request for the subpoena only if and to the extent it determines that the subpoena seeks evidence that is material and relevant to the post conviction hearing. For the purposes of this Section, "crime victim" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 3 of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act.

(Source: Incorporates P.A. 89-291, eff. 1-1-96; 89-626, eff. 8-9-96.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-17b)

Sec. 115-17b. Administrative subpoenas.

(a) Definitions. As used in this Section:

"Electronic communication services" and "remote computing services" have the same meaning as provided in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act in Chapter 121 (commencing with Section 2701) of Part I of Title 18 of the United States Code Annotated.

"Offense involving the sexual exploitation of children" means an offense under Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 11-6, 11-6.5, 11-6.6, 11-9.1, 11-14.4, 11-15.1, 11-17.1, 11-18.1, 11-19.1, 11-19.2, 11-20.1, 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, 11-21, 11-23, 11-25, 11-26, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or any attempt to commit any of these offenses when the victim is under 18 years of age.

(b) Subpoenas duces tecum. In any criminal investigation of an offense involving the sexual exploitation of children, the Attorney General, or his or her designee, or a State's Attorney, or his or her designee, may issue in writing and cause to be served subpoenas duces tecum to providers of electronic communication services or remote computing services requiring the production of records relevant to the investigation. Any such request for records shall not extend beyond requiring the provider to disclose the information specified in 18 U.S.C. 2703(c)(2). Any subpoena duces tecum issued under this Section shall be made returnable to the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court for the Circuit in which the State's Attorney resides, or his or her designee, or for subpoenas issued by the Attorney General, the subpoena shall be made returnable to the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court for the Circuit to which the investigation pertains, or his or her designee, to determine whether the documents are privileged and whether the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive.

(c) Contents of subpoena. A subpoena under this Section shall describe the records or other things required to be produced and prescribe a return date within a reasonable period of time within which the objects or records can be assembled and made available.

(c-5) Contemporaneous notice to Chief Judge. Whenever a subpoena is issued under this Section, the Attorney General or his or her designee or the State's Attorney or his or her designee shall be required to provide a copy of the subpoena to the Chief Judge of the county in which the subpoena is returnable.

(d) Modifying or quashing subpoena. At any time before the return date specified in the subpoena, the person or entity to whom the subpoena is directed may petition for an order modifying or quashing the subpoena on the grounds that the subpoena is oppressive or unreasonable or that the subpoena seeks privileged documents or records.

(e) Ex parte order. An Illinois circuit court for the circuit in which the subpoena is or will be issued, upon application of the Attorney General, or his or her designee, or State's Attorney, or his or her designee, may issue an ex parte order that no person or entity disclose to any other person or entity (other than persons necessary to comply with the subpoena) the existence of such subpoena for a period of up to 90 days.

(1) Such order may be issued upon a showing that the things being sought may be relevant to the investigation and there is reason to believe that such disclosure may result in:

(A) endangerment to the life or physical safety of any person;

(B) flight to avoid prosecution;

(C) destruction of or tampering with evidence;

(D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or

(E) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.

(2) An order under this Section may be renewed for additional periods of up to 90 days upon a showing that the circumstances described in paragraph (1) of this subsection (e) continue to exist.

(f) Enforcement. A witness who is duly subpoenaed who neglects or refuses to comply with the subpoena shall be proceeded against and punished for contempt of the court. A subpoena duces tecum issued under this Section may be enforced pursuant to the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Within or Without a State in Criminal Proceedings.

(g) Immunity from civil liability. Notwithstanding any federal, State, or local law, any person, including officers, agents, and employees, receiving a subpoena under this Section, who complies in good faith with the subpoena and thus produces the materials sought, shall not be liable in any court of Illinois to any customer or other person for such production or for nondisclosure of that production to the customer.

(Source: P.A. 99-642, eff. 7-28-16.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-18)

Sec. 115-18. Employee protected. No employer shall discharge or terminate, or threaten to discharge or terminate, from his or her employment, or otherwise punish or penalize his or her employee who is a witness to a crime, because of time lost from regular employment resulting from his or her attendance at a proceeding under subpoena issued in any criminal proceeding relative to the crime. An employer who knowingly or intentionally violates this Section shall be proceeded against and punished for contempt of court. This Section shall not be construed as requiring an employer to pay an employee for time lost resulting from attendance at any proceeding.

(Source: P.A. 89-234, eff. 1-1-96.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-19)

Sec. 115-19. Polygraph. In the course of a criminal trial the court shall not require, request, or suggest that the defendant submit to a polygraphic detection deception test, commonly known as a lie detector test, to questioning under the effect of thiopental sodium, or to any other test or questioning by means of a mechanical device or chemical substance.

(Source: P.A. 89-234, eff. 1-1-96.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-20)

Sec. 115-20. Evidence of prior conviction.

(a) Evidence of a prior conviction of a defendant for domestic battery, aggravated battery committed against a family or household member as defined in Section 112A-3, stalking, aggravated stalking, or violation of an order of protection is admissible in a later criminal prosecution for any of these types of offenses when the victim is the same person who was the victim of the previous offense that resulted in conviction of the defendant.

(b) If the defendant is accused of an offense set forth in subsection (a) or the defendant is tried or retried for any of the offenses set forth in subsection (a), evidence of the defendant's conviction for another offense or offenses set forth in subsection (a) may be admissible (if that evidence is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence) and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant if the victim is the same person who was the victim of the previous offense that resulted in conviction of the defendant.

(c) In weighing the probative value of the evidence against undue prejudice to the defendant, the court may consider:

(1) the proximity in time to the charged or predicate offense;

(2) the degree of factual similarity to the charged or predicate offense; or

(3) other relevant facts and circumstances.

(d) In a criminal case in which the prosecution intends to offer evidence under this Section, it must disclose the evidence, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony, at a reasonable time in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown.

(e) In a criminal case in which evidence is offered under this Section, proof may be made by specific instances of conduct as evidenced by proof of conviction, testimony as to reputation, or testimony in the form of an expert opinion, except that the prosecution may offer reputation testimony only after the opposing party has offered that testimony.

(Source: P.A. 90-387, eff. 1-1-98.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-21)

Sec. 115-21. Informant testimony.

(a) For the purposes of this Section, "informant" means someone who is purporting to testify about admissions made to him or her by the accused while detained or incarcerated in a penal institution contemporaneously.

(b) This Section applies to any criminal proceeding brought under Sections 9-1, 9-1.2, 9-2, 9-2.1, 9-3, 9-3.2, 9-3.3, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, or 20-1.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, in which the prosecution attempts to introduce evidence of incriminating statements made by the accused to or overheard by an informant.

