730 ILCS 5/ Unified Code of Corrections.

(730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2)

Sec. 5-5-3.2. Factors in aggravation and extended-term sentencing.

(a) The following factors shall be accorded weight in favor of imposing a term of imprisonment or may be considered by the court as reasons to impose a more severe sentence under Section 5-8-1 or Article 4.5 of Chapter V:

(1) the defendant's conduct caused or threatened serious harm;

(2) the defendant received compensation for committing the offense;

(3) the defendant has a history of prior delinquency or criminal activity;

(4) the defendant, by the duties of his office or by his position, was obliged to prevent the particular offense committed or to bring the offenders committing it to justice;

(5) the defendant held public office at the time of the offense, and the offense related to the conduct of that office;

(6) the defendant utilized his professional reputation or position in the community to commit the offense, or to afford him an easier means of committing it;

(7) the sentence is necessary to deter others from committing the same crime;

(8) the defendant committed the offense against a person 60 years of age or older or such person's property;

(9) the defendant committed the offense against a person who has a physical disability or such person's property;

(10) by reason of another individual's actual or perceived race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, gender, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability, or national origin, the defendant committed the offense against (i) the person or property of that individual; (ii) the person or property of a person who has an association with, is married to, or has a friendship with the other individual; or (iii) the person or property of a relative (by blood or marriage) of a person described in clause (i) or (ii). For the purposes of this Section, "sexual orientation" has the meaning ascribed to it in paragraph (O-1) of Section 1-103 of the Illinois Human Rights Act;

(11) the offense took place in a place of worship or on the grounds of a place of worship, immediately prior to, during or immediately following worship services. For purposes of this subparagraph, "place of worship" shall mean any church, synagogue or other building, structure or place used primarily for religious worship;

(12) the defendant was convicted of a felony committed while he was on pretrial release or his own recognizance pending trial for a prior felony and was convicted of such prior felony, or the defendant was convicted of a felony committed while he was serving a period of probation, conditional discharge, or mandatory supervised release under subsection (d) of Section 5-8-1 for a prior felony;

(13) the defendant committed or attempted to commit a felony while he was wearing a bulletproof vest. For the purposes of this paragraph (13), a bulletproof vest is any device which is designed for the purpose of protecting the wearer from bullets, shot or other lethal projectiles;

(14) the defendant held a position of trust or supervision such as, but not limited to, family member as defined in Section 11-0.1 of the Criminal Code of 2012, teacher, scout leader, baby sitter, or day care worker, in relation to a victim under 18 years of age, and the defendant committed an offense in violation of Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 11-6, 11-11, 11-14.4 except for an offense that involves keeping a place of juvenile prostitution, 11-15.1, 11-19.1, 11-19.2, 11-20.1, 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15 or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 against that victim;

(15) the defendant committed an offense related to the activities of an organized gang. For the purposes of this factor, "organized gang" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 10 of the Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act;

(16) the defendant committed an offense in violation of one of the following Sections while in a school, regardless of the time of day or time of year; on any conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school or a school related activity; on the real property of a school; or on a public way within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising any school: Section 10-1, 10-2, 10-5, 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 11-14.4, 11-15.1, 11-17.1, 11-18.1, 11-19.1, 11-19.2, 12-2, 12-4, 12-4.1, 12-4.2, 12-4.3, 12-6, 12-6.1, 12-6.5, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, 12-16, 18-2, or 33A-2, or Section 12-3.05 except for subdivision (a)(4) or (g)(1), of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012;

(16.5) the defendant committed an offense in violation of one of the following Sections while in a day care center, regardless of the time of day or time of year; on the real property of a day care center, regardless of the time of day or time of year; or on a public way within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising any day care center, regardless of the time of day or time of year: Section 10-1, 10-2, 10-5, 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 11-14.4, 11-15.1, 11-17.1, 11-18.1, 11-19.1, 11-19.2, 12-2, 12-4, 12-4.1, 12-4.2, 12-4.3, 12-6, 12-6.1, 12-6.5, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, 12-16, 18-2, or 33A-2, or Section 12-3.05 except for subdivision (a)(4) or (g)(1), of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012;

(17) the defendant committed the offense by reason of any person's activity as a community policing volunteer or to prevent any person from engaging in activity as a community policing volunteer. For the purpose of this Section, "community policing volunteer" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2-3.5 of the Criminal Code of 2012;

