HB4312 104TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

LRB104 17114 JRC 30533 b

104TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY
State of Illinois
2025 and 2026
HB4312

Introduced 1/14/2026, by Rep. Maurice A. West, II - Yolonda Morris

SYNOPSIS AS INTRODUCED:

See Index

Amends the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Changes the definitions of "harassment" to include, among other actions, doxing, electronic tracking, and nonconsensual creation, dissemination, or threatening the dissemination of electronically generated or digitally altered content pertaining to the petitioner. Requires a county (not just counties with more than 250,000 in population) to provide remote access to a hearing on a protective order to include relevant witnesses besides the petitioner and respondent. Creates additional remedies for the court to grant in a domestic violence order of protection. Requires that any motion to extend a plenary order must be filed on or before the expiration date, and the plenary order remains in effect after filing until its original expiration date or until the motion is presented or heard, whichever is later. Requires a plenary order to be extended if the court finds that since entry of the plenary order there has been no material change in the relevant circumstances as required by law, and an extension of a plenary order may be granted for any fixed period of time or indefinitely until the plenary order is vacated or modified. Provides that if the motion to extend the plenary order is uncontested, petitioner's motion or affidavit stating that there has been no material change in relevant circumstances since entry of the order and stating the reason for the requested extension is sufficient for the court to extend the plenary order for any length of time, including indefinitely. Provides that the court may grant a contested request for an extension of the plenary order for more than 2 years for good cause. Provides that a violation of the original order or a subsequent incident of abuse is not required to grant the extension or determine the length of the extension, and compliance with the original order does not negate the basis or length of the extension. Amends the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986. Makes conforming changes.

A BILL FOR

AN ACT concerning domestic violence.

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly:

Section 5. The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 is amended by changing Sections 112A-3, 112A-5.5, 112A-14, and 112A-20 as follows:

(725 ILCS 5/112A-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 112A-3)

Sec. 112A-3. Definitions.

(a) In this Article:

"Advocate" means a person whose communications with the victim are privileged under Section 8-802.1 or 8-802.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 227 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986.

"Named victim" means the person named as the victim in the delinquency petition or criminal prosecution.

"Protective order" means a domestic violence order of protection, a civil no contact order, or a stalking no contact order.

(b) For the purposes of domestic violence cases, the following terms shall have the following meanings in this Article:

(1) "Abuse" means physical abuse, harassment, intimidation of a dependent, interference with personal liberty or willful deprivation but does not include reasonable direction of a minor child by a parent or person in loco parentis.

(2) "Domestic violence" means abuse as described in paragraph (1) of this subsection (b).

(3) "Family or household members" include spouses, former spouses, parents, children, stepchildren, and other persons related by blood or by present or prior marriage, persons who share or formerly shared a common dwelling, persons who have or allegedly have a child in common, persons who share or allegedly share a blood relationship through a child, persons who have or have had a dating or engagement relationship, persons with disabilities and their personal assistants, and caregivers as defined in subsection (e) of Section 12-4.4a of the Criminal Code of 2012. For purposes of this paragraph (3), neither a casual acquaintanceship nor ordinary fraternization between 2 individuals in business or social contexts shall be deemed to constitute a dating relationship.

(4) "Harassment" means knowing conduct which is not necessary to accomplish a purpose which is reasonable under the circumstances; would cause a reasonable person emotional distress; and does cause emotional distress to the petitioner. Unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, the following types of conduct shall be presumed to cause emotional distress:

(i) creating a disturbance at petitioner's place of employment or school;

(ii) engaging in doxing as defined in the Civil Liability for Doxing Act repeatedly telephoning petitioner's place of employment, home or residence;

(iii) repeatedly following the petitioner including, but not limited to, directly or indirectly through third parties, by using an electronic tracking or monitoring device, a system or other electronic means, or acquiring tracking information to determine the petitioner's location, movement, or travel patterns without the petitioner's knowledge or consent about in a public place or places;

(iv) non-consensual creation, dissemination, or threatening the dissemination of electronically generated or digitally altered content directly or indirectly pertaining to the petitioner or to the likeness of the petitioner including, but not limited to, images of the petitioner or the petitioner's voice repeatedly keeping petitioner under surveillance by remaining present outside his or her home, school, place of employment, vehicle or other place occupied by petitioner or by peering in petitioner's windows;

(v) repeatedly surveilling the petitioner directly or indirectly including, but not limited to, by remaining present at or outside the petitioner's home, school, place of employment, vehicle, or other place occupied by petitioner, by peering in petitioner's windows, through an electronic tracking or monitoring device, a system or other electronic means, or by acquiring tracking information to determine the petitioner's location, movement, or travel patterns without the petitioner's knowledge and consent;

(vi) non-consensual creation, dissemination or threatening the non-consensual dissemination of private sexual images and digitally altered sexual images as defined in the Civil Remedies for Nonconsensual Dissemination of Private Sexual Images Act;

(vii) repeatedly contacting the petitioner directly or indirectly through any means including, but not limited to, telephonic, electronic, or online;

(viii) using an electronic tracking or monitoring, device, a system or other electronic means, or acquiring tracking information to determine the petitioner's location, movement, or travel patterns without the petitioner's knowledge or consent;

(ix) improperly concealing a minor child from petitioner, repeatedly threatening to improperly remove a minor child of petitioner's from the jurisdiction or from the physical care of petitioner, repeatedly threatening to conceal a minor child from petitioner, or making a single such threat following an actual or attempted improper removal or concealment, unless respondent was fleeing from an incident or pattern of domestic violence; or

(x) (vi) threatening physical force, confinement or restraint on one or more occasions.

(5) "Interference with personal liberty" means committing or threatening physical abuse, harassment, intimidation or willful deprivation so as to compel another to engage in conduct from which she or he has a right to abstain or to refrain from conduct in which she or he has a right to engage.

(6) "Intimidation of a dependent" means subjecting a person who is dependent because of age, health, or disability to participation in or the witnessing of: physical force against another or physical confinement or restraint of another which constitutes physical abuse as defined in this Article, regardless of whether the abused person is a family or household member.

(7) "Order of protection" or "domestic violence order of protection" means an ex parte or final order, granted pursuant to this Article, which includes any or all of the remedies authorized by Section 112A-14 of this Code.

(8) "Petitioner" may mean not only any named petitioner for the domestic violence order of protection and any named victim of abuse on whose behalf the petition is brought, but also any other person protected by this Article.

(9) "Physical abuse" includes sexual abuse and means any of the following:

(i) knowing or reckless use of physical force, confinement or restraint;

(ii) knowing, repeated and unnecessary sleep deprivation; or

(iii) knowing or reckless conduct which creates an immediate risk of physical harm.

(9.3) "Respondent" in a petition for a domestic violence order of protection means the defendant.

(9.5) "Stay away" means for the respondent to refrain from both physical presence and nonphysical contact with the petitioner whether direct, indirect (including, but not limited to, telephone calls, mail, email, faxes, and written notes), or through third parties who may or may not know about the domestic violence order of protection.

(10) "Willful deprivation" means wilfully denying a person who because of age, health or disability requires medication, medical care, shelter, accessible shelter or services, food, therapeutic device, or other physical assistance, and thereby exposing that person to the risk of physical, mental or emotional harm, except with regard to medical care and treatment when such dependent person has expressed the intent to forgo such medical care or treatment. This paragraph (10) does not create any new affirmative duty to provide support to dependent persons.

(c) For the purposes of cases involving sexual offenses, the following terms shall have the following meanings in this Article:

(1) "Civil no contact order" means an ex parte or final order granted under this Article, which includes a remedy authorized by Section 112A-14.5 of this Code.

(2) "Family or household members" include spouses, parents, children, stepchildren, and persons who share a common dwelling.

(3) "Non-consensual" means a lack of freely given agreement.

(4) "Petitioner" means not only any named petitioner for the civil no contact order and any named victim of non-consensual sexual conduct or non-consensual sexual penetration on whose behalf the petition is brought, but includes any other person sought to be protected under this Article.

(5) "Respondent" in a petition for a civil no contact order means the defendant.

(6) "Sexual conduct" means any intentional or knowing touching or fondling by the petitioner or the respondent, either directly or through clothing, of the sex organs, anus, or breast of the petitioner or the respondent, or any part of the body of a child under 13 years of age, or any transfer or transmission of semen by the respondent upon any part of the clothed or unclothed body of the petitioner, for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the petitioner or the respondent.

(7) "Sexual penetration" means any contact, however slight, between the sex organ or anus of one person by an object, the sex organ, mouth or anus of another person, or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of the body of one person or of any animal or object into the sex organ or anus of another person, including, but not limited to, cunnilingus, fellatio, or anal penetration. Evidence of emission of semen is not required to prove sexual penetration.

(8) "Stay away" means to refrain from both physical presence and nonphysical contact with the petitioner directly, indirectly, or through third parties who may or may not know of the order. "Nonphysical contact" includes, but is not limited to, telephone calls, mail, e-mail, fax, and written notes.

(d) For the purposes of cases involving stalking offenses, the following terms shall have the following meanings in this Article:

(1) "Course of conduct" means 2 or more acts, including, but not limited to, acts in which a respondent directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means follows, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, or communicates to or about, a person, engages in other contact, or interferes with or damages a person's property or pet. A course of conduct may include contact via electronic communications. The incarceration of a person in a penal institution who commits the course of conduct is not a bar to prosecution.

(2) "Emotional distress" means significant mental suffering, anxiety, or alarm.

(3) "Contact" includes any contact with the victim, that is initiated or continued without the victim's consent, or that is in disregard of the victim's expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued, including, but not limited to, being in the physical presence of the victim; appearing within the sight of the victim; approaching or confronting the victim in a public place or on private property; appearing at the workplace or residence of the victim; entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim; or placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim.

(4) "Petitioner" means any named petitioner for the stalking no contact order or any named victim of stalking on whose behalf the petition is brought.

(5) "Reasonable person" means a person in the petitioner's circumstances with the petitioner's knowledge of the respondent and the respondent's prior acts.

(6) "Respondent" in a petition for a civil no contact order means the defendant.

(7) "Stalking" means engaging in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and he or she knows or should know that this course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety or the safety of a third person or suffer emotional distress. "Stalking" does not include an exercise of the right to free speech or assembly that is otherwise lawful or picketing occurring at the workplace that is otherwise lawful and arises out of a bona fide labor dispute, including any controversy concerning wages, salaries, hours, working conditions or benefits, including health and welfare, sick leave, insurance, and pension or retirement provisions, the making or maintaining of collective bargaining agreements, and the terms to be included in those agreements.

(8) "Stalking no contact order" means an ex parte or final order granted under this Article, which includes a remedy authorized by Section 112A-14.7 of this Code.

(Source: P.A. 100-199, eff. 1-1-18; 100-597, eff. 6-29-18.)

(725 ILCS 5/112A-5.5)

Sec. 112A-5.5. Time for filing petition; service on respondent, hearing on petition, and default orders.

