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STATE OF ILLINOIS
HOUSE JOURNAL
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SECOND GENERAL ASSEMBLY
143RD LEGISLATIVE DAY
Perfunctory Session
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 2002
11:55 O'CLOCK A.M.
NO. 143
[November 7, 2002] 2
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Daily Journal Index
143rd Legislative Day
Action Page(s)
Adjournment........................................ 42
Introduction and First Reading - HB6294-6314....... 6
Letter of Transmittal.............................. 3
Messages from the Governor......................... 7
Permanent Committee Assignments.................... 3
Bill Number Legislative Action Page(s)
HB 3714 Motion Submitted................................... 4
HC 0016 Constitutional Amendment - First Reading........... 7
HJR 0085 Agreed Resolution.................................. 5
HR 1013 Resolution......................................... 4
3 [November 7, 2002]
The House met pursuant to adjournment.
Anthony D. Rossi, Clerk of the House in the Chair.
Prayer by Anthony D. Rossi, Clerk of the House.
Minutes Clerk Jennifer L. Timms led the House in the Pledge of
Allegiance.
PERMANENT COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS
Speaker Madigan appointed Representative Julie Hamos as a permanent
member of the Committee on Urban Revitalization.
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
STATE OF ILLINOIS
MICHAEL J. MADIGAN ROOM 300
SPEAKER STATE HOUSE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS 62706
June 17, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
RE: House Bill 6061 - An Act making appropriations
I am writing to make you aware of a circumstance that surrounded
the passage of House Bill 6061 on June 2. HB 6061 is a bill that makes
reappropriations for capital projects throughout the State. It should
not be confused with SB 2393, the bill making appropriations for the FY
'03 budget that was the subject of item and reduction vetoes by the
Governor.
The House had originally sent HB 6061 to the Senate as a vehicle
bill for appropriations that would be agreed to later as part of the FY
'03 budget. On June 2, the Senate adopted an amendment to HB 6061 that
contained reappropriations for certain capital projects previously
authorized in the FY '02 budget. The version of the amendment that was
filed with the Secretary of the Senate, however, differed in one
respect from the electronic version that appeared on the LIS system and
on the Senate members' laptops. The electronic version contained a
reappropriation for renovation work on the House and Senate chambers,
while the actual hard copy of the amendment filed with the Secretary of
the Senate did not contain that language.
That discrepancy was carried over to the House when the Senate sent
a message on the evening of June 2 that the Senate had adopted the
amendment. Accordingly, when House members voted to concur in the
Senate amendment the same evening, the version displayed on our laptops
contained the reappropriation for the legislative chamber, but the
original copy of the Senate amendment that accompanied the Senate's
message did not. The discrepancy was not detected because both
versions contained the same document identification tag assigned by the
Bureau of the Budget - BOB-Capital03.
As you may know, the Illinois Constitution requires the Speaker of
the House and the President of the Senate to certify the form of each
bill that passes both houses. In this case, I have certified the
version of the bill that does not include the reappropriation for
renovation of the Senate and House chambers. This was the form of HB
6061 as amended by Senate Amendment #2 reported to the House via the
original message from the Secretary of the Senate.
I fully recognize the seriousness of this matter. Like you, my
staff and I rely upon the accuracy of the LIS system to know exactly
what we are voting on. In this case, I too was unaware of the
difference between the original and electronic versions.
[November 7, 2002] 4
None of that, however, relieves me of the constitutional
responsibility to certify the form of the bill to the Senate and to the
Governor. Although we have come to rely upon the LIS system for our
legislative information, it has not replaced the essential and official
means of communication between the House and the Senate, through paper
copies of original messages sent from one chamber to the other.
Please be assured that I will call on all appropriate parties to
determine the full circumstances of this incident and take the
necessary steps to ensure that is does not happen again.
With kindest personal regards, I remain
Sincerely yours,
s/Michael J. Madigan
Speaker of the House
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
STATE OF ILLINOIS
MICHAEL J. MADIGAN ROOM 300
SPEAKER STATE HOUSE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS 62706
September 18, 2002
Mr. Anthony D. Rossi
Chief Clerk of the House
Illinois House of Representatives
402 State House
Springfield, IL 62706
Dear Clerk Rossi:
Please be advised that I am increasing the membership on the following
House Committee:
Urban Revitalization
(increase majority appointment to six (6) members)
(Increase minority appointment to five (5) members)
I am appointing Representative Julie Hamos as a permanent member of
this committee.
With kindest personal regards, I remain
Sincerely yours,
s/Michael J. Madigan
Speaker of the House
VETO MOTIONS SUBMITTED
Representative Hannig submitted the following written motion, which
was placed on the order of Motions:
MOTION
I move that HOUSE BILL 3714 do pass, the Veto of the Governor
notwithstanding.
RESOLUTION
The following resolutions were offered and placed in the Committee
on Rules.
HOUSE RESOLUTION 1013
5 [November 7, 2002]
Offered by Representative Bost:
WHEREAS, Amtrak was established in 1971 by the Rail Passenger
Service Act of 1970; and
WHEREAS, The Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act, passed
unanimously in 1997, requires that Amtrak become operationally
self-sufficient by December 2, 2002; and
WHEREAS, A combination of accumulated operating deficits, cash
shortages, management inefficiencies, and delay in full implementation
of Acela Express service have created a fiscal emergency at Amtrak,
with growing and substantial debt obligations totaling over $3.3
billion; and
WHEREAS, The Amtrak Reform Council has found that Amtrak will not
be operationally self-sufficient by December 2, 2002, as required by
law, citing major inherent flaws and weaknesses in Amtrak's
institutional design; and
WHEREAS, The Department of Transportation Inspector General Report
on the 2001 Assessment of Amtrak's Financial Performance and
Requirements found that Amtrak suffered operating losses of $1.1
billion, the largest in Amtrak's history, and that Amtrak is no closer
to operating self-sufficiency now than it was in 1997; and
WHEREAS, The nation should be afforded the opportunity to receive
safe, efficient and cost-effective rail passenger service; and
WHEREAS, The current federal formula for transportation funding is
heavily skewed towards highways and airports with less than 1% directed
at rail passenger service, creating highway and airport congestion and
perpetuating an unbalanced transportation system that is vulnerable to
emergencies, high traffic volumes, and temporary disruptions; and
WHEREAS, Amtrak currently serves over 500 communities across the
country, provides energy-efficient mobility, uses 38% less energy per
passenger mile than travel by commercial airlines, can reduce
congestion which currently costs the U.S. economy $100 billion
annually, and can further reduce U.S. dependence on imported foreign
oil; therefore be it
RESOLVED, BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NINETY-SECOND
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, that we urge the Congress
of the United States to pass S.1958, the Rail Passenger Service
Improvement Act, to eliminate budget deficits and cash shortages of
Amtrak through visionary financial planning, sound budgeting, accurate
revenue forecasts, and careful spending and to ensure the most
efficient and cost effective rail passenger service by Amtrak during a
period of fiscal emergency; and be it further
RESOLVED, That a suitable copy of this Resolution be presented to
each member of the U.S. Illinois Congressional delegation.
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 85
Offered by Representative Watson:
WHEREAS, The quality and availability of drinking water is a
matter of great importance to the health, safety, and welfare of people
throughout this State; and
WHEREAS, Despite the existence of numerous federal and State laws
and regulations to protect drinking water quality, many people in
Illinois, especially in small communities and rural areas, are forced
to rely on inferior water supplies or private wells that produce
unacceptably hard, smelly, or contaminated water; and
WHEREAS, It has been a long time since a coordinated,
comprehensive review cf Illinois drinking water protection needs has
been undertaken; therefore be it
RESOLVED, BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NINETY-SECOND
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, THE SENATE CONCURRING
HEREIN, that a Task Force on Drinking Water Quality is hereby created,
to consist of 2 members of the House of Representatives appointed by
the Speaker of the House, 2 members of the House of Representatives
appointed by the House Minority Leader, 2 members of the Senate
appointed by the President of the Senate, 2 members of the Senate
appointed by the Senate Minority Leader, and one representative of each
[November 7, 2002] 6
of the following agencies, appointed by their respective directors: the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, the Illinois Department of
Public Health, and the Illinois Department of Commerce and Community
Affairs; and be it further
RESOLVED, That the Task Force shall review and consider the
drinking water protection needs of people throughout Illinois,
especially in the smaller communities and rural areas of the State, and
where appropriate shall attempt to develop legislative proposals to
address any drinking water quality problems that it may identify; and
be it further
RESOLVED, That in the course of its duties the Task Force may
conduct public hearings or other meetings throughout the State and may
request the assistance of any appropriate federal, State, or local
governmental agency; and be it further
RESOLVED, That in the course of its work the Task Force may
consider all problems and issues relating to drinking water quality,
regardless of whether the water is provided by a public or private,
community or non-community water supply or well, and including any
related aquifer, reservoir, or treatment or distribution system; and be
it further
RESOLVED, That the Task Force shall report its findings,
proposals, and recommendations to the House of Representatives and the
Senate within 6 months after the adoption of this resolution, and upon
filing its report the Task Force is abolished; and be it further
RESOLVED, That a copy of this resolution be delivered to the
Director of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, the Director
of Public Health, and the Director of Commerce and Community Affairs.