(c) Except as provided in subsection (d-5), in any case under this Section, the prosecution shall disclose at least 30 days prior to a relevant evidentiary hearing or trial:

(1) the complete criminal history of the informant;

(2) any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that the offering party has made or will make in the future to the informant;

(3) the statements made by the accused;

(4) the time and place of the statements, the time and place of their disclosure to law enforcement officials, and the names of all persons who were present when the statements were made;

(5) whether at any time the informant recanted that testimony or statement and, if so, the time and place of the recantation, the nature of the recantation, and the names of the persons who were present at the recantation;

(6) other cases in which the informant testified, provided that the existence of such testimony can be ascertained through reasonable inquiry and whether the informant received any promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for or subsequent to that testimony or statement; and

(7) any other information relevant to the informant's credibility.

(d) Except as provided in subsection (d-5), in any case under this Section, the prosecution shall timely disclose at least 30 days prior to any relevant evidentiary hearing or trial its intent to introduce the testimony of an informant. The court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the testimony of the informant is reliable, unless the defendant waives such a hearing. If the prosecution fails to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the informant's testimony is reliable, the court shall not allow the testimony to be heard at trial. At this hearing, the court shall consider the factors enumerated in subsection (c) as well as any other factors relating to reliability.

(d-5) The court may permit the prosecution to disclose its intent to introduce the testimony of an informant with less notice than the 30-day notice required under subsections (c) and (d) of this Section if the court finds that the informant was not known prior to the 30-day notice period and could not have been discovered or obtained by the exercise of due diligence by the prosecution prior to the 30-day notice period. Upon good cause shown, the court may set a reasonable notice period under the circumstances or may continue the trial on its own motion to allow for a reasonable notice period, which motion shall toll the speedy trial period under Section 103-5 of this Code for the period of the continuance.

(e) If a lawful recording of an incriminating statement is made of an accused to an informant or made of a statement of an informant to law enforcement or the prosecution, including any deal, promise, inducement, or other benefit offered to the informant, the accused may request a reliability hearing under subsection (d) of this Section and the prosecution shall be subject to the disclosure requirements of subsection (c) of this Section.

(f) (Blank).

(g) This Section applies to all criminal prosecutions under subsection (b) of this Section on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 100th General Assembly.

(Source: P.A. 100-1119, eff. 1-1-19.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-22)

Sec. 115-22. Witness inducements. When the State intends to introduce the testimony of a witness in a capital case, the State shall, before trial, disclose to the defendant and to his or her defense counsel the following information, which shall be reduced to writing:

(1) whether the witness has received or been promised anything, including pay, immunity from prosecution, leniency in prosecution, or personal advantage, in exchange for testimony;

(2) any other case in which the witness testified or offered statements against an individual but was not called, and whether the statements were admitted in the case, and whether the witness received any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for that testimony or statement; provided that the existence of such testimony can be ascertained through reasonable inquiry;

(3) whether the witness has ever changed his or her testimony;

(4) the criminal history of the witness; and

(5) any other evidence relevant to the credibility of the witness.

(Source: P.A. 93-605, eff. 11-19-03.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-23)

Sec. 115-23. Admissibility of cannabis. In a prosecution for a violation of subsection (a) of Section 4 of the Cannabis Control Act or a municipal ordinance for possession of cannabis that is punished by only a fine, cannabis shall only be admitted into evidence based upon:

(1) a properly administered field test; or

(2) opinion testimony of a peace officer based on the officer's training and experience as qualified by the court.

(Source: P.A. 99-697, eff. 7-29-16.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 116 heading) ARTICLE 116. POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

(725 ILCS 5/116-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 116-1)

Sec. 116-1. Motion for new trial.

(a) Following a verdict or finding of guilty the court may grant the defendant a new trial.

(b) A written motion for a new trial shall be filed by the defendant within 30 days following the entry of a finding or the return of a verdict. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State.

(c) The motion for a new trial shall specify the grounds therefor.

(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)

(725 ILCS 5/116-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 116-2)

Sec. 116-2. Motion in arrest of judgment. (a) A written motion in arrest of judgment shall be filed by the defendant within 30 days following the entry of a verdict or finding of guilty. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State.

(b) The court shall grant the motion when:

(1) The indictment, information or complaint does not charge an offense, or

(2) The court is without jurisdiction of the cause.

(c) A motion in arrest of judgment attacking the indictment, information, or complaint on the ground that it does not charge an offense shall be denied if the indictment, information or complaint apprised the accused of the precise offense charged with sufficient specificity to prepare his defense and allow pleading a resulting conviction as a bar to future prosecution out of the same conduct.

(Source: P.A. 86-391.)

(725 ILCS 5/116-2.1)

Sec. 116-2.1. Motion to vacate prostitution convictions for sex trafficking victims.

(a) A motion under this Section may be filed at any time following the entry of a verdict or finding of guilty where the conviction was under Section 11-14 (prostitution) or Section 11-14.2 (first offender; felony prostitution) of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or a similar local ordinance and the defendant's participation in the offense was a result of having been a trafficking victim under Section 10-9 (involuntary servitude, involuntary sexual servitude of a minor, or trafficking in persons) of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012; or a victim of a severe form of trafficking under the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act (22 U.S.C. Section 7102(13)); provided that:

(1) a motion under this Section shall state why the facts giving rise to this motion were not presented to the trial court, and shall be made with due diligence, after the defendant has ceased to be a victim of such trafficking or has sought services for victims of such trafficking, subject to reasonable concerns for the safety of the defendant, family members of the defendant, or other victims of such trafficking that may be jeopardized by the bringing of such motion, or for other reasons consistent with the purpose of this Section; and

(2) reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State.

(b) The court may grant the motion if, in the discretion of the court, the violation was a result of the defendant having been a victim of human trafficking. Evidence of such may include, but is not limited to:

(1) certified records of federal or State court proceedings which demonstrate that the defendant was a victim of a trafficker charged with a trafficking offense under Section 10-9 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, or under 22 U.S.C. Chapter 78;

(2) certified records of "approval notices" or "law enforcement certifications" generated from federal immigration proceedings available to such victims; or

(3) a sworn statement from a trained professional staff of a victim services organization, an attorney, a member of the clergy, or a medical or other professional from whom the defendant has sought assistance in addressing the trauma associated with being trafficked.

Alternatively, the court may consider such other evidence as it deems of sufficient credibility and probative value in determining whether the defendant is a trafficking victim or victim of a severe form of trafficking.

(c) If the court grants a motion under this Section, it must vacate the conviction and may take such additional action as is appropriate in the circumstances.

(Source: P.A. 97-267, eff. 1-1-12; 97-897, eff. 1-1-13; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)

(725 ILCS 5/116-3)

Sec. 116-3. Motion for fingerprint, Integrated Ballistic Identification System, or forensic testing not available at trial or guilty plea regarding actual innocence.

(a) A defendant may make a motion before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case for the performance of fingerprint, Integrated Ballistic Identification System, or forensic DNA testing, including comparison analysis of genetic marker groupings of the evidence collected by criminal justice agencies pursuant to the alleged offense, to those of the defendant, to those of other forensic evidence, and to those maintained under subsection (f) of Section 5-4-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections, on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial or guilty plea which resulted in his or her conviction, and:

(1) was not subject to the testing which is now requested at the time of trial; or

(2) although previously subjected to testing, can be subjected to additional testing utilizing a method that was not scientifically available at the time of trial that provides a reasonable likelihood of more probative results.

Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State.

(b) The defendant must present a prima facie case that:

(1) identity was the issue in the trial or guilty plea which resulted in his or her conviction; and

(2) the evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material aspect.

(c) The trial court shall allow the testing under reasonable conditions designed to protect the State's interests in the integrity of the evidence and the testing process upon a determination that:

(1) the result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence (i) materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence when the defendant's conviction was the result of a trial, even though the results may not completely exonerate the defendant, or (ii) that would raise a reasonable probability that the defendant would have been acquitted if the results of the evidence to be tested had been available prior to the defendant's guilty plea and the petitioner had proceeded to trial instead of pleading guilty, even though the results may not completely exonerate the defendant; and

(2) the testing requested employs a scientific method generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.

(d) If evidence previously tested pursuant to this Section reveals an unknown fingerprint from the crime scene that does not match the defendant or the victim, the order of the Court shall direct the prosecuting authority to request the Illinois State Police Bureau of Forensic Science to submit the unknown fingerprint evidence into the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AIFIS) for identification.

(e) In the court's order to allow testing, the court shall order the investigating authority to prepare an inventory of the evidence related to the case and issue a copy of the inventory to the prosecution, the petitioner, and the court.

(f) When a motion is filed to vacate based on favorable post-conviction testing results, the State may, upon request, reactivate victim services for the victim of the crime during the pendency of the proceedings, and, as determined by the court after consultation with the victim or victim advocate, or both, following final adjudication of the case.

(Source: P.A. 102-538, eff. 8-20-21.)

(725 ILCS 5/116-4)

Sec. 116-4. Preservation of evidence for forensic testing.

(a) Before or after the trial in a prosecution for a violation of Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or in a prosecution for an offense defined in Article 9 of that Code, or in a prosecution for an attempt in violation of Section 8-4 of that Code of any of the above-enumerated offenses, unless otherwise provided herein under subsection (b) or (c), a law enforcement agency or an agent acting on behalf of the law enforcement agency shall preserve, subject to a continuous chain of custody, any physical evidence in their possession or control that is reasonably likely to contain forensic evidence, including, but not limited to, fingerprints or biological material secured in relation to a trial and with sufficient documentation to locate that evidence.

(b) After a judgment of conviction is entered, the evidence shall either be impounded with the Clerk of the Circuit Court or shall be securely retained by a law enforcement agency. Retention shall be until the completion of the sentence, including the period of mandatory supervised release for the offense, or January 1, 2006, whichever is later, for any conviction for an offense or an attempt of an offense defined in Article 9 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or in Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or for 7 years following any conviction for any other felony for which the defendant's genetic profile may be taken by a law enforcement agency and submitted for comparison in a forensic DNA database for unsolved offenses.

(c) After a judgment of conviction is entered, the law enforcement agency required to retain evidence described in subsection (a) may petition the court with notice to the defendant or, in cases where the defendant has died, his estate, his attorney of record, or an attorney appointed for that purpose by the court for entry of an order allowing it to dispose of evidence if, after a hearing, the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that:

(1) it has no significant value for forensic science analysis and should be returned to its rightful owner, destroyed, used for training purposes, or as otherwise provided by law; or

(2) it has no significant value for forensic science analysis and is of a size, bulk, or physical character not usually retained by the law enforcement agency and cannot practicably be retained by the law enforcement agency; or

(3) there no longer exists a reasonable basis to require the preservation of the evidence because of the death of the defendant.

(d) The court may order the disposition of the evidence if the defendant is allowed the opportunity to take reasonable measures to remove or preserve portions of the evidence in question for future testing.

(d-5) Any order allowing the disposition of evidence pursuant to subsection (c) or (d) shall be a final and appealable order. No evidence shall be disposed of until 30 days after the order is entered, and if a notice of appeal is filed, no evidence shall be disposed of until the mandate has been received by the circuit court from the appellate court.

(d-10) All records documenting the possession, control, storage, and destruction of evidence and all police reports, evidence control or inventory records, and other reports cited in this Section, including computer records, must be retained for as long as the evidence exists and may not be disposed of without the approval of the Local Records Commission.

(e) In this Section, "law enforcement agency" includes any of the following or an agent acting on behalf of any of the following: a municipal police department, county sheriff's office, any prosecuting authority, the Illinois State Police, or any other State, university, county, federal, or municipal police unit or police force.

"Biological material" includes, but is not limited to, any blood, hair, saliva, or semen from which genetic marker groupings may be obtained.

(Source: P.A. 102-538, eff. 8-20-21; 103-51, eff. 1-1-24.)

(725 ILCS 5/116-5)

Sec. 116-5. Motion for DNA database search (genetic marker groupings comparison analysis).

(a) Upon motion by a defendant charged with any offense where DNA evidence may be material to the defense investigation or relevant at trial, a court may order a DNA database search by the Illinois State Police. Such analysis may include comparing:

(1) the genetic profile from forensic evidence that was secured in relation to the trial against the genetic profile of the defendant,

(2) the genetic profile of items of forensic evidence secured in relation to trial to the genetic profile of other forensic evidence secured in relation to trial, or

(3) the genetic profiles referred to in subdivisions (1) and (2) against:

(i) genetic profiles of offenders maintained under subsection (f) of Section 5-4-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections, or

(ii) genetic profiles, including but not limited to, profiles from unsolved crimes maintained in state or local DNA databases by law enforcement agencies.

(b) If appropriate federal criteria are met, the court may order the Illinois State Police to request the National DNA index system to search its database of genetic profiles.

(c) If requested by the defense, a defense representative shall be allowed to view any genetic marker grouping analysis conducted by the Illinois State Police. The defense shall be provided with copies of all documentation, correspondence, including digital correspondence, notes, memoranda, and reports generated in relation to the analysis.

(d) Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State.

(Source: P.A. 102-538, eff. 8-20-21.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 117) ARTICLE 117. PROBATION

(725 ILCS 5/117-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 117-1)

Sec. 117-1. (Repealed).

(Source: Repealed by P.A. 77-2097, eff. 1-1-73.)

(725 ILCS 5/117-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 117-2)

Sec. 117-2. (Repealed).

(Source: Repealed by P.A. 77-2097, eff. 1-1-73.)

(725 ILCS 5/117-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 117-3)

Sec. 117-3. (Repealed).

(Source: Repealed by P.A. 77-2097, eff. 1-1-73.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 118) ARTICLE 118. SENTENCE AND JUDGMENT

(725 ILCS 5/118-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 118-1)

Sec. 118-1. (Repealed).

(Source: Repealed by P.A. 77-2097, eff. 1-1-73.)

(725 ILCS 5/118-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 118-2)

Sec. 118-2. (Repealed).

(Source: Repealed by P.A. 77-2097, eff. 1-1-73.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 119 heading) ARTICLE 119. EXECUTION OF SENTENCE

(725 ILCS 5/119-1)

Sec. 119-1. Death penalty abolished.