(a) A petition for a protective order may be filed at any time, in person or online, after a criminal charge or delinquency petition is filed and before the charge or delinquency petition is dismissed, the defendant or juvenile is acquitted, or the defendant or juvenile completes service of his or her sentence.

(b) The request for an ex parte protective order may be considered without notice to the respondent under Section 112A-17.5 of this Code.

(c) A summons shall be issued and served for a protective order. The summons may be served by delivery to the respondent personally in open court in the criminal or juvenile delinquency proceeding, in the form prescribed by subsection (d) of Supreme Court Rule 101, except that it shall require the respondent to answer or appear within 7 days. Attachments to the summons shall include the petition for protective order, supporting affidavits, if any, and any ex parte protective order that has been issued.

(d) The summons shall be served by the sheriff or other law enforcement officer at the earliest time available and shall take precedence over any other summons, except those of a similar emergency nature. Attachments to the summons shall include the petition for protective order, supporting affidavits, if any, and any ex parte protective order that has been issued. Special process servers may be appointed at any time and their designation shall not affect the responsibilities and authority of the sheriff or other official process servers. In a county with a population over 3,000,000, a special process server may not be appointed if the protective order grants the surrender of a child, the surrender of a firearm or Firearm Owner's Identification Card, or the exclusive possession of a shared residence.

(e) If the respondent is not served within 30 days of the filing of the petition, the court shall schedule a court proceeding on the issue of service. Either the petitioner, the petitioner's counsel, or the State's Attorney shall appear and the court shall either order continued attempts at personal service or shall order service by publication, in accordance with Sections 2-203, 2-206, and 2-207 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(f) The request for a final protective order can be considered at any court proceeding in the delinquency or criminal case after service of the petition. If the petitioner has not been provided notice of the court proceeding at least 10 days in advance of the proceeding, the court shall schedule a hearing on the petition and provide notice to the petitioner.

(f-5) A court in a county with a population above 250,000 shall offer the option of a remote hearing to a petitioner for a protective order. The court has the discretion to grant or deny the request for a remote hearing for good cause shown. Each court shall determine the procedure for a remote hearing. The petitioner, applicable witnesses, and respondent may appear remotely or in person.

The court shall issue and publish a court order, standing order, or local rule detailing information about the process for requesting and participating in a remote court appearance. The court order, standing order, or local rule shall be published on the court's website and posted on signs throughout the courthouse, including in the clerk's office. The sign shall be written in plain language and include information about the availability of remote court appearances and the process for requesting a remote hearing.

(g) Default orders.

(1) A final domestic violence order of protection may be entered by default:

(A) for any of the remedies sought in the petition, if the respondent has been served with documents under subsection (b) or (c) of this Section and if the respondent fails to appear on the specified return date or any subsequent hearing date agreed to by the petitioner and respondent or set by the court; or

(B) for any of the remedies provided under paragraph (1), (2), (3), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (14), (15), (17), or (18) of subsection (b) of Section 112A-14 of this Code, or if the respondent fails to answer or appear in accordance with the date set in the publication notice or the return date indicated on the service of a household member.

(2) A final civil no contact order may be entered by default for any of the remedies provided in Section 112A-14.5 of this Code, if the respondent has been served with documents under subsection (b) or (c) of this Section, and if the respondent fails to answer or appear in accordance with the date set in the publication notice or the return date indicated on the service of a household member.

(3) A final stalking no contact order may be entered by default for any of the remedies provided by Section 112A-14.7 of this Code, if the respondent has been served with documents under subsection (b) or (c) of this Section and if the respondent fails to answer or appear in accordance with the date set in the publication notice or the return date indicated on the service of a household member.

(Source: P.A. 102-853, eff. 1-1-23; 103-154, eff. 6-30-23.)

(725 ILCS 5/112A-14) (from Ch. 38, par. 112A-14)

Sec. 112A-14. Domestic violence order of protection; remedies.

(a) (Blank).

(b) The court may order any of the remedies listed in this subsection (b). The remedies listed in this subsection (b) shall be in addition to other civil or criminal remedies available to petitioner.

(1) Prohibition of abuse. Prohibit respondent's harassment, interference with personal liberty, intimidation of a dependent, physical abuse, or willful deprivation, as defined in this Article, if such abuse has occurred or otherwise appears likely to occur if not prohibited.

(A) Require the respondent to cease harassment.

(B) Require the respondent to:

(i) stop creating, using, and disseminating; remove; and delete the following harassing conduct:

(a) any and all material or statements that constitute harassment under this Act, including, but not limited to, doxing, electronically generated or digitally altered content, sexual private images, and digitally altered sexual images; and

(b) any and all electronic tracking or monitoring devices, system or other electronic means, or tracking information; and

(ii) present sufficient evidence that such compliance has occurred.

(2) Grant of exclusive possession of residence. Prohibit respondent from entering or remaining in any residence, household, or premises of the petitioner, including one owned or leased by respondent, if petitioner has a right to occupancy thereof. The grant of exclusive possession of the residence, household, or premises shall not affect title to real property, nor shall the court be limited by the standard set forth in subsection (c-2) of Section 501 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.

(A) Right to occupancy. A party has a right to occupancy of a residence or household if it is solely or jointly owned or leased by that party, that party's spouse, a person with a legal duty to support that party or a minor child in that party's care, or by any person or entity other than the opposing party that authorizes that party's occupancy (e.g., a domestic violence shelter). Standards set forth in subparagraph (B) shall not preclude equitable relief.

(B) Presumption of hardships. If petitioner and respondent each has the right to occupancy of a residence or household, the court shall balance (i) the hardships to respondent and any minor child or dependent adult in respondent's care resulting from entry of this remedy with (ii) the hardships to petitioner and any minor child or dependent adult in petitioner's care resulting from continued exposure to the risk of abuse (should petitioner remain at the residence or household) or from loss of possession of the residence or household (should petitioner leave to avoid the risk of abuse). When determining the balance of hardships, the court shall also take into account the accessibility of the residence or household. Hardships need not be balanced if respondent does not have a right to occupancy.

The balance of hardships is presumed to favor possession by petitioner unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, showing that the hardships to respondent substantially outweigh the hardships to petitioner and any minor child or dependent adult in petitioner's care. The court, on the request of petitioner or on its own motion, may order respondent to provide suitable, accessible, alternate housing for petitioner instead of excluding respondent from a mutual residence or household.

(3) Stay away order and additional prohibitions. Order respondent to stay away from petitioner or any other person protected by the domestic violence order of protection, or prohibit respondent from entering or remaining present at petitioner's school, place of employment, or other specified places at times when petitioner is present, or both, if reasonable, given the balance of hardships. Hardships need not be balanced for the court to enter a stay away order or prohibit entry if respondent has no right to enter the premises.

(A) If a domestic violence order of protection grants petitioner exclusive possession of the residence, prohibits respondent from entering the residence, or orders respondent to stay away from petitioner or other protected persons, then the court may allow respondent access to the residence to remove items of clothing and personal adornment used exclusively by respondent, medications, and other items as the court directs. The right to access shall be exercised on only one occasion as the court directs and in the presence of an agreed-upon adult third party or law enforcement officer.

(B) When the petitioner and the respondent attend the same public, private, or non-public elementary, middle, or high school, the court when issuing a domestic violence order of protection and providing relief shall consider the severity of the act, any continuing physical danger or emotional distress to the petitioner, the educational rights guaranteed to the petitioner and respondent under federal and State law, the availability of a transfer of the respondent to another school, a change of placement or a change of program of the respondent, the expense, difficulty, and educational disruption that would be caused by a transfer of the respondent to another school, and any other relevant facts of the case. The court may order that the respondent not attend the public, private, or non-public elementary, middle, or high school attended by the petitioner, order that the respondent accept a change of placement or change of program, as determined by the school district or private or non-public school, or place restrictions on the respondent's movements within the school attended by the petitioner. The respondent bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a transfer, change of placement, or change of program of the respondent is not available. The respondent also bears the burden of production with respect to the expense, difficulty, and educational disruption that would be caused by a transfer of the respondent to another school. A transfer, change of placement, or change of program is not unavailable to the respondent solely on the ground that the respondent does not agree with the school district's or private or non-public school's transfer, change of placement, or change of program or solely on the ground that the respondent fails or refuses to consent or otherwise does not take an action required to effectuate a transfer, change of placement, or change of program. When a court orders a respondent to stay away from the public, private, or non-public school attended by the petitioner and the respondent requests a transfer to another attendance center within the respondent's school district or private or non-public school, the school district or private or non-public school shall have sole discretion to determine the attendance center to which the respondent is transferred. If the court order results in a transfer of the minor respondent to another attendance center, a change in the respondent's placement, or a change of the respondent's program, the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of the respondent is responsible for transportation and other costs associated with the transfer or change.

(C) The court may order the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of a minor respondent to take certain actions or to refrain from taking certain actions to ensure that the respondent complies with the order. If the court orders a transfer of the respondent to another school, the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of the respondent is responsible for transportation and other costs associated with the change of school by the respondent.

(4) Counseling. Require or recommend the respondent to undergo counseling for a specified duration with a social worker, psychologist, clinical psychologist, psychiatrist, family service agency, alcohol or substance abuse program, mental health center guidance counselor, agency providing services to elders, program designed for domestic violence abusers, or any other guidance service the court deems appropriate. The court may order the respondent in any intimate partner relationship to report to an Illinois Department of Human Services protocol approved partner abuse intervention program for an assessment and to follow all recommended treatment.

(5) Physical care and possession of the minor child. In order to protect the minor child from abuse, neglect, or unwarranted separation from the person who has been the minor child's primary caretaker, or to otherwise protect the well-being of the minor child, the court may do either or both of the following: (i) grant petitioner physical care or possession of the minor child, or both, or (ii) order respondent to return a minor child to, or not remove a minor child from, the physical care of a parent or person in loco parentis.

If the respondent is charged with abuse (as defined in Section 112A-3 of this Code) of a minor child, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that awarding physical care to respondent would not be in the minor child's best interest.

(6) Temporary allocation of parental responsibilities and significant decision-making responsibilities. Award temporary significant decision-making responsibility to petitioner in accordance with this Section, the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, and this State's Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.

If the respondent is charged with abuse (as defined in Section 112A-3 of this Code) of a minor child, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that awarding temporary significant decision-making responsibility to respondent would not be in the child's best interest.

(7) Parenting time. Determine the parenting time, if any, of respondent in any case in which the court awards physical care or temporary significant decision-making responsibility of a minor child to petitioner. The court shall restrict or deny respondent's parenting time with a minor child if the court finds that respondent has done or is likely to do any of the following:

(i) abuse or endanger the minor child during parenting time;

(ii) use the parenting time as an opportunity to abuse or harass petitioner or petitioner's family or household members;

(iii) improperly conceal or detain the minor child; or

(iv) otherwise act in a manner that is not in the best interests of the minor child.