INTRODUCTION AND FIRST READING OF BILLS
The following bills were introduced, read by title a first time,
ordered printed and placed in the Committee on Rules:
HOUSE BILL 6294. Filed by Representatives Hamos - May - Winters -
Slone - Garrett, Bassi, Burke, Coulson, Currie, Dart, Delgado, Erwin,
Feigenholtz, Hoffman, Kurtz, Lang, Lindner, Mendoza, Novak, Osterman,
Pankau, Soto, Tenhouse, Turner and Yarbrough., a bill for AN ACT in
relation to taxes.
HOUSE BILL 6295. Filed by Representatives Franks - Dart, a bill
for AN ACT concerning unemployment insurance.
HOUSE BILL 6296. Filed by Representative Acevedo, a bill for AN
ACT concerning day care homes.
HOUSE BILL 6297. Filed by Representative O'Connor, a bill for AN
ACT concerning the General Assembly.
HOUSE BILL 6298. Filed by Representative Mathias, a bill for AN
ACT in relation to taxes.
HOUSE BILL 6299. Filed by Representative Bill Mitchell, a bill for
AN ACT concerning the State budget.
HOUSE BILL 6300. Filed by Representative Bill Mitchell, a bill for
AN ACT concerning State debt.
HOUSE BILL 6301. Filed by Representative Bost, a bill for AN ACT
in relation to alcoholic liquor.
HOUSE BILL 6302. Filed by Representative Mulligan, a bill for AN
ACT in relation to check cashing services.
HOUSE BILL 6303. Filed by Representative Wojcik, a bill for AN ACT
in relation to public health.
HOUSE BILL 6304. Filed by Representatives Black - Stephens -
Watson - Poe - Bost, Meyer, Myers, Righter and Wait, a bill for AN ACT
concerning taxation.
HOUSE BILL 6305. Filed by Representatives Mulligan - Stephens -
Bost - Meyer - Poe, a bill for AN ACT concerning taxes.
HOUSE BILL 6306. Filed by Representative Hannig, Beaubien, Boland,
Bost, Bradley, Brady, Brunsvold, Bugielski, Burke, Capparelli, Colvin,
Crotty, Dart, Steve Davis, Delgado, Flowers, Forby, Fowler, Franks,
Garrett, Granberg, Hamos, Hartke, Hoeft, Hoffman, Howard, Jefferson,
7 [November 7, 2002]
Lou Jones, Shirley Jones, Kenner, Lang, Mautino, May, McGuire, McKeon,
Miller, Bill Mitchell, Jerry Mitchell, Moffitt, Morrow, Myers, Novak,
O'Brien, Osterman, Poe, Reitz, Saviano, Schoenberg, Smith, Soto,
Watson, Winkel and Yarbrough., a bill for AN ACT concerning
appropriations.
HOUSE BILL 6307. Filed by Representative Berns, a bill for AN ACT
concerning sex offenders.
HOUSE BILL 6308. Filed by Representative Berns, a bill for AN ACT
concerning abduction alerts and prevention.
HOUSE BILL 6309. Filed by Representatives Wojcik - Bost, a bill
for AN ACT in relation to alcoholic liquor.
HOUSE BILL 6310. Filed by Representatives Bill Mitchell - Watson -
Poe - Moffitt - Black, a bill for AN ACT concerning State facility
closure.
HOUSE BILL 6311. Filed by Representative Acevedo, a bill for AN
ACT concerning higher education.
HOUSE BILL 6312. Filed by Representative McGuire, a bill for AN
ACT making appropriations.
HOUSE BILL 6313. Introduced by Representative Bellock, a bill for
AN ACT concerning animal cremation services.
HOUSE BILL 6314. Introduced by Representative Feigenholtz, a bill
for AN ACT concerning appropriations.
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
FIRST READING
Representative Franks introduced the following:
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 16
RESOLVED, BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NINETY-SECOND
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, THE SENATE CONCURRING
HEREIN, that there shall be submitted to the electors of the State for
adoption or rejection at the general election next occurring at least 6
months after the adoption of this resolution a proposition to add
Section 25 to Article I of the Illinois Constitution as follows:
ARTICLE I
BILL OF RIGHTS
(ILCON Art. I, Sec. 25 new)
SECTION 25. TAXPAYER SUITS
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, each
taxpayer of this State, of a unit of local government in this State, of
a school district in this State, or of any other taxing district in
this State has standing to bring suit in the circuit court to enforce
the rights of taxpayers recognized at common law or granted by the
General Assembly by law.
SCHEDULE
This Constitutional Amendment takes effect upon being declared
adopted in accordance with Section 7 of the Illinois Constitutional
Amendment Act.
The foregoing HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 16
was taken up, read in full a first time, ordered printed and placed in
the Committee on Rules.
MESSAGES FROM THE GOVERNOR
[November 7, 2002] 8
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
July 24, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Pursuant to Article IV, Section 9(d) of the Illinois Constitution
of 1970, I hereby veto and return several appropriation items included
in House Bill 6061 entitled "AN ACT making appropriations," having
taken the actions set forth below.
House Bill 6061 is the companion appropriation bill to the State
Budget, comprising the majority of capital (bond funded) projects under
consideration for Fiscal Year 2003. Unfortunately, not all of the
projects included in House Bill 6061 are ready for commencement during
Fiscal Year 2003. For example, some projects are lacking the necessary
regulatory approvals or site selection decisions. In others, the
anticipated construction was to occur at locations or facilities that
are slated to close during Fiscal Year 2003.
Item Vetoes
I hereby veto the following appropriation items:
Article Section Page Lines Amount Enacted
2 1 18 21-22 $3,200,000.00
2 3.2 23 12-18 $8,300,000.00
2 6 42 31-32 $70,719.00
2 6 44 4-8 $203,038.00
2 6 44 19-21 $398,354.00
2 6 46 6-9 $905,000.00
2 6 46 10-11 $103,661.00
2 6 46 12 $145,936.00
2 8 68 4-7 $185,062.00
2 8 68 8-10 $608,406.00
2 8 68 11-12 $1,603,317.00
2 8 68 13-15 $1,351,795.00
2 8 71 2-4 $144,992.00
2 8 71 7-10 $4,000,000.00
2 8.3 75 20-21 $292,081.00
2 8a 76 32-33 And
2 8a 77 1-2 $245,000.00
2 13 86 15-19 $46,944,676.00
3 Div.FY01,11 188 28-30 $250,000.00
In addition to these specific item vetoes, I hereby approve all
other appropriation items in House Bill 6061.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
JESSE WHITE - Secretary of State
November 7, 2002
To the Honorable Speaker of the House:
9 [November 7, 2002]
Sir:
I am enclosing herewith a copy of the Approval Message from the
Governor as filed in my office and directed to the Honorable Members of
the House of the 92nd General Assembly as follows:
HOUSE MESSAGES
HOUSE BILL PUBLIC ACT. NO. DATE OF MESSAGE
2828 92-0596 June 28, 2002
3629 92-0693 July 19, 2002
3645 92-0694 July 19, 2002
3713 92-0695 July 19, 2002
4229 92-0697 July 19, 2002
4720 92-0847 August 23, 2002
4937 92-0699 July 19, 2002
5567 92-0848 August 23, 2002
6004 92-0702 July 19, 2002
Respectfully,
s/Jesse White
Secretary of State
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
June 28, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Today I sign House Bill 2828, which authorizes the governor to use
future proceeds from Illinois' share of the National Tobacco Settlement
to pay the interest and principal on the sale of $750 million in State
general obligation bonds that could be offered only during Fiscal Year
2003.
Although I accept this authority from the General Assembly, I want
to make it very clear that no one with a stake in a balanced State
budget should view this source of money as a way to maintain programs,
services and facilities in the budget. Nor should anyone view this
money as a way to restore programs, services and facilities that had
to be cut in order to balance the Fiscal Year 2003 Budget.
Earlier in June, during the midst of budget negotiations,
well-meaning legislators from both parties looked to "tobacco
securitization" as a way to "balance" the budget without voting for
increased taxes. President Philip, Speaker Madigan and I all agreed
that "borrowing" against the receipt of future resources in general is
not a sound long-term fiscal policy, and should not be viewed as an
easy alternative to more painful spending cuts and tax increases. The
General Assembly and I have made those painful spending cuts, and, at
the end of Fiscal Year 2002, the State's finances are stable.