(a) Beginning on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly, notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the death penalty is abolished and a sentence to death may not be imposed.

(b) All unobligated and unexpended moneys remaining in the Capital Litigation Trust Fund on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly shall be transferred into the Death Penalty Abolition Fund, a special fund in the State treasury, to be expended by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, for services for families of victims of homicide or murder and for training of law enforcement personnel.

(Source: P.A. 96-1543, eff. 7-1-11.)

(725 ILCS 5/119-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 119-5)

Sec. 119-5. (Repealed).

(Source: P.A. 93-379, eff. 7-24-03. Repealed by P.A. 103-51, eff. 1-1-24.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 120 heading) ARTICLE 120. APPEAL BY THE STATE

(725 ILCS 5/120-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 120-1)

Sec. 120-1. (Repealed).

(Source: Repealed by P.A. 76-1412, eff. 9-22-69.)

(725 ILCS 5/120-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 120-2)

Sec. 120-2. (Repealed).

(Source: Repealed by Laws 1967, p. 3615.)

(725 ILCS 5/120-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 120-3)

Sec. 120-3. (Repealed).

(Source: Repealed by Laws 1967, p. 3615.)

(725 ILCS 5/120-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 120-4)

Sec. 120-4. (Repealed).

(Source: Repealed by Laws 1967, p. 3615.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 121 heading) ARTICLE 121. APPEAL BY DEFENDANT

(725 ILCS 5/121-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 121-1)

Sec. 121-1. Application of article.

Unless otherwise provided by Rules of the Supreme Court this Article shall govern review in all criminal cases.

(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)

(725 ILCS 5/121-13) (from Ch. 38, par. 121-13)

Sec. 121-13. Pauper appeals.

(a) In any case wherein the defendant was convicted of a felony, if the court determines that the defendant desires counsel on appeal but is indigent the Public Defender or the State Appellate Defender shall be appointed as counsel, unless with the consent of the defendant and for good cause shown, the court may appoint counsel other than the Public Defender or the State Appellate Defender.

(b) In any case wherein the defendant was convicted of a felony the reviewing court, upon petition of the defendant's counsel made not more frequently than every 60 days after appointment, shall determine a reasonable amount to be allowed an indigent defendant's counsel other than the Public Defender or the State Appellate Defender for compensation and reimbursement of expenditures necessarily incurred in the prosecution of the appeal or review proceedings. The compensation shall not exceed $1500 in each case, except that, in extraordinary circumstances, payment in excess of the limits herein stated may be made if the reviewing court certifies that the payment is necessary to provide fair compensation for protracted representation. The reviewing court shall enter an order directing the county treasurer of the county where the case was tried to pay the amount allowed by the court. The reviewing court may order the provisional payment of sums during the pendency of the cause.

(c) (Blank).

(Source: P.A. 103-51, eff. 1-1-24.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 121A heading) ARTICLE 121A. PENDING DIRECT APPEAL AFTER DEFENDANT'S DEATH (Source: P.A. 99-778, eff. 1-1-17.)

(725 ILCS 5/121A-1)

Sec. 121A-1. Application of Article. Unless otherwise provided by Rules of the Supreme Court, this Article shall govern pending direct appeal in all criminal cases after the death of the defendant.

(Source: P.A. 99-778, eff. 1-1-17.)

(725 ILCS 5/121A-2)

Sec. 121A-2. Pending direct appeal after the defendant's death.

(a) Whenever the prosecuting attorney learns of the death of the defendant following the entry of a final and appealable judgment but prior to the conclusion of the defendant's direct appeal from the conviction, he or she shall promptly notify the other party and file a certificate of notice of the defendant's death with the reviewing court before which the direct appeal is pending.

(b) Unless the executor or administrator of the defendant's estate or other successor in interest files a verified motion to intervene in the direct appeal within 30 days of the filing of the certificate under subsection (a) of this Section, the reviewing court shall dismiss the direct appeal without disturbing the judgment of the circuit court.

(c) If the court receives a timely petition for leave to intervene by an authorized party, the reviewing court shall permit the petitioning party to intervene in the direct appeal in place of the defendant and the direct appeal shall proceed in the same manner as if the defendant were still alive. The authority to intervene shall terminate automatically upon completion of the proceedings in the direct appeal.

(d) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to authorize the filing or continued litigation of a post-conviction petition or other collateral attack on a conviction or sentence on behalf of a deceased defendant.

(Source: P.A. 99-778, eff. 1-1-17.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 122 heading) ARTICLE 122. POST-CONVICTION HEARING

(725 ILCS 5/122-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-1)

Sec. 122-1. Petition in the trial court.

(a) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary may institute a proceeding under this Article if the person asserts that:

(1) in the proceedings which resulted in his or her conviction there was a substantial denial of his or her rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both;

(2) (blank); or

(3) (blank).

(a-5) A proceeding under paragraph (2) of subsection (a) may be commenced within a reasonable period of time after the person's conviction notwithstanding any other provisions of this Article. In such a proceeding regarding actual innocence, if the court determines the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition in a written order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision. Such order of dismissal is a final judgment and shall be served upon the petitioner by certified mail within 10 days of its entry.

(b) The proceeding shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place a petition (together with a copy thereof) verified by affidavit. Petitioner shall also serve another copy upon the State's Attorney by any of the methods provided in Rule 7 of the Supreme Court. The clerk shall docket the petition for consideration by the court pursuant to Section 122-2.1 upon his or her receipt thereof and bring the same promptly to the attention of the court.

(c) No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion of proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence. If a petition for certiorari is not filed, no proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months from the date for filing a certiorari petition, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence. If a defendant does not file a direct appeal, the post-conviction petition shall be filed no later than 3 years from the date of conviction, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.

This limitation does not apply to a petition advancing a claim of actual innocence.

(d) A person seeking relief by filing a petition under this Section must specify in the petition or its heading that it is filed under this Section. A trial court that has received a petition complaining of a conviction or sentence that fails to specify in the petition or its heading that it is filed under this Section need not evaluate the petition to determine whether it could otherwise have stated some grounds for relief under this Article.

(e) (Blank).

(f) Only one petition may be filed by a petitioner under this Article without leave of the court. Leave of court may be granted only if a petitioner demonstrates cause for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or her initial post-conviction proceedings and prejudice results from that failure. For purposes of this subsection (f): (1) a prisoner shows cause by identifying an objective factor that impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings; and (2) a prisoner shows prejudice by demonstrating that the claim not raised during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.

(Source: P.A. 102-639, eff. 8-27-21; 103-51, eff. 1-1-24.)

(725 ILCS 5/122-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-2)

Sec. 122-2. Contents of petition.

The petition shall identify the proceeding in which the petitioner was convicted, give the date of the rendition of the final judgment complained of, and clearly set forth the respects in which petitioner's constitutional rights were violated. The petition shall have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are not attached. The petition shall identify any previous proceedings that the petitioner may have taken to secure relief from his conviction. Argument and citations and discussion of authorities shall be omitted from the petition.