The court shall not be limited by the standards set forth in Section 603.10 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. If the court grants parenting time, the order shall specify dates and times for the parenting time to take place or other specific parameters or conditions that are appropriate. No order for parenting time shall refer merely to the term "reasonable parenting time". Petitioner may deny respondent access to the minor child if, when respondent arrives for parenting time, respondent is under the influence of drugs or alcohol and constitutes a threat to the safety and well-being of petitioner or petitioner's minor children or is behaving in a violent or abusive manner. If necessary to protect any member of petitioner's family or household from future abuse, respondent shall be prohibited from coming to petitioner's residence to meet the minor child for parenting time, and the petitioner and respondent shall submit to the court their recommendations for reasonable alternative arrangements for parenting time. A person may be approved to supervise parenting time only after filing an affidavit accepting that responsibility and acknowledging accountability to the court.

(8) Removal or concealment of minor child. Prohibit respondent from removing a minor child from the State or concealing the child within the State.

(9) Order to appear. Order the respondent to appear in court, alone or with a minor child, to prevent abuse, neglect, removal or concealment of the child, to return the child to the custody or care of the petitioner, or to permit any court-ordered interview or examination of the child or the respondent.

(10) Possession of personal property. Grant petitioner exclusive possession of personal property and, if respondent has possession or control, direct respondent to promptly make it available to petitioner, if:

(i) petitioner, but not respondent, owns the property; or

(ii) the petitioner and respondent own the property jointly; sharing it would risk abuse of petitioner by respondent or is impracticable; and the balance of hardships favors temporary possession by petitioner.

If petitioner's sole claim to ownership of the property is that it is marital property, the court may award petitioner temporary possession thereof under the standards of subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph only if a proper proceeding has been filed under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, as now or hereafter amended.

No order under this provision shall affect title to property.

(11) Protection of property. Forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, damaging, or otherwise disposing of any real or personal property, except as explicitly authorized by the court, if:

(i) petitioner, but not respondent, owns the property; or

(ii) the petitioner and respondent own the property jointly, and the balance of hardships favors granting this remedy.

If petitioner's sole claim to ownership of the property is that it is marital property, the court may grant petitioner relief under subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph only if a proper proceeding has been filed under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, as now or hereafter amended.

The court may further prohibit respondent from improperly using the financial or other resources of an aged member of the family or household for the profit or advantage of respondent or of any other person.

(11.5) Protection of animals. Grant the petitioner the exclusive care, custody, or control of any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either the petitioner or the respondent or a minor child residing in the residence or household of either the petitioner or the respondent and order the respondent to stay away from the animal and forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal.

(12) Order for payment of support. Order respondent to pay temporary support for the petitioner or any child in the petitioner's care or over whom the petitioner has been allocated parental responsibility, when the respondent has a legal obligation to support that person, in accordance with the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, which shall govern, among other matters, the amount of support, payment through the clerk and withholding of income to secure payment. An order for child support may be granted to a petitioner with lawful physical care of a child, or an order or agreement for physical care of a child, prior to entry of an order allocating significant decision-making responsibility. Such a support order shall expire upon entry of a valid order allocating parental responsibility differently and vacating petitioner's significant decision-making responsibility unless otherwise provided in the order.

(13) Order for payment of losses. Order respondent to pay petitioner for losses suffered as a direct result of the abuse. Such losses shall include, but not be limited to, medical expenses, lost earnings or other support, repair or replacement of property damaged or taken, reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and moving or other travel expenses, including additional reasonable expenses for temporary shelter and restaurant meals.

(i) Losses affecting family needs. If a party is entitled to seek maintenance, child support, or property distribution from the other party under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, as now or hereafter amended, the court may order respondent to reimburse petitioner's actual losses, to the extent that such reimbursement would be "appropriate temporary relief", as authorized by subsection (a)(3) of Section 501 of that Act.

(ii) Recovery of expenses. In the case of an improper concealment or removal of a minor child, the court may order respondent to pay the reasonable expenses incurred or to be incurred in the search for and recovery of the minor child, including, but not limited to, legal fees, court costs, private investigator fees, and travel costs.

(14) Prohibition of entry. Prohibit the respondent from entering or remaining in the residence or household while the respondent is under the influence of alcohol or drugs and constitutes a threat to the safety and well-being of the petitioner or the petitioner's children.

(14.5) Prohibition of possession of firearms and firearm parts; search and seizure of firearms and firearm parts.

(A) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (B-2), if applicable, a person who is subject to an existing domestic violence order of protection issued under this Code may not lawfully possess firearms or firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm or a Firearm Owner's Identification Card under Section 8.2 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act.

(B) Any firearms in the possession of the respondent, except as provided in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph (14.5) and subject to the provisions of subparagraph (B-2), if applicable, shall be ordered by the court to be surrendered to law enforcement for safekeeping. Any firearms or firearm parts on the respondent's person or at the place of service shall be immediately surrendered to the serving officers at the time of service of the order of protection, and any other firearms or firearm parts shall be surrendered to local law enforcement within 24 hours of service of the order of protection. Any Firearm Owner's Identification Card or Concealed Carry License in the possession of the respondent, except as provided in subparagraph (C), shall also be ordered by the court to be turned over to serving officers at the time of service of the order of protection or, if not on the respondent's person or at the location where the respondent is served at the time of service, to local law enforcement within 24 hours of service of the order. The law enforcement agency shall immediately mail the card, as well as any license, to the Illinois State Police Firearm Owner's Identification Card Office for safekeeping.

(B-1) Upon request of the petitioner or the State's Attorney on behalf of the petitioner, a law enforcement officer may seek a search warrant based on the allegations in the petition for the Order of Protection.

(i) If requested by law enforcement, the court shall issue a search warrant for the seizure of any firearms or firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm belonging to the respondent at or after entry of an order of protection if the court, based upon sworn testimony and governed by Sections 108-3 and 108-4, finds probable cause exists that:

(aa) the respondent poses an immediate and present credible threat to the physical safety of the petitioner protected by the order of protection;

(bb) the respondent possesses firearms or firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm; and

(cc) the firearms or firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm are located at the residence, vehicle, or other property of the respondent to be searched.

(ii) The search warrant shall specify with particularity the scope of the search, including the property to be searched, and shall direct the law enforcement agency to seize the respondent's firearms and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm. Law enforcement shall also be directed to seize into their possession any Firearm Owner's Identification Card and any Concealed Carry License belonging to the respondent.

(iii) The law enforcement agency to which the court has directed the warrant shall execute the warrant no later than 96 hours after issuance. The law enforcement agency to which the court has directed the warrant may coordinate with other law enforcement agencies to execute the warrant. A return of the warrant shall be filed by the law enforcement agency within 24 hours of execution, setting forth the time, date, and location where the warrant was executed and what items, if any, were seized. If the court is not in session, the return information shall be returned on the next date the court is in session. Subject to the provisions of this Section, peace officers shall have the same authority to execute a warrant issued under this subsection as a warrant issued under Article 108.

(iv) If the property to be searched is in another county, the petitioner or the State's Attorney may seek a search warrant in that county with the law enforcement agency with primary responsibility for responding to service calls at the property to be searched. Regardless of whether the petitioner is working with the State's Attorney under subsection (d) of Section 112A-4.5, the petitioner may request the State's Attorney's assistance to request that the law enforcement agency in the county where the property is located seek a search warrant.

(v) Service of an order of protection shall, to the extent possible, be concurrent with any warrant issued under this paragraph.

(B-2) Ex parte relief may be granted under this paragraph (14.5) only if the court finds that personal injury to the petitioner is likely to occur if the respondent received prior notice and if the petitioner has otherwise satisfied the requirements of Section 112A-17.5 of this Article.

(C) If the respondent is a peace officer as defined in Section 2-13 of the Criminal Code of 2012, the court shall order that any firearms used by the respondent in the performance of his or her duties as a peace officer be surrendered to the chief law enforcement executive of the agency in which the respondent is employed, who shall retain the firearms for safekeeping for the duration of the domestic violence order of protection.

(D)(i) Any firearms or firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm that have been seized or surrendered shall be kept by the law enforcement agency that took possession of the items for safekeeping, except as provided in subparagraph (C), (E), or (F). The period of safekeeping shall be for the duration of the order of protection. Except as provided in subparagraph (F), the respondent is prohibited from transferring firearms or firearm parts to another individual in lieu of surrender to law enforcement. The law enforcement agency shall provide an itemized statement of receipt to the respondent and the court describing any seized or surrendered firearms or firearm parts and informing the respondent that the respondent may seek the return of the respondent's items at the end of the order of protection. The law enforcement agency may enter arrangements, as needed, with federally licensed firearm dealers or other law enforcement agencies for the storage of any firearms seized or surrendered under this subsection.

(ii) It is the respondent's responsibility to request the return or reinstatement of any Firearm Owner's Identification Card or Concealed Carry License and to notify the Illinois State Police Firearm Owner's Identification Card Office at the end of the Order of Protection.

(iii) At the end of the order of protection, a respondent may request the return of any seized or surrendered firearms or firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm. Seized or surrendered firearms or firearm parts shall be returned within 14 days of the request to the respondent, if the respondent is lawfully eligible to possess firearms, or to a designated third party who is lawfully eligible to possess firearms. If the firearms or firearm parts cannot be returned to respondent because (1) the respondent has not requested the return or transfer of the firearms or firearm parts as set forth in this subparagraph and (2) the respondent cannot be located or fails to respond to more than 3 requests to retrieve the firearms, upon petition from the appropriate law enforcement agency and notice to the respondent at the respondent's last known address, the court may order the law enforcement agency to destroy the firearms or firearm parts; use the firearms or firearm parts for training purposes, or for any other application as deemed appropriate by the law enforcement agency; or turn over the firearms or firearm parts to a third party who is lawfully eligible to possess firearms, and who does not reside with respondent.

(E)(i) If a person other than the respondent claims title to any firearms or firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm seized or surrendered under this subsection, the person may petition the court to have the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm returned to him or her with proper notice to the petitioner and respondent. If, at a hearing on the petition, the court determines the person to be the lawful owner of the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm, the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm shall be returned to the person, provided that:

(aa) the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm are removed from the respondent's custody, control, or possession, and the lawful owner agrees to store the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm in a manner such that the respondent does not have access to or control of the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm; and

(bb) the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm are not otherwise unlawfully possessed by the owner.

(ii) The person petitioning for the return of his or her firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm must swear or affirm by affidavit that he or she:

(aa) is the lawful owner of the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm;

(bb) shall not transfer the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm to the respondent; and

(cc) will store the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm in a manner that the respondent does not have access to or control of the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm.

(F)(i) The respondent may file a motion to transfer, at the next scheduled hearing, any seized or surrendered firearms or firearm parts to a third party. Notice of the motion shall be provided to the petitioner and the third party must appear at the hearing.