Nonetheless, President Philip, Speaker Madigan and I did agree that
if "borrowing" from future tobacco settlement proceeds is used as a way
to maintain a healthy Rainy Day Fund and end-of-year balance, that
would be an acceptable part of an overall budget solution for the
coming year. In signing this bill today, my firm intention is to use
this authority, if necessary, only to build up the State budget's
end-of-year balance and Rainy Day Fund.
I view this new authority as a limited tool at my disposal that may
help strengthen the State's overall financial condition. This
authority is not a magic wand that will make the pain of previous
[November 7, 2002] 10
budget cuts disappear. It may be a tool to assist the State if the
economy fails to recover as expected.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
July 19, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Specialty license plates serve an admirable purpose of recognizing
and raising funds for organizations and worthy causes throughout the
State of Illinois. In signing House Bill 3629 today, I honor the
General Assembly's intentions and support a longstanding tradition in
Illinois to provide our residents with the opportunity to display their
support for a cause or organization through specialty license plates.
However, I also recognize that the State is experiencing a
proliferation of specialty plates, which holds the potential to impact
Illinois citizens with respect to public safety. The Illinois State
Police and law enforcement community have indicated a growing concern
with the increasing number of special plates. The myriad of designs
available make it difficult for law enforcement officers to identify
properly issued valid Illinois registrations, impairing the ability of
police to quickly identify suspect vehicles.
It is also essential, especially in these tight economic times, for
the State to curtail any unnecessary spending. In creating a funding
mechanism within House Bill 3629, the General Assembly has made clear
its intention for the additional fee paid by the recipients of special
license plates to cover the cost of their design and production. In
order to ensure that the General Assembly's intention is guaranteed, I
believe it is essential that the State incur the costs of special plate
production only after the applicants for the plates have demonstrated a
sufficient level of interest to cover those costs.
I encourage the Secretary of State's Office to use the
discretionary powers provided to the office by Section 3-600 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-600) which allows the Secretary to
produce new special plates only when a sufficient level of applications
have be received.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
July 19, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
11 [November 7, 2002]
Specialty license plates serve an admirable purpose of recognizing
and raising funds for organizations and worthy causes throughout the
State of Illinois. In signing House Bill 3645 today, I honor the
General Assembly's intentions and support a longstanding tradition in
Illinois to provide our residents with the opportunity to display their
support for a cause or organization through specialty license plates.
However, I also recognize that the State is experiencing a
proliferation of specialty plates, which holds the potential to impact
Illinois citizens with respect to public safety. The Illinois State
Police and law enforcement community have indicated a growing concern
with the increasing number of special plates. They myriad of designs
available make it difficult for law enforcement officers to identify
properly issued valid Illinois registrations, impairing the ability of
police to quickly identify suspect vehicles.
It is also essential, especially in these tight economic times, for
the State to curtail any unnecessary spending. In creating a funding
mechanism within House Bill 3645, the General Assembly has made clear
its intention for the additional fee paid by the recipients of special
license plates to cover the cost of their design and production. In
order to ensure that the General Assembly's intention is guaranteed, I
believe it is essential that the State incur the cost of special plate
production only after the applicants for the plates have demonstrated a
sufficient level of interest to cover those costs.
I encourage the Secretary of State's Office to use the
discretionary powers provided to the office by Section 3-600 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-600) which allows the Secretary to
produce new special plates only when a sufficient level of applications
have been received.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
July 19, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Specialty license plates serve an admirable purpose of recognizing
and raising funds for organizations and worthy causes throughout the
State of Illinois. In signing House Bill 3713 today, I honor the
General Assembly's intentions and support a longstanding tradition in
Illinois to provide our residents with the opportunity to display their
support for a cause or organization through specialty license plates.
However, I also recognize that the State is experiencing a
proliferation of specialty plates, which holds the potential to impact
Illinois citizens with respect to public safety. The Illinois State
Police and law enforcement community have indicated a growing concern
with the increasing number of special plates. They myriad of designs
available make it difficult for law enforcement officers to identify
properly issued valid Illinois registrations, impairing the ability of
police to quickly identify suspect vehicles.
It is also essential, especially in these tight economic times, for
the State to curtail any unnecessary spending. In creating a funding
mechanism within House Bill 3713, the General Assembly has made clear
its intention for the additional fee paid by the recipients of special
license plates to cover the cost of their design and production. In
order to ensure that the General Assembly's intention is guaranteed, I
[November 7, 2002] 12
believe it is essential that the State incur the cost of special plate
production only after the applicants for the plates have demonstrated a
sufficient level of interest to cover those costs.
I encourage the Secretary of State's Office to use the
discretionary powers provided to the office by Section 3-600 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-600) which allows the Secretary to
produce new special plates only when a sufficient level of applications
have been received.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
July 19, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Specialty license plates serve an admirable purpose of recognizing
and raising funds for organizations and worthy causes throughout the
State of Illinois. In signing House Bill 4229 today, I honor the
General Assembly's intentions and support a longstanding tradition in
Illinois to provide our residents with the opportunity to display their
support for a cause or organization through specialty license plates.
However, I also recognize that the State is experiencing a
proliferation of specialty plates, which holds the potential to impact
Illinois citizens with respect to public safety. The Illinois State
Police and law enforcement community have indicated a growing concern
with the increasing number of special plates. They myriad of designs
available make it difficult for law enforcement officers to identify
properly issued valid Illinois registrations, impairing the ability of
police to quickly identify suspect vehicles.
It is also essential, especially in these tight economic times, for
the State to curtail any unnecessary spending. In creating a funding
mechanism within House Bill 4229, the General Assembly has made clear
its intention for the additional fee paid by the recipients of special
license plates to cover the cost of their design and production. In
order to ensure that the General Assembly's intention is guaranteed, I
believe it is essential that the State incur the cost of special plate
production only after the applicants for the plates have demonstrated a
sufficient level of interest to cover those costs.
I encourage the Secretary of State's Office to use the
discretionary powers provided to the office by Section 3-600 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-600) which allows the Secretary to
produce new special plates only when a sufficient level of
applications have been received.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
13 [November 7, 2002]
August 23, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Today I sign House Bill 4720, which requires manufacturers to
reimburse retailers for warranty work at an hourly rate that is the
same as, or greater than, the hourly labor rate that the retailer
charges customers for non-warranty repair work.
I approve this legislation because a good case can be made for the
idea behind the bill, which is that a fair labor rate should not
fluctuate depending on whether or not the work is done related to a
warranty. This will mean that consumers of farm implements and
machinery who have warranty work performed will be assured that the
labor cost for the warranty work will be covered by the manufacturer
regardless of where the repair work is completed. Additionally, this
bill passed the General Assembly unanimously, so the members of the
General Assembly must feel that the provisions of House Bill 4720 are
sound public policy.
However, I do sign this bill with some reservations. I believe
this issue should have been worked out in the private sector by an
agreement between the retailers and the manufacturers rather than
through legislation. In the future, I would urge the General Assembly
to exercise caution before getting involved in issues that should be
negotiated between private businesses.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
July 19, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Specialty license plates serve an admirable purpose of recognizing
and raising funds for organizations and worthy causes throughout the
State of Illinois. In signing House Bill 4937 today, I honor the
General Assembly's intentions and support a longstanding tradition in
Illinois to provide our residents with the opportunity to display their
support for a cause or organization through specialty license plates.
However, I also recognize that the State is experiencing a
proliferation of specialty plates, which holds the potential to impact
Illinois citizens with respect to public safety. The Illinois State
Police and law enforcement community have indicated a growing concern
with the increasing number of special plates. They myriad of designs
available make it difficult for law enforcement officers to identify
properly issued valid Illinois registrations, impairing the ability of
police to quickly identify suspect vehicles.
It is also essential, especially in these tight economic times, for
the State to curtail any unnecessary spending. In creating a funding
mechanism within House Bill 4937, the General Assembly has made clear
its intention for the additional fee paid by the recipients of special
license plates to cover the cost of their design and production. In
order to ensure that the General Assembly's intention is guaranteed, I
believe it is essential that the State incur the cost of special plate
production only after the applicants for the plates have demonstrated a
[November 7, 2002] 14
sufficient level of interest to cover those costs.
I encourage the Secretary of State's Office to use the
discretionary powers provided to the office by Section 3-600 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-600) which allows the Secretary to
produce new special plates only when a sufficient level of applications
have been received.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
August 23, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Today I sign House Bill 5567, which amends the Public Aid Code to
provide that the Department of Public Aid (DPA) must implement a new
Medicaid payment methodology for the nursing component of the nursing
home rate effective July 1, 2003, using the federal mandated resident
assessment instrument, the Minimum Data Set (MDS). It provides for up
to a two-year period of transition to the new methodology.