(18) the defendant committed the offense in a nursing home or on the real property comprising a nursing home. For the purposes of this paragraph (18), "nursing home" means a skilled nursing or intermediate long term care facility that is subject to license by the Illinois Department of Public Health under the Nursing Home Care Act, the Specialized Mental Health Rehabilitation Act of 2013, the ID/DD Community Care Act, or the MC/DD Act;

(19) the defendant was a federally licensed firearm dealer and was previously convicted of a violation of subsection (a) of Section 3 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act and has now committed either a felony violation of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act or an act of armed violence while armed with a firearm;

(20) the defendant (i) committed the offense of reckless homicide under Section 9-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, intoxicating compound or compounds or any combination thereof under Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance and (ii) was operating a motor vehicle in excess of 20 miles per hour over the posted speed limit as provided in Article VI of Chapter 11 of the Illinois Vehicle Code;

(21) the defendant (i) committed the offense of reckless driving or aggravated reckless driving under Section 11-503 of the Illinois Vehicle Code and (ii) was operating a motor vehicle in excess of 20 miles per hour over the posted speed limit as provided in Article VI of Chapter 11 of the Illinois Vehicle Code;

(22) the defendant committed the offense against a person that the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, was a member of the Armed Forces of the United States serving on active duty. For purposes of this clause (22), the term "Armed Forces" means any of the Armed Forces of the United States, including a member of any reserve component thereof or National Guard unit called to active duty;

(23) the defendant committed the offense against a person who was elderly or infirm or who was a person with a disability by taking advantage of a family or fiduciary relationship with the elderly or infirm person or person with a disability;

(24) the defendant committed any offense under Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 and possessed 100 or more images;

(25) the defendant committed the offense while the defendant or the victim was in a train, bus, or other vehicle used for public transportation;

(26) the defendant committed the offense of child pornography or aggravated child pornography, specifically including paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), or (7) of subsection (a) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 where a child engaged in, solicited for, depicted in, or posed in any act of sexual penetration or bound, fettered, or subject to sadistic, masochistic, or sadomasochistic abuse in a sexual context and specifically including paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), or (7) of subsection (a) of Section 11-20.1B or Section 11-20.3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 where a child engaged in, solicited for, depicted in, or posed in any act of sexual penetration or bound, fettered, or subject to sadistic, masochistic, or sadomasochistic abuse in a sexual context;

(27) the defendant committed the offense of first degree murder, assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, robbery, armed robbery, or aggravated robbery against a person who was a veteran and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the person was a veteran performing duties as a representative of a veterans' organization. For the purposes of this paragraph (27), "veteran" means an Illinois resident who has served as a member of the United States Armed Forces, a member of the Illinois National Guard, or a member of the United States Reserve Forces; and "veterans' organization" means an organization comprised of members of which substantially all are individuals who are veterans or spouses, widows, or widowers of veterans, the primary purpose of which is to promote the welfare of its members and to provide assistance to the general public in such a way as to confer a public benefit;

(28) the defendant committed the offense of assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, robbery, armed robbery, or aggravated robbery against a person that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known was a letter carrier or postal worker while that person was performing his or her duties delivering mail for the United States Postal Service;

(29) the defendant committed the offense of criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, or aggravated criminal sexual abuse against a victim with an intellectual disability, and the defendant holds a position of trust, authority, or supervision in relation to the victim;

(30) the defendant committed the offense of promoting juvenile prostitution, patronizing a prostitute, or patronizing a minor engaged in prostitution and at the time of the commission of the offense knew that the prostitute or minor engaged in prostitution was in the custody or guardianship of the Department of Children and Family Services;

(31) the defendant (i) committed the offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, intoxicating compound or compounds or any combination thereof in violation of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance and (ii) the defendant during the commission of the offense was driving his or her vehicle upon a roadway designated for one-way traffic in the opposite direction of the direction indicated by official traffic control devices;

(32) the defendant committed the offense of reckless homicide while committing a violation of Section 11-907 of the Illinois Vehicle Code;

(33) the defendant was found guilty of an administrative infraction related to an act or acts of public indecency or sexual misconduct in the penal institution. In this paragraph (33), "penal institution" has the same meaning as in Section 2-14 of the Criminal Code of 2012; or

(34) the defendant committed the offense of leaving the scene of a crash in violation of subsection (b) of Section 11-401 of the Illinois Vehicle Code and the crash resulted in the death of a person and at the time of the offense, the defendant was: (i) driving under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, intoxicating compound or compounds or any combination thereof as defined by Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code; or (ii) operating the motor vehicle while using an electronic communication device as defined in Section 12-610.2 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.

