SB1300sam001 96TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Sen. John J. Cullerton

Filed: 5/15/2009

09600SB1300sam001 LRB096 09448 RCE 26899 a

AMENDMENT TO SENATE BILL 1300

AMENDMENT NO. ______. Amend Senate Bill 1300 by replacing everything after the enacting clause with the following:

"Section 10. The Health Care Worker Background Check Act is amended by changing Section 25 as follows:

(225 ILCS 46/25)

Sec. 25. Persons ineligible to be hired by health care employers and long-term care facilities.

(a) In the discretion of the Director of Public Health, as soon after January 1, 1996, January 1, 1997, January 1, 2006, or October 1, 2007, as applicable, and as is reasonably practical, no health care employer shall knowingly hire, employ, or retain any individual in a position with duties involving direct care for clients, patients, or residents, and no long-term care facility shall knowingly hire, employ, or retain any individual in a position with duties that involve or may involve contact with residents or access to the living quarters or the financial, medical, or personal records of residents, who has been convicted of committing or attempting to commit one or more of the following offenses: those defined in Sections 8-1(b), 8-1.1, 8-1.2, 9-1, 9-1.2, 9-2, 9-2.1, 9-3, 9-3.1, 9-3.2, 9-3.3, 9-3.4, 10-1, 10-2, 10-3, 10-3.1, 10-4, 10-5, 10-7, 11-6, 11-9.1, 11-9.5, 11-19.2, 11-20.1, 12-1, 12-2, 12-3, 12-3.1, 12-3.2, 12-4, 12-4.1, 12-4.2, 12-4.3, 12-4.4, 12-4.5, 12-4.6, 12-4.7, 12-7.4, 12-11, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, 12-16, 12-19, 12-21, 12-21.6, 12-32, 12-33, 16-1, 16-1.3, 16A-3, 17-3, 18-1, 18-2, 18-3, 18-4, 18-5, 19-1, 19-3, 19-4, 20-1, 20-1.1, 24-1, 24-1.2, 24-1.5, or 33A-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961; those provided in Section 4 of the Wrongs to Children Act; those provided in Section 53 of the Criminal Jurisprudence Act; those defined in Section 5, 5.1, 5.2, 7, or 9 of the Cannabis Control Act; those defined in the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act; or those defined in Sections 401, 401.1, 404, 405, 405.1, 407, or 407.1 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, unless the applicant or employee obtains a waiver pursuant to Section 40.

(a-1) In the discretion of the Director of Public Health, as soon after January 1, 2004 or October 1, 2007, as applicable, and as is reasonably practical, no health care employer shall knowingly hire any individual in a position with duties involving direct care for clients, patients, or residents, and no long-term care facility shall knowingly hire any individual in a position with duties that involve or may involve contact with residents or access to the living quarters or the financial, medical, or personal records of residents, who has (i) been convicted of committing or attempting to commit one or more of the offenses defined in Section 12-3.3, 12-4.2-5, 16-2, 16G-15, 16G-20, 18-5, 20-1.2, 24-1.1, 24-1.2-5, 24-1.6, 24-3.2, or 24-3.3 of the Criminal Code of 1961; Section 4, 5, 6, 8, or 17.02 of the Illinois Credit Card and Debit Card Act; or Section 5.1 of the Wrongs to Children Act; or (ii) violated Section 50-50 of the Nurse Practice Act, unless the applicant or employee obtains a waiver pursuant to Section 40 of this Act.

A health care employer is not required to retain an individual in a position with duties involving direct care for clients, patients, or residents, and no long-term care facility is required to retain an individual in a position with duties that involve or may involve contact with residents or access to the living quarters or the financial, medical, or personal records of residents, who has been convicted of committing or attempting to commit one or more of the offenses enumerated in this subsection.

(b) A health care employer shall not hire, employ, or retain any individual in a position with duties involving direct care of clients, patients, or residents, and no long-term care facility shall knowingly hire, employ, or retain any individual in a position with duties that involve or may involve contact with residents or access to the living quarters or the financial, medical, or personal records of residents, if the health care employer becomes aware that the individual has been convicted in another state of committing or attempting to commit an offense that has the same or similar elements as an offense listed in subsection (a) or (a-1), as verified by court records, records from a state agency, or an FBI criminal history record check, unless the applicant or employee obtains a waiver pursuant to Section 40 of this Act. This shall not be construed to mean that a health care employer has an obligation to conduct a criminal history records check in other states in which an employee has resided.

(Source: P.A. 94-556, eff. 9-11-05; 94-665, eff. 1-1-06; 94-1053, eff. 7-24-06; 95-120, eff. 8-13-07; 95-639, eff. 10-5-07; 95-876, eff. 8-21-08.)

Section 25. The Criminal Code of 1961 is amended by changing Sections 3-4, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 5-2, 7-11, 8-1, 8-1.2, 8-2, 8-4, 9-1, 9-2, 10-1, 10-2, 10-3, 10-3.1, 10-5, 10-5.5, 10-7, 11-9.3, 11-9.4, 25-1, 29B-1, 29D-25, 29D-35, and 36-1, by amending and renumbering Sections 9-3.1 (as 9-3.4), 25-1.1 (as 25-5), 25-2 (as 25-6), 29D-30 (as 29D-14.9), 20.5-5 (as 29D-15.1), 20.5-6 (as 29D-15.2), and 29D-15 (as 29D-29.9), and by adding Sections 10-9, 25-4, and 29D-35.1 as follows:

(720 ILCS 5/3-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 3-4)

Sec. 3-4. Effect of former prosecution.

(a) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for the same offense, based upon the same facts, if that such former prosecution:

(1) resulted Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal or in a determination that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction; or

(2) was Was terminated by a final order or judgment, even if entered before trial, that which required a determination inconsistent with any fact or legal proposition necessary to a conviction in the subsequent prosecution; or

(3) was Was terminated improperly after the jury was impaneled and sworn or, in a trial before a court without a jury, after the first witness was sworn but before findings were rendered by the trier of facts, or after a plea of guilty was accepted by the court.

A conviction of an included offense, other than through a plea of guilty, is an acquittal of the offense charged.

(b) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for a different offense, or for the same offense based upon different facts, if that such former prosecution:

(1) resulted Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal, and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the former prosecution; or was for an offense with which the defendant should have been charged on the former prosecution, as provided in Section 3-3 of this Code (unless the court ordered a separate trial of that such charge); or was for an offense that which involves the same conduct, unless each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required on the other prosecution, or the offense was not consummated when the former trial began; or

(2) was Was terminated by a final order or judgment, even if entered before trial, that which required a determination inconsistent with any fact necessary to a conviction in the subsequent prosecution; or

(3) was Was terminated improperly under the circumstances stated in subsection Subsection (a), and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted if the former prosecution had not been terminated improperly.

(c) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted in a District Court of the United States or in a sister state State for an offense that which is within the concurrent jurisdiction of this State, if that such former prosecution:

(1) resulted Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal, and the subsequent prosecution is for the same conduct, unless each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required in the other prosecution, or the offense was not consummated when the former trial began; or

(2) was Was terminated by a final order or judgment, even if entered before trial, that which required a determination inconsistent with any fact necessary to a conviction in the prosecution in this State.

(d) A However, a prosecution is not barred within the meaning of this Section 3-4, however, if the former prosecution:

(1) was Was before a court that which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense; or

(2) was Was procured by the defendant without the knowledge of the proper prosecuting officer, and with the purpose of avoiding the sentence that which otherwise might be imposed; or if subsequent proceedings resulted in the invalidation, setting aside, reversal, or vacating of the conviction, unless the defendant was thereby adjudged not guilty.

(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/4-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-5)

Sec. 4-5. Knowledge. A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of:

(a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his or her conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that his or her conduct is of that such nature or that those such circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that the such fact exists.

(b) The result of his or her conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that that such result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct.

Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed wilfully, within the meaning of a statute using the latter term "willfully", unless the statute clearly requires another meaning.

When the law provides that acting knowingly suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally.

(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/4-6) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-6)

Sec. 4-6. Recklessness. A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when that person he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, ; and that such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. An act performed recklessly is performed wantonly, within the meaning of a statute using the latter term "wantonly", unless the statute clearly requires another meaning.

(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/4-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-7)

Sec. 4-7. Negligence. A person is negligent, or acts negligently, when that person he fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, ; and that such failure constitutes a substantial deviation from the standard of care that which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.

(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/5-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 5-2)

Sec. 5-2. When accountability exists. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when:

(a) having Having a mental state described by the statute defining the offense, he or she causes another to perform the conduct, and the other person in fact or by reason of legal incapacity lacks such a mental state; or

(b) the The statute defining the offense makes him or her so accountable; or

(c) either Either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate that such commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid that , such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.

When 2 or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the common design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of those further acts. Mere presence at the scene of a crime does not render a person accountable for an offense; a person's presence at the scene of a crime, however, may be considered with other circumstances by the trier of fact when determining accountability.

A However, a person is not so accountable, however, unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if:

(1) he or she He is a victim of the offense committed; or

(2) the The offense is so defined that his or her conduct was inevitably incident to its commission; or

(3) before Before the commission of the offense, he or she terminates his or her effort to promote or facilitate that such commission, and does one of the following: (i) wholly deprives his or her prior efforts of effectiveness in that such commission, (ii) or gives timely warning to the proper law enforcement authorities, or (iii) otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense.

(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/7-11) (from Ch. 38, par. 7-11)

Sec. 7-11. Compulsion.

(a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense punishable with death, by reason of conduct that which he or she performs under the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, if he or she reasonably believes death or great bodily harm will be inflicted upon him or her, or upon his or her spouse or child, if he or she does not perform that such conduct.

(b) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the presence of her husband, to any presumption of compulsion, or to any defense of compulsion, except that stated in subsection Subsection (a).

(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/8-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 8-1)

Sec. 8-1. Solicitation and solicitation of murder.

(a) Solicitation Elements of the offense. A person commits the offense of solicitation when, with intent that an offense be committed, other than first degree murder, he or she commands, encourages, or requests another to commit that offense.

(b) Solicitation of murder. A person commits the offense of solicitation of murder when he or she commits solicitation with the intent that the offense of first degree murder be committed.

(c) Sentence (b) Penalty. A person convicted of solicitation may be fined or imprisoned or both not to exceed the maximum provided for the offense solicited, except that : Provided, however, the penalty shall not exceed the corresponding maximum limit provided by subparagraph (c) of Section 8-4 of this Code Act, as heretofore and hereafter amended. Solicitation of murder is a Class X felony, and a person convicted of solicitation of murder shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 15 years and not more than 30 years, except that a person convicted of solicitation of murder when the person solicited was a person under the age of 17 years shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 20 years and not more than 60 years.

(Source: P.A. 85-1030.)

(720 ILCS 5/8-1.2) (from Ch. 38, par. 8-1.2)

Sec. 8-1.2. Solicitation of murder Murder for hire Hire.

(a) A person commits the offense of solicitation of murder for hire when, with the intent that the offense of first degree murder be committed, he or she procures another to commit that offense pursuant to any contract, agreement, understanding, command, or request for money or anything of value.

(b) Sentence Penalty. Solicitation of murder for hire is a Class X felony, and a person convicted of solicitation of murder for hire shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 20 years and not more than 40 years, except that a person convicted of solicitation of murder for hire when the person solicited was a person under the age of 17 years shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than 60 years.

(Source: P.A. 85-1003; 85-1030; 85-1440.)

(720 ILCS 5/8-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 8-2)

Sec. 8-2. Conspiracy.

(a) Elements of the offense. A person commits the offense of conspiracy when, with intent that an offense be committed, he or she agrees with another to the commission of that offense. No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense unless an act in furtherance of that such agreement is alleged and proved to have been committed by him or her or by a co-conspirator.

(b) Co-conspirators. It is shall not be a defense to conspiracy that the person or persons with whom the accused is alleged to have conspired:

(1) have Has not been prosecuted or convicted, or

(2) have Has been convicted of a different offense, or

(3) are Is not amenable to justice, or

(4) have Has been acquitted, or

(5) lacked Lacked the capacity to commit an offense.

(c) Sentence.

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection or Code, a person convicted of conspiracy to commit:

(A) a Class X felony shall be sentenced for a Class 1 felony;

(B) a Class 1 felony shall be sentenced for a Class 2 felony;

(C) a Class 2 felony shall be sentenced for a Class 3 felony;

(D) a Class 3 felony shall be sentenced for a Class 4 felony;

(E) a Class 4 felony shall be sentenced for a Class 4 felony; and

(F) a misdemeanor may be fined or imprisoned or both not to exceed the maximum provided for the offense that is the object of the conspiracy.

(2) A person convicted of conspiracy to commit any of the following offenses shall be sentenced for a Class X felony:

(A) aggravated insurance fraud conspiracy when the person is an organizer of the conspiracy (720 ILCS 5/46-4); or

(B) aggravated governmental entity insurance fraud conspiracy when the person is an organizer of the conspiracy (720 ILCS 5/46-4).

(3) A person convicted of conspiracy to commit any of the following offenses shall be sentenced for a Class 1 felony:

(A) first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1); or

(B) aggravated insurance fraud (720 ILCS 5/46-3) or aggravated governmental insurance fraud (720 ILCS 5/46-3).

(4) A person convicted of conspiracy to commit insurance fraud (720 ILCS 5/46-3) or governmental entity insurance fraud (720 ILCS 5/46-3) shall be sentenced for a Class 2 felony.

(5) A person convicted of conspiracy to commit any of the following offenses shall be sentenced for a Class 3 felony:

(A) soliciting for a prostitute (720 ILCS 5/11-15);

(B) pandering (720 ILCS 5/11-16);

(C) keeping a place a place of prostitution (720 ILCS 5/11-17);

(D) pimping (720 ILCS 5/11-19);

(E) unlawful use of weapons under Section 24-1(a)(1) (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(1));

(F) unlawful use of weapons under Section 24-1(a)(7) (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(7));

(G) gambling (720 ILCS 5/28-1);

(H) keeping a gambling place (720 ILCS 5/28-3);

(I) registration of federal gambling stamps violation (720 ILCS 5/28-4);

(J) look-alike substances violation (720 ILCS 570/404);

(K) miscellaneous controlled substance violation under Section 406(b) (720 ILCS 570/406(b)) ; or

(L) an inchoate offense related to any of the principal offenses set forth in this item (5).

A person convicted of conspiracy may be fined or imprisoned or both not to exceed the maximum provided for the offense which is the object of the conspiracy, except that if the object is an offense prohibited by Sections 11-15, 11-16, 11-17, 11-19, 24-1(a)(1), 24-1(a)(7), 28-1, 28-3 and 28-4 of the "Criminal Code of 1961", approved July 28, 1961, as amended, or prohibited by Sections 404 or 406 (b) of the "Illinois Controlled Substances Act", enacted by the 77th General Assembly, or an inchoate offense related to any of the aforesaid principal offenses, the person convicted may be sentenced for a Class 3 felony however, conspiracy to commit treason, first degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated criminal sexual assault, or predatory criminal sexual assault of a child is a Class 1 felony, and conspiracy to commit any offense other than those specified in this subsection, and other than those set forth in Sections 401, 402, or 407 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, shall not be sentenced in excess of a Class 4 felony.

(Source: P.A. 94-184, eff. 7-12-05.)

(720 ILCS 5/8-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 8-4)

Sec. 8-4. Attempt.

(a) Elements of the offense Offense.

A person commits the offense of an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific offense, he or she does any act that which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense.

(b) Impossibility.

It is shall not be a defense to a charge of attempt that because of a misapprehension of the circumstances it would have been impossible for the accused to commit the offense attempted.

(c) Sentence.

A person convicted of an attempt may be fined or imprisoned or both not to exceed the maximum provided for the offense attempted but, except for an attempt to commit the offense defined in Section 33A-2 of this Code: Act,

(1) the sentence for attempt to commit first degree murder is the sentence for a Class X felony, except that

(A) an attempt to commit first degree murder when at least one of the aggravating factors specified in paragraphs (1), (2), and (12) of subsection (b) of Section 9-1 is present is a Class X felony for which the sentence shall be a term of imprisonment of not less than 20 years and not more than 80 years;

(B) an attempt to commit first degree murder while armed with a firearm is a Class X felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;

(C) an attempt to commit first degree murder during which the person personally discharged a firearm is a Class X felony for which 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;

(D) an attempt to commit first degree murder during which the person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person, is a Class X felony for which 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court; and .