(ii) The court may order transfer of the seized or surrendered firearm or firearm parts only if:

(aa) the third party transferee affirms by affidavit to the open court that:

(I) the third party transferee does not reside with the respondent;

(II) the respondent does not have access to the location in which the third party transferee intends to keep the firearms or firearm parts;

(III) the third party transferee will not transfer the firearm or firearm parts to the respondent or anyone who resides with the respondent;

(IV) the third party transferee will maintain control and possession of the firearm or firearm parts until otherwise ordered by the court; and

(V) the third party transferee will be subject to criminal penalties for transferring the firearms or firearm parts to the respondent; and

(bb) the court finds that:

(I) the respondent holds a valid Firearm Owner's Identification; and

(II) the transfer of firearms or firearm parts to the third party transferee does not place the petitioner or any other protected parties at any additional threat or risk of harm.

(15) Prohibition of access to records. If a domestic violence order of protection prohibits respondent from having contact with the minor child, or if petitioner's address is omitted under subsection (b) of Section 112A-5 of this Code, or if necessary to prevent abuse or wrongful removal or concealment of a minor child, the order shall deny respondent access to, and prohibit respondent from inspecting, obtaining, or attempting to inspect or obtain, school or any other records of the minor child who is in the care of petitioner.

(16) Order for payment of shelter services. Order respondent to reimburse a shelter providing temporary housing and counseling services to the petitioner for the cost of the services, as certified by the shelter and deemed reasonable by the court.

(17) Order for injunctive relief. Enter injunctive relief necessary or appropriate to prevent further abuse of a family or household member or to effectuate one of the granted remedies, if supported by the balance of hardships. If the harm to be prevented by the injunction is abuse or any other harm that one of the remedies listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of this subsection is designed to prevent, no further evidence is necessary to establish that the harm is an irreparable injury.

(18) Telephone services.

(A) Unless a condition described in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph exists, the court may, upon request by the petitioner, order a wireless telephone service provider to transfer to the petitioner the right to continue to use a telephone number or numbers indicated by the petitioner and the financial responsibility associated with the number or numbers, as set forth in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph. In this paragraph (18), the term "wireless telephone service provider" means a provider of commercial mobile service as defined in 47 U.S.C. 332. The petitioner may request the transfer of each telephone number that the petitioner, or a minor child in his or her custody, uses. The clerk of the court shall serve the order on the wireless telephone service provider's agent for service of process provided to the Illinois Commerce Commission. The order shall contain all of the following:

(i) The name and billing telephone number of the account holder including the name of the wireless telephone service provider that serves the account.

(ii) Each telephone number that will be transferred.

(iii) A statement that the provider transfers to the petitioner all financial responsibility for and right to the use of any telephone number transferred under this paragraph.

(B) A wireless telephone service provider shall terminate the respondent's use of, and shall transfer to the petitioner use of, the telephone number or numbers indicated in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph unless it notifies the petitioner, within 72 hours after it receives the order, that one of the following applies:

(i) The account holder named in the order has terminated the account.

(ii) A difference in network technology would prevent or impair the functionality of a device on a network if the transfer occurs.

(iii) The transfer would cause a geographic or other limitation on network or service provision to the petitioner.

(iv) Another technological or operational issue would prevent or impair the use of the telephone number if the transfer occurs.

(C) The petitioner assumes all financial responsibility for and right to the use of any telephone number transferred under this paragraph. In this paragraph, "financial responsibility" includes monthly service costs and costs associated with any mobile device associated with the number.

(D) A wireless telephone service provider may apply to the petitioner its routine and customary requirements for establishing an account or transferring a number, including requiring the petitioner to provide proof of identification, financial information, and customer preferences.

(E) Except for willful or wanton misconduct, a wireless telephone service provider is immune from civil liability for its actions taken in compliance with a court order issued under this paragraph.

(F) All wireless service providers that provide services to residential customers shall provide to the Illinois Commerce Commission the name and address of an agent for service of orders entered under this paragraph (18). Any change in status of the registered agent must be reported to the Illinois Commerce Commission within 30 days of such change.

(G) The Illinois Commerce Commission shall maintain the list of registered agents for service for each wireless telephone service provider on the Commission's website. The Commission may consult with wireless telephone service providers and the Circuit Court Clerks on the manner in which this information is provided and displayed.

(c) Relevant factors; findings.

(1) In determining whether to grant a specific remedy, other than payment of support, the court shall consider relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following:

(i) the nature, frequency, severity, pattern, and consequences of the respondent's past abuse of the petitioner or any family or household member, including the concealment of his or her location in order to evade service of process or notice, and the likelihood of danger of future abuse to petitioner or any member of petitioner's or respondent's family or household; and

(ii) the danger that any minor child will be abused or neglected or improperly relocated from the jurisdiction, improperly concealed within the State, or improperly separated from the child's primary caretaker.

(2) In comparing relative hardships resulting to the parties from loss of possession of the family home, the court shall consider relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following:

(i) availability, accessibility, cost, safety, adequacy, location, and other characteristics of alternate housing for each party and any minor child or dependent adult in the party's care;

(ii) the effect on the party's employment; and

(iii) the effect on the relationship of the party, and any minor child or dependent adult in the party's care, to family, school, church, and community.

(3) Subject to the exceptions set forth in paragraph (4) of this subsection (c), the court shall make its findings in an official record or in writing, and shall at a minimum set forth the following:

(i) That the court has considered the applicable relevant factors described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection (c).

(ii) Whether the conduct or actions of respondent, unless prohibited, will likely cause irreparable harm or continued abuse.

(iii) Whether it is necessary to grant the requested relief in order to protect petitioner or other alleged abused persons.

(4) (Blank).

(5) Never married parties. No rights or responsibilities for a minor child born outside of marriage attach to a putative father until a father and child relationship has been established under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, the Illinois Public Aid Code, Section 12 of the Vital Records Act, the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, the Probate Act of 1975, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, the Expedited Child Support Act of 1990, any judicial, administrative, or other act of another state or territory, any other statute of this State, or by any foreign nation establishing the father and child relationship, any other proceeding substantially in conformity with the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, or when both parties appeared in open court or at an administrative hearing acknowledging under oath or admitting by affirmation the existence of a father and child relationship. Absent such an adjudication, no putative father shall be granted temporary allocation of parental responsibilities, including parenting time with the minor child, or physical care and possession of the minor child, nor shall an order of payment for support of the minor child be entered.

(d) Balance of hardships; findings. If the court finds that the balance of hardships does not support the granting of a remedy governed by paragraph (2), (3), (10), (11), or (16) of subsection (b) of this Section, which may require such balancing, the court's findings shall so indicate and shall include a finding as to whether granting the remedy will result in hardship to respondent that would substantially outweigh the hardship to petitioner from denial of the remedy. The findings shall be an official record or in writing.

(e) Denial of remedies. Denial of any remedy shall not be based, in whole or in part, on evidence that:

(1) respondent has cause for any use of force, unless that cause satisfies the standards for justifiable use of force provided by Article 7 of the Criminal Code of 2012;

(2) respondent was voluntarily intoxicated;

(3) petitioner acted in self-defense or defense of another, provided that, if petitioner utilized force, such force was justifiable under Article 7 of the Criminal Code of 2012;

(4) petitioner did not act in self-defense or defense of another;

(5) petitioner left the residence or household to avoid further abuse by respondent;

(6) petitioner did not leave the residence or household to avoid further abuse by respondent; or

(7) conduct by any family or household member excused the abuse by respondent, unless that same conduct would have excused such abuse if the parties had not been family or household members.

(Source: P.A. 102-237, eff. 1-1-22; 102-538, eff. 8-20-21; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22; 103-1065, eff. 5-11-25.)

(725 ILCS 5/112A-20) (from Ch. 38, par. 112A-20)

Sec. 112A-20. Duration and extension of final protective orders.

(a) (Blank).

(b) A final protective order shall remain in effect as follows:

(1) if entered during pre-trial release, until disposition, withdrawal, or dismissal of the underlying charge; if, however, the case is continued as an independent cause of action, the order's duration may be for a fixed period of time not to exceed 2 years;

(2) if in effect in conjunction with a bond forfeiture warrant, until final disposition or an additional period of time not exceeding 2 years; no domestic violence order of protection, however, shall be terminated by a dismissal that is accompanied by the issuance of a bond forfeiture warrant;

(3) until 2 years after the expiration of any supervision, conditional discharge, probation, periodic imprisonment, parole, aftercare release, or mandatory supervised release for domestic violence orders of protection and civil no contact orders;

(4) until 2 years after the date set by the court for expiration of any sentence of imprisonment and subsequent parole, aftercare release, or mandatory supervised release for domestic violence orders of protection and civil no contact orders;

(5) permanent for a stalking no contact order if a judgment of conviction for stalking is entered; or

(6) permanent for a civil no contact order at the victim's request if a judgment of conviction for criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, excluding a conviction under subsection (c) of Section 11-1.50 of the Criminal Code of 2012, or aggravated criminal sexual abuse is entered.

(c) Computation of time. The duration of a domestic violence order of protection shall not be reduced by the duration of any prior domestic violence order of protection.

(d) Law enforcement records. When a protective order expires upon the occurrence of a specified event, rather than upon a specified date as provided in subsection (b), no expiration date shall be entered in Illinois State Police records. To remove the protective order from those records, either the petitioner or the respondent shall request the clerk of the court to file a certified copy of an order stating that the specified event has occurred or that the protective order has been vacated or modified with the sheriff, and the sheriff shall direct that law enforcement records shall be promptly corrected in accordance with the filed order.

(e) Extension of Orders. Any domestic violence order of protection or civil no contact order that expires 2 years after the expiration of the defendant's sentence under paragraph (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (b) of Section 112A-20 of this Article may be extended one or more times, as required. The petitioner, petitioner's counsel, or the State's Attorney on the petitioner's behalf shall file the motion for an extension of the final protective order in the criminal case and serve the motion in accordance with Supreme Court Rules 11 and 12. The court shall transfer the motion to the appropriate court or division for consideration under subsection (e) of Section 220 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, subsection (c) of Section 216 of the Civil No Contact Order Act, or subsection (c) of Section 105 of the Stalking No Contact Order as appropriate.

(1) Motion to extend plenary order. Any motion to extend a plenary order must be filed on or before the expiration date. When the motion is filed, the plenary order remains in effect until its original expiration date or until the motion is presented or heard, whichever is later. Upon the timely filing of the motion, the clerk shall transmit to law enforcement the motion and notice of motion with the next court date in accordance with Section 112A-22. If the next court date is after the expiration date of the original order, the next court date shall be entered into LEADS as the updated expiration date of the plenary order.

(2) A plenary order shall be extended if the court finds that since entry of the plenary order there has been no material change in the relevant circumstances that met the requirements of subsection (a) of Section 112A-14 and Section 112A-19. An extension of a plenary order may be granted for any fixed period of time or indefinitely until the plenary order is vacated or modified.

(3) If the motion to extend the plenary order is uncontested, petitioner's motion or affidavit stating that there has been no material change in relevant circumstances since entry of the order and stating the reason for the requested extension is sufficient for the court to extend the plenary order for any length of time, including indefinitely.