The nursing home industry and associated advocacy groups have
sought for several years to update the methodology utilized by DPA for
setting the nursing component of nursing facilities rates paid by the
Illinois Medical Assistance Program (Medicaid). In fact, the 89th
General Assembly passed legislation (P.A. 89-415) that established a
workgroup to develop a new reimbursement system using the MDS for data
collection. The workgroup established under P.A. 89-415 failed to
recommend a methodology for determining rates for payment of services
provided for Medicaid clients in nursing facilities. I find this
illustrative of the complexity of the charge of House Bill 5567.
The bill requires DPA to develop and implement this new
methodology, but the successful accomplishment of this task will
require substantial input and cooperation from certain interested
parties, particularly long-term care industry experts. I will,
therefore, appoint an advisory panel to consult with DPA in the
development of this methodology. This will ensure full recognition of
the perspectives of this important industry and also the diverse needs
of the citizens served by the long-term care industry.
With this clarification, I hereby sign House Bill 5567.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
July 19, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
15 [November 7, 2002]
Specialty license plates serve an admirable purpose of recognizing
and raising funds for organizations and worthy causes throughout the
State of Illinois. In signing House Bill 6004 today, I honor the
General Assembly's intentions and support a longstanding tradition in
Illinois to provide our residents with the opportunity to display their
support for a cause or organization through specialty license plates.
However, I also recognize that the State is experiencing a
proliferation of specialty plates, which holds the potential to impact
Illinois citizens with respect to public safety. The Illinois State
Police and law enforcement community have indicated a growing concern
with the increasing number of special plates. They myriad of designs
available make it difficult for law enforcement officers to identify
properly issued valid Illinois registrations, impairing the ability of
police to quickly identify suspect vehicles.
It is also essential, especially in these tight economic times, for
the State to curtail any unnecessary spending. In creating a funding
mechanism within House Bill 6004, the General Assembly has made clear
its intention for the additional fee paid by the recipients of special
license plates to cover the cost of their design and production. In
order to ensure that the General Assembly's intention is guaranteed, I
believe it is essential that the State incur the cost of special plate
production only after the applicants for the plates have demonstrated a
sufficient level of interest to cover those costs.
I encourage the Secretary of State's Office to use the
discretionary powers provided to the office by Section 3-600 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-600) which allows the Secretary to
produce new special plates only when a sufficient level of applications
have been received.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
JESSE WHITE - Secretary of State
November 7, 2002
To the Honorable Speaker of the House:
Sir:
In compliance with the provisions of the Constitution of the State
of Illinois, I am forwarding herewith the enclosed House Bills that are
being returned by the Governor with specific recommendations for
change.
HOUSE BILLS
2
2058
2271
4074
4179
4938
5610
5652
Respectfully,
s/Jesse White
Secretary of State
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
[November 7, 2002] 16
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
August 28, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Governor by Article IV,
Section 9(e) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and re-affirmed by
the People of the State of Illinois by popular referendum in 1974, and
conforming to the standard articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in
People ex Rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 Ill. 2d 242 (1972), Continental
Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Zagel, 78 Ill. 2d 387 (1979),
People ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356 (1980), and
County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186 (1987), that gubernatorial
action be consistent with the fundamental purposes and the intent of
the bill, I hereby return House Bill 2 entitled "AN ACT in relation to
alternate fuels," with my specific recommendations for change.
House Bill 2 contains important provisions to further promote the
use of clean alternative fuels in the State, especially in the Chicago
area, fostering research, outreach and facility construction for the
ethanol and alternative fuel industry. The existing programs for
alternate fuel rebates and ethanol research, which will sunset in
December of this year, are extended until 2004. In addition, House Bill
2 creates the Alternate Fuel Infrastructure Program and provides that
the Department of Commerce and Community Affairs (DCCA) shall
administer a Clean Fuel Education Program. House Bill 2 also creates an
Alternate Fuel Infrastructure Advisory Board to provide private sector
input into the State's efforts to expand the alternate fuel industry in
Illinois.
House Bill 2 is the product of cooperative efforts of industry
representatives, IEPA, DCCA and state legislators to provide state
programming for alternative fuel development, research, facility and
continuation of the Clean Fuels Fleet program. Each of these
initiatives serves to foster vital components of the alternative fuel
industry in Illinois. The State can play a pivotal role in securing the
expansion of alternative fuel production and use, bringing both
economic and environmental benefits to the State of Illinois.
However, the language in House Bill 2, as passed by the General
Assembly, creates significant fiscal and legal implications for the
State of Illinois. House Bill 2 eliminates the existing funding
structure for Fiscal Year 2002, exposing the State to possible
litigation for user fees collected and expended during this period. In
addition, House Bill 2 mandates that the state agencies continue
operation of the existing rebate and education programs and establish
new infrastructure and research programs without any identified funding
source. House Bill 2 does provide the authority for agencies to accept
funds from outside sources for these programs. However, the legislation
restricts the distribution of these private contributions, with no
consideration for the delegation of funds desired by the funding
source. Finally, House Bill 2 establishes an essential advisory board
to accommodate private sector involvement, but provides this "advisory"
board with excessive levels of authority, allowing the independent
board members to determine distribution of state funds with no
oversight by state agencies or the General Assembly.
I urge the General Assembly to continue the State's efforts to
support and expand the alternative fuel industry in Illinois. However,
any time we create new programs and mandate the continuation of
existing programs, it is essential that the State be fiscally
responsible and, when possible, provide sufficient funding sources for
17 [November 7, 2002]
the programs we stand behind.
For these reasons, I hereby return House Bill 2 with the following
recommendations for change:
on page 1, line 13, by replacing "electricity.", with "electricity,
excluding on-board electric generation."; and
on page 3, line 1, by replacing "Act; (2) determine" with "Act and
(2) recommend"; and
on page 3, line 2, by replacing "grants and review" with "grants.";
and
on page 3, by deleting lines 3 through 6; and
on page 3, by replacing line 19 with "research program shall remain
in effect, subject to appropriation after calendar year until
December 31,'; and
on page 3, line 24, after "1997,", by inserting "and as long as
funds are available,"; and
on page 3, by replacing lines 27 through 32 with the following:
"issued under the provisions of this Act. The Alternate Fuels
Advisory Board shall develop and recommend to the Agency rules
that provide incentives or other measures to ensure that small
fleet operators and owners participate in, and benefit from, the
rebate program. Such rules shall define and identify small fleet
operators and owners in the covered"; and
on page 4, by replacing lines 1 through 8 with the following:
"area and make provisions for the establishment of criteria to
ensure that funds from the Alternate Fuels Fund specified in this
Act are made readily available to these entities. The Advisory
Board shall, in the development of its rebate application review
criteria, make provisions for preference to be given to
applications proposing a partnership between the fleet operator or
owner and a fueling service station to make alternate fuels
available to the public. An owner may; and
on page 4, by replacing lines 26 and 27 with the following:
"conversion cost rebates applied for during or after calendar year
years 1997,1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 shall"; and
on page 4, line 30, by replacing "2004," with "2002,"; and
on page 5, by replacing lines 13 and 14 with the following:
"or after calendar year years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and
2002 shall be 80% of all approved cost differential"; and
on page 5, line 16, by replacing "2004," with "2002,"; and
on page 5, by replacing lines 31 and 32 with the following:
"applied for during or after calendar year years 1997, 1998, 1999,
2000, and 2001 and approved rebates shall be 80% of the cost"; and
on page 6, by replacing lines 1 through 32 with the following:
"year 2002 if funds are still available.
Twenty-five percent of the amount appropriated under Section 40 to
[November 7, 2002] 18
be used to fund the programs authorized by this Section during calendar
year 1998 shall be designated to fund fuel cost differential rebates.
If the total dollar amount of approved fuel cost differential rebate
applications as of October 1, 1998 is less than the amount designated
for that calendar year, the balance of designated funds shall be
immediately available to fund any rebate authorized by this Section and
approved in the calendar year. An applicant may include on an
application submitted in 1997 all amounts spent within that calendar
year on fuel cost differential, even if the expenditure occurred before
the promulgation of the Agency rules.
Twenty-five percent of the amount appropriated under Section 40 to
be used to fund the programs authorized by this Section during calendar
year 1999 shall be designated to fund fuel cost differential rebates.