(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)

(725 ILCS 5/122-2.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-2.1)

Sec. 122-2.1. (a) Within 90 days after the filing and docketing of each petition, the court shall examine such petition and enter an order thereon pursuant to this Section.

(1) (Blank).

(2) If the petitioner is sentenced to imprisonment and the court determines the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition in a written order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision. Such order of dismissal is a final judgment and shall be served upon the petitioner by certified mail within 10 days of its entry.

(b) If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to this Section, the court shall order the petition to be docketed for further consideration in accordance with Sections 122-4 through 122-6.

(c) In considering a petition pursuant to this Section, the court may examine the court file of the proceeding in which the petitioner was convicted, any action taken by an appellate court in such proceeding and any transcripts of such proceeding.

(Source: P.A. 103-51, eff. 1-1-24.)

(725 ILCS 5/122-2.2)

Sec. 122-2.2. Intellectual disability and post-conviction relief.

(a) (Blank).

(b) All other provisions of this Article governing petitions for post-conviction relief shall apply to a petition for post-conviction relief alleging an intellectual disability.

(Source: P.A. 103-51, eff. 1-1-24.)

(725 ILCS 5/122-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-3)

Sec. 122-3. Waiver of claims.

Any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.

(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)

(725 ILCS 5/122-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-4)

Sec. 122-4. Pauper petitions. If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to Section 122-2.1, and alleges that the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the court may order that the petitioner be permitted to proceed as a poor person and order a transcript of the proceedings delivered to petitioner in accordance with Rule of the Supreme Court. If the petitioner is without counsel and alleges that he is without means to procure counsel, he shall state whether or not he wishes counsel to be appointed to represent him. If appointment of counsel is so requested, and the petition is not dismissed pursuant to Section 122-2.1, the court shall appoint counsel if satisfied that the petitioner has no means to procure counsel. A petitioner who is a prisoner in an Illinois Department of Corrections facility who files a pleading, motion, or other filing that purports to be a legal document seeking post-conviction relief under this Article against the State, the Illinois Department of Corrections, the Prisoner Review Board, or any of their officers or employees in which the court makes a specific finding that the pleading, motion, or other filing that purports to be a legal document is frivolous shall not proceed as a poor person and shall be liable for the full payment of filing fees and actual court costs as provided in Article XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The court, at the conclusion of the proceedings upon receipt of a petition by the appointed counsel, shall determine a reasonable amount to be allowed an indigent defendant's counsel other than the Public Defender or the State Appellate Defender for compensation and reimbursement of expenditures necessarily incurred in the proceedings. The compensation shall not exceed $500 in each case, except that, in extraordinary circumstances, payment in excess of the limits herein stated may be made if the trial court certifies that the payment is necessary to provide fair compensation for protracted representation, and the amount is approved by the chief judge of the circuit. The court shall enter an order directing the county treasurer of the county where the case was tried to pay the amount thereby allowed by the court. The court may order the provisional payment of sums during the pendency of the cause.

(Source: P.A. 103-51, eff. 1-1-24.)

(725 ILCS 5/122-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-5)

Sec. 122-5. Proceedings on petition.) Within 30 days after the making of an order pursuant to subsection (b) of Section 122-2.1, or within such further time as the court may set, the State shall answer or move to dismiss. In the event that a motion to dismiss is filed and denied, the State must file an answer within 20 days after such denial. No other or further pleadings shall be filed except as the court may order on its own motion or on that of either party. The court may in its discretion grant leave, at any stage of the proceeding prior to entry of judgment, to withdraw the petition. The court may in its discretion make such order as to amendment of the petition or any other pleading, or as to pleading over, or filing further pleadings, or extending the time of filing any pleading other than the original petition, as shall be appropriate, just and reasonable and as is generally provided in civil cases.

(Source: P.A. 83-942.)

(725 ILCS 5/122-6) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-6)

Sec. 122-6. Disposition in trial court. The court may receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence. In its discretion the court may order the petitioner brought before the court for the hearing. If the court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings and such supplementary orders as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, conditions of pretrial release or discharge as may be necessary and proper.

(Source: P.A. 101-652, eff. 1-1-23.)

(725 ILCS 5/122-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-7)

Sec. 122-7. Any final judgment entered upon such petition shall be reviewed in a manner pursuant to the rules of the Supreme Court.

(Source: P.A. 79-917.)

(725 ILCS 5/122-8)

Sec. 122-8. (Repealed).

(Source: P.A. 83-942. Repealed by P.A. 96-1200, eff. 7-22-10.)

(725 ILCS 5/122-9)

Sec. 122-9. Motion to resentence by the People.

(a) The purpose of sentencing is to advance public safety through punishment, rehabilitation, and restorative justice. By providing a means to reevaluate a sentence after some time has passed, the General Assembly intends to provide the State's Attorney and the court with another tool to ensure that these purposes are achieved.

(b) At any time upon the recommendation of the State's Attorney of the county in which the defendant was sentenced, the State's Attorney may petition the sentencing court or the sentencing court's successor to resentence the offender if the original sentence no longer advances the interests of justice. The sentencing court or the sentencing court's successor may resentence the offender if it finds that the original sentence no longer advances the interests of justice.

(c) Upon the receipt of a petition for resentencing, the court may resentence the defendant in the same manner as if the offender had not previously been sentenced; however, the new sentence, if any, may not be greater than the initial sentence.

(d) The court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the inmate's disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation while incarcerated; evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the inmate's risk for future violence; and evidence that reflects changed circumstances since the inmate's original sentencing such that the inmate's continued incarceration no longer serves the interests of justice. Credit shall be given for time served.

(e) Victims shall be afforded all rights as outlined in the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act.

(f) A resentencing under this Section shall not reopen the defendant's conviction to challenges that would otherwise be barred.

(g) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit the power of the Governor under the Constitution to grant a reprieve, commutation of sentence, or pardon.

(Source: P.A. 102-102, eff. 1-1-22; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22.)

(725 ILCS 5/123)

Sec. 123. (Renumbered).

(Source: P.A. 102-102, eff. 1-1-22. Renumbered by P.A. 102-813, eff. 5-13-22.)

(725 ILCS 5/Tit. VIII heading) TITLE VIII. MISCELLANEOUS

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 124A heading) ARTICLE 124A. LIENS AND COSTS

(725 ILCS 5/124A-5)

Sec. 124A-5. Judgment for costs of prosecution.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), when a person is convicted of an offense under a statute, or at common law, the court shall enter judgment that the offender pay the costs of the prosecution. The costs shall include reasonable costs incurred by the Sheriff for serving arrest warrants, for picking up the offender from a county other than the one in which he or she was convicted, and for picking up the offender from a location outside the State of Illinois pursuant either to his or her extradition or to his or her waiver of extradition.

(b) During the first 180 days following a person's release from a penal institution, a court shall not order the person to pay any outstanding fines, taxes, or costs arising from a criminal proceeding involving the person.