(E) if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing that, at the time of the attempted murder, he or she was acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the individual whom the defendant endeavored to kill, or another, and, had the individual the defendant endeavored to kill died, the defendant would have negligently or accidentally caused that death, then the sentence for the attempted murder is the sentence for a Class 1 felony;

(2) the sentence for attempt to commit a Class X felony is the sentence for a Class 1 felony;

(3) the sentence for attempt to commit a Class 1 felony is the sentence for a Class 2 felony;

(4) the sentence for attempt to commit a Class 2 felony is the sentence for a Class 3 felony; and

(5) the sentence for attempt to commit any felony other than those specified in items subsections (1), (2), (3), and (4) of this subsection (c) hereof is the sentence for a Class A misdemeanor.

(Source: P.A. 91-404, eff. 1-1-00; 91-696, eff. 4-13-00.)

(720 ILCS 5/9-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 9-1)

Sec. 9-1. First degree Murder - Death penalties - Exceptions - Separate Hearings - Proof - Findings - Appellate procedures - Reversals.

(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:

(1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or

(2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or

(3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder.

(b) Aggravating Factors. A defendant who at the time of the commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or more and who has been found guilty of first degree murder may be sentenced to death if:

(1) the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman killed in the course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman; or

(2) the murdered individual was an employee of an institution or facility of the Department of Corrections, or any similar local correctional agency, killed in the course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, or the murdered individual was an inmate at such institution or facility and was killed on the grounds thereof, or the murdered individual was otherwise present in such institution or facility with the knowledge and approval of the chief administrative officer thereof; or

(3) the defendant has been convicted of murdering two or more individuals under subsection (a) of this Section or under any law of the United States or of any state which is substantially similar to subsection (a) of this Section regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated acts so long as the deaths were the result of either an intent to kill more than one person or of separate acts which the defendant knew would cause death or create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; or

(4) the murdered individual was killed as a result of the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus or other public conveyance; or

(5) the defendant committed the murder pursuant to a contract, agreement or understanding by which he was to receive money or anything of value in return for committing the murder or procured another to commit the murder for money or anything of value; or

(6) the murdered individual was killed in the course of another felony if:

(a) the murdered individual:

(i) was actually killed by the defendant, or

(ii) received physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant substantially contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by one or more persons for whose conduct the defendant is legally accountable under Section 5-2 of this Code, and the physical injuries inflicted by either the defendant or the other person or persons for whose conduct he is legally accountable caused the death of the murdered individual; and

(b) in performing the acts which caused the death of the murdered individual or which resulted in physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant on the murdered individual under the circumstances of subdivision (ii) of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (6) of subsection (b) of this Section, the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; and

(c) the other felony was an inherently violent crime or the attempt to commit an inherently violent crime. In this subparagraph (c), "inherently violent crime" includes, but is not limited to, armed robbery, robbery, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated arson, aggravated stalking, residential burglary, and home invasion; or

(7) the murdered individual was under 12 years of age and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or

(8) the defendant committed the murder with intent to prevent the murdered individual from testifying or participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution or giving material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another; or the defendant committed the murder because the murdered individual was a witness in any prosecution or gave material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another; for purposes of this paragraph (8), "participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution" is intended to include those appearing in the proceedings in any capacity such as trial judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, investigators, witnesses, or jurors; or

(9) the defendant, while committing an offense punishable under Sections 401, 401.1, 401.2, 405, 405.2, 407 or 407.1 or subsection (b) of Section 404 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional killing of the murdered individual; or

(10) the defendant was incarcerated in an institution or facility of the Department of Corrections at the time of the murder, and while committing an offense punishable as a felony under Illinois law, or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional killing of the murdered individual; or

(11) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable expectation that the death of a human being would result therefrom; or

(12) the murdered individual was an emergency medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistance or first aid personnel, employed by a municipality or other governmental unit, killed in the course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was an emergency medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistance or first aid personnel; or

(13) the defendant was a principal administrator, organizer, or leader of a calculated criminal drug conspiracy consisting of a hierarchical position of authority superior to that of all other members of the conspiracy, and the defendant counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or caused the intentional killing of the murdered person; or

(14) the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture. For the purpose of this Section torture means the infliction of or subjection to extreme physical pain, motivated by an intent to increase or prolong the pain, suffering or agony of the victim; or

(15) the murder was committed as a result of the intentional discharge of a firearm by the defendant from a motor vehicle and the victim was not present within the motor vehicle; or

(16) the murdered individual was 60 years of age or older and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or

(17) the murdered individual was a disabled person and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was disabled. For purposes of this paragraph (17), "disabled person" means a person who suffers from a permanent physical or mental impairment resulting from disease, an injury, a functional disorder, or a congenital condition that renders the person incapable of adequately providing for his or her own health or personal care; or

(18) the murder was committed by reason of any person's activity as a community policing volunteer or to prevent any person from engaging in activity as a community policing volunteer; or

(19) the murdered individual was subject to an order of protection and the murder was committed by a person against whom the same order of protection was issued under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986; or

(20) the murdered individual was known by the defendant to be a teacher or other person employed in any school and the teacher or other employee is upon the grounds of a school or grounds adjacent to a school, or is in any part of a building used for school purposes; or

(21) the murder was committed by the defendant in connection with or as a result of the offense of terrorism as defined in Section 29D-14.9 29D-30 of this Code.

(c) Consideration of factors in Aggravation and Mitigation.

The court shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to consider any aggravating and any mitigating factors which are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. Aggravating factors may include but need not be limited to those factors set forth in subsection (b). Mitigating factors may include but need not be limited to the following:

(1) the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;

(2) the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution;

(3) the murdered individual was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act;

(4) the defendant acted under the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm;

(5) the defendant was not personally present during commission of the act or acts causing death;

(6) the defendant's background includes a history of extreme emotional or physical abuse;

(7) the defendant suffers from a reduced mental capacity.

(d) Separate sentencing hearing.

Where requested by the State, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine the existence of factors set forth in subsection (b) and to consider any aggravating or mitigating factors as indicated in subsection (c). The proceeding shall be conducted:

(1) before the jury that determined the defendant's guilt; or

(2) before a jury impanelled for the purpose of the proceeding if:

A. the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; or

B. the defendant was convicted after a trial before the court sitting without a jury; or

C. the court for good cause shown discharges the jury that determined the defendant's guilt; or

(3) before the court alone if the defendant waives a jury for the separate proceeding.

(e) Evidence and Argument.

During the proceeding any information relevant to any of the factors set forth in subsection (b) may be presented by either the State or the defendant under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. Any information relevant to any additional aggravating factors or any mitigating factors indicated in subsection (c) may be presented by the State or defendant regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. The State and the defendant shall be given fair opportunity to rebut any information received at the hearing.

(f) Proof.

The burden of proof of establishing the existence of any of the factors set forth in subsection (b) is on the State and shall not be satisfied unless established beyond a reasonable doubt.

(g) Procedure - Jury.

If at the separate sentencing proceeding the jury finds that none of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exists, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections. If there is a unanimous finding by the jury that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exist, the jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating factors as instructed by the court and shall determine whether the sentence of death shall be imposed. If the jury determines unanimously, after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. If the court does not concur with the jury determination that death is the appropriate sentence, the court shall set forth reasons in writing including what facts or circumstances the court relied upon, along with any relevant documents, that compelled the court to non-concur with the sentence. This document and any attachments shall be part of the record for appellate review. The court shall be bound by the jury's sentencing determination.

If after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, one or more jurors determines that death is not the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.

(h) Procedure - No Jury.

In a proceeding before the court alone, if the court finds that none of the factors found in subsection (b) exists, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.

If the Court determines that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exists, the Court shall consider any aggravating and mitigating factors as indicated in subsection (c). If the Court determines, after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence, the Court shall sentence the defendant to death.

If the court finds that death is not the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.

(h-5) Decertification as a capital case.

In a case in which the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder by a judge or jury, or a case on remand for resentencing, and the State seeks the death penalty as an appropriate sentence, on the court's own motion or the written motion of the defendant, the court may decertify the case as a death penalty case if the court finds that the only evidence supporting the defendant's conviction is the uncorroborated testimony of an informant witness, as defined in Section 115-21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, concerning the confession or admission of the defendant or that the sole evidence against the defendant is a single eyewitness or single accomplice without any other corroborating evidence. If the court decertifies the case as a capital case under either of the grounds set forth above, the court shall issue a written finding. The State may pursue its right to appeal the decertification pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1). If the court does not decertify the case as a capital case, the matter shall proceed to the eligibility phase of the sentencing hearing.

(i) Appellate Procedure.

The conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court. Such review shall be in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. The Illinois Supreme Court may overturn the death sentence, and order the imposition of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections if the court finds that the death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular case. If the Illinois Supreme Court finds that the death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular case, independent of any procedural grounds for relief, the Illinois Supreme Court shall issue a written opinion explaining this finding.

(j) Disposition of reversed death sentence.

In the event that the death penalty in this Act is held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or of the State of Illinois, any person convicted of first degree murder shall be sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.

In the event that any death sentence pursuant to the sentencing provisions of this Section is declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or of the State of Illinois, the court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death shall cause the defendant to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.

(k) Guidelines for seeking the death penalty.

The Attorney General and State's Attorneys Association shall consult on voluntary guidelines for procedures governing whether or not to seek the death penalty. The guidelines do not have the force of law and are only advisory in nature.

(Source: P.A. 92-854, eff. 12-5-02; 93-605, eff. 11-19-03.)

(720 ILCS 5/9-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 9-2)

Sec. 9-2. Second degree murder Degree Murder.

(a) A person commits the offense of second degree murder when he or she commits the offense of first degree murder as defined in paragraph paragraphs (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of Section 9-1 of this Code and either of the following mitigating factors are present:

(1) at At the time of the killing he or she is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed or another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he or she negligently or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed; or

(2) at At the time of the killing he or she believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his or her belief is unreasonable.

(b) Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person.

(c) When a defendant is on trial for first degree murder and evidence of either of the mitigating factors defined in subsection (a) of this Section has been presented, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove either mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence before the defendant can be found guilty of second degree murder. The However, the burden of proof, however, remains on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of first degree murder and, when appropriately raised, the absence of circumstances at the time of the killing that would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code. In a jury trial for first degree murder in which evidence of either of the mitigating factors defined in subsection (a) of this Section has been presented and the defendant has requested that the jury be given the option of finding the defendant guilty of second degree murder, the jury must be instructed that it may not consider whether the defendant has met his burden of proof with regard to second degree murder until and unless it has first determined that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of first degree murder.

(d) Sentence. Second degree murder Degree Murder is a Class 1 felony.

(Source: P.A. 84-1450.)

(720 ILCS 5/9-3.4) (was 720 ILCS 5/9-3.1)

Sec. 9-3.4 9-3.1. Concealment of homicidal death.

(a) A person commits the offense of concealment of homicidal death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person with knowledge that such other person has died by homicidal means.

(b) Nothing in this Section prevents the defendant from also being charged with and tried for the first degree murder, second degree murder, or involuntary manslaughter of the person whose death is concealed. If a person convicted under this Section is also convicted of first degree murder, second degree murder or involuntary manslaughter, the penalty under this Section shall be imposed separately and in addition to the penalty for first degree murder, second degree murder or involuntary manslaughter.

(b-5) For purposes of this Section:

"Conceal" means the performing of some act or acts for the purpose of preventing or delaying the discovery of a death by homicidal means. "Conceal" means something more than simply withholding knowledge or failing to disclose information.

"Homicidal means" means any act or acts, lawful or unlawful, of a person that cause the death of another person.

(c) Sentence. Concealment of homicidal death is a Class 3 felony.

(Source: P.A. 84-1308; 84-1450.)

(720 ILCS 5/10-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 10-1)

Sec. 10-1. Kidnapping.)

(a) A person commits the offense of kidnapping when he or she Kidnapping occurs when a person knowingly:

(1) and And secretly confines another against his or her will; , or

(2) by By force or threat of imminent force carries another from one place to another with intent secretly to confine that other person him against his or her will; , or

(3) by By deceit or enticement induces another to go from one place to another with intent secretly to confine that other person him against his or her will.

(b) Confinement of a child under the age of 13 years, or of a severely or profoundly mentally retarded person, is against that child's or person's his will within the meaning of this Section if that such confinement is without the consent of that child's or person's his parent or legal guardian.

(c) Sentence. Kidnapping is a Class 2 felony.

(Source: P.A. 79-765.)

(720 ILCS 5/10-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 10-2)

Sec. 10-2. Aggravated kidnaping.

(a) A person commits kidnaper within the definition of paragraph (a) of Section 10-1 is guilty of the offense of aggravated kidnaping when he or she commits kidnapping and:

(1) kidnaps with the intent to obtain Kidnaps for the purpose of obtaining ransom from the person kidnaped or from any other person; , or

(2) takes Takes as his or her victim a child under the age of 13 years, or a severely or profoundly mentally retarded person; , or

(3) inflicts Inflicts great bodily harm, other than by the discharge of a firearm, or commits another felony upon his or her victim; , or

(4) wears Wears a hood, robe, or mask or conceals his or her identity; , or

(5) commits Commits the offense of kidnaping while armed with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm, as defined in Section 33A-1 of this the "Criminal Code; of 1961", or

(6) commits Commits the offense of kidnaping while armed with a firearm; , or

(7) during During the commission of the offense of kidnaping, personally discharges discharged a firearm; , or

(8) during During the commission of the offense of kidnaping, personally discharges discharged a firearm that proximately causes caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person.

As used in this Section, "ransom" includes money, benefit, or other valuable thing or concession.

(b) Sentence. Aggravated kidnaping in violation of paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) of subsection (a) is a Class X felony. A violation of subsection (a)(6) is a Class X felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court. A violation of subsection (a)(7) is a Class X felony for which 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court. A violation of subsection (a)(8) is a Class X felony for which 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.

A person who is convicted of a second or subsequent offense of aggravated kidnaping shall be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment; except provided, however, that a sentence of natural life imprisonment shall not be imposed under this Section unless the second or subsequent offense was committed after conviction on the first offense.

(Source: P.A. 91-404, eff. 1-1-00; 92-434, eff. 1-1-02.)

(720 ILCS 5/10-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 10-3)

Sec. 10-3. Unlawful restraint.)

(a) A person commits the offense of unlawful restraint when he or she knowingly without legal authority detains another.

(b) Sentence. Unlawful restraint is a Class 4 felony.

(Source: P.A. 79-840.)

(720 ILCS 5/10-3.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 10-3.1)

Sec. 10-3.1. Aggravated unlawful restraint Unlawful Restraint.

(a) A person commits the offense of aggravated unlawful restraint when he or she commits unlawful restraint knowingly without legal authority detains another while using a deadly weapon.

(b) Sentence. Aggravated unlawful restraint is a Class 3 felony.

(Source: P.A. 84-930.)

(720 ILCS 5/10-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 10-5)

Sec. 10-5. Child abduction Abduction.

(a) For purposes of this Section, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

(1) "Child" means a person who, at the time the alleged violation occurred, was under the age of 18 or a severely or profoundly mentally retarded. person at the time the alleged violation occurred ; and

(2) "Detains" means taking or retaining physical custody of a child, whether or not the child resists or objects. ; and

(3) "Lawful custodian" means a person or persons granted legal custody of a child or entitled to physical possession of a child pursuant to a court order. It is presumed that, when the parties have never been married to each other, the mother has legal custody of the child unless a valid court order states otherwise. If an adjudication of paternity has been completed and the father has been assigned support obligations or visitation rights, such a paternity order should, for the purposes of this Section, be considered a valid court order granting custody to the mother.

(4) "Putative father" means a man who has a reasonable belief that he is the father of a child born of a woman who is not his wife.