If the total dollar amount of approved fuel cost differential rebate
applications as of July 1, 1999 is less than the amount designated for
that calendar year, the balance of designated funds shall be
immediately available to fund any rebate authorized by this Section and
approved in the calendar year. Twenty-five percent of the amount
appropriated under Section 40 to be used to fund programs authorized by
this Section during calendar year 2000 shall be designated to fund fuel
cost differential rebates. If the total dollar amount of approved fuel
cost differential rebate applications as of July 1, 2000 is less than
the amount designated for that calendar year, the balance of designated
funds shall be immediately available to fund any rebate authorized by
this Section and approved in the calendar year."; and
on page 7, line 24 by replacing "The" with "Subject to
appropriation, the"; and
on page 7, line 32, by deleting "Under the grant program,"; and
on page 7, by deleting line 33; and
on page 8, by deleting lines 1 and 2; and
on page 8, line 4, by replacing "The" with "Subject to
appropriation, the"; and
on page 8, by replacing line 13, with the following:
"(a) During fiscal years 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002"; and
on page 9, lines 9, 12, 18, and 21 by replacing "and 2001" with
"2001, and 2002" each time it appears; and
on page 9, line 32 by replacing "2001," with "2002,"; and
on page 10, lines 11, 16, and 20, by replacing "2002, 2003," with
"2003" each time it appears; and
on page 11, by deleting lines 2 through 15; and
on page 11, line 16, by deleting "(d) Blank.".
With these changes, House Bill 2 will have my approval. I
respectfully request your concurrence.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
19 [November 7, 2002]
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
August 23, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Governor by Article IV,
Section 9(e) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and re-affirmed by
the People of the State of Illinois by popular referendum in 1974, and
conforming to the standard articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in
People ex Rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 Ill. 2d 242 (1972), Continental
Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Zagel, 78 Ill. 2d 387 (1979),
People ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356 (1980), and
County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186 (1987), that gubernatorial
action be consistent with the fundamental purposes and the intent of
the bill, I hereby return House Bill 2058, entitled "AN ACT in relation
to terrorism", with my specific recommendations for change.
House Bill 2058 amends the Criminal Code of 1961, the Solicitation
for Charity Act, the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act, the Code
of Criminal Procedure of 1963, the Boarding Aircraft with Weapon Act,
the Statewide Grand Jury Act, the Unified Code of Corrections, the
Charitable Trust Act and other Acts with respect to investigating,
prosecuting and punishing acts of terrorism. Specifically, the bill
amends the Criminal Code of 1961 allow the death penalty to be
considered for a first-degree murder committed as a result of or in
connection with a terrorism offense.
House Bill 2058 is the second terrorism bill to pass the General
Assembly. On February 8th of this year, I amendatorily vetoed the first
terrorism bill (House Bill 2299) due to, among others, concerns
surrounding the over-expansive eavesdropping & wiretapping provisions,
the expansion of our death eligibility factors, the need for additional
due process protections before seizing and freezing of assets of
charitable organizations and persons, and other technical flaws. The
proposed amendments were important to protecting the constitutional
rights of our citizens from some of the overly broad provisions of this
legislation. I am pleased to see that the General Assembly has passed
a much-improved anti-terrorism bill by including all but one of my
suggested changes in House Bill 2058. However, the one suggested
amendatory veto change that the General Assembly did not incorporate
into House Bill 2058 is removing the addition of an unnecessary death
eligibility factor for a first-degree murder committed as part of a
terrorist offense. Our current death penalty statute has numerous
provisions that cover just about every conceivable murder circumstance
that would be committed by a terrorist. Illinois' legislative response
to the tragic events of September 11th should not compromise our state
government's integrity by succumbing to the urge to enact largely
symbolic legislative changes.
House Bill 2058 passed the General Assembly on May 29, 2002. This
was a month and a half after my Commission on Capital Punishment
delivered its report with 85 proposed reforms to the death penalty
system and more than two weeks after I introduced reform legislation
that would codify many of the Commission's recommendations. The General
Assembly, however, did not address the important issue of comprehensive
death penalty reform during the spring legislative session, but rather
sent me yet another bill expanding the death penalty. This occurred
despite what I believe is a growing consensus to limit eligibility
factors in some fashion. The General Assembly has convened committees
to look into the issue of death penalty reform, which have been meeting
over the summer months. And while I applaud both the House and Senate
for convening these committees to look into the issue of death penalty
[November 7, 2002] 20
reform, I am troubled by the relative ease with which a death penalty
expansion bill was able to pass before any real legislative attention
had been given to carrying out much needed reforms. Given our State's
capital punishment track record, there can be little doubt that reform
should take precedence over expanding death penalty eligibility in what
most believe to be a flawed system. Failure to do so can only serve to
demonstrate that Illinois is more concerned with making a symbolic
statement with an unnecessary death penalty provision than with
ensuring that additional innocent persons do not end up on death row
and executed at the hands of the state.
While it is true that the General Assembly previously passed the
Capital Crimes Litigation Act to better fund defense and prosecution
of capital cases and legislation requiring stricter controls over
retaining evidence, this year I did not receive a single death penalty
reform proposal. For the third time in barely over a year, I am
receiving legislation aimed at expanding the death penalty statute,
despite my two previous vetoes of the prior attempts to expand the
statute. Instead of sending me comprehensive death penalty reform
legislation, I have received only death penalty expansion legislation.
This, despite the fact that my Commission comprised of intelligent,
insightful, experienced, passionate and well-rounded individuals has
come up with 85 recommendations for change to our flawed capital
punishment system. The Illinois State Bar Association, the Illinois
State's Attorney's Association, the Illinois Chiefs of Police, the
Illinois Public Defender's Association and many others have gone on
record as agreeing with the vast majority of the Commission's
recommendations.
Since the reinstatement of the death penalty on June 27, 1977, the
number of innocent persons exonerated from death row has outnumbered
the number of those who have been executed. There may still be
innocent persons on death row-sentenced to die by a badly flawed
system. If that system is allowed to continue unchanged and unreformed,
then there undoubtedly will be more innocent men and women who find
themselves awaiting their death at the hands of the people of the State
of Illinois for a crime that they did not commit.
Now is the time for reform of Illinois' death penalty system. To
do anything otherwise is unjust, unfair and unprincipled.
Therefore, if the General Assembly wants to expand the death
penalty with House Bill 2058, then justice demands that the General
Assembly be prepared to adopt some needed reforms to make sure the
death penalty is considered and imposed in a fair and just manner. To
that end, I am proposing an amendatory veto of House Bill 2058 to
include changes in the death penalty system that I believe will help
keep Illinois' death penalty statutes constitutional, address technical
flaws in the system and begin restoring public confidence in our system
of justice. There are additional reforms the General Assembly must
consider in November, but the reform proposals contained in this
amendatory veto are both applicable and necessary to the death penalty
provision in this bill.
For these reasons, I hereby return House Bill 2058 with the
following recommendations for change:
on page 1, by inserting between lines 3 and 4 the following:
"Section 2. The Counties Code is amended by changing Section
3-4006 as follows:
(55 ILCS 5/3-4006) (from Ch. 34, par. 3-4006)
Sec. 3-4006. Duties of public defender. The Public Defender, as
directed by the court, shall act as attorney, without fee, before any
court within any county for all persons who are held in custody or who
21 [November 7, 2002]
are charged with the commission of any criminal offense, and who the
court finds are unable to employ counsel.
The Public Defender shall be the attorney, without fee, when so
appointed by the court under Section 1-20 of the Juvenile Court Act
or Section 1-5 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or by any court
under Section 5(b) of the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983 for
any party who the court finds is financially unable to employ counsel.
The Public Defender may act as attorney, without fee and
appointment by the court, for a person in custody during the person's
interrogation regarding first degree murder for which the death penalty
may be imposed, if the person has requested the advice of counsel and
there is a reasonable belief that the person is indigent. Any further
representation of the person by the Public Defender shall be pursuant
to Section 109-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.
Every court shall, with the consent of the defendant and where the
court finds that the rights of the defendant would be prejudiced by
the appointment of the public defender, appoint counsel other than the
public defender, except as otherwise provided in Section 113-3 of the
"Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963". That counsel shall be compensated
as is provided by law. He shall also, in the case of the conviction of
any such person, prosecute any proceeding in review which in his
judgment the interests of justice require. (Source: P.A. 86-962.)";
and
on page 8, by replacing lines 18 through 21 with the following:
"(b) Aggravating Factors. A defendant:
(i) who at the time of the commission of the offense has attained
the age of 18 or more;
(ii) and who has been found guilty of first degree murder; and
(iii) whose guilt was not, in the determination of the court, based
solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of one eyewitness, of one
accomplice, or of one incarcerated informant;
may be sentenced to death if:"; and
on page 11, by replacing lines 1 and 2 with the following:
"to prevent the murdered individual from testifying or participating in
any criminal investigation or prosecution or giving material assistance
to the"; and
on page 11, by replacing line 5 with the following:
"murder because the murdered individual was a witness or participated
in"; and
on page 13, by replacing lines 23 through 27 with the following:
"For the purpose of this Section:
"Torture" means the intentional and depraved infliction of extreme
physical pain for a prolonged period of time prior to the victim's
death.