For the purposes of this Section:

"School" is defined as a public or private elementary or secondary school, community college, college, or university.

"Day care center" means a public or private State certified and licensed day care center as defined in Section 2.09 of the Child Care Act of 1969 that displays a sign in plain view stating that the property is a day care center.

"Intellectual disability" means significantly subaverage intellectual functioning which exists concurrently with impairment in adaptive behavior.

"Public transportation" means the transportation or conveyance of persons by means available to the general public, and includes paratransit services.

"Traffic control devices" means all signs, signals, markings, and devices that conform to the Illinois Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning, or guiding traffic.

(b) The following factors, related to all felonies, may be considered by the court as reasons to impose an extended term sentence under Section 5-8-2 upon any offender:

(1) When a defendant is convicted of any felony, after having been previously convicted in Illinois or any other jurisdiction of the same or similar class felony or greater class felony, when such conviction has occurred within 10 years after the previous conviction, excluding time spent in custody, and such charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts; or

(2) When a defendant is convicted of any felony and the court finds that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or

(3) When a defendant is convicted of any felony committed against:

(i) a person under 12 years of age at the time of the offense or such person's property;

(ii) a person 60 years of age or older at the time of the offense or such person's property; or

(iii) a person who had a physical disability at the time of the offense or such person's property; or

(4) When a defendant is convicted of any felony and the offense involved any of the following types of specific misconduct committed as part of a ceremony, rite, initiation, observance, performance, practice or activity of any actual or ostensible religious, fraternal, or social group:

(i) the brutalizing or torturing of humans or animals;

(ii) the theft of human corpses;

(iii) the kidnapping of humans;

(iv) the desecration of any cemetery, religious, fraternal, business, governmental, educational, or other building or property; or

(v) ritualized abuse of a child; or

(5) When a defendant is convicted of a felony other than conspiracy and the court finds that the felony was committed under an agreement with 2 or more other persons to commit that offense and the defendant, with respect to the other individuals, occupied a position of organizer, supervisor, financier, or any other position of management or leadership, and the court further finds that the felony committed was related to or in furtherance of the criminal activities of an organized gang or was motivated by the defendant's leadership in an organized gang; or

(6) When a defendant is convicted of an offense committed while using a firearm with a laser sight attached to it. For purposes of this paragraph, "laser sight" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 26-7 of the Criminal Code of 2012; or

(7) When a defendant who was at least 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is convicted of a felony and has been previously adjudicated a delinquent minor under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 for an act that if committed by an adult would be a Class X or Class 1 felony when the conviction has occurred within 10 years after the previous adjudication, excluding time spent in custody; or

(8) When a defendant commits any felony and the defendant used, possessed, exercised control over, or otherwise directed an animal to assault a law enforcement officer engaged in the execution of his or her official duties or in furtherance of the criminal activities of an organized gang in which the defendant is engaged; or

(9) When a defendant commits any felony and the defendant knowingly video or audio records the offense with the intent to disseminate the recording.

(c) The following factors may be considered by the court as reasons to impose an extended term sentence under Section 5-8-2 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2) upon any offender for the listed offenses:

(1) When a defendant is convicted of first degree murder, after having been previously convicted in Illinois of any offense listed under paragraph (c)(2) of Section 5-5-3 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3), when that conviction has occurred within 10 years after the previous conviction, excluding time spent in custody, and the charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts.

(1.5) When a defendant is convicted of first degree murder, after having been previously convicted of domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2) or aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3) committed on the same victim or after having been previously convicted of violation of an order of protection (720 ILCS 5/12-30) in which the same victim was the protected person.

(2) When a defendant is convicted of voluntary manslaughter, second degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, or reckless homicide in which the defendant has been convicted of causing the death of more than one individual.

(3) When a defendant is convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault or criminal sexual assault, when there is a finding that aggravated criminal sexual assault or criminal sexual assault was also committed on the same victim by one or more other individuals, and the defendant voluntarily participated in the crime with the knowledge of the participation of the others in the crime, and the commission of the crime was part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective.