(b) A person commits the offense of child abduction when he or she does any one of the following:

(1) Intentionally violates any terms of a valid court order granting sole or joint custody, care, or possession to another, by concealing or detaining the child or removing the child from the jurisdiction of the court. ; or

(2) Intentionally violates a court order prohibiting the person from concealing or detaining the child or removing the child from the jurisdiction of the court. ; or

(3) Intentionally conceals, detains, or removes the child without the consent of the mother or lawful custodian of the child if the person is a putative father and either: (A) the paternity of the child has not been legally established or (B) the paternity of the child has been legally established but no orders relating to custody have been entered. Notwithstanding However, notwithstanding the presumption created by paragraph (3) of subsection (a), however, a mother commits child abduction when she intentionally conceals or removes a child, whom she has abandoned or relinquished custody of, from an unadjudicated father who has provided sole ongoing care and custody of the child in her absence. ; or

(4) Intentionally conceals or removes the child from a parent after filing a petition or being served with process in an action affecting marriage or paternity but prior to the issuance of a temporary or final order determining custody. ; or

(5) At the expiration of visitation rights outside the State, intentionally fails or refuses to return or impedes the return of the child to the lawful custodian in Illinois. ; or

(6) Being a parent of the child, and if where the parents of that such child are or have been married and there has been no court order of custody, knowingly conceals the child for 15 days, and fails to make reasonable attempts within the 15-day 15 day period to notify the other parent as to the specific whereabouts of the child, including a means by which to contact the such child, or to arrange reasonable visitation or contact with the child. It is not a violation of this Section for a person fleeing domestic violence to take the child with him or her to housing provided by a domestic violence program. ; or

(7) Being a parent of the child, and if where the parents of the child are or have been married and there has been no court order of custody, knowingly conceals, detains, or removes the child with physical force or threat of physical force. ; or

(8) Knowingly conceals Conceals, detains, or removes the child for payment or promise of payment at the instruction of a person who has no legal right to custody. ; or

(9) Knowingly retains Retains in this State for 30 days a child removed from another state without the consent of the lawful custodian or in violation of a valid court order of custody. ; or

(10) Intentionally lures or attempts to lure a child under the age of 16 into a motor vehicle, building, housetrailer, or dwelling place without the consent of the child's parent or lawful custodian of the child for other than a lawful purpose. For the purposes of this item subsection (b), paragraph (10), the luring or attempted luring of a child under the age of 16 into a motor vehicle, building, housetrailer, or dwelling place without the consent of the child's parent or lawful custodian is of the child shall be prima facie evidence of other than a lawful purpose.

(11) With the intent to obstruct or prevent efforts to locate the child victim of a child abduction, knowingly destroys, alters, conceals, or disguises physical evidence or furnishes false information.

(c) It is shall be an affirmative defense to subsections (b)(1) through (b)(10) of this Section that:

(1) the The person had custody of the child pursuant to a court order granting legal custody or visitation rights that which existed at the time of the alleged violation; or

(2) the The person had physical custody of the child pursuant to a court order granting legal custody or visitation rights and failed to return the child as a result of circumstances beyond his or her control, and the person notified and disclosed to the other parent or legal custodian the specific whereabouts of the child and a means by which the such child could can be contacted or made a reasonable attempt to notify the other parent or lawful custodian of the child of those such circumstances and made the make such disclosure within 24 hours after the visitation period had expired and returned the child as soon as possible; or

(3) the The person was fleeing an incidence or pattern of domestic violence; or

(4) the The person lured or attempted to lure a child under the age of 16 into a motor vehicle, building, housetrailer, or dwelling place for a lawful purpose in prosecutions under paragraph (10) of subsection (b), paragraph (10).

(d) A person convicted of child abduction under this Section is guilty of a Class 4 felony. A person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of paragraph (10) of subsection (b) of this Section is guilty of a Class 3 felony. It is shall be a factor in aggravation under subsections (b)(1) through (b)(10) of this Section for which a court may impose a more severe sentence under Section 5-8-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections, if, upon sentencing, the court finds evidence of any of the following aggravating factors:

(1) that the defendant abused or neglected the child following the concealment, detention, or removal of the child; or

(2) that the defendant inflicted or threatened to inflict physical harm on a parent or lawful custodian of the child or on the child with intent to cause that such parent or lawful custodian to discontinue criminal prosecution of the defendant under this Section; or

(3) that the defendant demanded payment in exchange for return of the child or demanded that he or she be relieved of the financial or legal obligation to support the child in exchange for return of the child; or

(4) that the defendant has previously been convicted of child abduction; or

(5) that the defendant committed the abduction while armed with a deadly weapon or the taking of the child resulted in serious bodily injury to another; or

(6) that the defendant committed the abduction while in a school, regardless of the time of day or time of year; in a playground; on any conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school or a school related activity; on the real property of a school; or on a public way within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising any school or playground. For purposes of this paragraph (6), "playground" means a piece of land owned or controlled by a unit of local government that is designated by the unit of local government for use solely or primarily for children's recreation; and "school" means a public or private elementary or secondary school, community college, college, or university.

(e) The court may order the child to be returned to the parent or lawful custodian from whom the child was concealed, detained, or removed. In addition to any sentence imposed, the court may assess any reasonable expense incurred in searching for or returning the child against any person convicted of violating this Section.

(f) Nothing contained in this Section shall be construed to limit the court's contempt power.

(g) Every law enforcement officer investigating an alleged incident of child abduction shall make a written police report of any bona fide allegation and the disposition of that such investigation. Every police report completed pursuant to this Section shall be compiled and recorded within the meaning of Section 5.1 of the Criminal Identification Act "An Act in relation to criminal identification and investigation", approved July 2, 1931, as now or hereafter amended.

(h) Whenever a law enforcement officer has reasons to believe a child abduction has occurred, she or he shall provide the lawful custodian a summary of her or his rights under this Code Act, including the procedures and relief available to her or him.

(i) If during the course of an investigation under this Section the child is found in the physical custody of the defendant or another, the law enforcement officer shall return the child to the parent or lawful custodian from whom the child was concealed, detained, or removed, unless there is good cause for the law enforcement officer or the Department of Children and Family Services to retain temporary protective custody of the child pursuant to the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act, as now or hereafter amended.

(Source: P.A. 92-434, eff. 1-1-02.)

(720 ILCS 5/10-5.5)

Sec. 10-5.5. Unlawful visitation interference.

(a) As used in this Section, the terms "child", "detain", and "lawful custodian" shall have the meanings ascribed to them in Section 10-5 of this Code.

(b) Every person who, in violation of the visitation provisions of a court order relating to child custody, detains or conceals a child with the intent to deprive another person of his or her rights to visitation commits the offense shall be guilty of unlawful visitation interference.

(c) A person committing unlawful visitation interference is guilty of a petty offense. Any However, any person violating this Section after 2 prior convictions of unlawful visitation interference, however, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.

(d) Any law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing an act in violation of this Section shall issue to that person a notice to appear.

(e) The notice shall:

(1) be in writing;

(2) state the name of the person and his or her address, if known;

(3) set forth the nature of the offense;

(4) be signed by the officer issuing the notice; and

(5) request the person to appear before a court at a certain time and place.

(f) Upon failure of the person to appear, a summons or warrant of arrest may be issued.

(g) It is an affirmative defense that:

(1) a person or lawful custodian committed the act to protect the child from imminent physical harm, provided that the defendant's belief that there was physical harm imminent was reasonable and that the defendant's conduct in withholding visitation rights was a reasonable response to the harm believed imminent;

(2) the act was committed with the mutual consent of all parties having a right to custody and visitation of the child; or

(3) the act was otherwise authorized by law.

(h) A person convicted of unlawful visitation interference shall not be subject to a civil contempt citation for the same conduct for violating visitation provisions of a court order issued under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.

(Source: P.A. 88-96.)

(720 ILCS 5/10-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 10-7)

Sec. 10-7. Aiding or and abetting child abduction.

(a) A person violates this Section when, before : (i) Before or during the commission of a child abduction as defined in Section 10-5 and with the intent to promote or facilitate such offense, he or she intentionally aids or abets another in the planning or commission of child abduction, unless before the commission of the offense he or she makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense; or (ii) With the intent to prevent the apprehension of a person known to have committed the offense of child abduction, or with the intent to obstruct or prevent efforts to locate the child victim of a child abduction, he or she knowingly destroys, alters, conceals or disguises physical evidence or furnishes false information.

(b) Sentence. A person who violates this Section commits a Class 4 felony.

(Source: P.A. 84-1308.)

(720 ILCS 5/10-9 new)

Sec. 10-9. Trafficking in persons, involuntary servitude, and related offenses.

(a) Definitions. In this Section:

(1) "Intimidation" has the meaning prescribed in Section 12-6.

(2) "Commercial sexual activity" means any sex act on account of which anything of value is given, promised to, or received by any person.

(3) "Financial harm" includes intimidation that brings about financial loss, criminal usury, or employment contracts that violate the Frauds Act.

(4) "Forced labor or services" means labor or services that are performed or provided by another person and are obtained or maintained through:

(A) any scheme, plan, or pattern intending to cause or threatening to cause serious harm to any person;

(B) an actor's physically restraining or threatening to physically restrain another person;

(C) an actor's abusing or threatening to abuse the law or legal process;

(D) an actor's knowingly destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating, or possessing any actual or purported passport or other immigration document, or any other actual or purported government identification document, of another person;

(E) an actor's blackmail; or

(F) an actor's causing or threatening to cause financial harm to or exerting financial control over any person.

(5) "Labor" means work of economic or financial value.

(6) "Maintain" means, in relation to labor or services, to secure continued performance thereof, regardless of any initial agreement on the part of the victim to perform that type of service.

(7) "Obtain" means, in relation to labor or services, to secure performance thereof.

(8) "Services" means activities resulting from a relationship between a person and the actor in which the person performs activities under the supervision of or for the benefit of the actor. Commercial sexual activity and sexually-explicit performances are forms of activities that are "services" under this Section. Nothing in this definition may be construed to legitimize or legalize prostitution.

(9) "Sexually-explicit performance" means a live, recorded, broadcast (including over the Internet), or public act or show intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires or appeal to the prurient interests of patrons.

(10) "Trafficking victim" means a person subjected to the practices set forth in subsection (b), (c), or (d).

(b) Involuntary servitude. A person commits the offense of involuntary servitude when he or she knowingly subjects, attempts to subject, or engages in a conspiracy to subject another person to forced labor or services and:

(1) causes or threatens to cause physical harm to any person;

(2) physically restrains or threatens to physically restrain another person;

(3) abuses or threatens to abuse the law or legal process;

(4) knowingly destroys, conceals, removes, confiscates, or possesses any actual or purported passport or other immigration document, or any other actual or purported government identification document, of another person; or

(5) uses intimidation, or uses or threatens to cause financial harm to or exerts financial control over any person.

Sentence. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) or (f), a violation of subsection (b)(1) is a Class X felony, (b)(2) is a Class 1 felony, (b)(3) is a Class 2 felony, (b)(4) is a Class 3 felony, and (b)(5) is a Class 4 felony.

(c) Involuntary sexual servitude of a minor. A person commits the offense of involuntary sexual servitude of a minor when he or she knowingly recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means, or attempts to recruit, entice, harbor, provide, or obtain by any means, another person under 18 years of age, knowing that the minor will engage in commercial sexual activity, a sexually-explicit performance, or the production of pornography, or causes or attempts to cause a minor to engage in one or more of those activities and:

(1) there is no overt force or threat and the minor is between the ages of 17 and 18 years;

(2) there is no overt force or threat and the minor is under the age of 17 years; or

(3) there is overt force or threat.

Sentence. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) or (f), a violation of subsection (c)(1) is a Class 1 felony, (c)(2) is a Class X felony, and (c)(3) is a Class X felony.

(d) Trafficking in persons for forced labor or services. A person commits the offense of trafficking in persons for forced labor or services when he or she knowingly: (1) recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means, or attempts to recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, or obtain by any means, another person, intending or knowing that the person will be subjected to forced labor or services; or (2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture that has engaged in an act of involuntary servitude or involuntary sexual servitude of a minor.

Sentence. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) or (f), a violation of this subsection is a Class 1 felony.

(e) Aggravating factors. A violation of this Section involving kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated criminal sexual assault or an attempt to commit aggravated criminal sexual assault, or an attempt to commit first degree murder is a Class X felony.

(f) Sentencing considerations.

(1) Bodily injury. If, pursuant to a violation of this Section, a victim suffered bodily injury, the defendant may be sentenced to an extended-term sentence under Section 5-8-2 of the Unified Code of Corrections. The sentencing court must take into account the time in which the victim was held in servitude, with increased penalties for cases in which the victim was held for between 180 days and one year, and increased penalties for cases in which the victim was held for more than one year.

(2) Number of victims. In determining sentences within statutory maximums, the sentencing court should take into account the number of victims, and may provide for substantially-increased sentences in cases involving more than 10 victims.

(g) Restitution. Restitution is mandatory under this Section. In addition to any other amount of loss identified, the court shall order restitution including the greater of (1) the gross income or value to the defendant of the victim's labor or services or (2) the value of the victim's labor as guaranteed under the Minimum Wage Law and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) or the Minimum Wage Law, whichever is greater.

(h) Trafficking victim services. Subject to the availability of funds, the Department of Human Services may provide or fund emergency services and assistance to individuals who are victims of one or more offenses defined in this Section.

(i) Certification. The Attorney General, a State's Attorney, or any law enforcement official shall certify in writing to the United States Department of Justice or other federal agency, such as the United States Department of Homeland Security, that an investigation or prosecution under this Section has begun and the individual who is a likely victim of a crime described in this Section is willing to cooperate or is cooperating with the investigation to enable the individual, if eligible under federal law, to qualify for an appropriate special immigrant visa and to access available federal benefits. Cooperation with law enforcement shall not be required of victims of a crime described in this Section who are under 18 years of age. This certification shall be made available to the victim and his or her designated legal representative.

(j) A person who commits the offense of involuntary servitude, involuntary sexual servitude of a minor, or trafficking in persons for forced labor or services under subsection (b), (c), or (d) of this Section shall forfeit to the State of Illinois any profits or proceeds and any interest or property he or she has acquired or maintained in violation of subsection (b), (c), or (d) of this Section that the sentencing court determines, after a forfeiture hearing, to have been acquired or maintained as a result of maintaining a person in involuntary servitude or participating in trafficking in persons for forced labor or services.

Upon petition by the Attorney General or State's Attorney at any time following sentencing, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether any property or property interest is subject to forfeiture under this Section. At the forfeiture hearing the People have the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that property or property interests are subject to forfeiture under this Section.

In any action brought by the People of the State of Illinois under this Section, in which a restraining order, injunction, or prohibition or any other action in connection with any property or interest subject to forfeiture under this Section is sought, the circuit court presiding over the trial of the person or persons charged with involuntary servitude, involuntary sexual servitude of a minor, or trafficking in persons for forced labor or services shall first determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the person or persons so charged have committed the offense of involuntary servitude, involuntary sexual servitude of a minor, or trafficking in persons for forced labor or services and whether the property or interest is subject to forfeiture under this Section. In order to make that determination, prior to entering any such order, the court shall conduct a hearing without a jury, in which the People shall establish that there is: (i) probable cause that the person or persons so charged have committed the offense of involuntary servitude, involuntary sexual servitude of a minor, or trafficking in persons for forced labor or services and (ii) probable cause that any property or interest may be subject to forfeiture under this Section. The hearing may be conducted simultaneously with a preliminary hearing, if the prosecution is commenced by information or complaint, or by motion of the People, at any stage in the proceedings. The court may accept a finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing following the filing of an information charging the offense of involuntary servitude, involuntary sexual servitude of a minor, or trafficking in persons for forced labor or services or the return of an indictment by a grand jury charging the offense of involuntary servitude, involuntary sexual servitude of a minor, or trafficking in persons for forced labor or services as sufficient evidence of probable cause as provided in item (i) of this paragraph. Upon the a finding, the circuit court shall enter the restraining order, injunction, or prohibition, or shall take such other action in connection with any such property or other interest subject to forfeiture, as is necessary to ensure that the property is not removed from the jurisdiction of the court, concealed, destroyed, or otherwise disposed of by the owner of that property or interest prior to a forfeiture hearing under this Section. The Attorney General or State's Attorney shall file a certified copy of the restraining order, injunction, or other prohibition with the recorder or registrar of titles of each county where any such property of the defendant may be located. No such injunction, restraining order, or other prohibition shall affect the rights of any bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, judgment creditor, or other lien holder arising prior to the date of that filing. At any time, upon verified petition by the defendant or an innocent owner or innocent bona fide third party lien holder who neither had knowledge of, nor consented to, the illegal act or omission, the court may conduct a hearing to release all or portions of any such property or interest that the court previously determined to be subject to forfeiture or subject to any restraining order, injunction, or prohibition or other action. The court may release that property to the defendant or innocent owner or innocent bona fide third party lien holder who neither had knowledge of nor consented to the illegal act or omission for good cause shown and within the sound discretion of the court.

Upon conviction of a person of involuntary servitude, involuntary sexual servitude of a minor, or trafficking in persons for forced labor or services, the court shall authorize the Attorney General to seize all property or other interest declared forfeited under this Section upon terms and conditions the court deems proper.