"Depraved" means the defendant relished the infliction of extreme
physical pain upon the victim evidencing debasement or perversion or
that the defendant evidenced a sense of pleasure in the infliction of
extreme physical pain.
"Participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution" is
intended to include those appearing in the proceedings in any capacity,
such as trial judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, investigators,
witnesses, or jurors.
(c) Consideration of accomplice or informant testimony and factors
in aggravation and mitigation.
When the sentence of death is being sought by the State, the court
shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to consider that the
testimony of an accomplice or incarcerated informant who may provide
[November 7, 2002] 22
evidence against a defendant for pay, immunity from punishment, or
personal advantage must be examined and weighed with greater care than
the testimony of an ordinary witness. Whether the accomplice or
informant's testimony has been affected by interest or prejudice
against the defendant must be determined. In making the determination,
the jury must consider (i) whether the accomplice or incarcerated
informant has received anything, including pay, immunity from
prosecution, leniency in prosecution, or personal advantage, in
exchange for testimony, (ii) any other case in which the accomplice or
informant testified or offered statements against an individual but was
not called, and whether the statements were admitted in the case, and
whether the accomplice or informant received any deal, promise,
inducement, or benefit in exchange for that testimony or statement,
(iii) whether the accomplice or informant has ever changed his or her
testimony, (iv) the criminal history of the accomplice or informant,
and (v) any other evidence relevant to the credibility of the
accomplice or informant.
The court shall also consider, or shall also instruct the jury to
consider, any aggravating and any mitigating factors which are
relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. Before the jury makes
a determination with respect to the imposition of the death penalty,
the court shall also instruct the jury of the applicable alternative
sentences under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections that the
court may impose for first degree murder if a jury determination
precludes the death sentence. Aggravating"; and
on page 14, line 10, by replacing the period with "; .
(6) the defendant's background includes a history of extreme
emotional or physical abuse;
(7) the defendant suffers from a reduced mental capacity."; and
on page 15, line 4, by inserting after the period the following:
"The defendant shall be given the opportunity, personally or through
counsel, to make a statement that is not subject to cross-examination.
If the proceeding is before a jury, the defendant's statement shall be
reduced to writing in advance and submitted to the court and the State,
so that the court may rule upon any evidentiary objection with respect
to admissibility of the statement."; and
on page 15, by replacing lines 22 through 29 with the following:
"determines unanimously, after weighing the factors in aggravation and
mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence and the court
concurs with the jury determination that there are no mitigating
factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence,
the court shall sentence the defendant to death. If the court does not
concur with the jury determination that death is the appropriate
sentence, the court shall set forth reasons in writing and shall then
sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment under
Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
If Unless the jury determines unanimously, after weighing the
factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is not the
appropriate sentence, finds that there are no mitigating factors
sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence the court
shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V
of the Unified Code of Corrections."; and
on page 16, by replacing lines 5 through 13 with the following:
"subsection (c). If the Court determines, after weighing the factors
in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence
that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the
imposition of the death sentence, the Court shall sentence the
defendant to death.
23 [November 7, 2002]
If Unless the court finds that there are no mitigating factors
sufficient to preclude the imposition of the sentence of death is not
the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to a
term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of
Corrections."; and
on page 16, line 17, by inserting after the period the following:
"Upon the request of the defendant, the Supreme Court must determine
whether the sentence was imposed due to some arbitrary factor; whether
an independent weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
indicate death was the proper sentence; and whether the sentence of
death was excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases. The Supreme Court may order the collection of data and
information to support the review required by this subsection (i).";
and
on page 20, line 5, by replacing "and" with "and"; and
on page 22, line 3, by replacing the period with the following:
"; and
(k) Recording the interrogation or statement of a person in custody
for first degree murder or a witness in a first degree murder case,
when the person in custody or witness knows the interrogation is
being conducted by a law enforcement officer or prosecutor. For the
purposes of this Section, "interrogation of a person in custody"
means any interrogation during which the person being interrogated
is not free to leave and the person is being asked questions
relevant to the first degree murder investigation."; and
on page 41, by replacing line 28 with the following:
"108B-11, 108B-12, 108B-14, 114-11, 114-13, 116-3, 122-1, and 122-2.1
and by adding Sections 108B-7.5, 113-7, 114-15, 114-16, 115-16.1, and
115-21 as"; and
on page 68, by inserting between lines 1 and 2 the following:
"(725 ILCS 5/113-7 new)
Sec. 113-7. Notice of intention to seek or decline the death
penalty. The State's Attorney or Attorney General shall provide notice
of the State's intention to seek or decline the death penalty by filing
a Notice of Intent to Seek or Decline the Death Penalty as soon as
practicable. In no event shall the filing of the notice be later than
120 days after arraignment, unless, for good cause shown, the court
directs otherwise. A notice of intent to seek the death penalty shall
also include all of the statutory aggravating factors enumerated in
subsection (b) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 which the
State intends to introduce during the death penalty sentencing hearing.
(725 ILCS 5/114-11) (from Ch. 38, par. 114-11)
Sec. 114-11. Motion to Suppress Confession.
(a) Prior to the trial of any criminal case a defendant may move to
suppress as evidence any confession given by him on the ground that it
was not voluntary.
(b) The motion shall be in writing and state facts showing wherein
the confession is involuntary.
(c) If the allegations of the motion state facts which, if true,
show that the confession was not voluntarily made the court shall
conduct a hearing into the merits of the motion.
(d) The burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of
proving that a confession was voluntary shall be on the State.
Objection to the failure of the State to call all material witnesses
on the issue of whether the confession was voluntary must be made in
the trial court.
[November 7, 2002] 24
(e) The motion shall be made only before a court with jurisdiction
to try the offense.
(f) The issue of the admissibility of the confession shall not be
submitted to the jury. The circumstances surrounding the making of the
confession may be submitted to the jury as bearing upon the credibility
or the weight to be given to the confession.
(g) The motion shall be made before trial unless opportunity
therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds
for the motion. If the motion is made during trial, and the court
determines that the motion is not untimely, and the court conducts a
hearing on the merits and enters an order suppressing the confession,
the court shall terminate the trial with respect to every defendant
who was a party to the hearing and who was within the scope of the
order of suppression, without further proceedings, unless the State
files a written notice that there will be no interlocutory appeal from
such order of suppression. In the event of such termination, the court
shall proceed with the trial of other defendants not thus affected.
Such termination of trial shall be proper and shall not bar subsequent
prosecution of the identical charges and defendants; however, if after
such termination the State fails to prosecute the interlocutory appeal
until a determination of the merits of the appeal by the reviewing
court, the termination shall be improper within the meaning of
subparagraph (a) (3) of Section 3--4 of the "Criminal Code of 1961",
approved July 28, 1961, as amended, and subsequent prosecution of such
defendants upon such charges shall be barred.
(h) In capital cases, the court may also conduct a hearing
pursuant to Section 115-21 on the admissibility of the statement made
by the defendant where the statement has not been recorded by
electronic video or audio, regardless of whether the defense requests
such a hearing. (Source: P.A. 76-1096.)
(725 ILCS 5/114-13) (from Ch. 38, par. 114-13)
Sec. 114-13. Discovery in criminal cases.
(a) Discovery procedures in criminal cases shall be in accordance
with Supreme Court Rules.
(b) Discovery deposition procedures applicable in cases for which
the death penalty may be imposed shall be in accordance with Supreme
Court Rules and this subsection (b), unless the State has given notice
of its intention not to seek the death penalty.
(1) The intent of this subsection is to (i) ensure that
capital defendants receive fair and impartial trials and sentencing
hearings within the courts of this State and (ii) minimize the
occurrence of error to the maximum extent feasible by identifying
and correcting with due promptness any error that may occur.
(2) A party may, with leave of court upon a showing of good
cause, take the discovery deposition upon oral questions of any
person disclosed as a witness as provided by law or Supreme Court
Rule. In determining whether to allow a deposition, the court
should consider (i) the consequences to the party if the deposition
is not allowed, (ii) the complexities of the issues involved, (iii)
the complexity of the testimony of the witness, and (iv) the other
opportunities available to the party to discover the information
sought by deposition. Under no circumstances, however, may the
defendant be deposed.
(3) The taking of depositions shall be in accordance with
rules providing for the taking of depositions in civil actions, and
the order for the taking of a deposition may provide that any
designated books, papers, documents, or tangible objects, not
privileged, be produced at the same time and place.
(4) A defendant shall have no right to be physically present
at a discovery deposition. If there is any concern regarding
witness safety, the court may require that the deposition be held
in a place or manner that will ensure the security of the witness.
The court may also issue protective orders to restrict the use and
disclosure of information provided by a witness.