(4) If the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, when a defendant is convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault or predatory criminal sexual assault of a child under subsection (a)(1) of Section 11-1.40 or subsection (a)(1) of Section 12-14.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40 or 5/12-14.1).

(5) When a defendant is convicted of a felony violation of Section 24-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/24-1) and there is a finding that the defendant is a member of an organized gang.

(6) When a defendant was convicted of unlawful use of weapons under Section 24-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/24-1) for possessing a weapon that is not readily distinguishable as one of the weapons enumerated in Section 24-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/24-1).

(7) When a defendant is convicted of an offense involving the illegal manufacture of a controlled substance under Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/401), the illegal manufacture of methamphetamine under Section 25 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act (720 ILCS 646/25), or the illegal possession of explosives and an emergency response officer in the performance of his or her duties is killed or injured at the scene of the offense while responding to the emergency caused by the commission of the offense. In this paragraph, "emergency" means a situation in which a person's life, health, or safety is in jeopardy; and "emergency response officer" means a peace officer, community policing volunteer, fireman, emergency medical technician-ambulance, emergency medical technician-intermediate, emergency medical technician-paramedic, ambulance driver, other medical assistance or first aid personnel, or hospital emergency room personnel.

(8) When the defendant is convicted of attempted mob action, solicitation to commit mob action, or conspiracy to commit mob action under Section 8-1, 8-2, or 8-4 of the Criminal Code of 2012, where the criminal object is a violation of Section 25-1 of the Criminal Code of 2012, and an electronic communication is used in the commission of the offense. For the purposes of this paragraph (8), "electronic communication" shall have the meaning provided in Section 26.5-0.1 of the Criminal Code of 2012.

(d) For the purposes of this Section, "organized gang" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 10 of the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act.

(e) The court may impose an extended term sentence under Article 4.5 of Chapter V upon an offender who has been convicted of a felony violation of Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 when the victim of the offense is under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense and, during the commission of the offense, the victim was under the influence of alcohol, regardless of whether or not the alcohol was supplied by the offender; and the offender, at the time of the commission of the offense, knew or should have known that the victim had consumed alcohol.

(Source: P.A. 101-173, eff. 1-1-20; 101-401, eff. 1-1-20; 101-417, eff. 1-1-20; 101-652, eff. 1-1-23; 102-558, eff. 8-20-21; 102-982, eff. 7-1-23.)

(730 ILCS 5/5-5-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-5-4)

Sec. 5-5-4. Resentences.

(a) Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied unless the more severe sentence is based upon conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the original sentencing. If a sentence is vacated on appeal or on collateral attack due to the failure of the trier of fact at trial to determine beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a fact (other than a prior conviction) necessary to increase the punishment for the offense beyond the statutory maximum otherwise applicable, either the defendant may be re-sentenced to a term within the range otherwise provided or, if the State files notice of its intention to again seek the extended sentence, the defendant shall be afforded a new trial.

(b) If a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on collateral attack and the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was factually innocent of the charge, the court shall enter an order expunging the record of arrest from the official records of the arresting authority and order that the records of the clerk of the circuit court and Illinois State Police be sealed until further order of the court upon good cause shown or as otherwise provided herein, and the name of the defendant obliterated from the official index requested to be kept by the circuit court clerk under Section 16 of the Clerks of Courts Act in connection with the arrest and conviction for the offense but the order shall not affect any index issued by the circuit court clerk before the entry of the order. The court shall enter the expungement order regardless of whether the defendant has prior criminal convictions.

All records sealed by the Illinois State Police may be disseminated by the Department only as required by law or to the arresting authority, the State's Attorney, the court upon a later arrest for the same or similar offense, or for the purpose of sentencing for any subsequent felony. Upon conviction for any subsequent offense, the Department of Corrections shall have access to all sealed records of the Department pertaining to that individual.

Upon entry of the order of expungement, the clerk of the circuit court shall promptly mail a copy of the order to the person whose records were expunged and sealed.

(c) If a conviction has been vacated as a result of a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence made under Section 122-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 or Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (g) of Section 2-702 of the Code of Civil Procedure are otherwise satisfied, the court shall enter an order for a certificate of innocence and an order expunging the conviction for which the petitioner has been determined to be innocent as provided in subsection (h) of Section 2-702 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(Source: P.A. 102-538, eff. 8-20-21.)