All moneys forfeited and the sale proceeds of all other property forfeited and seized under this Section shall be distributed as follows:

(1) one-half shall be divided equally between all State agencies and units of local government whose officers or employees conducted the investigation that resulted in the forfeiture; and

(2) one-half shall be deposited into the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund and targeted to services for victims of the offenses of involuntary servitude, involuntary sexual servitude of a minor, and trafficking in persons for forced labor or services.

(720 ILCS 5/11-9.3)

Sec. 11-9.3. Presence within school zone by child sex offenders prohibited.

(a) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly be present in any school building, on real property comprising any school, or in any conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school or a school related activity when persons under the age of 18 are present in the building, on the grounds or in the conveyance, unless the offender is a parent or guardian of a student attending the school and the parent or guardian is: (i) attending a conference at the school with school personnel to discuss the progress of his or her child academically or socially, (ii) participating in child review conferences in which evaluation and placement decisions may be made with respect to his or her child regarding special education services, or (iii) attending conferences to discuss other student issues concerning his or her child such as retention and promotion and notifies the principal of the school of his or her presence at the school or unless the offender has permission to be present from the superintendent or the school board or in the case of a private school from the principal. In the case of a public school, if permission is granted, the superintendent or school board president must inform the principal of the school where the sex offender will be present. Notification includes the nature of the sex offender's visit and the hours in which the sex offender will be present in the school. The sex offender is responsible for notifying the principal's office when he or she arrives on school property and when he or she departs from school property. If the sex offender is to be present in the vicinity of children, the sex offender has the duty to remain under the direct supervision of a school official. A child sex offender who violates this provision is guilty of a Class 4 felony.

(a-5) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly be present within 100 feet of a site posted as a pick-up or discharge stop for a conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school or a school related activity when one or more persons under the age of 18 are present at the site.

(b) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly loiter within 500 feet of a school building or real property comprising any school while persons under the age of 18 are present in the building or on the grounds, unless the offender is a parent or guardian of a student attending the school and the parent or guardian is: (i) attending a conference at the school with school personnel to discuss the progress of his or her child academically or socially, (ii) participating in child review conferences in which evaluation and placement decisions may be made with respect to his or her child regarding special education services, or (iii) attending conferences to discuss other student issues concerning his or her child such as retention and promotion and notifies the principal of the school of his or her presence at the school or has permission to be present from the superintendent or the school board or in the case of a private school from the principal. In the case of a public school, if permission is granted, the superintendent or school board president must inform the principal of the school where the sex offender will be present. Notification includes the nature of the sex offender's visit and the hours in which the sex offender will be present in the school. The sex offender is responsible for notifying the principal's office when he or she arrives on school property and when he or she departs from school property. If the sex offender is to be present in the vicinity of children, the sex offender has the duty to remain under the direct supervision of a school official. A child sex offender who violates this provision is guilty of a Class 4 felony.

(b-5) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly reside within 500 feet of a school building or the real property comprising any school that persons under the age of 18 attend. Nothing in this subsection (b-5) prohibits a child sex offender from residing within 500 feet of a school building or the real property comprising any school that persons under 18 attend if the property is owned by the child sex offender and was purchased before the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 91st General Assembly.

(c) Definitions. In this Section:

(1) "Child sex offender" means any person who:

(i) has been charged under Illinois law, or any substantially similar federal law or law of another state, with a sex offense set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection (c) or the attempt to commit an included sex offense, and:

(A) is convicted of such offense or an attempt to commit such offense; or

(B) is found not guilty by reason of insanity of such offense or an attempt to commit such offense; or

(C) is found not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to subsection (c) of Section 104-25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 of such offense or an attempt to commit such offense; or

(D) is the subject of a finding not resulting in an acquittal at a hearing conducted pursuant to subsection (a) of Section 104-25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 for the alleged commission or attempted commission of such offense; or

(E) is found not guilty by reason of insanity following a hearing conducted pursuant to a federal law or the law of another state substantially similar to subsection (c) of Section 104-25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 of such offense or of the attempted commission of such offense; or

(F) is the subject of a finding not resulting in an acquittal at a hearing conducted pursuant to a federal law or the law of another state substantially similar to subsection (a) of Section 104-25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 for the alleged violation or attempted commission of such offense; or

(ii) is certified as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, or any substantially similar federal law or the law of another state, when any conduct giving rise to such certification is committed or attempted against a person less than 18 years of age; or

(iii) is subject to the provisions of Section 2 of the Interstate Agreements on Sexually Dangerous Persons Act.

Convictions that result from or are connected with the same act, or result from offenses committed at the same time, shall be counted for the purpose of this Section as one conviction. Any conviction set aside pursuant to law is not a conviction for purposes of this Section.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2.5), "sex offense" means:

(i) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961: 10-7 (aiding or and abetting child abduction under Section 10-5(b)(10)), 10-5(b)(10) (child luring), 11-6 (indecent solicitation of a child), 11-6.5 (indecent solicitation of an adult), 11-9 (public indecency when committed in a school, on the real property comprising a school, or on a conveyance, owned, leased, or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school or a school related activity), 11-9.1 (sexual exploitation of a child), 11-15.1 (soliciting for a juvenile prostitute), 11-17.1 (keeping a place of juvenile prostitution), 11-18.1 (patronizing a juvenile prostitute), 11-19.1 (juvenile pimping), 11-19.2 (exploitation of a child), 11-20.1 (child pornography), 11-20.3 (aggravated child pornography), 11-21 (harmful material), 12-14.1 (predatory criminal sexual assault of a child), 12-33 (ritualized abuse of a child), 11-20 (obscenity) (when that offense was committed in any school, on real property comprising any school, in any conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school or a school related activity). An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(ii) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim is a person under 18 years of age: 12-13 (criminal sexual assault), 12-14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault), 12-15 (criminal sexual abuse), 12-16 (aggravated criminal sexual abuse). An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(iii) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim is a person under 18 years of age and the defendant is not a parent of the victim:

10-1 (kidnapping),

10-2 (aggravated kidnapping),

10-3 (unlawful restraint),

10-3.1 (aggravated unlawful restraint).

An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(iv) A violation of any former law of this State substantially equivalent to any offense listed in clause (2)(i) of subsection (c) of this Section.

(2.5) For the purposes of subsection (b-5) only, a sex offense means:

(i) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961:

10-5(b)(10) (child luring), 10-7 (aiding or and abetting child abduction under Section 10-5(b)(10)), 11-6 (indecent solicitation of a child), 11-6.5 (indecent solicitation of an adult), 11-15.1 (soliciting for a juvenile prostitute), 11-17.1 (keeping a place of juvenile prostitution), 11-18.1 (patronizing a juvenile prostitute), 11-19.1 (juvenile pimping), 11-19.2 (exploitation of a child), 11-20.1 (child pornography), 11-20.3 (aggravated child pornography), 12-14.1 (predatory criminal sexual assault of a child), or 12-33 (ritualized abuse of a child). An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(ii) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim is a person under 18 years of age: 12-13 (criminal sexual assault), 12-14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault), 12-16 (aggravated criminal sexual abuse), and subsection (a) of Section 12-15 (criminal sexual abuse). An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(iii) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim is a person under 18 years of age and the defendant is not a parent of the victim:

10-1 (kidnapping),

10-2 (aggravated kidnapping),

10-3 (unlawful restraint),

10-3.1 (aggravated unlawful restraint).

An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(iv) A violation of any former law of this State substantially equivalent to any offense listed in this paragraph (2.5) of this subsection.

(3) A conviction for an offense of federal law or the law of another state that is substantially equivalent to any offense listed in paragraph (2) of subsection (c) of this Section shall constitute a conviction for the purpose of this Article. A finding or adjudication as a sexually dangerous person under any federal law or law of another state that is substantially equivalent to the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act shall constitute an adjudication for the purposes of this Section.

(4) "School" means a public or private pre-school, elementary, or secondary school.

(5) "Loiter" means:

(i) Standing, sitting idly, whether or not the person is in a vehicle or remaining in or around school property.

(ii) Standing, sitting idly, whether or not the person is in a vehicle or remaining in or around school property, for the purpose of committing or attempting to commit a sex offense.

(iii) Entering or remaining in a building in or around school property, other than the offender's residence.

(6) "School official" means the principal, a teacher, or any other certified employee of the school, the superintendent of schools or a member of the school board.

(c-5) For the purposes of this Section, the 500 feet distance shall be measured from the edge of the property of the school building or the real property comprising the school that is closest to the edge of the property of the child sex offender's residence or where he or she is loitering.

(d) Sentence. A person who violates this Section is guilty of a Class 4 felony.

(Source: P.A. 94-158, eff. 7-11-05; 94-164, eff. 1-1-06; 94-170, eff. 7-11-05; 95-331, eff. 8-21-07; 95-440, eff. 8-27-07; 95-640, eff. 6-1-08; 95-819, eff. 1-1-09; 95-876, eff. 8-21-08; revised 9-23-08.)

(720 ILCS 5/11-9.4)

(Text of Section before amendment by P.A. 95-983)

Sec. 11-9.4. Approaching, contacting, residing, or communicating with a child within certain places by child sex offenders prohibited.

(a) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly be present in any public park building or on real property comprising any public park when persons under the age of 18 are present in the building or on the grounds and to approach, contact, or communicate with a child under 18 years of age, unless the offender is a parent or guardian of a person under 18 years of age present in the building or on the grounds.

(b) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly loiter on a public way within 500 feet of a public park building or real property comprising any public park while persons under the age of 18 are present in the building or on the grounds and to approach, contact, or communicate with a child under 18 years of age, unless the offender is a parent or guardian of a person under 18 years of age present in the building or on the grounds.

(b-5) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly reside within 500 feet of a playground, child care institution, day care center, part day child care facility, day care home, group day care home, or a facility providing programs or services exclusively directed toward persons under 18 years of age. Nothing in this subsection (b-5) prohibits a child sex offender from residing within 500 feet of a playground or a facility providing programs or services exclusively directed toward persons under 18 years of age if the property is owned by the child sex offender and was purchased before the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 91st General Assembly. Nothing in this subsection (b-5) prohibits a child sex offender from residing within 500 feet of a child care institution, day care center, or part day child care facility if the property is owned by the child sex offender and was purchased before the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly. Nothing in this subsection (b-5) prohibits a child sex offender from residing within 500 feet of a day care home or group day care home if the property is owned by the child sex offender and was purchased before August 14, 2008 (the effective date of Public Act 95-821) this amendatory Act of the 95th General Assembly.

(b-6) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly reside within 500 feet of the victim of the sex offense. Nothing in this subsection (b-6) prohibits a child sex offender from residing within 500 feet of the victim if the property in which the child sex offender resides is owned by the child sex offender and was purchased before the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 92nd General Assembly.

This subsection (b-6) does not apply if the victim of the sex offense is 21 years of age or older.

(c) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly operate, manage, be employed by, volunteer at, be associated with, or knowingly be present at any: (i) facility providing programs or services exclusively directed towards persons under the age of 18; (ii) day care center; (iii) part day child care facility; (iv) child care institution; (v) school providing before and after school programs for children under 18 years of age; (vi) day care home; or (vii) group day care home. This does not prohibit a child sex offender from owning the real property upon which the programs or services are offered or upon which the day care center, part day child care facility, child care institution, or school providing before and after school programs for children under 18 years of age is located, provided the child sex offender refrains from being present on the premises for the hours during which: (1) the programs or services are being offered or (2) the day care center, part day child care facility, child care institution, school providing before and after school programs for children under 18 years of age, day care home, or group day care home is operated.

(c-5) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly operate, manage, be employed by, or be associated with any county fair when persons under the age of 18 are present.

(c-6) It is unlawful for a child sex offender who owns and resides at residential real estate to knowingly rent any residential unit within the same building in which he or she resides to a person who is the parent or guardian of a child or children under 18 years of age. This subsection shall apply only to leases or other rental arrangements entered into after January 1, 2009 (the effective date of Public Act 95-820) this amendatory Act of the 95th General Assembly.

(c-7) (c-6) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly offer or provide any programs or services to persons under 18 years of age in his or her residence or the residence of another or in any facility for the purpose of offering or providing such programs or services, whether such programs or services are offered or provided by contract, agreement, arrangement, or on a volunteer basis.

(d) Definitions. In this Section:

(1) "Child sex offender" means any person who:

(i) has been charged under Illinois law, or any substantially similar federal law or law of another state, with a sex offense set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection (d) or the attempt to commit an included sex offense, and:

(A) is convicted of such offense or an attempt to commit such offense; or

(B) is found not guilty by reason of insanity of such offense or an attempt to commit such offense; or

(C) is found not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to subsection (c) of Section 104-25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 of such offense or an attempt to commit such offense; or

(D) is the subject of a finding not resulting in an acquittal at a hearing conducted pursuant to subsection (a) of Section 104-25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 for the alleged commission or attempted commission of such offense; or

(E) is found not guilty by reason of insanity following a hearing conducted pursuant to a federal law or the law of another state substantially similar to subsection (c) of Section 104-25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 of such offense or of the attempted commission of such offense; or

(F) is the subject of a finding not resulting in an acquittal at a hearing conducted pursuant to a federal law or the law of another state substantially similar to subsection (a) of Section 104-25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 for the alleged violation or attempted commission of such offense; or

(ii) is certified as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, or any substantially similar federal law or the law of another state, when any conduct giving rise to such certification is committed or attempted against a person less than 18 years of age; or

(iii) is subject to the provisions of Section 2 of the Interstate Agreements on Sexually Dangerous Persons Act.

Convictions that result from or are connected with the same act, or result from offenses committed at the same time, shall be counted for the purpose of this Section as one conviction. Any conviction set aside pursuant to law is not a conviction for purposes of this Section.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2.5), "sex offense" means:

(i) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961: 10-7 (aiding or and abetting child abduction under Section 10-5(b)(10)), 10-5(b)(10) (child luring), 11-6 (indecent solicitation of a child), 11-6.5 (indecent solicitation of an adult), 11-9 (public indecency when committed in a school, on the real property comprising a school, on a conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school or a school related activity, or in a public park), 11-9.1 (sexual exploitation of a child), 11-15.1 (soliciting for a juvenile prostitute), 11-17.1 (keeping a place of juvenile prostitution), 11-18.1 (patronizing a juvenile prostitute), 11-19.1 (juvenile pimping), 11-19.2 (exploitation of a child), 11-20.1 (child pornography), 11-20.3 (aggravated child pornography), 11-21 (harmful material), 12-14.1 (predatory criminal sexual assault of a child), 12-33 (ritualized abuse of a child), 11-20 (obscenity) (when that offense was committed in any school, on real property comprising any school, on any conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school or a school related activity, or in a public park). An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(ii) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim is a person under 18 years of age: 12-13 (criminal sexual assault), 12-14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault), 12-15 (criminal sexual abuse), 12-16 (aggravated criminal sexual abuse). An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(iii) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim is a person under 18 years of age and the defendant is not a parent of the victim:

10-1 (kidnapping),

10-2 (aggravated kidnapping),

10-3 (unlawful restraint),

10-3.1 (aggravated unlawful restraint).

An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(iv) A violation of any former law of this State substantially equivalent to any offense listed in clause (2)(i) of this subsection (d).

(2.5) For the purposes of subsection (b-5) only, a sex offense means:

(i) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961:

10-5(b)(10) (child luring), 10-7 (aiding or and abetting child abduction under Section 10-5(b)(10)), 11-6 (indecent solicitation of a child), 11-6.5 (indecent solicitation of an adult), 11-15.1 (soliciting for a juvenile prostitute), 11-17.1 (keeping a place of juvenile prostitution), 11-18.1 (patronizing a juvenile prostitute), 11-19.1 (juvenile pimping), 11-19.2 (exploitation of a child), 11-20.1 (child pornography), 11-20.3 (aggravated child pornography), 12-14.1 (predatory criminal sexual assault of a child), or 12-33 (ritualized abuse of a child). An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(ii) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim is a person under 18 years of age: 12-13 (criminal sexual assault), 12-14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault), 12-16 (aggravated criminal sexual abuse), and subsection (a) of Section 12-15 (criminal sexual abuse). An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(iii) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim is a person under 18 years of age and the defendant is not a parent of the victim:

10-1 (kidnapping),

10-2 (aggravated kidnapping),

10-3 (unlawful restraint),

10-3.1 (aggravated unlawful restraint).

An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(iv) A violation of any former law of this State substantially equivalent to any offense listed in this paragraph (2.5) of this subsection.