(5) Absent good cause shown to the court, depositions shall
25 [November 7, 2002]
be completed within 90 days after the disclosure of witnesses. The
parties shall have the right to compel depositions under this
subsection by subpoena. No witness may be deposed more than once,
except by leave of the court upon a showing of good cause.
(6) If the defendant is indigent, the costs of taking
depositions shall be paid by the county where the criminal charge
is initiated with reimbursement to the county from the Capital
Litigation Trust Fund. If the defendant is not indigent, the costs
shall be allocated as in civil actions.
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)
(725 ILCS 5/114-15 new)
Sec. 114-15. Motion for genetic marker groupings comparison
analysis.
(a) A defendant may make a motion for a court order before trial
for comparison analysis by the Department of State Police with those
genetic marker groupings maintained under subsection (f) of Section
5-4-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections if the defendant meets all
of the following requirements:
(1) The defendant is charged with any offense.
(2) The defendant seeks for the Department of State Police to
identify genetic marker groupings from evidence collected by
criminal justice agencies pursuant to the alleged offense.
(3) The defendant seeks comparison analysis of genetic marker
groupings of the evidence under subdivision (2) to those of the
defendant, to those of other forensic evidence, and to those
maintained under subsection (f) of Section 5-4-3 of the Unified
Code of Corrections.
(4) Genetic marker grouping analysis must be performed by a
laboratory compliant with the quality assurance standards required
by the Department of State Police for genetic marker grouping
analysis comparisons.
(5) Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the
State.
(b) The Department of State Police may promulgate rules for the
types of comparisons performed and the quality assurance standards
required for submission of genetic marker groupings. The provisions of
the Administrative Review Law shall apply to all actions taken under
the rules so promulgated.
(725 ILCS 5/114-16 new)
Sec. 114-16. Motion to preclude death penalty based upon mental
retardation.
(a) A defendant charged with first degree murder may make a motion
prior to trial to preclude the imposition of the death penalty based
upon the mental retardation of the defendant. The motion shall be in
writing and shall state facts to demonstrate the mental retardation of
the defendant. As used in this Section, "mental retardation" means:
(1) having significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning as evidenced by a functional intelligence quotient
(I.Q.) of 70 or below; and
(2) having deficits in adaptive behavior. The mental
retardation must have been manifested during the developmental
period, or by 18 years of age.
(b) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a
defendant with mental retardation at the time of committing first
degree murder shall not be sentenced to death.
(c) The burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden
of proving the defendant's mental retardation by a preponderance of the
evidence is upon the defendant. The determination of whether the
defendant was mentally retarded at the time of the offense of first
degree murder shall be made by the court after a hearing.
(d) If the issue of mental retardation is raised prior to trial
and the court determines that the defendant is not a person with mental
retardation, the defendant shall be entitled to offer evidence to the
trier of fact of diminished intellectual capacity as a mitigating
[November 7, 2002] 26
circumstance pursuant to clause (c)(7) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal
Code of 1961.
(e) The determination by the trier of fact on the defendant's
motion shall not be appealable by interlocutory appeal, but may be a
basis of appeal by either the State or defendant following the
sentencing stage of the trial.
(725 ILCS 5/115-16.1 new)
Sec. 115-16.1. Witness qualification in first degree murder
trial.
(a) In a prosecution for first degree murder where the State has
given notice of its intention to seek the death penalty, the
prosecution must promptly notify the court and the defendant's attorney
of the intention to introduce testimony at trial from a person who is
in custody or who was in custody at the time of the factual matters to
which the person will testify. The notice to the defendant's attorney
must include the identification, criminal history, and background of
the witness. The prosecution must also promptly notify the defendant's
attorney of any discussion, inducement, benefit, or agreement between
that witness and a law enforcement agency, officer, or prosecutor for
that witness.
(b) After notice has been given to the court pursuant to
subsection (a), the court must prior to trial conduct an evidentiary
hearing to determine the reliability and admissibility of the testimony
of the witness. The prosecution has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence the reliability of the testimony of the
witness. In making its determination, the court may consider:
(1) the specific statements or facts to which the witness
will testify;
(2) the time, place, and other circumstances regarding the
statements or facts to which the witness will testify;
(3) any discussion, inducement, benefit, or agreement between
the witness and a law enforcement agency or officer for that
witness;
(4) the criminal history of the witness;
(5) whether the witness has ever recanted his or her
testimony;
(6) other criminal cases in which the witness has testified;
(7) the presence or absence of any relationship between the
accused and the witness; and
(8) any other evidence relevant to the credibility of the
witness.
(725 ILCS 5/115-21 new)
Sec. 115-21. Evidence of statement in capital case.
(a)The General Assembly believes that justice and fairness are
best served if the custodial interrogation and any statement of the
defendant that may result from the interrogation in a capital case
are recorded by means of electronic video and audio. The General
Assembly finds that the video and audio recording of the
interrogation and statement produce some of the best evidence with
respect to the voluntariness and reliability of the statement and
compliance with the constitutional rights of the defendant. The
General Assembly understands that to implement such recording
practices will require time, training, and funding. Therefore, the
General Assembly believes that law enforcement officers, to the
extent possible, should record any interrogations and statements of
the suspect, defendant, or significant witness in capital cases in
video and audio format. However, the General Assembly also
recognizes that such video and audio recording may not always be
available or practical under the circumstances and resources of a
particular case. Further, an interrogation or statement that is not
recorded by video or audio may be just as reliable and voluntary as
one that is so recorded. Therefore, the purpose of this Section is
not to mandate video and audio recording of interrogations and
27 [November 7, 2002]
statements in first degree murder cases and compel the exclusion of
unrecorded statements or interrogations, but rather to guarantee an
admissibility hearing before the court for statements made without
a video or audio recording. The State's Attorney for each county
and the Attorney General shall each report separately to the
General Assembly by August 1, 2003 as to the implementation of
these recording procedures in their respective jurisdictions.
(b) When a statement of the defendant made during a custodial
interrogation without an electronic video and audio recording of
the interrogation and statement is to be offered as evidence at
trial for first degree murder when the State has given notice of
its intention to seek the death penalty, the court must conduct a
hearing on the admissibility of the statement regardless of whether
an admissibility objection has been made. In making a determination
regarding admissibility of the statement, the court must review the
facts with respect to the voluntariness of the statement, whether
the defendant was properly advised of his or her right to counsel
during the interrogation process, and whether a request for counsel
by the defendant during the interrogation process was appropriately
satisfied. The court shall conduct the hearing in accordance with
the applicable court rules, procedures, and case law. The hearing
required by this Section may be combined with the hearing on the
defendant's motion to suppress his or her confession pursuant to
Section 114-11 of this Code.
(c) For the purposes of this Section, "custodial
interrogation" means any interrogation during which the person
being interrogated is not free to leave and the person is being
asked questions relevant to the first degree murder investigation.
(725 ILCS 5/116-3)
Sec. 116-3. Motion for fingerprint or forensic testing not
available at trial regarding actual innocence.
(a) A defendant may make a motion before the trial court that
entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case for the
performance of fingerprint or forensic DNA testing, including
comparison analysis of genetic marker groupings of the evidence
collected by criminal justice agencies pursuant to the alleged offense,
to those of the defendant, to those of other forensic evidence, and to
those maintained under subsection (f) of Section 5-4-3 of the Unified
Code of Corrections, on evidence that was secured in relation to the
trial which resulted in his or her conviction, but which was not
subject to the testing which is now requested because the technology
for the testing was not available at the time of trial. Reasonable
notice of the motion shall be served upon the State.
(b) The defendant must present a prima facie case that:
(1) identity was the issue in the trial which resulted in his
or her conviction; and
(2) the evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of
custody sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted,
tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material aspect.
(c) The trial court shall allow the testing under reasonable
conditions designed to protect the State's interests in the integrity
of the evidence and the testing process upon a determination that:
(1) the result of the testing has the scientific potential to
produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the
defendant's assertion of actual innocence that significantly
advances the defendant's claim of innocence;
(2) the testing requested employs a scientific method
generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.
(Source: P.A. 90-141, eff. 1-1-98.)
(725 ILCS 5/122-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-1)
Sec. 122-1. Petition in the trial court.
(a) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary may institute a
proceeding under this Article if the person who asserts that:
1) in the proceedings which resulted in his or her conviction
[November 7, 2002] 28
there was a substantial denial of his or her rights under the
Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or
both; or
(2) the death penalty was imposed and there is newly
discovered evidence not available to the person at the time of the
proceeding that resulted in his or her conviction that establishes
the person's innocence.
(a-5) A proceeding under paragraph (2) of subsection (a) may be
commenced at any time after the person's conviction notwithstanding
any other provisions of may institute a proceeding under this Article.
In such a proceeding regarding actual innocence, if the court
determines the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit, it
shall dismiss the petition in a written order, specifying the findings
of fact and conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision. Such
order of dismissal is a final judgment and shall be served upon the
petitioner by certified mail within 10 days of its entry.