(730 ILCS 5/5-5-4.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-5-4.1)

Sec. 5-5-4.1. Appeal. The defendant has the right of appeal in all cases from sentences entered on conviction of first degree murder or any other Class of felony.

(Source: P.A. 84-1450.)

(730 ILCS 5/5-5-4.2) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-5-4.2)

Sec. 5-5-4.2. Statewide Sentence Equalization Procedures.) The Supreme Court may by rule, not inconsistent with law, prescribe such practices and procedures as will promote a uniformity and parity of sentences within and among the various circuit courts and appellate court districts.

(Source: P.A. 80-1099.)

(730 ILCS 5/5-5-4.3)

Sec. 5-5-4.3. (Repealed).

(Source: P.A. 95-1052, eff. 7-1-09. Repealed by P.A. 97-800, eff. 7-13-12.)

(730 ILCS 5/5-5-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-5-5)

Sec. 5-5-5. Loss and restoration of rights.

(a) Conviction and disposition shall not entail the loss by the defendant of any civil rights, except under this Section and Sections 29-6 and 29-10 of The Election Code, as now or hereafter amended.

(b) A person convicted of a felony shall be ineligible to hold an office created by the Constitution of this State until the completion of his sentence.

(b-5) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person convicted of a felony, bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime for an offense committed on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 103rd General Assembly and committed while he or she was serving as a public official in this State is ineligible to hold any local public office or any office created by the Constitution of this State unless the person's conviction is reversed, the person is again restored to such rights by the terms of a pardon for the offense, the person has received a restoration of rights by the Governor, or the person's rights are otherwise restored by law.

(c) A person sentenced to imprisonment shall lose his right to vote until released from imprisonment.

(d) On completion of sentence of imprisonment or upon discharge from probation, conditional discharge or periodic imprisonment, or at any time thereafter, all license rights and privileges granted under the authority of this State which have been revoked or suspended because of conviction of an offense shall be restored unless the authority having jurisdiction of such license rights finds after investigation and hearing that restoration is not in the public interest. This paragraph (d) shall not apply to the suspension or revocation of a license to operate a motor vehicle under the Illinois Vehicle Code.

(e) Upon a person's discharge from incarceration or parole, or upon a person's discharge from probation or at any time thereafter, the committing court may enter an order certifying that the sentence has been satisfactorily completed when the court believes it would assist in the rehabilitation of the person and be consistent with the public welfare. Such order may be entered upon the motion of the defendant or the State or upon the court's own motion.

(f) Upon entry of the order, the court shall issue to the person in whose favor the order has been entered a certificate stating that his behavior after conviction has warranted the issuance of the order.

(g) This Section shall not affect the right of a defendant to collaterally attack his conviction or to rely on it in bar of subsequent proceedings for the same offense.

(h) No application for any license specified in subsection (i) of this Section granted under the authority of this State shall be denied by reason of an eligible offender who has obtained a certificate of relief from disabilities, as defined in Article 5.5 of this Chapter, having been previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses, or by reason of a finding of lack of "good moral character" when the finding is based upon the fact that the applicant has previously been convicted of one or more criminal offenses, unless:

(1) there is a direct relationship between one or more of the previous criminal offenses and the specific license sought; or

(2) the issuance of the license would involve an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general public.

In making such a determination, the licensing agency shall consider the following factors:

(1) the public policy of this State, as expressed in Article 5.5 of this Chapter, to encourage the licensure and employment of persons previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses;

(2) the specific duties and responsibilities necessarily related to the license being sought;

(3) the bearing, if any, the criminal offenses or offenses for which the person was previously convicted will have on his or her fitness or ability to perform one or more such duties and responsibilities;

(4) the time which has elapsed since the occurrence of the criminal offense or offenses;

(5) the age of the person at the time of occurrence of the criminal offense or offenses;

(6) the seriousness of the offense or offenses;

(7) any information produced by the person or produced on his or her behalf in regard to his or her rehabilitation and good conduct, including a certificate of relief from disabilities issued to the applicant, which certificate shall create a presumption of rehabilitation in regard to the offense or offenses specified in the certificate; and

(8) the legitimate interest of the licensing agency in protecting property, and the safety and welfare of specific individuals or the general public.