(3) A conviction for an offense of federal law or the law of another state that is substantially equivalent to any offense listed in paragraph (2) of this subsection (d) shall constitute a conviction for the purpose of this Section. A finding or adjudication as a sexually dangerous person under any federal law or law of another state that is substantially equivalent to the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act shall constitute an adjudication for the purposes of this Section.

(4) "Public park" includes a park, forest preserve, or conservation area under the jurisdiction of the State or a unit of local government.

(5) "Facility providing programs or services directed towards persons under the age of 18" means any facility providing programs or services exclusively directed towards persons under the age of 18.

(6) "Loiter" means:

(i) Standing, sitting idly, whether or not the person is in a vehicle or remaining in or around public park property.

(ii) Standing, sitting idly, whether or not the person is in a vehicle or remaining in or around public park property, for the purpose of committing or attempting to commit a sex offense.

(7) "Playground" means a piece of land owned or controlled by a unit of local government that is designated by the unit of local government for use solely or primarily for children's recreation.

(8) "Child care institution" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2.06 of the Child Care Act of 1969.

(9) "Day care center" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2.09 of the Child Care Act of 1969.

(10) "Part day child care facility" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2.10 of the Child Care Act of 1969.

(11) "Day care home" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2.18 of the Child Care Act of 1969.

(12) "Group day care home" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2.20 of the Child Care Act of 1969.

(d-5) For the purposes of this Section, the 500 feet distance shall be measured from the edge of the property comprising the public park building or the real property comprising the public park, playground, child care institution, day care center, part day child care facility, or a facility providing programs or services exclusively directed toward persons under 18 years of age, or a victim of the sex offense who is under 21 years of age to the edge of the child sex offender's place of residence or where he or she is loitering.

(e) Sentence. A person who violates this Section is guilty of a Class 4 felony.

(Source: P.A. 94-925, eff. 6-26-06; 95-32, eff. 1-1-08; 95-640, eff. 6-1-08; 95-819, eff. 1-1-09; 95-820, eff. 1-1-09; 95-821, eff. 8-14-08; 95-876, eff. 8-21-08; revised 10-20-08.)

(Text of Section after amendment by P.A. 95-983)

Sec. 11-9.4. Approaching, contacting, residing, or communicating with a child within certain places by child sex offenders prohibited.

(a) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly be present in any public park building or on real property comprising any public park when persons under the age of 18 are present in the building or on the grounds and to approach, contact, or communicate with a child under 18 years of age, unless the offender is a parent or guardian of a person under 18 years of age present in the building or on the grounds.

(b) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly loiter on a public way within 500 feet of a public park building or real property comprising any public park while persons under the age of 18 are present in the building or on the grounds and to approach, contact, or communicate with a child under 18 years of age, unless the offender is a parent or guardian of a person under 18 years of age present in the building or on the grounds.

(b-5) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly reside within 500 feet of a playground, child care institution, day care center, part day child care facility, day care home, group day care home, or a facility providing programs or services exclusively directed toward persons under 18 years of age. Nothing in this subsection (b-5) prohibits a child sex offender from residing within 500 feet of a playground or a facility providing programs or services exclusively directed toward persons under 18 years of age if the property is owned by the child sex offender and was purchased before the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 91st General Assembly. Nothing in this subsection (b-5) prohibits a child sex offender from residing within 500 feet of a child care institution, day care center, or part day child care facility if the property is owned by the child sex offender and was purchased before the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly. Nothing in this subsection (b-5) prohibits a child sex offender from residing within 500 feet of a day care home or group day care home if the property is owned by the child sex offender and was purchased before August 14, 2008 (the effective date of Public Act 95-821) this amendatory Act of the 95th General Assembly.

(b-6) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly reside within 500 feet of the victim of the sex offense. Nothing in this subsection (b-6) prohibits a child sex offender from residing within 500 feet of the victim if the property in which the child sex offender resides is owned by the child sex offender and was purchased before the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 92nd General Assembly.

This subsection (b-6) does not apply if the victim of the sex offense is 21 years of age or older.

(b-7) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly communicate, other than for a lawful purpose under Illinois law, using the Internet or any other digital media, with a person under 18 years of age or with a person whom he or she believes to be a person under 18 years of age, unless the offender is a parent or guardian of the person under 18 years of age.

(c) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly operate, manage, be employed by, volunteer at, be associated with, or knowingly be present at any: (i) facility providing programs or services exclusively directed towards persons under the age of 18; (ii) day care center; (iii) part day child care facility; (iv) child care institution; (v) school providing before and after school programs for children under 18 years of age; (vi) day care home; or (vii) group day care home. This does not prohibit a child sex offender from owning the real property upon which the programs or services are offered or upon which the day care center, part day child care facility, child care institution, or school providing before and after school programs for children under 18 years of age is located, provided the child sex offender refrains from being present on the premises for the hours during which: (1) the programs or services are being offered or (2) the day care center, part day child care facility, child care institution, school providing before and after school programs for children under 18 years of age, day care home, or group day care home is operated.

(c-5) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly operate, manage, be employed by, or be associated with any county fair when persons under the age of 18 are present.

(c-6) It is unlawful for a child sex offender who owns and resides at residential real estate to knowingly rent any residential unit within the same building in which he or she resides to a person who is the parent or guardian of a child or children under 18 years of age. This subsection shall apply only to leases or other rental arrangements entered into after January 1, 2009 (the effective date of Public Act 95-820) this amendatory Act of the 95th General Assembly.

(c-7) (c-6) It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly offer or provide any programs or services to persons under 18 years of age in his or her residence or the residence of another or in any facility for the purpose of offering or providing such programs or services, whether such programs or services are offered or provided by contract, agreement, arrangement, or on a volunteer basis.

(d) Definitions. In this Section:

(1) "Child sex offender" means any person who:

(i) has been charged under Illinois law, or any substantially similar federal law or law of another state, with a sex offense set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection (d) or the attempt to commit an included sex offense, and:

(A) is convicted of such offense or an attempt to commit such offense; or

(B) is found not guilty by reason of insanity of such offense or an attempt to commit such offense; or

(C) is found not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to subsection (c) of Section 104-25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 of such offense or an attempt to commit such offense; or

(D) is the subject of a finding not resulting in an acquittal at a hearing conducted pursuant to subsection (a) of Section 104-25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 for the alleged commission or attempted commission of such offense; or

(E) is found not guilty by reason of insanity following a hearing conducted pursuant to a federal law or the law of another state substantially similar to subsection (c) of Section 104-25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 of such offense or of the attempted commission of such offense; or

(F) is the subject of a finding not resulting in an acquittal at a hearing conducted pursuant to a federal law or the law of another state substantially similar to subsection (a) of Section 104-25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 for the alleged violation or attempted commission of such offense; or

(ii) is certified as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, or any substantially similar federal law or the law of another state, when any conduct giving rise to such certification is committed or attempted against a person less than 18 years of age; or

(iii) is subject to the provisions of Section 2 of the Interstate Agreements on Sexually Dangerous Persons Act.

Convictions that result from or are connected with the same act, or result from offenses committed at the same time, shall be counted for the purpose of this Section as one conviction. Any conviction set aside pursuant to law is not a conviction for purposes of this Section.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2.5), "sex offense" means:

(i) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961: 10-7 (aiding or and abetting child abduction under Section 10-5(b)(10)), 10-5(b)(10) (child luring), 11-6 (indecent solicitation of a child), 11-6.5 (indecent solicitation of an adult), 11-9 (public indecency when committed in a school, on the real property comprising a school, on a conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school or a school related activity, or in a public park), 11-9.1 (sexual exploitation of a child), 11-15.1 (soliciting for a juvenile prostitute), 11-17.1 (keeping a place of juvenile prostitution), 11-18.1 (patronizing a juvenile prostitute), 11-19.1 (juvenile pimping), 11-19.2 (exploitation of a child), 11-20.1 (child pornography), 11-20.3 (aggravated child pornography), 11-21 (harmful material), 12-14.1 (predatory criminal sexual assault of a child), 12-33 (ritualized abuse of a child), 11-20 (obscenity) (when that offense was committed in any school, on real property comprising any school, on any conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school or a school related activity, or in a public park). An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(ii) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim is a person under 18 years of age: 12-13 (criminal sexual assault), 12-14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault), 12-15 (criminal sexual abuse), 12-16 (aggravated criminal sexual abuse). An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(iii) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim is a person under 18 years of age and the defendant is not a parent of the victim:

10-1 (kidnapping),

10-2 (aggravated kidnapping),

10-3 (unlawful restraint),

10-3.1 (aggravated unlawful restraint).

An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(iv) A violation of any former law of this State substantially equivalent to any offense listed in clause (2)(i) of this subsection (d).

(2.5) For the purposes of subsection (b-5) only, a sex offense means:

(i) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961:

10-5(b)(10) (child luring), 10-7 (aiding or and abetting child abduction under Section 10-5(b)(10)), 11-6 (indecent solicitation of a child), 11-6.5 (indecent solicitation of an adult), 11-15.1 (soliciting for a juvenile prostitute), 11-17.1 (keeping a place of juvenile prostitution), 11-18.1 (patronizing a juvenile prostitute), 11-19.1 (juvenile pimping), 11-19.2 (exploitation of a child), 11-20.1 (child pornography), 11-20.3 (aggravated child pornography), 12-14.1 (predatory criminal sexual assault of a child), or 12-33 (ritualized abuse of a child). An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(ii) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim is a person under 18 years of age: 12-13 (criminal sexual assault), 12-14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault), 12-16 (aggravated criminal sexual abuse), and subsection (a) of Section 12-15 (criminal sexual abuse). An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(iii) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim is a person under 18 years of age and the defendant is not a parent of the victim:

10-1 (kidnapping),

10-2 (aggravated kidnapping),

10-3 (unlawful restraint),

10-3.1 (aggravated unlawful restraint).

An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(iv) A violation of any former law of this State substantially equivalent to any offense listed in this paragraph (2.5) of this subsection.

(3) A conviction for an offense of federal law or the law of another state that is substantially equivalent to any offense listed in paragraph (2) of this subsection (d) shall constitute a conviction for the purpose of this Section. A finding or adjudication as a sexually dangerous person under any federal law or law of another state that is substantially equivalent to the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act shall constitute an adjudication for the purposes of this Section.

(4) "Public park" includes a park, forest preserve, or conservation area under the jurisdiction of the State or a unit of local government.

(5) "Facility providing programs or services directed towards persons under the age of 18" means any facility providing programs or services exclusively directed towards persons under the age of 18.

(6) "Loiter" means:

(i) Standing, sitting idly, whether or not the person is in a vehicle or remaining in or around public park property.

(ii) Standing, sitting idly, whether or not the person is in a vehicle or remaining in or around public park property, for the purpose of committing or attempting to commit a sex offense.

(7) "Playground" means a piece of land owned or controlled by a unit of local government that is designated by the unit of local government for use solely or primarily for children's recreation.

(8) "Child care institution" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2.06 of the Child Care Act of 1969.

(9) "Day care center" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2.09 of the Child Care Act of 1969.

(10) "Part day child care facility" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2.10 of the Child Care Act of 1969.

(11) "Day care home" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2.18 of the Child Care Act of 1969.

(12) "Group day care home" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2.20 of the Child Care Act of 1969.

(13) (11) "Internet" means an interactive computer service or system or an information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, and includes, but is not limited to, an information service, system, or access software provider that provides access to a network system commonly known as the Internet, or any comparable system or service and also includes, but is not limited to, a World Wide Web page, newsgroup, message board, mailing list, or chat area on any interactive computer service or system or other online service.

(d-5) For the purposes of this Section, the 500 feet distance shall be measured from the edge of the property comprising the public park building or the real property comprising the public park, playground, child care institution, day care center, part day child care facility, or a facility providing programs or services exclusively directed toward persons under 18 years of age, or a victim of the sex offense who is under 21 years of age to the edge of the child sex offender's place of residence or where he or she is loitering.

(e) Sentence. A person who violates this Section is guilty of a Class 4 felony.

(Source: P.A. 94-925, eff. 6-26-06; 95-32, eff. 1-1-08; 95-640, eff. 6-1-08; 95-819, eff. 1-1-09; 95-820, eff. 1-1-09; 95-821, eff. 8-14-08; 95-876, eff. 8-21-08; 95-983, eff. 6-1-09; revised 10-20-08.)

(720 ILCS 5/25-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 25-1)

Sec. 25-1. Mob action.

(a) A person commits the offense of mob Mob action when he or she engages in consists of any of the following:

(1) the knowing or reckless The use of force or violence disturbing the public peace by 2 or more persons acting together and without authority of law; or

(2) the knowing The assembly of 2 or more persons with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony or misdemeanor to do an unlawful act; or

(3) the knowing The assembly of 2 or more persons, without authority of law, for the purpose of doing violence to the person or property of anyone any one supposed to have been guilty of a violation of the law, or for the purpose of exercising correctional powers or regulative powers over any person by violence.

(b) Mob action as defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) is a Class 4 felony.

(c) Mob action as defined in paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (a) is a Class C misdemeanor.

(d) Any participant in a mob action that which shall by violence inflicts inflict injury to the person or property of another commits a Class 4 felony.

(e) Any participant in a mob action who does not withdraw on being commanded to do so by any peace officer commits a Class A misdemeanor.

(f) In addition to any other sentence that may be imposed, a court shall order any person convicted of mob action to perform community service for not less than 30 and not more than 120 hours, if community service is available in the jurisdiction and is funded and approved by the county board of the county where the offense was committed. In addition, whenever any person is placed on supervision for an alleged offense under this Section, the supervision shall be conditioned upon the performance of the community service.

This subsection does not apply when the court imposes a sentence of incarceration.

(Source: P.A. 88-558, eff. 1-1-95; 89-8, eff. 3-21-95.)

(720 ILCS 5/25-4 new)

Sec. 25-4. Looting by individuals.

(a) A person commits the offense of looting when he or she knowingly without authority of law or the owner enters any home or dwelling or upon any premises of another, or enters any commercial, mercantile, business, or industrial building, plant, or establishment, in which normal security of property is not present by virtue of a hurricane, fire, or vis major of any kind or by virtue of a riot, mob, or other human agency, and obtains or exerts control over property of the owner.

(b) Sentence. Looting is a Class 4 felony. In addition to any other penalty imposed, the court shall impose a sentence of at least 100 hours of community service as determined by the court and shall require the defendant to make restitution to the owner of the property looted pursuant to Section 5-5-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections.

(720 ILCS 5/25-5) (was 720 ILCS 5/25-1.1)

Sec. 25-5 25-1.1. Unlawful contact with streetgang members.

(a) A person commits the offense of unlawful contact with streetgang members when:

(1) he He or she knowingly has direct or indirect contact with a streetgang member as defined in Section 10 of the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act after having been sentenced to probation, conditional discharge, or supervision for a criminal offense with a condition of that such sentence being to refrain from direct or indirect contact with a streetgang member or members; or

(2) he He or she knowingly has direct or indirect contact with a streetgang member as defined in Section 10 of the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act after having been released on bond for any criminal offense with a condition of that such bond being to refrain from direct or indirect contact with a streetgang member or members.

(b) Unlawful contact with streetgang members is a Class A misdemeanor.

(c) This Section does not apply to a person when the only streetgang member or members he or she is with is a family or household member or members as defined in paragraph (3) of Section 112A-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 and the streetgang members are not engaged in any streetgang-related streetgang related activity.

(Source: P.A. 90-795, eff. 8-14-98; 91-357, eff. 7-29-99.)

(720 ILCS 5/25-6) (was 720 ILCS 5/25-2)

Sec. 25-6 25-2. Removal of chief of police or sheriff for allowing a person in his or her custody to be lynched.

(a) If a prisoner is taken from the custody of any policeman or chief of police of any municipality city, town or village and lynched, it shall be prima facie evidence of wrong-doing on the part of that such chief of police and he or she shall be suspended. The mayor or chief executive of the municipality such city, town or village shall appoint an acting chief of police until he or she has ascertained whether the suspended chief of police had has done all in his or her power to protect the life of the prisoner. If, upon hearing all evidence and argument, the mayor or chief executive finds that the chief of police had has done his or her utmost to protect the prisoner, he or she may reinstate the chief of police; but, if he or she finds the chief of police guilty of not properly protecting the prisoner, a new chief of police shall be appointed. Any chief of police replaced is shall not be eligible to serve again in that such office.