(4) The court may grant a contested request for an extension of the plenary order for more than 2 years based on good cause shown. Good cause is established by the facts of the original order, and a new finding that a compelling reason related to the physical danger, emotional distress, safety, or well-being of the petitioner or other protected parties exists for the extension. Good cause is not required for uncontested requests for any duration or contested requests for extensions up to 2 years.

(5) A violation of the original order or a subsequent incident of abuse is not required to grant the extension or determine the length of the extension. Compliance with the original order does not negate the basis or length of the extension.

(6) Any requested modification to the plenary order independent from the length of the extension shall be determined in accordance with the requirements of subsection (a) of Section 112A-14 and 112A-19.

(f) Termination date. Any final protective order which would expire on a court holiday shall instead expire at the close of the next court business day.

(g) Statement of purpose. The practice of dismissing or suspending a criminal prosecution in exchange for issuing a protective order undermines the purposes of this Article. This Section shall not be construed as encouraging that practice.

(Source: P.A. 102-184, eff. 1-1-22; 102-538, eff. 8-20-21; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22.)

Section 10. The Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 is amended by changing Sections 103, 212, 214, and 220 as follows:

(750 ILCS 60/103) (from Ch. 40, par. 2311-3)

Sec. 103. Definitions. For the purposes of this Act, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

(1) "Abuse" means physical abuse, harassment, intimidation of a dependent, interference with personal liberty or willful deprivation but does not include reasonable direction of a minor child by a parent or person in loco parentis.

(2) "Adult with disabilities" means an elder adult with disabilities or a high-risk adult with disabilities. A person may be an adult with disabilities for purposes of this Act even though he or she has never been adjudicated an incompetent adult. However, no court proceeding may be initiated or continued on behalf of an adult with disabilities over that adult's objection, unless such proceeding is approved by his or her legal guardian, if any.

(3) "Domestic violence" means abuse as defined in paragraph (1).

(4) "Elder adult with disabilities" means an adult prevented by advanced age from taking appropriate action to protect himself or herself from abuse by a family or household member.

(5) "Exploitation" means the illegal, including tortious, use of a high-risk adult with disabilities or of the assets or resources of a high-risk adult with disabilities. Exploitation includes, but is not limited to, the misappropriation of assets or resources of a high-risk adult with disabilities by undue influence, by breach of a fiduciary relationship, by fraud, deception, or extortion, or the use of such assets or resources in a manner contrary to law.

(6) "Family or household members" include spouses, former spouses, parents, children, stepchildren and other persons related by blood or by present or prior marriage, persons who share or formerly shared a common dwelling, persons who have or allegedly have a child in common, persons who share or allegedly share a blood relationship through a child, persons who have or have had a dating or engagement relationship, persons with disabilities and their personal assistants, and caregivers as defined in Section 12-4.4a of the Criminal Code of 2012. For purposes of this paragraph, neither a casual acquaintanceship nor ordinary fraternization between 2 individuals in business or social contexts shall be deemed to constitute a dating relationship. In the case of a high-risk adult with disabilities, "family or household members" includes any person who has the responsibility for a high-risk adult as a result of a family relationship or who has assumed responsibility for all or a portion of the care of a high-risk adult with disabilities voluntarily, or by express or implied contract, or by court order.

(7) "Harassment" means knowing conduct which is not necessary to accomplish a purpose that is reasonable under the circumstances; would cause a reasonable person emotional distress; and does cause emotional distress to the petitioner. Unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, the following types of conduct shall be presumed to cause emotional distress:

(i) creating a disturbance at petitioner's place of employment or school;

(ii) engaging in doxing as defined in the Civil Liability for Doxing Act repeatedly telephoning petitioner's place of employment, home or residence;

(iii) repeatedly following the petitioner including, but not limited to, directly or indirectly through third parties, by using an electronic tracking or monitoring device, a system or other electronic means, or acquiring tracking information to determine the petitioner's location, movement or travel patterns without the petitioner's knowledge or consent about in a public place or places;

(iv) non-consensual creation, dissemination, or threatening the dissemination of electronically generated or digitally altered content directly or indirectly pertaining to the petitioner or to the likeness of the petitioner including, but not limited to, images of the petitioner or the petitioner's voice repeatedly keeping petitioner under surveillance by remaining present outside his or her home, school, place of employment, vehicle or other place occupied by petitioner or by peering in petitioner's windows;

(v) repeatedly surveilling the petitioner directly or indirectly including, but not limited to, by remaining present at or outside the petitioner's home, school, place of employment, vehicle, or other place occupied by petitioner, by peering in petitioner's windows, through an electronic tracking or monitoring device, a system or other electronic means, or by acquiring tracking information to determine the petitioner's location, movement, or travel patterns without the petitioner's knowledge and consent;

(vi) non-consensual creation, dissemination or threatening the non-consensual dissemination of private sexual images and digitally altered sexual images as defined in the Civil Remedies for Nonconsensual Dissemination of Private Sexual Images Act;

(vii) repeatedly contacting the petitioner directly or indirectly through any means including, but not limited to, telephonic, electronic or online;

(viii) using an electronic tracking or monitoring, device, a system or other electronic means, or acquiring tracking information to determine the petitioner's location, movement, or travel patterns without the petitioner's knowledge or consent;

(ix) improperly concealing a minor child from petitioner, repeatedly threatening to improperly remove a minor child of petitioner's from the jurisdiction or from the physical care of petitioner, repeatedly threatening to conceal a minor child from petitioner, or making a single such threat following an actual or attempted improper removal or concealment, unless respondent was fleeing an incident or pattern of domestic violence; or

(x) (vi) threatening physical force, confinement or restraint on one or more occasions.

(8) "High-risk adult with disabilities" means a person aged 18 or over whose physical or mental disability impairs his or her ability to seek or obtain protection from abuse, neglect, or exploitation.

(9) "Interference with personal liberty" means committing or threatening physical abuse, harassment, intimidation or willful deprivation so as to compel another to engage in conduct from which she or he has a right to abstain or to refrain from conduct in which she or he has a right to engage.

(10) "Intimidation of a dependent" means subjecting a person who is dependent because of age, health or disability to participation in or the witnessing of: physical force against another or physical confinement or restraint of another which constitutes physical abuse as defined in this Act, regardless of whether the abused person is a family or household member.

(11) (A) "Neglect" means the failure to exercise that degree of care toward a high-risk adult with disabilities which a reasonable person would exercise under the circumstances and includes but is not limited to:

(i) the failure to take reasonable steps to protect a high-risk adult with disabilities from acts of abuse;

(ii) the repeated, careless imposition of unreasonable confinement;

(iii) the failure to provide food, shelter, clothing, and personal hygiene to a high-risk adult with disabilities who requires such assistance;

(iv) the failure to provide medical and rehabilitative care for the physical and mental health needs of a high-risk adult with disabilities; or

(v) the failure to protect a high-risk adult with disabilities from health and safety hazards.

(B) Nothing in this subsection (10) shall be construed to impose a requirement that assistance be provided to a high-risk adult with disabilities over his or her objection in the absence of a court order, nor to create any new affirmative duty to provide support to a high-risk adult with disabilities.

(12) "Order of protection" means an emergency order, interim order or plenary order, granted pursuant to this Act, which includes any or all of the remedies authorized by Section 214 of this Act.

(13) "Petitioner" may mean not only any named petitioner for the order of protection and any named victim of abuse on whose behalf the petition is brought, but also any other person protected by this Act.

(14) "Physical abuse" includes sexual abuse and means any of the following:

(i) knowing or reckless use of physical force, confinement or restraint;

(ii) knowing, repeated and unnecessary sleep deprivation; or

(iii) knowing or reckless conduct which creates an immediate risk of physical harm.

(14.5) "Stay away" means for the respondent to refrain from both physical presence and nonphysical contact with the petitioner whether direct, indirect (including, but not limited to, telephone calls, mail, email, faxes, and written notes), or through third parties who may or may not know about the order of protection.

(15) "Willful deprivation" means wilfully denying a person who because of age, health or disability requires medication, medical care, shelter, accessible shelter or services, food, therapeutic device, or other physical assistance, and thereby exposing that person to the risk of physical, mental or emotional harm, except with regard to medical care or treatment when the dependent person has expressed an intent to forgo such medical care or treatment. This paragraph does not create any new affirmative duty to provide support to dependent persons.

(Source: P.A. 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)

(750 ILCS 60/212) (from Ch. 40, par. 2312-12)

Sec. 212. Hearings.

(a) A petition for an order of protection shall be treated as an expedited proceeding, and no court shall transfer or otherwise decline to decide all or part of such petition except as otherwise provided herein. Nothing in this Section shall prevent the court from reserving issues when jurisdiction or notice requirements are not met.

(b) Any court or a division thereof which ordinarily does not decide matters of child custody and family support may decline to decide contested issues of physical care, custody, visitation, or family support unless a decision on one or more of those contested issues is necessary to avoid the risk of abuse, neglect, removal from the State or concealment within the State of the child or of separation of the child from the primary caretaker. If the court or division thereof has declined to decide any or all of these issues, then it shall transfer all undecided issues to the appropriate court or division. In the event of such a transfer, a government attorney involved in the criminal prosecution may, but need not, continue to offer counsel to the petitioner on transferred matters.

(c) If the court transfers or otherwise declines to decide any issue, judgment on that issue shall be expressly reserved and ruling on other issues shall not be delayed or declined.

(d) A court in a county with a population above 250,000 shall offer the option of a remote hearing to a petitioner for an order of protection. The court has the discretion to grant or deny the request for a remote hearing for good cause shown. Each court shall determine the procedure for a remote hearing. The petitioner, applicable witnesses, and respondent may appear remotely or in person.

The court shall issue and publish a court order, standing order, or local rule detailing information about the process for requesting and participating in a remote court appearance. The court order, standing order, or local rule shall be published on the court's website and posted on signs throughout the courthouse, including in the clerk's office. The sign shall be written in plain language and include information about the availability of remote court appearances and the process for requesting a remote hearing.

(Source: P.A. 102-853, eff. 1-1-23; 103-154, eff. 6-30-23.)

(750 ILCS 60/214) (from Ch. 40, par. 2312-14)

Sec. 214. Order of protection; remedies.

(a) Issuance of order. If the court finds that petitioner has been abused by a family or household member or that petitioner is a high-risk adult who has been abused, neglected, or exploited, as defined in this Act, an order of protection prohibiting the abuse, neglect, or exploitation shall issue; provided that petitioner must also satisfy the requirements of one of the following Sections, as appropriate: Section 217 on emergency orders, Section 218 on interim orders, or Section 219 on plenary orders. Petitioner shall not be denied an order of protection because petitioner or respondent is a minor. The court, when determining whether or not to issue an order of protection, shall not require physical manifestations of abuse on the person of the victim. Modification and extension of prior orders of protection shall be in accordance with this Act.

(b) Remedies and standards. The remedies to be included in an order of protection shall be determined in accordance with this Section and one of the following Sections, as appropriate: Section 217 on emergency orders, Section 218 on interim orders, and Section 219 on plenary orders. The remedies listed in this subsection shall be in addition to other civil or criminal remedies available to petitioner.

