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| | SR0541 | | LRB103 34974 ECR 64868 r |
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| 1 | | SENATE RESOLUTION |
| 2 | | WHEREAS, State law forces contractors who do construction |
| 3 | | for government agencies to lend money back to their government |
| 4 | | clients at a zero percent interest rate pursuant to retention |
| 5 | | laws; and |
| 6 | | WHEREAS, Under retention laws, for every pay period after |
| 7 | | the project bill is approved, the government agency pays only |
| 8 | | 90% of the bill; and |
| 9 | | WHEREAS, The government agency keeps 10% of the bill, |
| 10 | | which is known as the retention or retainage; and |
| 11 | | WHEREAS, The government agency will pay back this forced |
| 12 | | loan months or even years after the contractor has performed |
| 13 | | the work and paid for all the supplies and labor required; and |
| 14 | | WHEREAS, The forced loan of retainage has an enormous |
| 15 | | impact on contractors' ability to grow; and |
| 16 | | WHEREAS, Instead of improving access to capital, the |
| 17 | | retention law drains capital from employers; and |
| 18 | | WHEREAS, Defenders of retention laws argue that without |
| 19 | | the leverage of keeping the contractors in debt from the costs |
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| | SR0541 | - 2 - | LRB103 34974 ECR 64868 r |
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| 1 | | they have incurred for doing the approved work for agencies, |
| 2 | | the agencies wouldn't be able to require contractors to |
| 3 | | perform to the agencies' satisfaction; and |
| 4 | | WHEREAS, Agencies have many other tools to manage |
| 5 | | contractors, including, but not limited to, their existing |
| 6 | | vigorous approval and verification process for every pay |
| 7 | | period or invoice, liquidated damages clauses if a contractor |
| 8 | | doesn't perform, warranties on all work performed by |
| 9 | | contractors, and a more nuanced contract for those few |
| 10 | | circumstances where the quality of the work needs to be |
| 11 | | verified later; and |
| 12 | | WHEREAS, Retention takes 10% of the contract value from |
| 13 | | all contractors as a forced loan from everyone, whether the |
| 14 | | subcontractor simply delivered materials or the prime |
| 15 | | contractor is working on a complicated project that needs some |
| 16 | | later examination; and |
| 17 | | WHEREAS, Under State law, this forced loan drops to 5% of |
| 18 | | the contract value halfway through the project until close |
| 19 | | out, a paperwork exercise that can take months after the work |
| 20 | | is performed; and |
| 21 | | WHEREAS, Sometimes, government agencies are understaffed |
| 22 | | and aren't able to close out a project in a reasonable period |
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| | SR0541 | - 3 - | LRB103 34974 ECR 64868 r |
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| 1 | | of time, or some required paperwork isn't in from one vendor, |
| 2 | | leading all the contractors to suffer with a forced loan until |
| 3 | | the agency is satisfied; and |
| 4 | | WHEREAS, Retention is a punishing, blunt, and expensive |
| 5 | | policy; and |
| 6 | | WHEREAS, Subcontractors will regularly and successfully |
| 7 | | complete major work, fronting all the money for supplies and |
| 8 | | labor, only to be caught waiting for the prime contractor to |
| 9 | | pay out while they muddle through a retention dispute with a |
| 10 | | government agency, putting the subcontractor in debt; |
| 11 | | therefore, be it |
| 12 | | RESOLVED, BY THE SENATE OF THE ONE HUNDRED THIRD GENERAL |
| 13 | | ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, that we urge all |
| 14 | | stakeholders and policymakers to collaborate and consider how |
| 15 | | to best upgrade public works law in 2024 from the |
| 16 | | across-the-board, capital-draining policy of retention that |
| 17 | | takes money from all contractors on all projects to a more |
| 18 | | efficient, nuanced, and tailored approach that protects |
| 19 | | government agencies without forcing cash-strapped contractors |
| 20 | | to go into debt by providing no interest loans to their |
| 21 | | government clients. |