(i) A certificate of relief from disabilities shall be issued only for a license or certification issued under the following Acts:

(1) the Animal Welfare Act; except that a certificate of relief from disabilities may not be granted to provide for the issuance or restoration of a license under the Animal Welfare Act for any person convicted of violating Section 3, 3.01, 3.02, 3.03, 3.03-1, or 4.01 of the Humane Care for Animals Act or Section 26-5 or 48-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012;

(2) the Illinois Athletic Trainers Practice Act;

(3) the Barber, Cosmetology, Esthetics, Hair Braiding, and Nail Technology Act of 1985;

(4) the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Repairer Regulation Act;

(5) the Boxing and Full-contact Martial Arts Act;

(6) the Illinois Certified Shorthand Reporters Act of 1984;

(7) the Illinois Farm Labor Contractor Certification Act;

(8) the Registered Interior Designers Act;

(9) the Illinois Professional Land Surveyor Act of 1989;

(10) the Landscape Architecture Registration Act;

(11) the Marriage and Family Therapy Licensing Act;

(12) the Private Employment Agency Act;

(13) the Professional Counselor and Clinical Professional Counselor Licensing and Practice Act;

(14) the Real Estate License Act of 2000;

(15) the Illinois Roofing Industry Licensing Act;

(16) the Professional Engineering Practice Act of 1989;

(17) the Water Well and Pump Installation Contractor's License Act;

(18) the Electrologist Licensing Act;

(19) the Auction License Act;

(20) the Illinois Architecture Practice Act of 1989;

(21) the Dietitian Nutritionist Practice Act;

(22) the Environmental Health Practitioner Licensing Act;

(23) the Funeral Directors and Embalmers Licensing Code;

(24) (blank);

(25) the Professional Geologist Licensing Act;

(26) the Illinois Public Accounting Act; and

(27) the Structural Engineering Practice Act of 1989.

(Source: P.A. 102-284, eff. 8-6-21; 103-562, eff. 11-17-23.)

(730 ILCS 5/5-5-6) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-5-6)

Sec. 5-5-6. In all convictions for offenses in violation of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code in which the person received any injury to his or her person or damage to his or her real or personal property as a result of the criminal act of the defendant, the court shall order restitution as provided in this Section. In all other cases, except cases in which restitution is required under this Section, the court must at the sentence hearing determine whether restitution is an appropriate sentence to be imposed on each defendant convicted of an offense. If the court determines that an order directing the offender to make restitution is appropriate, the offender may be sentenced to make restitution. The court may consider restitution an appropriate sentence to be imposed on each defendant convicted of an offense in addition to a sentence of imprisonment. The sentence of the defendant to a term of imprisonment is not a mitigating factor that prevents the court from ordering the defendant to pay restitution. If the offender is sentenced to make restitution the Court shall determine the restitution as hereinafter set forth:

(a) At the sentence hearing, the court shall determine whether the property may be restored in kind to the possession of the owner or the person entitled to possession thereof; or whether the defendant is possessed of sufficient skill to repair and restore property damaged; or whether the defendant should be required to make restitution in cash, for out-of-pocket expenses, damages, losses, or injuries found to have been proximately caused by the conduct of the defendant or another for whom the defendant is legally accountable under the provisions of Article 5 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012.

(b) In fixing the amount of restitution to be paid in cash, the court shall allow credit for property returned in kind, for property damages ordered to be repaired by the defendant, and for property ordered to be restored by the defendant; and after granting the credit, the court shall assess the actual out-of-pocket expenses, losses, damages, and injuries suffered by the victim named in the charge and any other victims who may also have suffered out-of-pocket expenses, losses, damages, and injuries proximately caused by the same criminal conduct of the defendant, and insurance carriers who have indemnified the named victim or other victims for the out-of-pocket expenses, losses, damages, or injuries, provided that in no event shall restitution be ordered to be paid on account of pain and suffering. When a victim's out-of-pocket expenses have been paid pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act, the court shall order restitution be paid to the compensation program. If a defendant is placed on supervision for, or convicted of, domestic battery, the defendant shall be required to pay restitution to any domestic violence shelter in which the victim and any other family or household members lived because of the domestic battery. The amount of the restitution shall equal the actual expenses of the domestic violence shelter in providing housing and any other services for the victim and any other family or household members living at the shelter. If a defendant fails to pay restitution in the manner or within the time period specified by the court, the court may enter an order directing the sheriff to seize any real or personal property of a defendant to the extent necessary to satisfy the order of restitution and dispose of the property by public sale. All proceeds from such sale in excess of the amount of restitution plus court costs and the costs of the sheriff in conducting the sale shall be paid to the defendant. The defendant convicted of domestic battery, if a person under 18 years of age was present and witnessed the domestic battery of the victim, is liable to pay restitution for the cost of any counseling required for the child at the discretion of the court.