(1) Prohibition of abuse, neglect, or exploitation. Prohibit respondent's harassment, interference with personal liberty, intimidation of a dependent, physical abuse, or willful deprivation, neglect or exploitation, as defined in this Act, or stalking of the petitioner, as defined in Section 12-7.3 of the Criminal Code of 2012, if such abuse, neglect, exploitation, or stalking has occurred or otherwise appears likely to occur if not prohibited.

(2) Grant of exclusive possession of residence. Prohibit respondent from entering or remaining in any residence, household, or premises of the petitioner, including one owned or leased by respondent, if petitioner has a right to occupancy thereof. The grant of exclusive possession of the residence, household, or premises shall not affect title to real property, nor shall the court be limited by the standard set forth in subsection (c-2) of Section 501 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.

(A) Right to occupancy. A party has a right to occupancy of a residence or household if it is solely or jointly owned or leased by that party, that party's spouse, a person with a legal duty to support that party or a minor child in that party's care, or by any person or entity other than the opposing party that authorizes that party's occupancy (e.g., a domestic violence shelter). Standards set forth in subparagraph (B) shall not preclude equitable relief.

(B) Presumption of hardships. If petitioner and respondent each has the right to occupancy of a residence or household, the court shall balance (i) the hardships to respondent and any minor child or dependent adult in respondent's care resulting from entry of this remedy with (ii) the hardships to petitioner and any minor child or dependent adult in petitioner's care resulting from continued exposure to the risk of abuse (should petitioner remain at the residence or household) or from loss of possession of the residence or household (should petitioner leave to avoid the risk of abuse). When determining the balance of hardships, the court shall also take into account the accessibility of the residence or household. Hardships need not be balanced if respondent does not have a right to occupancy.

The balance of hardships is presumed to favor possession by petitioner unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, showing that the hardships to respondent substantially outweigh the hardships to petitioner and any minor child or dependent adult in petitioner's care. The court, on the request of petitioner or on its own motion, may order respondent to provide suitable, accessible, alternate housing for petitioner instead of excluding respondent from a mutual residence or household.

(3) Stay away order and additional prohibitions. Order respondent to stay away from petitioner or any other person protected by the order of protection, or prohibit respondent from entering or remaining present at petitioner's school, place of employment, or other specified places at times when petitioner is present, or both, if reasonable, given the balance of hardships. Hardships need not be balanced for the court to enter a stay away order or prohibit entry if respondent has no right to enter the premises.

(A) If an order of protection grants petitioner exclusive possession of the residence, or prohibits respondent from entering the residence, or orders respondent to stay away from petitioner or other protected persons, then the court may allow respondent access to the residence to remove items of clothing and personal adornment used exclusively by respondent, medications, and other items as the court directs. The right to access shall be exercised on only one occasion as the court directs and in the presence of an agreed-upon adult third party or law enforcement officer.

(B) When the petitioner and the respondent attend the same public, private, or non-public elementary, middle, or high school, the court when issuing an order of protection and providing relief shall consider the severity of the act, any continuing physical danger or emotional distress to the petitioner, the educational rights guaranteed to the petitioner and respondent under federal and State law, the availability of a transfer of the respondent to another school, a change of placement or a change of program of the respondent, the expense, difficulty, and educational disruption that would be caused by a transfer of the respondent to another school, and any other relevant facts of the case. The court may order that the respondent not attend the public, private, or non-public elementary, middle, or high school attended by the petitioner, order that the respondent accept a change of placement or change of program, as determined by the school district or private or non-public school, or place restrictions on the respondent's movements within the school attended by the petitioner. The respondent bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a transfer, change of placement, or change of program of the respondent is not available. The respondent also bears the burden of production with respect to the expense, difficulty, and educational disruption that would be caused by a transfer of the respondent to another school. A transfer, change of placement, or change of program is not unavailable to the respondent solely on the ground that the respondent does not agree with the school district's or private or non-public school's transfer, change of placement, or change of program or solely on the ground that the respondent fails or refuses to consent or otherwise does not take an action required to effectuate a transfer, change of placement, or change of program. When a court orders a respondent to stay away from the public, private, or non-public school attended by the petitioner and the respondent requests a transfer to another attendance center within the respondent's school district or private or non-public school, the school district or private or non-public school shall have sole discretion to determine the attendance center to which the respondent is transferred. In the event the court order results in a transfer of the minor respondent to another attendance center, a change in the respondent's placement, or a change of the respondent's program, the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of the respondent is responsible for transportation and other costs associated with the transfer or change.

(C) The court may order the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of a minor respondent to take certain actions or to refrain from taking certain actions to ensure that the respondent complies with the order. In the event the court orders a transfer of the respondent to another school, the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of the respondent is responsible for transportation and other costs associated with the change of school by the respondent.

(4) Counseling. Require or recommend the respondent to undergo counseling for a specified duration with a social worker, psychologist, clinical psychologist, psychiatrist, family service agency, alcohol or substance abuse program, mental health center guidance counselor, agency providing services to elders, program designed for domestic violence abusers or any other guidance service the court deems appropriate. The Court may order the respondent in any intimate partner relationship to report to an Illinois Department of Human Services protocol approved partner abuse intervention program for an assessment and to follow all recommended treatment.

(5) Physical care and possession of the minor child. In order to protect the minor child from abuse, neglect, or unwarranted separation from the person who has been the minor child's primary caretaker, or to otherwise protect the well-being of the minor child, the court may do either or both of the following: (i) grant petitioner physical care or possession of the minor child, or both, or (ii) order respondent to return a minor child to, or not remove a minor child from, the physical care of a parent or person in loco parentis.

If a court finds, after a hearing, that respondent has committed abuse (as defined in Section 103) of a minor child, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that awarding physical care to respondent would not be in the minor child's best interest.

(6) Temporary allocation of parental responsibilities: significant decision-making. Award temporary decision-making responsibility to petitioner in accordance with this Section, the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, and this State's Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.

If a court finds, after a hearing, that respondent has committed abuse (as defined in Section 103) of a minor child, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that awarding temporary significant decision-making responsibility to respondent would not be in the child's best interest.

(7) Parenting time. Determine the parenting time, if any, of respondent in any case in which the court awards physical care or allocates temporary significant decision-making responsibility of a minor child to petitioner. The court shall restrict or deny respondent's parenting time with a minor child if the court finds that respondent has done or is likely to do any of the following: (i) abuse or endanger the minor child during parenting time; (ii) use the parenting time as an opportunity to abuse or harass petitioner or petitioner's family or household members; (iii) improperly conceal or detain the minor child; or (iv) otherwise act in a manner that is not in the best interests of the minor child. The court shall not be limited by the standards set forth in Section 603.10 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. If the court grants parenting time, the order shall specify dates and times for the parenting time to take place or other specific parameters or conditions that are appropriate. No order for parenting time shall refer merely to the term "reasonable parenting time".

Petitioner may deny respondent access to the minor child if, when respondent arrives for parenting time, respondent is under the influence of drugs or alcohol and constitutes a threat to the safety and well-being of petitioner or petitioner's minor children or is behaving in a violent or abusive manner.

If necessary to protect any member of petitioner's family or household from future abuse, respondent shall be prohibited from coming to petitioner's residence to meet the minor child for parenting time, and the parties shall submit to the court their recommendations for reasonable alternative arrangements for parenting time. A person may be approved to supervise parenting time only after filing an affidavit accepting that responsibility and acknowledging accountability to the court.

(8) Removal or concealment of minor child. Prohibit respondent from removing a minor child from the State or concealing the child within the State.

(9) Order to appear. Order the respondent to appear in court, alone or with a minor child, to prevent abuse, neglect, removal or concealment of the child, to return the child to the custody or care of the petitioner or to permit any court-ordered interview or examination of the child or the respondent.

(10) Possession of personal property. Grant petitioner exclusive possession of personal property and, if respondent has possession or control, direct respondent to promptly make it available to petitioner, if:

(i) petitioner, but not respondent, owns the property; or

(ii) the parties own the property jointly; sharing it would risk abuse of petitioner by respondent or is impracticable; and the balance of hardships favors temporary possession by petitioner.

If petitioner's sole claim to ownership of the property is that it is marital property, the court may award petitioner temporary possession thereof under the standards of subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph only if a proper proceeding has been filed under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, as now or hereafter amended.

No order under this provision shall affect title to property.

(11) Protection of property. Forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, damaging or otherwise disposing of any real or personal property, except as explicitly authorized by the court, if:

(i) petitioner, but not respondent, owns the property; or

(ii) the parties own the property jointly, and the balance of hardships favors granting this remedy.

If petitioner's sole claim to ownership of the property is that it is marital property, the court may grant petitioner relief under subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph only if a proper proceeding has been filed under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, as now or hereafter amended.

The court may further prohibit respondent from improperly using the financial or other resources of an aged member of the family or household for the profit or advantage of respondent or of any other person.

(11.5) Protection of animals. Grant the petitioner the exclusive care, custody, or control of any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either the petitioner or the respondent or a minor child residing in the residence or household of either the petitioner or the respondent and order the respondent to stay away from the animal and forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal.

(12) Order for payment of support. Order respondent to pay temporary support for the petitioner or any child in the petitioner's care or over whom the petitioner has been allocated parental responsibility, when the respondent has a legal obligation to support that person, in accordance with the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, which shall govern, among other matters, the amount of support, payment through the clerk and withholding of income to secure payment. An order for child support may be granted to a petitioner with lawful physical care of a child, or an order or agreement for physical care of a child, prior to entry of an order allocating significant decision-making responsibility. Such a support order shall expire upon entry of a valid order allocating parental responsibility differently and vacating the petitioner's significant decision-making authority, unless otherwise provided in the order.

(13) Order for payment of losses. Order respondent to pay petitioner for losses suffered as a direct result of the abuse, neglect, or exploitation. Such losses shall include, but not be limited to, medical expenses, lost earnings or other support, repair or replacement of property damaged or taken, reasonable attorney's fees, court costs and moving or other travel expenses, including additional reasonable expenses for temporary shelter and restaurant meals.

(i) Losses affecting family needs. If a party is entitled to seek maintenance, child support or property distribution from the other party under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, as now or hereafter amended, the court may order respondent to reimburse petitioner's actual losses, to the extent that such reimbursement would be "appropriate temporary relief", as authorized by subsection (a)(3) of Section 501 of that Act.

(ii) Recovery of expenses. In the case of an improper concealment or removal of a minor child, the court may order respondent to pay the reasonable expenses incurred or to be incurred in the search for and recovery of the minor child, including but not limited to legal fees, court costs, private investigator fees, and travel costs.

(14) Prohibition of entry. Prohibit the respondent from entering or remaining in the residence or household while the respondent is under the influence of alcohol or drugs and constitutes a threat to the safety and well-being of the petitioner or the petitioner's children.

(14.5) Prohibition of possession of firearms and firearm parts; search and seizure of firearms and firearms parts.