(Source: P.A. 103-254, eff. 1-1-24.)

(725 ILCS 5/124A-10)

Sec. 124A-10. Lien. The property, real and personal, of a person who is convicted of an offense shall be bound, and a lien is created on the property, both real and personal, of every offender, not exempt from the enforcement of a judgment or attachment, from the time of finding the indictment at least so far as will be sufficient to pay the fine and costs of prosecution. The clerk of the court in which the conviction is had shall upon the expiration of 30 days after judgment is entered issue a certified copy of the judgment for any fine that remains unpaid, and all costs of conviction remaining unpaid. Unless a court ordered payment schedule is implemented, the clerk of the court may add to any judgment a delinquency amount equal to 5% of the unpaid fines, costs, fees, and penalties that remain unpaid after 30 days, 10% of the unpaid fines, costs, fees, and penalties that remain unpaid after 60 days, and 15% of the unpaid fines, costs, fees, and penalties that remain unpaid after 90 days. Notice to those parties affected may be made by signage posting or publication. The clerk of the court may also after a period of 90 days release to credit reporting agencies, information regarding unpaid amounts. The additional delinquency amounts collected under this Section shall be used to defray additional administrative costs incurred by the clerk of the court in collecting unpaid fines, costs, fees, and penalties. The certified copy of the judgment shall state the day on which the arrest was made or indictment found, as the case may be. Enforcement of the judgment may be directed to the proper officer of any county in this State. The officer to whom the certified copy of the judgment is delivered shall levy the judgment upon all the estate, real and personal, of the defendant (not exempt from enforcement) possessed by him or her on the day of the arrest or finding the indictment, as stated in the certified copy of the judgment and any such property subsequently acquired; and the property so levied upon shall be advertised and sold in the same manner as in civil cases, with the like rights to all parties that may be interested in the property. It is not an objection to the selling of any property under the judgment that the defendant is in custody for the fine or costs, or both.

(Source: P.A. 92-653, eff. 1-1-03.)

(725 ILCS 5/124A-15)

Sec. 124A-15. Reversal of conviction; refund of fines, fees, and costs.

(a) A defendant convicted in a criminal prosecution whose conviction is reversed by a finding of factual innocence in a collateral proceeding such as habeas corpus or post-conviction relief under Article 122 of this Code is not liable for any costs or fees of the court or circuit clerk's office, or for any charge of subsistence while detained in custody. If the defendant has paid any costs, fine, or fees, in the case, a refund of those costs shall be determined by the judge and paid by the clerk of the court. The timing of the refund payment shall be determined by the clerk of the court based upon the availability of funds in the subject fund account.

(b) To receive a refund under this Section, a defendant must submit a request for the refund to the clerk of the court on a form and in a manner prescribed by the clerk. The defendant must attach to the form an order from the court demonstrating the defendant's right to the refund and the amount of the refund.

(Source: P.A. 98-943, eff. 1-1-15; 99-883, eff. 1-1-17.)

(725 ILCS 5/124A-20)

Sec. 124A-20. Assessment waiver.

(a) As used in this Section:

"Assessments" means any costs imposed on a criminal defendant under Article 15 of the Criminal and Traffic Assessment Act, but does not include violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code assessments except as provided in subsection (a-5).

"Indigent person" means any person who meets one or more of the following criteria:

(1) He or she is receiving assistance under one or more of the following means-based governmental public benefits programs: Supplemental Security Income; Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; General Assistance; Transitional Assistance; or State Children and Family Assistance.

(2) His or her available personal income is 200% or less of the current poverty level, unless the applicant's assets that are not exempt under Part 9 or 10 of Article XII of the Code of Civil Procedure are of a nature and value that the court determines that the applicant is able to pay the assessments.

(3) He or she is, in the discretion of the court, unable to proceed in an action with payment of assessments and whose payment of those assessments would result in substantial hardship to the person or his or her family.

"Poverty level" means the current poverty level as established by the United States Department of Health and Human Services.

(a-5) In a county having a population of more than 3,000,000, "assessments" means any costs imposed on a criminal defendant under Article 15 of the Criminal and Traffic Assessment Act, including violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code assessments. This subsection is inoperative on and after July 1, 2024.

(b) For criminal offenses reflected in Schedules 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of Article 15 of the Criminal and Traffic Assessment Act, upon the application of any defendant, after the commencement of an action, but no later than 30 days after sentencing:

(1) If the court finds that the applicant is an indigent person, the court shall grant the applicant a full assessment waiver exempting him or her from the payment of any assessments.

(2) The court shall grant the applicant a partial assessment as follows:

(A) 75% of all assessments shall be waived if the applicant's available income is greater than 200% but no more than 250% of the poverty level, unless the applicant's assets that are not exempt under Part 9 or 10 of Article XII of the Code of Civil Procedure are such that the applicant is able, without undue hardship, to pay the total assessments.

(B) 50% of all assessments shall be waived if the applicant's available income is greater than 250% but no more than 300% of the poverty level, unless the applicant's assets that are not exempt under Part 9 or 10 of Article XII of the Code of Civil Procedure are such that the court determines that the applicant is able, without undue hardship, to pay a greater portion of the assessments.

(C) 25% of all assessments shall be waived if the applicant's available income is greater than 300% but no more than 400% of the poverty level, unless the applicant's assets that are not exempt under Part 9 or 10 of Article XII of the Code of Civil Procedure are such that the court determines that the applicant is able, without undue hardship, to pay a greater portion of the assessments.

(b-5) For traffic and petty offenses reflected in Schedules 2, 6, 9, 10, and 13 of Article 15 of the Criminal and Traffic Assessment Act, upon the application of any defendant, after the commencement of an action, but no later than 30 days after sentencing, the court shall grant the applicant a partial assessment as follows:

(1) 50% of all assessments shall be waived if the court finds that the applicant is an indigent person or if the applicant's available income is not greater than 200% of the poverty level, unless the applicant's assets that are not exempt under Part 9 or 10 of Article XII of the Code of Civil Procedure are such that the applicant is able, without undue hardship, to pay the total assessments.

(2) 37.5% of all assessments shall be waived if the applicant's available income is greater than 200% but no more than 250% of the poverty level, unless the applicant's assets that are not exempt under Part 9 or 10 of Article XII of the Code of Civil Procedure are such that the applicant is able, without undue hardship, to pay the total assessments.

(3) 25% of all assessments shall be waived if the applicant's available income is greater than 250% but no more than 300% of the poverty level, unless the applicant's assets that are not exempt under Part 9 or 10 of Article XII of the Code of Civil Procedure are such that the court determines that the applicant is able, without undue hardship, to pay a greater portion of the assessments.

(4) 12.5% of all assessments shall be waived if the applicant's available income is greater than 300% but no more than 400% of the poverty level, unless the applicant's assets that are not exempt under Part 9 or 10 of Article XII of the Code of Civil Procedure are such that the court determines that the applicant is able, without undue hardship, to pay a greater portion of the assessments.