(c) In cases where more than one defendant is accountable for the same criminal conduct that results in out-of-pocket expenses, losses, damages, or injuries, each defendant shall be ordered to pay restitution in the amount of the total actual out-of-pocket expenses, losses, damages, or injuries to the victim proximately caused by the conduct of all of the defendants who are legally accountable for the offense.

(1) In no event shall the victim be entitled to recover restitution in excess of the actual out-of-pocket expenses, losses, damages, or injuries, proximately caused by the conduct of all of the defendants.

(2) As between the defendants, the court may apportion the restitution that is payable in proportion to each co-defendant's culpability in the commission of the offense.

(3) In the absence of a specific order apportioning the restitution, each defendant shall bear his pro rata share of the restitution.

(4) As between the defendants, each defendant shall be entitled to a pro rata reduction in the total restitution required to be paid to the victim for amounts of restitution actually paid by co-defendants, and defendants who shall have paid more than their pro rata share shall be entitled to refunds to be computed by the court as additional amounts are paid by co-defendants.

(d) In instances where a defendant has more than one criminal charge pending against him in a single case, or more than one case, and the defendant stands convicted of one or more charges, a plea agreement negotiated by the State's Attorney and the defendants may require the defendant to make restitution to victims of charges that have been dismissed or which it is contemplated will be dismissed under the terms of the plea agreement, and under the agreement, the court may impose a sentence of restitution on the charge or charges of which the defendant has been convicted that would require the defendant to make restitution to victims of other offenses as provided in the plea agreement.

(e) The court may require the defendant to apply the balance of the cash bond, after payment of court costs, and any fine that may be imposed to the payment of restitution.

(f) Taking into consideration the ability of the defendant to pay, including any real or personal property or any other assets of the defendant, the court shall determine whether restitution shall be paid in a single payment or in installments, and shall fix a period of time not in excess of 5 years, except for violations of Sections 16-1.3 and 17-56 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, or the period of time specified in subsection (f-1), not including periods of incarceration, within which payment of restitution is to be paid in full. Complete restitution shall be paid in as short a time period as possible. However, if the court deems it necessary and in the best interest of the victim, the court may extend beyond 5 years the period of time within which the payment of restitution is to be paid. If the defendant is ordered to pay restitution and the court orders that restitution is to be paid over a period greater than 6 months, the court shall order that the defendant make monthly payments; the court may waive this requirement of monthly payments only if there is a specific finding of good cause for waiver.

(f-1)(1) In addition to any other penalty prescribed by law and any restitution ordered under this Section that did not include long-term physical health care costs, the court may, upon conviction of any misdemeanor or felony, order a defendant to pay restitution to a victim in accordance with the provisions of this subsection (f-1) if the victim has suffered physical injury as a result of the offense that is reasonably probable to require or has required long-term physical health care for more than 3 months. As used in this subsection (f-1), "long-term physical health care" includes mental health care.

(2) The victim's estimate of long-term physical health care costs may be made as part of a victim impact statement under Section 6 of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act or made separately. The court shall enter the long-term physical health care restitution order at the time of sentencing. An order of restitution made under this subsection (f-1) shall fix a monthly amount to be paid by the defendant for as long as long-term physical health care of the victim is required as a result of the offense. The order may exceed the length of any sentence imposed upon the defendant for the criminal activity. The court shall include as a special finding in the judgment of conviction its determination of the monthly cost of long-term physical health care.

(3) After a sentencing order has been entered, the court may from time to time, on the petition of either the defendant or the victim, or upon its own motion, enter an order for restitution for long-term physical care or modify the existing order for restitution for long-term physical care as to the amount of monthly payments. Any modification of the order shall be based only upon a substantial change of circumstances relating to the cost of long-term physical health care or the financial condition of either the defendant or the victim. The petition shall be filed as part of the original criminal docket.

(g) In addition to the sentences provided for in Sections 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 11-19.2, 11-20.1, 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, and 12-16, and subdivision (a)(4) of Section 11-14.4, of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, the court may order any person who is convicted of violating any of those Sections or who was charged with any of those offenses and which charge was reduced to another charge as a result of a plea agreement under subsection (d) of this Section to meet all or any portion of the financial obligations of treatment, including but not limited to medical, psychiatric, or rehabilitative treatment or psychological counseling, prescribed for the victim or victims of the offense.