(A)(i) Prohibit a respondent against whom an emergency, interim, or plenary order of protection was issued from possessing, during the duration of the order, any firearms or firearm parts that could be assembled into an operable firearm if a search warrant is issued under (A-1) or the order:

(aa) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate, or the petitioner has satisfied the requirements of Section 217;

(bb) restrains such person from using physical force; harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person; or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and

(cc) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child.

(ii) The court shall order any respondent prohibited from possessing firearms under item (i) of subparagraph (A) to surrender any firearms or firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm. Any firearms or firearm parts on the respondent's person or at the place of service shall be surrendered to the serving officers at the time of service of the order of protection, and any other firearms or firearm parts shall be surrendered to local law enforcement within 24 hours of service of the order of protection. Any Firearm Owner's Identification Card or Concealed Carry License in the possession of the respondent, except as provided in subparagraph (B), shall also be ordered by the court to be turned over to the officer serving the order of protection at the time of service or, if not on the respondent's person or at the location where the respondent is served at the time of service, to local law enforcement within 24 hours of service of the order of protection. The law enforcement agency shall immediately mail the card, as well as any license, to the Illinois State Police Firearm Owner's Identification Card Office for safekeeping.

(A-1)(i) Upon issuance of an emergency, interim, or plenary order of protection and subject to the provisions of item (ii) of this subparagraph (A-1), the court shall issue a search warrant for the seizure of any firearms or firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm belonging to the respondent if the court, based upon sworn testimony, finds that:

(aa) the respondent poses a credible threat to the physical safety of the petitioner protected by the order of protection; and

(bb) probable cause exists to believe that:

(I) the respondent possesses firearms or firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm;

(II) the firearms or firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm are located at the residence, vehicle, or other property of the respondent to be searched; and

(III) the credible threat to the physical safety of the petitioner protected by the order of protection is immediate and present.

The record shall reflect the court's findings in determining whether the search warrant shall be issued.

(ii) If the petitioner does not seek a warrant under this subparagraph (A-1) or the court determines that the requirements of this subparagraph (A-1) have not been met, relief under subparagraph (A) alone may be granted.

(iii) An ex parte search warrant shall be granted under this subparagraph (A-1) only if the court finds that:

(aa) the elements of item (i) of subparagraph (A-1) have been met;

(bb) personal injury to the petitioner is likely to occur if the respondent received prior notice; and

(cc) the petitioner has otherwise satisfied the requirements of Section 217 of this Act.

(iv) Oral testimony is sufficient in lieu of an affidavit to support a finding of probable cause.

(v) A search warrant issued under this subparagraph (A-1) shall be directed by the court for enforcement to the law enforcement agency with primary responsibility for responding to calls for service at the location to be searched or to another appropriate law enforcement agency if justified by the circumstances. The search warrant shall specify with particularity the scope of the search, including the property to be searched, and shall direct the law enforcement agency to seize the respondent's firearms and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm. Law enforcement shall also be directed to seize any Firearm Owner's Identification Card and any Concealed Carry License belonging to the respondent.

(vi) The petitioner shall prepare an information sheet, reviewed by the court, for law enforcement at the time the warrant is granted. The information sheet shall include:

(aa) contact information for the petitioner, the petitioner's attorney, or both, including a telephone number and email, if available;

(bb) a physical description of the respondent, including the respondent's date of birth, if known, or approximate age, height, weight, race, and hair color;

(cc) days and times that the respondent is likely to be at the property to be searched, if known; and

(dd) whether people other than the respondent are likely to be present at the property to be searched and when, if known.

(vii) The information sheet shall be transmitted to the law enforcement agency to which the search warrant is directed in the same manner as the warrant is transmitted under Section 222 of this Act.

(viii) If the court, after determining a search warrant should issue, finds that the petitioner has made a credible report of domestic violence to the local law enforcement agency within the previous 90 days, law enforcement shall execute the warrant no later than 96 hours after receipt of the warrant. If the court finds that petitioner has not made such a report, the law enforcement agency to which the court has directed the warrant shall, within 48 hours of receipt, evaluate the warrant and seek any corrections to the warrant, and, if applicable, add to or negate the warrant. The record shall reflect the court's findings in determining whether to correct, add, or negate the warrant. If a change is made regarding the search warrant, law enforcement shall execute the warrant no later than 96 hours after the correction is issued. The law enforcement agency shall notify the petitioner of any changes to the warrant or if the warrant has been negated. The law enforcement agency to which the court has directed the warrant may coordinate with other law enforcement agencies to execute the warrant. A return of the warrant shall be filed by the law enforcement agency within 24 hours of execution, setting forth the time, date, and location where the warrant was executed and what items, if any, were seized. If the court is not in session, the return information shall be returned on the next date the court is in session. Subject to the provisions of this Section, peace officers shall have the same authority to execute a warrant issued pursuant to this subsection as a warrant issued under Article 108 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.

(ix) Upon discovering a defect in the search warrant, the appropriate law enforcement agency may petition the court to correct the warrant. The law enforcement agency shall notify the petitioner of any such correction.

(x) Upon petition by the appropriate law enforcement agency, the court may modify the search warrant or extend the time to execute the search warrant for a period of no more than 96 hours. In determining whether to modify or extend the warrant, the court shall consider:

(aa) any increased risk to the petitioner's safety that may result from a modification or extension of the warrant;

(bb) any unnecessary risk to law enforcement that would be mitigated by a modification or extension of the warrant;

(cc) any risks to third parties at the location to be searched that would be mitigated by a modification or extension of the warrant; and

(dd) the likelihood of successful execution of warrant.

The record shall reflect the court's findings in determining whether to extend or modify the warrant. The law enforcement agency shall notify the petitioner of any modification or extension of the warrant.

(xi) Service of any order of protection shall, to the extent possible, be concurrent with the execution of any search warrant under this paragraph.

(B) If the respondent is a peace officer as defined in Section 2-13 of the Criminal Code of 2012, the court shall order that any firearms used by the respondent in the performance of his or her duties as a peace officer be surrendered to the chief law enforcement executive of the agency in which the respondent is employed, who shall retain the firearms for safekeeping for the duration of the order of protection.

(C)(i) Any firearms or firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm shall be kept by the law enforcement agency that took possession of the items for safekeeping, except as provided in subparagraph (B). The period of safekeeping shall be for the duration of the order of protection. Except as provided in subparagraph (E), the respondent is prohibited from transferring firearms or firearm parts to another individual in lieu of surrender to law enforcement. The law enforcement agency shall provide an itemized statement of receipt to the respondent and the court describing any seized or surrendered firearms or firearm parts and informing the respondent that the respondent may seek the return of the respondent's items at the end of the order of protection. The law enforcement agency may enter arrangements, as needed, with federally licensed firearm dealers or other law enforcement agencies for the storage of any firearms seized or surrendered under this subsection.

(ii) It is the respondent's responsibility to request the return or reinstatement of any Firearm Owner's Identification Card or Concealed Carry License and notify the Illinois State Police Firearm Owner's Identification Card Office at the end of the Order of Protection.

(iii) At the end of the order of protection, a respondent may request the return of any seized or surrendered firearms or firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm. Such firearms or firearm parts shall be returned within 14 days of the request to the respondent, if the respondent is lawfully eligible to possess firearms, or to a designated third party who is lawfully eligible to possess firearms. If the firearms or firearm parts cannot be returned to respondent because (1) the respondent has not requested the return or transfer of the firearms or firearm parts as set forth in this subparagraph, and (2) the respondent cannot be located or fails to respond to more than 3 requests to retrieve the firearms or firearm parts the court may, or is not lawfully eligible to possess a firearm, upon petition from the appropriate law enforcement agency and notice to the respondent at the respondent's last known address, order the law enforcement agency to destroy the firearms or firearm parts; use the firearms or firearm parts for training purposes or for any other application as deemed appropriate by the law enforcement agency; or turn over the firearm or firearm parts to a third party who is lawfully eligible to possess firearms, and who does not reside with respondent.

(D)(i) If a person other than the respondent claims title to any firearms and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm seized or surrendered under this subsection, the person may petition the court to have the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm returned to him or her with proper notice to the petitioner and respondent. If, at a hearing on the petition, the court determines the person to be the lawful owner of the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm, the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm shall be returned to the person, provided that:

(aa) the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm are removed from the respondent's custody, control, or possession and the lawful owner agrees to store the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm in a manner such that the respondent does not have access to or control of the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm; and

(bb) the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm are not otherwise unlawfully possessed by the owner.

(ii) The person petitioning for the return of his or her firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm must swear or affirm by affidavit that he or she:

(aa) is the lawful owner of the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm;

(bb) shall not transfer the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm to the respondent; and

(cc) will store the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm in a manner that the respondent does not have access to or control of the firearm and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm.

(E)(i) The respondent may file a motion to transfer, at the next scheduled hearing, any seized or surrendered firearms or firearm parts to a third party. Notice of the motion shall be provided to the petitioner and the third party must appear at the hearing.

(ii) The court may order transfer of the seized or surrendered firearm or firearm parts only if:

(aa) the third party transferee affirms by affidavit to the open court that:

(I) the third party transferee does not reside with the respondent;

(II) the respondent does not have access to the location in which the third party transferee intends to keep the firearms or firearm parts;

(III) the third party transferee will not transfer the firearm or firearm parts to the respondent or anyone who resides with the respondent;

(IV) the third party transferee will maintain control and possession of the firearm or firearm parts until otherwise ordered by the court; and

(V) the third party transferee will be subject to criminal penalties for transferring the firearms or firearm parts to the respondent; and

(bb) the court finds that:

(I) the respondent holds a valid Firearm Owner's Identification; and

(II) the transfer of firearms or firearm parts to the third party transferee does not place the petitioner or any other protected parties at any additional threat or risk of harm.

(15) Prohibition of access to records. If an order of protection prohibits respondent from having contact with the minor child, or if petitioner's address is omitted under subsection (b) of Section 203, or if necessary to prevent abuse or wrongful removal or concealment of a minor child, the order shall deny respondent access to, and prohibit respondent from inspecting, obtaining, or attempting to inspect or obtain, school or any other records of the minor child who is in the care of petitioner.

(16) Order for payment of shelter services. Order respondent to reimburse a shelter providing temporary housing and counseling services to the petitioner for the cost of the services, as certified by the shelter and deemed reasonable by the court.

(17) Order for injunctive relief. Enter injunctive relief necessary or appropriate to prevent further abuse of a family or household member or further abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a high-risk adult with disabilities or to effectuate one of the granted remedies, if supported by the balance of hardships. If the harm to be prevented by the injunction is abuse or any other harm that one of the remedies listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of this subsection is designed to prevent, no further evidence is necessary that the harm is an irreparable injury.

(18) Telephone services.