(c) An application for a waiver of assessments shall be in writing, signed by the defendant or, if the defendant is a minor, by another person having knowledge of the facts, and filed no later than 30 days after sentencing. The contents of the application for a waiver of assessments, and the procedure for deciding the applications, shall be established by Supreme Court Rule. Factors to consider in evaluating an application shall include:

(1) the applicant's receipt of needs based governmental public benefits, including Supplemental Security Income (SSI); Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled (AABD); Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF); Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP or "food stamps"); General Assistance; Transitional Assistance; or State Children and Family Assistance;

(2) the employment status of the applicant and amount of monthly income, if any;

(3) income received from the applicant's pension, Social Security benefits, unemployment benefits, and other sources;

(4) income received by the applicant from other household members;

(5) the applicant's monthly expenses, including rent, home mortgage, other mortgage, utilities, food, medical, vehicle, childcare, debts, child support, and other expenses; and

(6) financial affidavits or other similar supporting documentation provided by the applicant showing that payment of the imposed assessments would result in substantial hardship to the applicant or the applicant's family.

(d) The clerk of court shall provide the application for a waiver of assessments to any defendant who indicates an inability to pay the assessments. The clerk of the court shall post in a conspicuous place in the courthouse a notice, no smaller than 8.5 x 11 inches and using no smaller than 30-point typeface printed in English and in Spanish, advising criminal defendants they may ask the court for a waiver of any court ordered assessments. The notice shall be substantially as follows:

"If you are unable to pay the required assessments, you may ask the court to waive payment of them. Ask the clerk of the court for forms."

(e) For good cause shown, the court may allow an applicant whose application is denied or who receives a partial assessment waiver to defer payment of the assessments, make installment payments, or make payment upon reasonable terms and conditions stated in the order.

(f) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to affect the right of a party to court-appointed counsel, as authorized by any other provision of law or by the rules of the Illinois Supreme Court.

(g) The provisions of this Section are severable under Section 1.31 of the Statute on Statutes.

(Source: P.A. 102-558, eff. 8-20-21; 102-620, eff. 8-27-21.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 124B heading) ARTICLE 124B. FORFEITURE (Source: P.A. 96-712, eff. 1-1-10.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 124B Pt. 5 heading) Part 5. General Provisions (Source: P.A. 96-712, eff. 1-1-10.)

(725 ILCS 5/124B-5)

Sec. 124B-5. Purpose and scope. The purpose of this Article is to set forth in one place the provisions relating to forfeiture of property in connection with violations of certain criminal statutes. Part 100 of this Article sets forth standard provisions that apply to these forfeiture proceedings. In Parts 300 and following, for each type of criminal violation, this Article sets forth (i) provisions that apply to forfeiture only in connection with that type of violation and (ii) by means of incorporation by reference, the standard forfeiture provisions that apply to that type of violation.

(Source: P.A. 96-712, eff. 1-1-10.)

(725 ILCS 5/124B-10)

Sec. 124B-10. Applicability; offenses. This Article applies to forfeiture of property in connection with the following:

(1) A violation of Section 10-9 or 10A-10 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 (involuntary servitude; involuntary servitude of a minor; or trafficking in persons).

(2) A violation of subdivision (a)(1) of Section 11-14.4 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 (promoting juvenile prostitution) or a violation of Section 11-17.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (keeping a place of juvenile prostitution).

(3) A violation of subdivision (a)(4) of Section 11-14.4 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 (promoting juvenile prostitution) or a violation of Section 11-19.2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (exploitation of a child).

(4) A second or subsequent violation of Section 11-20 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 (obscenity).

(5) A violation of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 (child pornography).

(6) A violation of Section 11-20.1B or 11-20.3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (aggravated child pornography).

(6.5) A violation of Section 11-23.5 of the Criminal Code of 2012.

(7) A violation of Section 12C-65 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or Article 44 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (unlawful transfer of a telecommunications device to a minor).

(8) A violation of Section 17-50 or Section 16D-5 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or the Criminal Code of 1961 (computer fraud).

(9) A felony violation of Section 17-6.3 or Article 17B of the Criminal Code of 2012 or the Criminal Code of 1961 (WIC fraud).

(10) A felony violation of Section 48-1 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or Section 26-5 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (dog fighting).

(11) A violation of Article 29D of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 (terrorism).

(12) A felony violation of Section 4.01 of the Humane Care for Animals Act (animals in entertainment).

(Source: P.A. 97-897, eff. 1-1-13; 97-1108, eff. 1-1-13; 97-1109, eff. 1-1-13; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13; 98-1138, eff. 6-1-15.)

(725 ILCS 5/124B-15)

Sec. 124B-15. Applicability; actions. This Article applies to actions pending on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly as well as actions commenced on or after that date.

(Source: P.A. 96-712, eff. 1-1-10.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 124B Pt. 100 heading) Part 100. Standard Forfeiture Provisions (Source: P.A. 96-712, eff. 1-1-10.)

(725 ILCS 5/124B-100)

Sec. 124B-100. Definition; "offense". For purposes of this Article, "offense" is defined as follows:

(1) In the case of forfeiture authorized under Section 10A-15 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or Section 10-9 of the Criminal Code of 2012, "offense" means the offense of involuntary servitude, involuntary servitude of a minor, or trafficking in persons in violation of Section 10-9 or 10A-10 of those Codes.

(2) In the case of forfeiture authorized under subdivision (a)(1) of Section 11-14.4, or Section 11-17.1, of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, "offense" means the offense of promoting juvenile prostitution or keeping a place of juvenile prostitution in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of Section 11-14.4, or Section 11-17.1, of those Codes.

(3) In the case of forfeiture authorized under subdivision (a)(4) of Section 11-14.4, or Section 11-19.2, of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, "offense" means the offense of promoting juvenile prostitution or exploitation of a child in violation of subdivision (a)(4) of Section 11-14.4, or Section 11-19.2, of those Codes.

(4) In the case of forfeiture authorized under Section 11-20 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, "offense" means the offense of obscenity in violation of that Section.

(5) In the case of forfeiture authorized under Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, "offense" means the offense of child pornography in violation of Section 11-20.1 of that Code.

(6) In the case of forfeiture authorized under Section 11-20.1B or 11-20.3 of the Criminal Code of 1961, "offense" means the offense of aggravated child pornography in violation of Section 11-20.1B or 11-20.3 of that Code.

(7) In the case of forfeiture authorized under Section 12C-65 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or Article 44 of the Criminal Code of 1961, "offense" means the offense of unlawful transfer of a telecommunications device to a minor in violation of Section 12C-65 or Article 44 of those Codes.

(8) In the case of forfeiture authorized under Section 17-50 or 16D-5 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, "offense" means the offense of computer fraud in violation of Section 17-50 or 16D-5 of those Codes.

(9) In the case of forfeiture authorized under Section 17-6.3 or Article 17B of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, "offense" means any felony violation of Section 17-6.3 or Article 17B of those Codes.

(10) In the case of forfeiture authorized under Section 29D-65 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, "offense" means any offense under Article 29D of that Code.