The payments shall be made by the defendant to the clerk of the circuit court and transmitted by the clerk to the appropriate person or agency as directed by the court. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (f-1), the order may require such payments to be made for a period not to exceed 5 years after sentencing, not including periods of incarceration.

(h) The judge may enter an order of withholding to collect the amount of restitution owed in accordance with Part 8 of Article XII of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(i) A sentence of restitution may be modified or revoked by the court if the offender commits another offense, or the offender fails to make restitution as ordered by the court, but no sentence to make restitution shall be revoked unless the court shall find that the offender has had the financial ability to make restitution, and he has wilfully refused to do so. When the offender's ability to pay restitution was established at the time an order of restitution was entered or modified, or when the offender's ability to pay was based on the offender's willingness to make restitution as part of a plea agreement made at the time the order of restitution was entered or modified, there is a rebuttable presumption that the facts and circumstances considered by the court at the hearing at which the order of restitution was entered or modified regarding the offender's ability or willingness to pay restitution have not materially changed. If the court shall find that the defendant has failed to make restitution and that the failure is not wilful, the court may impose an additional period of time within which to make restitution. The length of the additional period shall not be more than 2 years. The court shall retain all of the incidents of the original sentence, including the authority to modify or enlarge the conditions, and to revoke or further modify the sentence if the conditions of payment are violated during the additional period.

(j) The procedure upon the filing of a Petition to Revoke a sentence to make restitution shall be the same as the procedures set forth in Section 5-6-4 of this Code governing violation, modification, or revocation of Probation, of Conditional Discharge, or of Supervision.

(k) Nothing contained in this Section shall preclude the right of any party to proceed in a civil action to recover for any damages incurred due to the criminal misconduct of the defendant.

(l) Restitution ordered under this Section shall not be subject to disbursement by the circuit clerk under the Criminal and Traffic Assessment Act.

(m) A restitution order under this Section is a judgment lien in favor of the victim that:

(1) Attaches to the property of the person subject to the order;

(2) May be perfected in the same manner as provided in Part 3 of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code;

(3) May be enforced to satisfy any payment that is delinquent under the restitution order by the person in whose favor the order is issued or the person's assignee; and

(4) Expires in the same manner as a judgment lien created in a civil proceeding.

When a restitution order is issued under this Section, the issuing court shall send a certified copy of the order to the clerk of the circuit court in the county where the charge was filed. Upon receiving the order, the clerk shall enter and index the order in the circuit court judgment docket.

(n) An order of restitution under this Section does not bar a civil action for:

(1) Damages that the court did not require the person to pay to the victim under the restitution order but arise from an injury or property damages that is the basis of restitution ordered by the court; and

(2) Other damages suffered by the victim.

The restitution order is not discharged by the completion of the sentence imposed for the offense.

A restitution order under this Section is not discharged by the liquidation of a person's estate by a receiver. A restitution order under this Section may be enforced in the same manner as judgment liens are enforced under Article XII of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The provisions of Section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for interest on judgments, apply to judgments for restitution entered under this Section.

(Source: P.A. 100-987, eff. 7-1-19; 101-81, eff. 7-12-19.)

(730 ILCS 5/5-5-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-5-7)

Sec. 5-5-7. Neither the State, any local government, probation department, public or community service program or site, nor any official, volunteer, or employee thereof acting in the course of their official duties shall be liable for any injury or loss a person might receive while performing public or community service as ordered either (1) by the court or (2) by any duly authorized station or probation adjustment, teen court, community mediation, or other administrative diversion program authorized by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 for a violation of a penal statute of this State or a local government ordinance (whether penal, civil, or quasi-criminal) or for a traffic offense, nor shall they be liable for any tortious acts of any person performing public or community service, except for wilful, wanton misconduct or gross negligence on the part of such governmental unit, probation department, or public or community service program or site, or the official, volunteer, or employee.

(Source: P.A. 91-820, eff. 6-13-00.)

(730 ILCS 5/5-5-8) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-5-8)

Sec. 5-5-8. No person assigned to a public or community service program shall be considered an employee for any purpose, nor shall the county board be obligated to provide any compensation to such person.

(Source: P.A. 85-449.)