(A) Unless a condition described in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph exists, the court may, upon request by the petitioner, order a wireless telephone service provider to transfer to the petitioner the right to continue to use a telephone number or numbers indicated by the petitioner and the financial responsibility associated with the number or numbers, as set forth in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph. For purposes of this paragraph (18), the term "wireless telephone service provider" means a provider of commercial mobile service as defined in 47 U.S.C. 332. The petitioner may request the transfer of each telephone number that the petitioner, or a minor child in his or her custody, uses. The clerk of the court shall serve the order on the wireless telephone service provider's agent for service of process provided to the Illinois Commerce Commission. The order shall contain all of the following:

(i) The name and billing telephone number of the account holder including the name of the wireless telephone service provider that serves the account.

(ii) Each telephone number that will be transferred.

(iii) A statement that the provider transfers to the petitioner all financial responsibility for and right to the use of any telephone number transferred under this paragraph.

(B) A wireless telephone service provider shall terminate the respondent's use of, and shall transfer to the petitioner use of, the telephone number or numbers indicated in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph unless it notifies the petitioner, within 72 hours after it receives the order, that one of the following applies:

(i) The account holder named in the order has terminated the account.

(ii) A difference in network technology would prevent or impair the functionality of a device on a network if the transfer occurs.

(iii) The transfer would cause a geographic or other limitation on network or service provision to the petitioner.

(iv) Another technological or operational issue would prevent or impair the use of the telephone number if the transfer occurs.

(C) The petitioner assumes all financial responsibility for and right to the use of any telephone number transferred under this paragraph. In this paragraph, "financial responsibility" includes monthly service costs and costs associated with any mobile device associated with the number.

(D) A wireless telephone service provider may apply to the petitioner its routine and customary requirements for establishing an account or transferring a number, including requiring the petitioner to provide proof of identification, financial information, and customer preferences.

(E) Except for willful or wanton misconduct, a wireless telephone service provider is immune from civil liability for its actions taken in compliance with a court order issued under this paragraph.

(F) All wireless service providers that provide services to residential customers shall provide to the Illinois Commerce Commission the name and address of an agent for service of orders entered under this paragraph (18). Any change in status of the registered agent must be reported to the Illinois Commerce Commission within 30 days of such change.

(G) The Illinois Commerce Commission shall maintain the list of registered agents for service for each wireless telephone service provider on the Commission's website. The Commission may consult with wireless telephone service providers and the Circuit Court Clerks on the manner in which this information is provided and displayed.

(19) Require the respondent to cease harassment. Require the respondent to:

(A) stop creating, using, disseminating and delete the following harassing conduct:

(i) any and all material or statements that constitute harassment under this Act, including, but not limited to, doxing, electronically generated or digitally altered content, sexual private images and digitally altered sexual images; and

(ii) any and all electronic tracking or monitoring devices, system or other electronic means, or tracking information; and

(B) present sufficient evidence that such compliance has occurred.

(c) Relevant factors; findings.

(1) In determining whether to grant a specific remedy, other than payment of support, the court shall consider relevant factors, including but not limited to the following:

(i) the nature, frequency, severity, pattern and consequences of the respondent's past abuse, neglect or exploitation of the petitioner or any family or household member, including the concealment of his or her location in order to evade service of process or notice, and the likelihood of danger of future abuse, neglect, or exploitation to petitioner or any member of petitioner's or respondent's family or household; and

(ii) the danger that any minor child will be abused or neglected or improperly relocated from the jurisdiction, improperly concealed within the State or improperly separated from the child's primary caretaker.

(2) In comparing relative hardships resulting to the parties from loss of possession of the family home, the court shall consider relevant factors, including but not limited to the following:

(i) availability, accessibility, cost, safety, adequacy, location and other characteristics of alternate housing for each party and any minor child or dependent adult in the party's care;

(ii) the effect on the party's employment; and

(iii) the effect on the relationship of the party, and any minor child or dependent adult in the party's care, to family, school, church and community.

(3) Subject to the exceptions set forth in paragraph (4) of this subsection, the court shall make its findings in an official record or in writing, and shall at a minimum set forth the following:

(i) That the court has considered the applicable relevant factors described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection.

(ii) Whether the conduct or actions of respondent, unless prohibited, will likely cause irreparable harm or continued abuse.

(iii) Whether it is necessary to grant the requested relief in order to protect petitioner or other alleged abused persons.

(4) For purposes of issuing an ex parte emergency order of protection, the court, as an alternative to or as a supplement to making the findings described in paragraphs (c)(3)(i) through (c)(3)(iii) of this subsection, may use the following procedure:

When a verified petition for an emergency order of protection in accordance with the requirements of Sections 203 and 217 is presented to the court, the court shall examine petitioner on oath or affirmation. An emergency order of protection shall be issued by the court if it appears from the contents of the petition and the examination of petitioner that the averments are sufficient to indicate abuse by respondent and to support the granting of relief under the issuance of the emergency order of protection.

(5) Never married parties. No rights or responsibilities for a minor child born outside of marriage attach to a putative father until a father and child relationship has been established under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, the Illinois Public Aid Code, Section 12 of the Vital Records Act, the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, the Probate Act of 1975, the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, the Expedited Child Support Act of 1990, any judicial, administrative, or other act of another state or territory, any other Illinois statute, or by any foreign nation establishing the father and child relationship, any other proceeding substantially in conformity with the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-193), or where both parties appeared in open court or at an administrative hearing acknowledging under oath or admitting by affirmation the existence of a father and child relationship. Absent such an adjudication, finding, or acknowledgment, no putative father shall be granted temporary allocation of parental responsibilities, including parenting time with the minor child, or physical care and possession of the minor child, nor shall an order of payment for support of the minor child be entered.

(d) Balance of hardships; findings. If the court finds that the balance of hardships does not support the granting of a remedy governed by paragraph (2), (3), (10), (11), or (16) of subsection (b) of this Section, which may require such balancing, the court's findings shall so indicate and shall include a finding as to whether granting the remedy will result in hardship to respondent that would substantially outweigh the hardship to petitioner from denial of the remedy. The findings shall be an official record or in writing.

(e) Denial of remedies. Denial of any remedy shall not be based, in whole or in part, on evidence that:

(1) Respondent has cause for any use of force, unless that cause satisfies the standards for justifiable use of force provided by Article 7 of the Criminal Code of 2012;

(2) Respondent was voluntarily intoxicated;

(3) Petitioner acted in self-defense or defense of another, provided that, if petitioner utilized force, such force was justifiable under Article 7 of the Criminal Code of 2012;

(4) Petitioner did not act in self-defense or defense of another;

(5) Petitioner left the residence or household to avoid further abuse, neglect, or exploitation by respondent;

(6) Petitioner did not leave the residence or household to avoid further abuse, neglect, or exploitation by respondent;

(7) Conduct by any family or household member excused the abuse, neglect, or exploitation by respondent, unless that same conduct would have excused such abuse, neglect, or exploitation if the parties had not been family or household members.

(Source: P.A. 102-538, eff. 8-20-21; 103-1065, eff. 5-11-25.)

(750 ILCS 60/220) (from Ch. 40, par. 2312-20)

Sec. 220. Duration and extension of orders.

(a) Duration of emergency and interim orders. Unless re-opened or extended or voided by entry of an order of greater duration:

(1) Emergency orders issued under Section 217 shall be effective for not less than 14 nor more than 21 days;

(2) Interim orders shall be effective for up to 30 days.

(b) Duration of plenary orders.

(0.05) A plenary order of protection entered under this Act shall be valid for a fixed period of time, not to exceed two years.

(1) A plenary order of protection entered in conjunction with another civil proceeding shall remain in effect as follows:

(i) if entered as preliminary relief in that other proceeding, until entry of final judgment in that other proceeding;

(ii) if incorporated into the final judgment in that other proceeding, until the order of protection is vacated or modified; or

(iii) if incorporated in an order for involuntary commitment, until termination of both the involuntary commitment and any voluntary commitment, or for a fixed period of time not exceeding 2 years.

(2) Duration of an order of protection entered in conjunction with a criminal prosecution or delinquency petition shall remain in effect as provided in Section 112A-20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.

(c) Computation of time. The duration of an order of protection shall not be reduced by the duration of any prior order of protection.

(d) Law enforcement records. When a plenary order of protection expires upon the occurrence of a specified event, rather than upon a specified date as provided in subsection (b), no expiration date shall be entered in Illinois State Police records. To remove the plenary order from those records, either party shall request the clerk of the court to file a certified copy of an order stating that the specified event has occurred or that the plenary order has been vacated or modified with the Sheriff, and the Sheriff shall direct that law enforcement records shall be promptly corrected in accordance with the filed order.

(e) Extension of orders. Any emergency, interim or plenary order may be extended one or more times, as required, provided that the requirements of Section 217, 218 or 219, as appropriate, are satisfied. If the motion for extension is uncontested and petitioner seeks no modification of the order, the order may be extended on the basis of petitioner's motion or affidavit stating that there has been no material change in relevant circumstances since entry of the order and stating the reason for the requested extension. An extension of a plenary order of protection may be granted, upon good cause shown, to remain in effect until the order of protection is vacated or modified. Extensions may be granted only in open court and not under the provisions of subsection (c) of Section 217, which applies only when the court is unavailable at the close of business or on a court holiday.

(1) Motion to extend plenary order. Any motion to extend a plenary order must be filed on or before the expiration date. When the motion is filed, the plenary order remains in effect until its original expiration date or until the motion is presented or heard, whichever is later. Upon the timely filing of the motion, the clerk shall transmit to law enforcement the motion and notice of motion with the next court date in accordance with subsection (b) of Section 222. If the next court date is after the expiration date of the original order, the next court date shall be entered into LEADS as the updated expiration date of the plenary order.

(2) A plenary order shall be extended if the court finds that since entry of the plenary order there has been no material change in the relevant circumstances that met the requirements of Section 214. An extension of a plenary order may be granted for any fixed period of time or indefinitely until the plenary order is vacated or modified.

(3) If the motion to extend the plenary order is uncontested, petitioner's motion or affidavit stating that there has been no material change in relevant circumstances since entry of the order and stating the reason for the requested extension is sufficient for the court to extend the plenary order for any length of time, including indefinitely.

(4) The court may grant a contested request for an extension of the plenary order for more than 2 years based on good cause shown. Good cause is established by the facts of the original order, and a new finding that a compelling reason related to the physical danger, emotional distress, safety, or well-being of the petitioner or other protected parties exists for the extension. Good cause is not required for uncontested requests for any duration or contested requests for extensions up to 2 years.

(5) A violation of the original order or a subsequent incident of abuse is not required to grant the extension or determine the length of the extension. Compliance with the original order does not negate the basis or length of the extension.

(6) Any requested modification to the plenary order independent from the length of the extension shall be determined in accordance with the requirements of Section 224.

(f) Termination date. Any order of protection which would expire on a court holiday shall instead expire at the close of the next court business day.

(g) Statement of purpose. The practice of dismissing or suspending a criminal prosecution in exchange for the issuance of an order of protection undermines the purposes of this Act. This Section shall not be construed as encouraging that practice.

(Source: P.A. 102-538, eff. 8-20-21.)