(b) If a prisoner is taken from the custody of any sheriff or his or her deputy and lynched, it is shall be prima facie evidence of wrong-doing on the part of that such sheriff and he or she shall be suspended. The Governor governor shall appoint an acting sheriff until he or she has ascertained whether the suspended sheriff had has done all in his or her power to protect the life of the prisoner. If, upon hearing all evidence and argument, the Governor governor finds that the sheriff had has done his or her utmost to protect the prisoner, he or she shall reinstate the sheriff; but, if he or she finds the sheriff guilty of not properly protecting the prisoner, a new sheriff shall be duly elected or appointed, pursuant to the existing law provided for the filling of vacancies in that such office. Any sheriff replaced is shall not be eligible to serve again in that such office.

(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/29B-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 29B-1)

Sec. 29B-1. (a) A person commits the offense of money laundering:

(1) when, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, he or she conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves criminally derived property:

(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of the unlawful activity from which the criminally derived property was obtained; or

(B) where he or she knows or reasonably should know that the financial transaction is designed in whole or in part:

(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership or the control of the criminally derived property; or

(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State law; or

(1.5) when he or she transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument:

(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of the unlawful activity from which the criminally derived property was obtained; or

(B) knowing, or having reason to know, that the financial transaction is designed in whole or in part:

(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership or the control of the criminally derived property; or

(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State law; or

(2) when, with the intent to:

(A) promote the carrying on of a specified criminal activity as defined in this Article; or

(B) conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of property believed to be the proceeds of a specified criminal activity as defined by subdivision (b)(6); or

(C) avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State law,

he or she conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction involving property he or she believes to be the proceeds of specified criminal activity as defined by subdivision (b)(6) or property used to conduct or facilitate specified criminal activity as defined by subdivision (b)(6).

(b) As used in this Section:

(0.5) "Knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity" means that the person knew the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under State, federal, or foreign law, regardless of whether or not such activity is specified in subdivision (b)(4).

(1) "Financial transaction" means a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery or other disposition utilizing criminally derived property, and with respect to financial institutions, includes a deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, loan, extension of credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond, certificate of deposit or other monetary instrument, use of safe deposit box, or any other payment, transfer or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution. For purposes of clause (a)(2) of this Section, the term "financial transaction" also means a transaction which without regard to whether the funds, monetary instruments, or real or personal property involved in the transaction are criminally derived, any transaction which in any way or degree: (1) involves the movement of funds by wire or any other means; (2) involves one or more monetary instruments; or (3) the transfer of title to any real or personal property. The receipt by an attorney of bona fide fees for the purpose of legal representation is not a financial transaction for purposes of this Section.

(2) "Financial institution" means any bank; saving and loan association; trust company; agency or branch of a foreign bank in the United States; currency exchange; credit union, mortgage banking institution; pawnbroker; loan or finance company; operator of a credit card system; issuer, redeemer or cashier of travelers checks, checks or money orders; dealer in precious metals, stones or jewels; broker or dealer in securities or commodities; investment banker; or investment company.

(3) "Monetary instrument" means United States coins and currency; coins and currency of a foreign country; travelers checks; personal checks, bank checks, and money orders; investment securities; bearer negotiable instruments; bearer investment securities; or bearer securities and certificates of stock in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery.

(4) "Criminally derived property" means: (A) any property, real or personal, constituting or derived from proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly, pursuant to a violation of the Criminal Code of 1961, the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, the Cannabis Control Act, or the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act; or (B) any property represented to be property constituting or derived from proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly, pursuant to a violation of this Code, the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, the Cannabis Control Act, or the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act.

(5) "Conduct" or "conducts" includes, in addition to its ordinary meaning, initiating, concluding, or participating in initiating or concluding a transaction.

(6) "Specified criminal activity" means any violation of Section 29D-15.1 20.5-5 (720 ILCS 5/29D-15.1 5/20.5-5) and any violation of Article 29D of this Code.

(7) "Director" means the Director of State Police or his or her designated agents.

(8) "Department" means the Department of State Police of the State of Illinois or its successor agency.

(9) "Transaction reporting requirement under State law" means any violation as defined under the Currency Reporting Act.

(c) Sentence.

(1) Laundering of criminally derived property of a value not exceeding $10,000 is a Class 3 felony;

(2) Laundering of criminally derived property of a value exceeding $10,000 but not exceeding $100,000 is a Class 2 felony;

(3) Laundering of criminally derived property of a value exceeding $100,000 but not exceeding $500,000 is a Class 1 felony;

(4) Money laundering in violation of subsection (a)(2) of this Section is a Class X felony;

(5) Laundering of criminally derived property of a value exceeding $500,000 is a Class 1 non-probationable felony.

(d) Evidence. In a prosecution under this Article, either party may introduce the following evidence pertaining to the issue of whether the property or proceeds were known to be some form of criminally derived property or from some form of unlawful activity:

(1) A financial transaction was conducted or structured or attempted in violation of the reporting requirements of any State or federal law; or

(2) A financial transaction was conducted or attempted with the use of a false or fictitious name or a forged instrument; or

(3) A falsely altered or completed written instrument or a written instrument that contains any materially false personal identifying information was made, used, offered or presented, whether accepted or not, in connection with a financial transaction; or

(4) A financial transaction was structured or attempted to be structured so as to falsely report the actual consideration or value of the transaction; or

(5) A money transmitter, a person engaged in a trade or business or any employee of a money transmitter or a person engaged in a trade or business, knows or reasonably should know that false personal identifying information has been presented and incorporates the false personal identifying information into any report or record; or

(6) The criminally derived property is transported or possessed in a fashion inconsistent with the ordinary or usual means of transportation or possession of such property and where the property is discovered in the absence of any documentation or other indicia of legitimate origin or right to such property; or

(7) A person pays or receives substantially less than face value for one or more monetary instruments; or

(8) A person engages in a transaction involving one or more monetary instruments, where the physical condition or form of the monetary instrument or instruments makes it apparent that they are not the product of bona fide business or financial transactions.

(e) Duty to enforce this Article.

(1) It is the duty of the Department of State Police, and its agents, officers, and investigators, to enforce all provisions of this Article, except those specifically delegated, and to cooperate with all agencies charged with the enforcement of the laws of the United States, or of any state, relating to money laundering. Only an agent, officer, or investigator designated by the Director may be authorized in accordance with this Section to serve seizure notices, warrants, subpoenas, and summonses under the authority of this State.

(2) Any agent, officer, investigator, or peace officer designated by the Director may: (A) make seizure of property pursuant to the provisions of this Article; and (B) perform such other law enforcement duties as the Director designates. It is the duty of all State's Attorneys to prosecute violations of this Article and institute legal proceedings as authorized under this Article.

(f) Protective orders.

(1) Upon application of the State, the court may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any other action to preserve the availability of property described in subsection (h) for forfeiture under this Article:

(A) upon the filing of an indictment, information, or complaint charging a violation of this Article for which forfeiture may be ordered under this Article and alleging that the property with respect to which the order is sought would be subject to forfeiture under this Article; or

(B) prior to the filing of such an indictment, information, or complaint, if, after notice to persons appearing to have an interest in the property and opportunity for a hearing, the court determines that:

(i) there is probable cause to believe that the State will prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order will result in the property being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture; and

(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property through the entry of the requested order outweighs the hardship on any party against whom the order is to be entered.

Provided, however, that an order entered pursuant to subparagraph (B) shall be effective for not more than 90 days, unless extended by the court for good cause shown or unless an indictment, information, complaint, or administrative notice has been filed.

(2) A temporary restraining order under this subsection may be entered upon application of the State without notice or opportunity for a hearing when an indictment, information, complaint, or administrative notice has not yet been filed with respect to the property, if the State demonstrates that there is probable cause to believe that the property with respect to which the order is sought would be subject to forfeiture under this Section and that provision of notice will jeopardize the availability of the property for forfeiture. Such a temporary order shall expire not more than 30 days after the date on which it is entered, unless extended for good cause shown or unless the party against whom it is entered consents to an extension for a longer period. A hearing requested concerning an order entered under this paragraph shall be held at the earliest possible time and prior to the expiration of the temporary order.

(3) The court may receive and consider, at a hearing held pursuant to this subsection (f), evidence and information that would be inadmissible under the Illinois rules of evidence.

(4) Order to repatriate and deposit.

(A) In general. Pursuant to its authority to enter a pretrial restraining order under this Section, the court may order a defendant to repatriate any property that may be seized and forfeited and to deposit that property pending trial with the Illinois State Police or another law enforcement agency designated by the Illinois State Police.

(B) Failure to comply. Failure to comply with an order under this subsection (f) is punishable as a civil or criminal contempt of court.

(g) Warrant of seizure. The State may request the issuance of a warrant authorizing the seizure of property described in subsection (h) in the same manner as provided for a search warrant. If the court determines that there is probable cause to believe that the property to be seized would be subject to forfeiture, the court shall issue a warrant authorizing the seizure of such property.

(h) Forfeiture.

(1) The following are subject to forfeiture:

(A) any property, real or personal, constituting, derived from, or traceable to any proceeds the person obtained directly or indirectly, as a result of a violation of this Article;

(B) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this Article;

(C) all conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in subparagraphs (A) and (B), but:

(i) no conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction of business as a common carrier is subject to forfeiture under this Section unless it appears that the owner or other person in charge of the conveyance is a consenting party or privy to a violation of this Article;

(ii) no conveyance is subject to forfeiture under this Section by reason of any act or omission which the owner proves to have been committed or omitted without his or her knowledge or consent;

(iii) a forfeiture of a conveyance encumbered by a bona fide security interest is subject to the interest of the secured party if he or she neither had knowledge of nor consented to the act or omission;

(D) all real property, including any right, title, and interest (including, but not limited to, any leasehold interest or the beneficial interest in a land trust) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or in any manner to facilitate the commission of, any violation of this Article or that is the proceeds of any violation or act that constitutes a violation of this Article.

(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this Article may be seized by the Director or any peace officer upon process or seizure warrant issued by any court having jurisdiction over the property. Seizure by the Director or any peace officer without process may be made:

(A) if the seizure is incident to a seizure warrant;

(B) if the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the State in a criminal proceeding, or in an injunction or forfeiture proceeding based upon this Article;

(C) if there is probable cause to believe that the property is directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety;

(D) if there is probable cause to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture under this Article and the property is seized under circumstances in which a warrantless seizure or arrest would be reasonable; or

(E) in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.

(3) In the event of seizure pursuant to paragraph (2), forfeiture proceedings shall be instituted in accordance with subsections (i) through (r).

(4) Property taken or detained under this Section shall not be subject to replevin, but is deemed to be in the custody of the Director subject only to the order and judgments of the circuit court having jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceedings and the decisions of the State's Attorney under this Article. When property is seized under this Article, the seizing agency shall promptly conduct an inventory of the seized property and estimate the property's value and shall forward a copy of the inventory of seized property and the estimate of the property's value to the Director. Upon receiving notice of seizure, the Director may:

(A) place the property under seal;

(B) remove the property to a place designated by the Director;

(C) keep the property in the possession of the seizing agency;

(D) remove the property to a storage area for safekeeping or, if the property is a negotiable instrument or money and is not needed for evidentiary purposes, deposit it in an interest bearing account;

(E) place the property under constructive seizure by posting notice of pending forfeiture on it, by giving notice of pending forfeiture to its owners and interest holders, or by filing notice of pending forfeiture in any appropriate public record relating to the property; or

(F) provide for another agency or custodian, including an owner, secured party, or lienholder, to take custody of the property upon the terms and conditions set by the Director.

(5) When property is forfeited under this Article, the Director shall sell all such property unless such property is required by law to be destroyed or is harmful to the public, and shall distribute the proceeds of the sale, together with any moneys forfeited or seized, in accordance with paragraph (6). However, upon the application of the seizing agency or prosecutor who was responsible for the investigation, arrest or arrests and prosecution which lead to the forfeiture, the Director may return any item of forfeited property to the seizing agency or prosecutor for official use in the enforcement of laws, if the agency or prosecutor can demonstrate that the item requested would be useful to the agency or prosecutor in its enforcement efforts. When any real property returned to the seizing agency is sold by the agency or its unit of government, the proceeds of the sale shall be delivered to the Director and distributed in accordance with paragraph (6).

(6) All monies and the sale proceeds of all other property forfeited and seized under this Article shall be distributed as follows:

(A) 65% shall be distributed to the metropolitan enforcement group, local, municipal, county, or State law enforcement agency or agencies which conducted or participated in the investigation resulting in the forfeiture. The distribution shall bear a reasonable relationship to the degree of direct participation of the law enforcement agency in the effort resulting in the forfeiture, taking into account the total value of the property forfeited and the total law enforcement effort with respect to the violation of the law upon which the forfeiture is based. Amounts distributed to the agency or agencies shall be used for the enforcement of laws.

(B)(i) 12.5% shall be distributed to the Office of the State's Attorney of the county in which the prosecution resulting in the forfeiture was instituted, deposited in a special fund in the county treasury and appropriated to the State's Attorney for use in the enforcement of laws. In counties over 3,000,000 population, 25% shall be distributed to the Office of the State's Attorney for use in the enforcement of laws. If the prosecution is undertaken solely by the Attorney General, the portion provided hereunder shall be distributed to the Attorney General for use in the enforcement of laws.

(ii) 12.5% shall be distributed to the Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor and deposited in the Narcotics Profit Forfeiture Fund of that office to be used for additional expenses incurred in the investigation, prosecution and appeal of cases arising under laws. The Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor shall not receive distribution from cases brought in counties with over 3,000,000 population.

(C) 10% shall be retained by the Department of State Police for expenses related to the administration and sale of seized and forfeited property.

(i) Notice to owner or interest holder.

(1) Whenever notice of pending forfeiture or service of an in rem complaint is required under the provisions of this Article, such notice or service shall be given as follows:

(A) If the owner's or interest holder's name and current address are known, then by either personal service or mailing a copy of the notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to that address. For purposes of notice under this Section, if a person has been arrested for the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, then the address provided to the arresting agency at the time of arrest shall be deemed to be that person's known address. Provided, however, if an owner or interest holder's address changes prior to the effective date of the notice of pending forfeiture, the owner or interest holder shall promptly notify the seizing agency of the change in address or, if the owner or interest holder's address changes subsequent to the effective date of the notice of pending forfeiture, the owner or interest holder shall promptly notify the State's Attorney of the change in address; or

(B) If the property seized is a conveyance, to the address reflected in the office of the agency or official in which title or interest to the conveyance is required by law to be recorded, then by mailing a copy of the notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to that address; or

(C) If the owner's or interest holder's address is not known, and is not on record as provided in paragraph (B), then by publication for 3 successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the seizure occurred.

(2) Notice served under this Article is effective upon personal service, the last date of publication, or the mailing of written notice, whichever is earlier.

(j) Notice to State's Attorney. The law enforcement agency seizing property for forfeiture under this Article shall, within 90 days after seizure, notify the State's Attorney for the county, either where an act or omission giving rise to the forfeiture occurred or where the property was seized, of the seizure of the property and the facts and circumstances giving rise to the seizure and shall provide the State's Attorney with the inventory of the property and its estimated value. When the property seized for forfeiture is a vehicle, the law enforcement agency seizing the property shall immediately notify the Secretary of State that forfeiture proceedings are pending regarding such vehicle.

(k) Non-judicial forfeiture. If non-real property that exceeds $20,000 in value excluding the value of any conveyance, or if real property is seized under the provisions of this Article, the State's Attorney shall institute judicial in rem forfeiture proceedings as described in subsection (l) of this Section within 45 days from receipt of notice of seizure from the seizing agency under subsection (j) of this Section. However, if non-real property that does not exceed $20,000 in value excluding the value of any conveyance is seized, the following procedure shall be used:

(1) If, after review of the facts surrounding the seizure, the State's Attorney is of the opinion that the seized property is subject to forfeiture, then within 45 days after the receipt of notice of seizure from the seizing agency, the State's Attorney shall cause notice of pending forfeiture to be given to the owner of the property and all known interest holders of the property in accordance with subsection (i) of this Section.

(2) The notice of pending forfeiture must include a description of the property, the estimated value of the property, the date and place of seizure, the conduct giving rise to forfeiture or the violation of law alleged, and a summary of procedures and procedural rights applicable to the forfeiture action.

(3)(A) Any person claiming an interest in property which is the subject of notice under paragraph (1) of this subsection (k), must, in order to preserve any rights or claims to the property, within 45 days after the effective date of notice as described in subsection (i) of this Section, file a verified claim with the State's Attorney expressing his or her interest in the property. The claim must set forth:

(i) the caption of the proceedings as set forth on the notice of pending forfeiture and the name of the claimant;

(ii) the address at which the claimant will accept mail;

(iii) the nature and extent of the claimant's interest in the property;

(iv) the date, identity of the transferor, and circumstances of the claimant's acquisition of the interest in the property;

(v) the name and address of all other persons known to have an interest in the property;

(vi) the specific provision of law relied on in asserting the property is not subject to forfeiture;

(vii) all essential facts supporting each assertion; and

(viii) the relief sought.