(11) In the case of forfeiture authorized under Section 4.01 of the Humane Care for Animals Act, Section 26-5 of the Criminal Code of 1961, or Section 48-1 of the Criminal Code of 2012, "offense" means any felony offense under either of those Sections.

(12) In the case of forfeiture authorized under Section 124B-1000(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, "offense" means an offense in violation of the Criminal Code of 1961, the Criminal Code of 2012, the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, the Cannabis Control Act, or the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act, or an offense involving a telecommunications device possessed by a person on the real property of any elementary or secondary school without authority of the school principal.

(Source: P.A. 96-712, eff. 1-1-10; 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11; 97-897, eff. 1-1-13; 97-1108, eff. 1-1-13; 97-1109, eff. 1-1-13; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)

(725 ILCS 5/124B-105)

Sec. 124B-105. Definition; "conveyance". In this Article, "conveyance" means a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft.

(Source: P.A. 96-712, eff. 1-1-10.)

(725 ILCS 5/124B-110)

Sec. 124B-110. Definition; "owner". In this Article, "owner" means a person with an ownership interest in the specific property sought to be forfeited, including a leasehold, lien, mortgage, recorded security interest, or valid assignment of an ownership interest. "Owner" does not include any of the following:

(1) A person with only a general unsecured interest in, or claim against, the property or estate of another.

(2) A bailee, unless the bailor is identified and the bailee shows a colorable legitimate interest in the property seized.

(3) A nominee who exercises no dominion or control over the property.

(Source: P.A. 96-712, eff. 1-1-10.)

(725 ILCS 5/124B-115)

Sec. 124B-115. Definition; "person". In this Article, "person" means any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, organization, or association.

(Source: P.A. 96-712, eff. 1-1-10.)

(725 ILCS 5/124B-120)

Sec. 124B-120. Definition; "property". In this Article, "property" means:

(1) Real property, including, without limitation, land, fixtures or improvements on land, and anything growing on or found in land.

(2) Tangible or intangible personal property, including, without limitation, rights, privileges, interests, claims, securities, and money.

"Property" includes any leasehold or possessory interest and, in the case of real property, includes a beneficial interest in a land trust.

(Source: P.A. 96-712, eff. 1-1-10.)

(725 ILCS 5/124B-125)

Sec. 124B-125. Real property exempt from forfeiture.

(a) An interest in real property is exempt from forfeiture under this Article if its owner or interest holder establishes by a preponderance of evidence that he or she meets all of the following requirements:

(1) He or she is not legally accountable for the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, or did not solicit, conspire, or attempt to commit the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture.

(2) He or she had not acquired and did not stand to acquire substantial proceeds from the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture other than as an interest holder in an arms-length commercial transaction.

(3) He or she does not hold the property for the benefit of or as a nominee for any person whose conduct gave rise to the forfeiture, and, if he or she acquired the interest through any such person, he or she acquired it as a bona fide purchaser for value without knowingly taking part in the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture.

(4) He or she acquired the interest before a notice of seizure for forfeiture or a lis pendens notice with respect to the property was filed in the office of the recorder of deeds of the county in which the property is located and either:

(A) acquired the interest before the commencement of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, and the person whose conduct gave rise to the forfeiture did not have the authority to convey the interest to a bona fide purchaser for value at the time of the conduct; or

(B) acquired the interest after the commencement of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, and he or she acquired the interest as a mortgagee, secured creditor, lienholder, or bona fide purchaser for value without knowledge of the conduct that gave rise to the forfeiture.

(5) With respect to a property interest in existence at the time the illegal conduct giving rise to the forfeiture took place, he or she either:

(A) did not know of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture; or

(B) upon learning of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, did all that reasonably could be expected under the circumstances to terminate that use of the property.

(6) The property is not a type of property, possession of which is otherwise in violation of law.

(b) For purposes of paragraph (5) of subsection (a), ways in which a person may show that he or she did all that reasonably could be expected include demonstrating that he or she, to the extent permitted by law, did either of the following:

(1) Gave timely notice to an appropriate law enforcement agency of information that led the person to know that the conduct giving rise to a forfeiture would occur or had occurred.

(2) In a timely fashion revoked or made a good faith attempt to revoke permission for those engaging in the conduct to use the property or took reasonable actions in consultation with a law enforcement agency to discourage or prevent the illegal use of the property.

A person is not required by this subsection (b) to take steps that the person reasonably believes would be likely to subject any person (other than the person whose conduct gave rise to the forfeiture) to physical danger.

(Source: P.A. 96-712, eff. 1-1-10; 97-813, eff. 7-13-12.)

(725 ILCS 5/124B-130)

Sec. 124B-130. Personal property exempt from forfeiture.

(a) An interest in personal property is exempt from forfeiture under this Article if its owner or interest holder establishes by a preponderance of evidence that he or she meets all of the following requirements:

(1) He or she is not legally accountable for the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, did not acquiesce in it, and did not know and could not reasonably have known of the conduct or that the conduct was likely to occur.

(2) He or she had not acquired and did not stand to acquire substantial proceeds from the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture other than as an interest holder in an arms-length commercial transaction.

(3) He or she does not hold the property for the benefit of or as a nominee for any person whose conduct gave rise to the forfeiture, and, if he or she acquired the interest through any such person, he or she acquired it as a bona fide purchaser for value without knowingly taking part in the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture.

(4) He or she acquired the interest without knowledge of the seizure of the property for forfeiture and either:

(A) acquired the interest before the commencement of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, and the person whose conduct gave rise to the forfeiture did not have the authority to convey the interest to a bona fide purchaser for value at the time of the conduct; or

(B) acquired the interest after the commencement of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, and he or she acquired the interest as a mortgagee, secured creditor, lienholder, or bona fide purchaser for value without knowledge of the conduct that gave rise to the forfeiture.

(5) With respect to a property interest in existence at the time the illegal conduct giving rise to the forfeiture took place, he or she either:

(A) did not know of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture; or

(B) upon learning of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, did all that reasonably could be expected under the circumstances to terminate that use of the property.

(6) With respect to conveyances, he or she did not hold the property jointly or in common with a person whose conduct gave rise to the forfeiture.

(7) The property is not a type of property, possession of which is otherwise in violation of law.

(b) For purposes of paragraph (5) of subsection (a), ways in which a person may show that he or she did all that reasonably could be expected include demonstrating that he or she, to the extent permitted by law, did either of the following:

(1) Gave timely notice to an appropriate law enforcement agency of information that led the person to know that the conduct giving rise to a forfeiture would occur or had occurred.

(2) In a timely fashion revoked or made a good faith attempt to revoke permission for those engaging in the conduct to use the property or took reasonable actions in consultation with a law enforcement agency to discourage or prevent the illegal use of the property.

A person is not required by this subsection (b) to take steps that the person reasonably believes would be likely to subject any person (other than the person whose conduct gave rise to the forfeiture) to physical danger.

(Source: P.A. 96-712, eff. 1-1-10.)