(B) If a claimant files the claim and deposits with the State's Attorney a cost bond, in the form of a cashier's check payable to the clerk of the court, in the sum of 10% of the reasonable value of the property as alleged by the State's Attorney or the sum of $100, whichever is greater, upon condition that, in the case of forfeiture, the claimant must pay all costs and expenses of forfeiture proceedings, then the State's Attorney shall institute judicial in rem forfeiture proceedings and deposit the cost bond with the clerk of the court as described in subsection (l) of this Section within 45 days after receipt of the claim and cost bond. In lieu of a cost bond, a person claiming interest in the seized property may file, under penalty of perjury, an indigency affidavit which has been approved by a circuit court judge.

(C) If none of the seized property is forfeited in the judicial in rem proceeding, the clerk of the court shall return to the claimant, unless the court orders otherwise, 90% of the sum which has been deposited and shall retain as costs 10% of the money deposited. If any of the seized property is forfeited under the judicial forfeiture proceeding, the clerk of the court shall transfer 90% of the sum which has been deposited to the State's Attorney prosecuting the civil forfeiture to be applied to the costs of prosecution and the clerk shall retain as costs 10% of the sum deposited.

(4) If no claim is filed or bond given within the 45 day period as described in paragraph (3) of this subsection (k), the State's Attorney shall declare the property forfeited and shall promptly notify the owner and all known interest holders of the property and the Director of State Police of the declaration of forfeiture and the Director shall dispose of the property in accordance with law.

(l) Judicial in rem procedures. If property seized under the provisions of this Article is non-real property that exceeds $20,000 in value excluding the value of any conveyance, or is real property, or a claimant has filed a claim and a cost bond under paragraph (3) of subsection (k) of this Section, the following judicial in rem procedures shall apply:

(1) If, after a review of the facts surrounding the seizure, the State's Attorney is of the opinion that the seized property is subject to forfeiture, then within 45 days of the receipt of notice of seizure by the seizing agency or the filing of the claim and cost bond, whichever is later, the State's Attorney shall institute judicial forfeiture proceedings by filing a verified complaint for forfeiture and, if the claimant has filed a claim and cost bond, by depositing the cost bond with the clerk of the court. When authorized by law, a forfeiture must be ordered by a court on an action in rem brought by a State's Attorney under a verified complaint for forfeiture.

(2) During the probable cause portion of the judicial in rem proceeding wherein the State presents its case-in-chief, the court must receive and consider, among other things, all relevant hearsay evidence and information. The laws of evidence relating to civil actions apply to all other portions of the judicial in rem proceeding.

(3) Only an owner of or interest holder in the property may file an answer asserting a claim against the property in the action in rem. For purposes of this Section, the owner or interest holder shall be referred to as claimant. Upon motion of the State, the court shall first hold a hearing, wherein any claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she has a lawful, legitimate ownership interest in the property and that it was obtained through a lawful source.

(4) The answer must be signed by the owner or interest holder under penalty of perjury and must set forth:

(A) the caption of the proceedings as set forth on the notice of pending forfeiture and the name of the claimant;

(B) the address at which the claimant will accept mail;

(C) the nature and extent of the claimant's interest in the property;

(D) the date, identity of transferor, and circumstances of the claimant's acquisition of the interest in the property;

(E) the name and address of all other persons known to have an interest in the property;

(F) all essential facts supporting each assertion; and

(G) the precise relief sought.

(5) The answer must be filed with the court within 45 days after service of the civil in rem complaint.

(6) The hearing must be held within 60 days after filing of the answer unless continued for good cause.

(7) The State shall show the existence of probable cause for forfeiture of the property. If the State shows probable cause, the claimant has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant's interest in the property is not subject to forfeiture.

(8) If the State does not show existence of probable cause, the court shall order the interest in the property returned or conveyed to the claimant and shall order all other property forfeited to the State. If the State does show existence of probable cause, the court shall order all property forfeited to the State.

(9) A defendant convicted in any criminal proceeding is precluded from later denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense of which the defendant was convicted in any proceeding under this Article regardless of the pendency of an appeal from that conviction. However, evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible.

(10) An acquittal or dismissal in a criminal proceeding does not preclude civil proceedings under this Article; however, for good cause shown, on a motion by the State's Attorney, the court may stay civil forfeiture proceedings during the criminal trial for a related criminal indictment or information alleging a money laundering violation. Such a stay shall not be available pending an appeal. Property subject to forfeiture under this Article shall not be subject to return or release by a court exercising jurisdiction over a criminal case involving the seizure of such property unless such return or release is consented to by the State's Attorney.

(11) All property declared forfeited under this Article vests in this State on the commission of the conduct giving rise to forfeiture together with the proceeds of the property after that time. Any such property or proceeds subsequently transferred to any person remain subject to forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited.

(12) A civil action under this Article must be commenced within 5 years after the last conduct giving rise to forfeiture became known or should have become known or 5 years after the forfeitable property is discovered, whichever is later, excluding any time during which either the property or claimant is out of the State or in confinement or during which criminal proceedings relating to the same conduct are in progress.

(m) Stay of time periods. If property is seized for evidence and for forfeiture, the time periods for instituting judicial and non-judicial forfeiture proceedings shall not begin until the property is no longer necessary for evidence.

(n) Settlement of claims. Notwithstanding other provisions of this Article, the State's Attorney and a claimant of seized property may enter into an agreed-upon settlement concerning the seized property in such an amount and upon such terms as are set out in writing in a settlement agreement.

(o) Property constituting attorney fees. Nothing in this Article applies to property which constitutes reasonable bona fide attorney's fees paid to an attorney for services rendered or to be rendered in the forfeiture proceeding or criminal proceeding relating directly thereto where such property was paid before its seizure, before the issuance of any seizure warrant or court order prohibiting transfer of the property and where the attorney, at the time he or she received the property did not know that it was property subject to forfeiture under this Article.

(p) Construction. It is the intent of the General Assembly that the forfeiture provisions of this Article be liberally construed so as to effect their remedial purpose. The forfeiture of property and other remedies hereunder shall be considered to be in addition to, and not exclusive of, any sentence or other remedy provided by law.

(q) Judicial review. If property has been declared forfeited under subsection (k) of this Section, any person who has an interest in the property declared forfeited may, within 30 days after the effective date of the notice of the declaration of forfeiture, file a claim and cost bond as described in paragraph (3) of subsection (k) of this Section. If a claim and cost bond is filed under this Section, then the procedures described in subsection (l) of this Section apply.

(r) Burden of proof of exemption or exception. It is not necessary for the State to negate any exemption or exception in this Article in any complaint, information, indictment or other pleading or in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding under this Article. The burden of proof of any exemption or exception is upon the person claiming it.

(s) Review of administrative decisions. All administrative findings, rulings, final determinations, findings, and conclusions of the State's Attorney's Office under this Article are final and conclusive decisions of the matters involved. Any person aggrieved by the decision may obtain review of the decision pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Review Law and the rules adopted pursuant to that Law. Pending final decision on such review, the administrative acts, orders, and rulings of the State's Attorney's Office remain in full force and effect unless modified or suspended by order of court pending final judicial decision. Pending final decision on such review, the acts, orders, and rulings of the State's Attorney's Office remain in full force and effect, unless stayed by order of court. However, no stay of any decision of the administrative agency shall issue unless the person aggrieved by the decision establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that good cause exists for the stay. In determining good cause, the court shall find that the aggrieved party has established a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits and that granting the stay will not have an injurious effect on the general public.

(Source: P.A. 93-520, eff. 8-6-03; 94-364, eff. 7-29-05; 94-556, eff. 9-11-05; 94-955, eff. 6-27-06.)

(720 ILCS 5/29D-14.9) (was 720 ILCS 5/29D-30)

Sec. 29D-14.9 29D-30. Terrorism.

(a) A person commits the offense is guilty of terrorism when, with the intent to intimidate or coerce a significant portion of a civilian population:

(1) he or she knowingly commits a terrorist act as defined in Section 29D-10(1) of this Code within this State; or

(2) he or she, while outside this State, knowingly commits a terrorist act as defined in Section 29D-10(1) of this Code that takes effect within this State or produces substantial detrimental effects within this State.

(b) Sentence. Terrorism is a Class X felony. If no deaths are caused by the terrorist act, the sentence shall be a term of 20 years to natural life imprisonment; however, if the terrorist act caused the death of one or more persons, however, a mandatory term of natural life imprisonment shall be the sentence if in the event the death penalty is not imposed.

(Source: P.A. 92-854, eff. 12-5-02.)

(720 ILCS 5/29D-15.1) (was 720 ILCS 5/20.5-5)

Sec. 29D-15.1 20.5-5. Causing a catastrophe.

(a) A person commits the offense of causing a catastrophe if he or she knowingly causes a catastrophe by explosion, fire, flood, collapse of a building, or release of poison, radioactive material, bacteria, virus, or other dangerous and difficult to confine force or substance.

(b) As used in this Section, "catastrophe" means serious physical injury to 5 or more persons, or substantial damage to 5 or more buildings or inhabitable structures, or substantial damage to a vital public facility that seriously impairs its usefulness or operation; and "vital public facility" means a facility that is necessary to ensure or protect the public health, safety, or welfare, including, but not limited to, a hospital, a law enforcement agency, a fire department, a private or public utility company, a national defense contractor, a facility of the armed forces, or an emergency services agency.

(c) Sentence. Causing a catastrophe is a Class X felony.

(Source: P.A. 90-669, eff. 7-31-98.)

(720 ILCS 5/29D-15.2) (was 720 ILCS 5/20.5-6)

Sec. 29D-15.2 20.5-6. Possession of a deadly substance.

(a) A person commits the offense of possession of a deadly substance when he or she possesses, manufactures, or transports any poisonous gas, deadly biological or chemical contaminant or agent, or radioactive substance either with the intent to use that such gas, biological or chemical contaminant or agent, or radioactive substance to commit a felony or with the knowledge that another person intends to use that such gas, biological or chemical contaminant or agent, or radioactive substance to commit a felony.

(b) Sentence. Possession of a deadly substance is a Class 1 felony for which a person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 4 years and not more than 30 years.

(Source: P.A. 91-121, eff. 7-15-99.)

(720 ILCS 5/29D-25)

Sec. 29D-25. Falsely making a terrorist threat.

(a) A person commits the offense is guilty of falsely making a terrorist threat when in any manner he or she knowingly makes a threat to commit or cause to be committed a terrorist act as defined in Section 29D-10(1) or otherwise knowingly creates the impression or belief that a terrorist act is about to be or has been committed, or in any manner knowingly makes a threat to commit or cause to be committed a catastrophe as defined in Section 29D-15.1 20.5-5 (720 ILCS 5/29D-15.1 5/20.5-5) of this Code that which he or she knows is false.

(b) Sentence. Falsely making a terrorist threat is a Class 1 felony.

(Source: P.A. 92-854, eff. 12-5-02.)

(720 ILCS 5/29D-29.9) (was 720 ILCS 5/29D-15)

Sec. 29D-29.9 29D-15. Material Soliciting material support for terrorism; providing material support for a terrorist act.

(a) A person commits the offense is guilty of soliciting or providing material support for terrorism if he or she knowingly raises, solicits, or collects, or provides material support or resources knowing that the material support or resources will be used, in whole or in part, to plan, prepare, carry out, facilitate, or avoid apprehension for committing terrorism as defined in Section 29D-14.9 (720 ILCS 5/29D-14.9) 29D-30 or causing a catastrophe as defined in Section 29D-15.1 20.5-5 (720 ILCS 5/29D-15.1 5/20.5-5) of this Code, or who knows and intends that the material support or resources so raised, solicited, or collected, or provided will be used in the commission of a terrorist act as defined in Section 29D-10(1) of this Code by an organization designated under 8 U.S.C. 1189, as amended. It is not an element of the offense that the defendant actually knows that an organization has been designated under 8 U.S.C. 1189, as amended.

(b) A person is guilty of providing material support for terrorism if he or she knowingly provides material support or resources to a person knowing that the person will use that support or those resources in whole or in part to plan, prepare, carry out, facilitate, or to avoid apprehension for committing terrorism as defined in Section 29D-30 or to cause a catastrophe as defined in Section 20.5-5 (720 ILCS 5/20.5-5) of this Code.

(b) (c) Sentence. Soliciting or providing material support for terrorism is a Class X felony for which the sentence shall be a term of imprisonment of no less than 9 years and no more than 40 years. Providing material support for a terrorist act is a Class X felony for which the sentence shall be a term of imprisonment of no less than 9 years and no more than 40 years.

(Source: P.A. 92-854, eff. 12-5-02.)

(720 ILCS 5/29D-35)

Sec. 29D-35. Hindering prosecution of terrorism.

(a) A person commits the offense is guilty of hindering prosecution of terrorism when he or she renders criminal assistance to a person who has committed terrorism as defined in Section 29D-14.9 29D-30 or caused a catastrophe, as defined in Section 29D-15.1 20.5-5 of this Code when he or she knows that the person to whom he or she rendered criminal assistance engaged in an act of terrorism or caused a catastrophe.

(b) Hindering prosecution of terrorism is a Class X felony, the sentence for which shall be a term of 20 years to natural life imprisonment if no death was caused by the act of terrorism committed by the person to whom the defendant rendered criminal assistance and a mandatory term of natural life imprisonment if death was caused by the act of terrorism committed by the person to whom the defendant rendered criminal assistance.

(Source: P.A. 92-854, eff. 12-5-02.)

(720 ILCS 5/29D-35.1 new)

Sec. 29D-35.1. Boarding or attempting to board an aircraft with weapon.

(a) It is unlawful for any person to board or attempt to board any commercial or charter aircraft, knowingly having in his or her possession any firearm, explosive of any type, or other lethal or dangerous weapon.

(b) This Section does not apply to any person authorized by either the federal government or any state government to carry firearms, but the person so exempted from the provisions of this Section shall notify the commander of any aircraft he or she is about to board that he or she does possess a firearm and show identification satisfactory to the aircraft commander that he or she is authorized to carry that firearm.

(c) Any person purchasing a ticket to board any commercial or charter aircraft shall by that purchase consent to a search of his or her person or personal belongings by the company selling the ticket to him or her. The person may refuse to submit to a search of his or her person or personal belongings by the aircraft company, but the person refusing may be denied the right to board the commercial or charter aircraft at the discretion of the carrier. Such a refusal creates no inference of unlawful conduct.

(d) Any evidence of criminal activity found during a search made pursuant to this Section shall be admissible in legal proceedings for the sole purpose of supporting a charge of violation of this Section and is inadmissible as evidence in any legal proceeding for any other purpose, except in the prosecution of offenses related to weapons as set out in Article 24 of this Code.

(e) No action may be brought against any commercial or charter airline company operating in this State for the refusal of that company to permit a person to board any aircraft if that person refused to be searched as set out in subsection (c) of this Section.

(f) Violation of this Section is a Class 4 felony.

(720 ILCS 5/36-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 36-1)

Sec. 36-1. Seizure. Any vessel, vehicle or aircraft used with the knowledge and consent of the owner in the commission of, or in the attempt to commit as defined in Section 8-4 of this Code, an offense prohibited by (a) Section 9-1, 9-3, 10-2, 11-6, 11-15.1, 11-19.1, 11-19.2, 11-20.1, 12-4.1, 12-4.2, 12-4.2-5, 12-4.3, 12-4.6, 12-7.3, 12-7.4, 12-13, 12-14, 18-2, 19-1, 19-2, 19-3, 20-1, 20-2, 29D-15.2 20.5-6, 24-1.2, 24-1.2-5, 24-1.5, or 28-1 of this Code, paragraph (a) of Section 12-4 of this Code, paragraph (a) of Section 12-15 or paragraphs (a), (c) or (d) of Section 12-16 of this Code, or paragraph (a)(6) or (a)(7) of Section 24-1 of this Code; (b) Section 21, 22, 23, 24 or 26 of the Cigarette Tax Act if the vessel, vehicle or aircraft contains more than 10 cartons of such cigarettes; (c) Section 28, 29 or 30 of the Cigarette Use Tax Act if the vessel, vehicle or aircraft contains more than 10 cartons of such cigarettes; (d) Section 44 of the Environmental Protection Act; (e) 11-204.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code; (f) the offenses described in the following provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code: Section 11-501 subdivisions (c-1)(1), (c-1)(2), (c-1)(3), (d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(D), (d)(1)(G), or (d)(1)(H); (g) an offense described in subsection (g) of Section 6-303 of the Illinois Vehicle Code; or (h) an offense described in subsection (e) of Section 6-101 of the Illinois Vehicle Code; may be seized and delivered forthwith to the sheriff of the county of seizure.

Within 15 days after such delivery the sheriff shall give notice of seizure to each person according to the following method: Upon each such person whose right, title or interest is of record in the office of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency, or any other Department of this State, or any other state of the United States if such vessel, vehicle or aircraft is required to be so registered, as the case may be, by mailing a copy of the notice by certified mail to the address as given upon the records of the Secretary of State, the Department of Aeronautics, Department of Public Works and Buildings or any other Department of this State or the United States if such vessel, vehicle or aircraft is required to be so registered. Within that 15 day period the sheriff shall also notify the State's Attorney of the county of seizure about the seizure.

In addition, any mobile or portable equipment used in the commission of an act which is in violation of Section 7g of the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District Act shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture under the same procedures provided in this Article for the seizure and forfeiture of vessels, vehicles and aircraft, and any such equipment shall be deemed a vessel, vehicle or aircraft for purposes of this Article.

When a person discharges a firearm at another individual from a vehicle with the knowledge and consent of the owner of the vehicle and with the intent to cause death or great bodily harm to that individual and as a result causes death or great bodily harm to that individual, the vehicle shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture under the same procedures provided in this Article for the seizure and forfeiture of vehicles used in violations of clauses (a), (b), (c), or (d) of this Section.

If the spouse of the owner of a vehicle seized for an offense described in subsection (g) of Section 6-303 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, a violation of subdivision (c-1)(1), (c-1)(2), (c-1)(3), (d)(1)(A), or (d)(1)(D) of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, or Section 9-3 of this Code makes a showing that the seized vehicle is the only source of transportation and it is determined that the financial hardship to the family as a result of the seizure outweighs the benefit to the State from the seizure, the vehicle may be forfeited to the spouse or family member and the title to the vehicle shall be transferred to the spouse or family member who is properly licensed and who requires the use of the vehicle for employment or family transportation purposes. A written declaration of forfeiture of a vehicle under this Section shall be sufficient cause for the title to be transferred to the spouse or family member. The provisions of this paragraph shall apply only to one forfeiture per vehicle. If the vehicle is the subject of a subsequent forfeiture proceeding by virtue of a subsequent conviction of either spouse or the family member, the spouse or family member to whom the vehicle was forfeited under the first forfeiture proceeding may not utilize the provisions of this paragraph in another forfeiture proceeding. If the owner of the vehicle seized owns more than one vehicle, the procedure set out in this paragraph may be used for only one vehicle.

Property declared contraband under Section 40 of the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act may be seized and forfeited under this Article.

(Source: P.A. 93-187, eff. 7-11-03; 94-329, eff. 1-1-06; 94-1017, eff. 7-7-06.)

(720 ILCS 5/8-1.1 rep.)

(720 ILCS 5/Art. 10A rep.)

(720 ILCS 5/42-1 rep.)

(720 ILCS 5/42-2 rep.)

Section 30. The Criminal Code of 1961 is amended by repealing Sections 8-1.1, 42-1, and 42-2 and by repealing Article 10A.

(720 ILCS 545/Act rep.)

Section 35. The Boarding Aircraft With Weapon Act is repealed.

Section 40. The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 is amended by changing Sections 108B-3 and 115-10 as follows:

(725 ILCS 5/108B-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 108B-3)

Sec. 108B-3. Authorization for the interception of private communication.

(a) The State's Attorney, or a person designated in writing or by law to act for him and to perform his duties during his absence or disability, may authorize, in writing, an ex parte application to the chief judge of a court of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing the interception of a private communication when no party has consented to the interception and (i) the interception may provide evidence of, or may assist in the apprehension of a person who has committed, is committing or is about to commit, a violation of Section 8-1(b) 8-1.1 (solicitation of murder), 8-1.2 (solicitation of murder for hire), 9-1 (first degree murder), or 29B-1 (money laundering) of the Criminal Code of 1961, Section 401, 401.1 (controlled substance trafficking), 405, 405.1 (criminal drug conspiracy) or 407 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or any Section of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act, a violation of Section 24-2.1, 24-2.2, 24-3, 24-3.1, 24-3.3, 24-3.4, 24-4, or 24-5 or subsection 24-1(a)(4), 24-1(a)(6), 24-1(a)(7), 24-1(a)(9), 24-1(a)(10), or 24-1(c) of the Criminal Code of 1961 or conspiracy to commit money laundering or conspiracy to commit first degree murder; (ii) in response to a clear and present danger of imminent death or great bodily harm to persons resulting from: (1) a kidnapping or the holding of a hostage by force or the threat of the imminent use of force; or (2) the occupation by force or the threat of the imminent use of force of any premises, place, vehicle, vessel or aircraft; (iii) to aid an investigation or prosecution of a civil action brought under the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act when there is probable cause to believe the interception of the private communication will provide evidence that a streetgang is committing, has committed, or will commit a second or subsequent gang-related offense or that the interception of the private communication will aid in the collection of a judgment entered under that Act; or (iv) upon information and belief that a streetgang has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a felony.

(b) The State's Attorney or a person designated in writing or by law to act for the State's Attorney and to perform his or her duties during his or her absence or disability, may authorize, in writing, an ex parte application to the chief judge of a circuit court for an order authorizing the interception of a private communication when no party has consented to the interception and the interception may provide evidence of, or may assist in the apprehension of a person who has committed, is committing or is about to commit, a violation of an offense under Article 29D of the Criminal Code of 1961.

(b-1) Subsection (b) is inoperative on and after January 1, 2005.

(b-2) No conversations recorded or monitored pursuant to subsection (b) shall be made inadmissible in a court of law by virtue of subsection (b-1).

(c) As used in this Section, "streetgang" and "gang-related" have the meanings ascribed to them in Section 10 of the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act.

(Source: P.A. 94-468, eff. 8-4-05; 94-556, eff. 9-11-05; 95-331, eff. 8-21-07.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-10) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-10)

Sec. 115-10. Certain hearsay exceptions.

(a) In a prosecution for a physical or sexual act perpetrated upon or against a child under the age of 13, or a person who was a moderately, severely, or profoundly mentally retarded person as defined in this Code and in Section 2-10.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 at the time the act was committed, including but not limited to prosecutions for violations of Sections 12-13 through 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 and prosecutions for violations of Sections 10-1 (kidnapping), 10-2 (aggravated kidnapping), 10-3 (unlawful restraint), 10-3.1 (aggravated unlawful restraint), 10-4 (forcible detention), 10-5 (child abduction), 10-6 (harboring a runaway), 10-7 (aiding or and abetting child abduction), 11-9 (public indecency), 11-11 (sexual relations within families), 11-21 (harmful material), 12-1 (assault), 12-2 (aggravated assault), 12-3 (battery), 12-3.2 (domestic battery), 12-4 (aggravated battery), 12-4.1 (heinous battery), 12-4.2 (aggravated battery with a firearm), 12-4.3 (aggravated battery of a child), 12-4.7 (drug induced infliction of great bodily harm), 12-5 (reckless conduct), 12-6 (intimidation), 12-6.1 (compelling organization membership of persons), 12-7.1 (hate crime), 12-7.3 (stalking), 12-7.4 (aggravated stalking), 12-10 (tattooing body of minor), 12-11 (home invasion), 12-21.5 (child abandonment), 12-21.6 (endangering the life or health of a child) or 12-32 (ritual mutilation) of the Criminal Code of 1961 or any sex offense as defined in subsection (B) of Section 2 of the Sex Offender Registration Act, the following evidence shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule:

(1) testimony by the victim of an out of court statement made by the victim that he or she complained of such act to another; and

(2) testimony of an out of court statement made by the victim describing any complaint of such act or matter or detail pertaining to any act which is an element of an offense which is the subject of a prosecution for a sexual or physical act against that victim.

(b) Such testimony shall only be admitted if:

(1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability; and

(2) The child or moderately, severely, or profoundly mentally retarded person either:

(A) testifies at the proceeding; or

(B) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement; and

(3) In a case involving an offense perpetrated against a child under the age of 13, the out of court statement was made before the victim attained 13 years of age or within 3 months after the commission of the offense, whichever occurs later, but the statement may be admitted regardless of the age of the victim at the time of the proceeding.

(c) If a statement is admitted pursuant to this Section, the court shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to be given the statement and that, in making the determination, it shall consider the age and maturity of the child, or the intellectual capabilities of the moderately, severely, or profoundly mentally retarded person, the nature of the statement, the circumstances under which the statement was made, and any other relevant factor.

(d) The proponent of the statement shall give the adverse party reasonable notice of his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement.

(e) Statements described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) shall not be excluded on the basis that they were obtained as a result of interviews conducted pursuant to a protocol adopted by a Child Advocacy Advisory Board as set forth in subsections (c), (d), and (e) of Section 3 of the Children's Advocacy Center Act or that an interviewer or witness to the interview was or is an employee, agent, or investigator of a State's Attorney's office.

(Source: P.A. 95-892, eff. 1-1-09.)

Section 45. The Unified Code of Corrections is amended by changing Section 3-1-2 as follows:

(730 ILCS 5/3-1-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 1003-1-2)

Sec. 3-1-2. Definitions.

(a) "Chief Administrative Officer" means the person designated by the Director to exercise the powers and duties of the Department of Corrections in regard to committed persons within a correctional institution or facility, and includes the superintendent of any juvenile institution or facility.

(a-5) "Sex offense" for the purposes of paragraph (16) of subsection (a) of Section 3-3-7, paragraph (10) of subsection (a) of Section 5-6-3, and paragraph (18) of subsection (c) of Section 5-6-3.1 only means:

(i) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961: 10-7 (aiding or and abetting child abduction under Section 10-5(b)(10)), 10-5(b)(10) (child luring), 11-6 (indecent solicitation of a child), 11-6.5 (indecent solicitation of an adult), 11-15.1 (soliciting for a juvenile prostitute), 11-17.1 (keeping a place of juvenile prostitution), 11-18.1 (patronizing a juvenile prostitute), 11-19.1 (juvenile pimping), 11-19.2 (exploitation of a child), 11-20.1 (child pornography), 12-14.1 (predatory criminal sexual assault of a child), or 12-33 (ritualized abuse of a child). An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(ii) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961: 12-13 (criminal sexual assault), 12-14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault), 12-16 (aggravated criminal sexual abuse), and subsection (a) of Section 12-15 (criminal sexual abuse). An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(iii) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961 when the defendant is not a parent of the victim:

10-1 (kidnapping),

10-2 (aggravated kidnapping),

10-3 (unlawful restraint),

10-3.1 (aggravated unlawful restraint).

An attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(iv) A violation of any former law of this State substantially equivalent to any offense listed in this subsection (a-5).

An offense violating federal law or the law of another state that is substantially equivalent to any offense listed in this subsection (a-5) shall constitute a sex offense for the purpose of this subsection (a-5). A finding or adjudication as a sexually dangerous person under any federal law or law of another state that is substantially equivalent to the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act shall constitute an adjudication for a sex offense for the purposes of this subsection (a-5).

(b) "Commitment" means a judicially determined placement in the custody of the Department of Corrections on the basis of delinquency or conviction.

(c) "Committed Person" is a person committed to the Department, however a committed person shall not be considered to be an employee of the Department of Corrections for any purpose, including eligibility for a pension, benefits, or any other compensation or rights or privileges which may be provided to employees of the Department.

(d) "Correctional Institution or Facility" means any building or part of a building where committed persons are kept in a secured manner.

(e) In the case of functions performed before the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly, "Department" means the Department of Corrections of this State. In the case of functions performed on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly, "Department" has the meaning ascribed to it in subsection (f-5).

(f) In the case of functions performed before the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly, "Director" means the Director of the Department of Corrections. In the case of functions performed on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly, "Director" has the meaning ascribed to it in subsection (f-5).

(f-5) In the case of functions performed on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly, references to "Department" or "Director" refer to either the Department of Corrections or the Director of Corrections or to the Department of Juvenile Justice or the Director of Juvenile Justice unless the context is specific to the Department of Juvenile Justice or the Director of Juvenile Justice.

(g) "Discharge" means the final termination of a commitment to the Department of Corrections.

(h) "Discipline" means the rules and regulations for the maintenance of order and the protection of persons and property within the institutions and facilities of the Department and their enforcement.

(i) "Escape" means the intentional and unauthorized absence of a committed person from the custody of the Department.

(j) "Furlough" means an authorized leave of absence from the Department of Corrections for a designated purpose and period of time.

(k) "Parole" means the conditional and revocable release of a committed person under the supervision of a parole officer.

(l) "Prisoner Review Board" means the Board established in Section 3-3-1(a), independent of the Department, to review rules and regulations with respect to good time credits, to hear charges brought by the Department against certain prisoners alleged to have violated Department rules with respect to good time credits, to set release dates for certain prisoners sentenced under the law in effect prior to the effective date of this Amendatory Act of 1977, to hear requests and make recommendations to the Governor with respect to pardon, reprieve or commutation, to set conditions for parole and mandatory supervised release and determine whether violations of those conditions justify revocation of parole or release, and to assume all other functions previously exercised by the Illinois Parole and Pardon Board.

(m) Whenever medical treatment, service, counseling, or care is referred to in this Unified Code of Corrections, such term may be construed by the Department or Court, within its discretion, to include treatment, service or counseling by a Christian Science practitioner or nursing care appropriate therewith whenever request therefor is made by a person subject to the provisions of this Act.

(n) "Victim" shall have the meaning ascribed to it in subsection (a) of Section 3 of the Bill of Rights for Victims and Witnesses of Violent Crime Act.

(Source: P.A. 94-159, eff. 7-11-05; 94-696, eff. 6-1-06.)

Section 50. The Predator Accountability Act is amended by changing Section 10 as follows:

(740 ILCS 128/10)

Sec. 10. Definitions. As used in this Act:

"Sex trade" means any act, which if proven beyond a reasonable doubt could support a conviction for a violation or attempted violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961: 11-15 (soliciting for a prostitute); 11-15.1 (soliciting for a juvenile prostitute); 11-16 (pandering); 11-17 (keeping a place of prostitution); 11-17.1 (keeping a place of juvenile prostitution); 11-19 (pimping); 11-19.1 (juvenile pimping and aggravated juvenile pimping); 11-19.2 (exploitation of a child); 11-20 (obscenity); or 11-20.1 (child pornography); or Section 10-9 Article 10A of the Criminal Code of 1961 (trafficking of persons and involuntary servitude).

"Sex trade" activity may involve adults and youth of all genders and sexual orientations.

"Victim of the sex trade" means, for the following sex trade acts, the person or persons indicated:

(1) soliciting for a prostitute: the prostitute who is the object of the solicitation;

(2) soliciting for a juvenile prostitute: the juvenile prostitute, or severely or profoundly mentally retarded person, who is the object of the solicitation;

(3) pandering: the person intended or compelled to act as a prostitute;

(4) keeping a place of prostitution: any person intended or compelled to act as a prostitute, while present at the place, during the time period in question;

(5) keeping a place of juvenile prostitution: any juvenile intended or compelled to act as a prostitute, while present at the place, during the time period in question;

(6) pimping: the prostitute from whom anything of value is received;

(7) juvenile pimping and aggravated juvenile pimping: the juvenile, or severely or profoundly mentally retarded person, from whom anything of value is received for that person's act of prostitution;

(8) exploitation of a child: the juvenile, or severely or profoundly mentally retarded person, intended or compelled to act as a prostitute or from whom anything of value is received for that person's act of prostitution;

(9) obscenity: any person who appears in or is described or depicted in the offending conduct or material;

(10) child pornography: any child, or severely or profoundly mentally retarded person, who appears in or is described or depicted in the offending conduct or material; or

(11) trafficking of persons or involuntary servitude: a "trafficking victim" as defined in Section 10-9 10A-5 of the Criminal Code of 1961.

(Source: P.A. 94-998, eff. 7-3-06.)

Section 95. No acceleration or delay. Where this Act makes changes in a statute that is represented in this Act by text that is not yet or no longer in effect (for example, a Section represented by multiple versions), the use of that text does not accelerate or delay the taking effect of (i) the changes made by this Act or (ii) provisions derived from any other Public Act.

Section 99. Effective date. This Act takes effect January 1, 2010.".