(b) The proceeding shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of
the court in which the conviction took place a petition (together
with a copy thereof) verified by affidavit. Petitioner shall also
serve another copy upon the State's Attorney by any of the methods
provided in Rule 7 of the Supreme Court. The clerk shall docket the
petition for consideration by the court pursuant to Section 122-2.1
upon his or her receipt thereof and bring the same promptly to the
attention of the court.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (a-5), if the
petitioner is under sentence of death, no proceedings under this
Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the issuance of
the mandate by the Supreme Court following affirmance of the
defendant's direct appeal of the trial court verdict. In all other
cases,no proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6
months after the denial of a petition for leave to appeal or the
date for filing such a petition if none is filed or more than 45 days
after the defendant files his or her brief in the appeal of the
sentence before the Illinois Supreme Court (or more than 45 days
after the deadline for the filing of the defendant's brief with the
Illinois Supreme Court if no brief is filed) or 3 years from the date
of conviction, whichever is sooner, unless the petitioner alleges facts
showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.
(d) A person seeking relief by filing a petition under this
Section must specify in the petition or its heading that it is filed
under this Section. A trial court that has received a petition
complaining of a conviction or sentence that fails to specify in the
petition or its heading that it is filed under this Section need not
evaluate the petition to determine whether it could otherwise have
stated some grounds for relief under this Article.
(e) A proceeding under this Article may not be commenced on behalf
of a defendant who has been sentenced to death without the written
consent of the defendant, unless the defendant, because of a
mental or physical condition, is incapable of asserting his or her
own claim.
(Source: P.A. 89-284, eff. 1-1-96; 89-609, eff. 1-1-97; 89-684, eff.
6-1-97; 90-14, eff. 7-1-97.)
(725 ILCS 5/122-2.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-2.1)
Sec. 122-2.1. (a) Within 90 days after the filing and docketing of
each petition, the court shall examine such petition and enter an
order thereon pursuant to this Section.
(1) If the petitioner is under sentence of death and is
without counsel and alleges that he is without means to procure
counsel, he shall state whether or not he wishes counsel to be
appointed to represent him. If appointment of counsel is so
requested, the court shall appoint counsel if satisfied that the
petitioner has no means to procure counsel.
(2) If the petitioner is sentenced to imprisonment and the court
determines the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit, it
29 [November 7, 2002]
shall dismiss the petition in a written order, specifying the
findings of fact and conclusions of law it made in reaching its
decision. Such order of dismissal is a final judgment and shall be
served upon the petitioner by certified mail within 10 days of its
entry.
(b) If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to this Section, the
court shall order the petition to be docketed for further
consideration in accordance with Sections 122-4 through 122-6. If the
petitioner is under sentence of death, the court shall order the
petition to be docketed for further consideration and hearing within
one year of the filing of the petition.
(c) In considering a petition pursuant to this Section, the court
may examine the court file of the proceeding in which the petitioner
was convicted, any action taken by an appellate court in such
proceeding and any transcripts of such proceeding. (Source: P.A.
86-655; 87-904.)
Section 20.5. The Capital Crimes Litigation Act is amended by
changing Sections 10 and 19 as follows:
725 ILCS 124/10)
(Section scheduled to be repealed on July 1, 2004)
Sec. 10. Court appointed trial counsel; compensation and expenses.
(a) This Section applies only to compensation and expenses of
trial counsel appointed by the court as set forth in Section 5, other
than public defenders, for the period after arraignment and so long
as the State's Attorney has not, at any time, filed a certificate
indicating he or she will not seek the death penalty or stated on the
record in open court that the death penalty will not be sought.
(b)Appointed trial counsel shall be compensated upon presentment
and certification by the circuit court of a claim for services
detailing the date, activity, and time duration for which
compensation is sought. Compensation for appointed trial counsel may be
paid at a reasonable rate not to exceed $125 per hour.
Beginning in 2001, every January 20, the statutory rate prescribed
in this subsection shall be automatically increased or decreased, as
applicable, by a percentage equal to the percentage change in the
consumer price index-u during the preceding 12- month calendar year.
"Consumer price index-u" means the index published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor that measures
the average change in prices of goods and services purchased by all
urban consumers, United States city average, all items, 1982-84=100.
The new rate resulting from each annual adjustment shall be determined
by the State Treasurer and made available to the chief judge of each
judicial circuit. Payment in excess of the limitations stated in this
subsection (b) may be made if the trial court certifies that such
payment is necessary to provide fair compensation for representation
based upon customary charges in the relevant legal market for
attorneys of similar skill, background, and experience. A trial
court may entertain the filing of this verified statement before the
termination of the cause and may order the provisional payment of sums
during the pendency of the cause.
(c) Appointed trial counsel may also petition the court for
certification of expenses for reasonable and necessary capital
litigation expenses including, but not limited to, investigatory and
other assistance, expert, forensic, and other witnesses, and
mitigation specialists. Counsel may not petition for certification of
expenses that may have been provided or compensated by the State
Appellate Defender under item (c)(5) of Section 10 of the State
Appellate Defender Act.
(d) Appointed trial counsel shall petition the court for
certification of compensation and expenses under this Section
periodically during the course of counsel's representation. If the
court determines that the compensation and expenses should be paid
from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund, the court shall certify, on a
[November 7, 2002] 30
form created by the State Treasurer, that all or a designated portion
of the amount requested is reasonable, necessary, and appropriate for
payment from the Trust Fund. Certification of compensation and
expenses by a court in any county other than Cook County shall be
delivered by the court to the State Treasurer and paid by the State
Treasurer directly from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund if there
are sufficient moneys in the Trust Fund to pay the compensation and
expenses. Certification of compensation and expenses by a court in
Cook County shall be delivered by the court to the county treasurer and
paid by the county treasurer from moneys granted to the county from
the Capital Litigation Trust Fund.
(Source: P.A. 91-589, eff. 1-1-00.)
(725 ILCS 124/19)
(Section scheduled to be repealed on July 1, 2004)
Sec. 19. Report; repeal.
(a) The Cook County Public Defender, the Cook County State's
Attorney, the State Appellate Defender, the State's Attorneys
Appellate Prosecutor, and the Attorney General shall each report
separately to the General Assembly by January 1, 2004 detailing
the amounts of money received by them through this Act, the uses
for which those funds were expended, the balances then in the
Capital Litigation Trust Fund or county accounts, as the case may
be, dedicated to them for the use and support of Public Defenders,
appointed trial defense counsel, and State's Attorneys, as the
case may be. The report shall describe and discuss the need for
continued funding through the Fund and contain any suggestions for
changes to this Act.
(b) (Blank) Unless the General Assembly provides otherwise, this
Act is repealed on July 1, 2004.
(Source: P.A. 91-589, eff. 1-1-00.)"; and
on page 73, line 29, by inserting after "5-4-3" the following:
"and by adding Section 5-2-7"; and
on page 81, by inserting between lines 27 and 28 the following:
"(730 ILCS 5/5-2-7 new)
Sec. 5-2-7. Fitness to be executed.
(a) A person is unfit to be executed if the person is mentally
retarded. For the purposes of this Section, "mentally retarded"
means:
(1) having significantly sub-average general intellectual
functioning as evidenced by a functional intelligence quotient
(I.Q.) of 70 or below; and
(2) having deficits in adaptive behavior.
The mental retardation must have been manifested during the
developmental period, or by 18 years of age.
(b) The question of fitness to be executed may be raised after
pronouncement of the death sentence. The procedure for raising and
deciding the question shall be the same as that provided for raising
and deciding the question of fitness to stand trial subject to the
following specific provisions:
(1) the question shall be raised by motion filed in the
sentencing court;
(2) the question shall be decided by the court;
(3) the burden of proving that the offender is unfit to be
executed is on the offender;
(4) if the offender is found to be mentally retarded, the
court must resentence the offender to natural life imprisonment
under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections."; and
on page 84, by replacing lines 19 and 20 with the following:
"Illinois and to all prosecutorial agencies. Notwithstanding the limits
on disclosure stated by this subsection (f), the genetic marker
31 [November 7, 2002]
grouping analysis information obtained under this Act also may be
released by court order pursuant to a motion under Section 114-15 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 to a defendant who meets all of
the requirements under that Section.
Notwithstanding any other statutory provision to the contrary,
all".
With these specific recommendations for change, House Bill 2058
will have my approval. I respectfully request your concurrence.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
August 21, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Governor by Article IV,
Section 9(e) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and re-affirmed by
the People of the State of Illinois by popular referendum in 1974, and
conforming to the standard articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in
People ex Rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 Ill. 2d 242 (1972), Continental
Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Zagel, 78 Ill. 2d 387 (1979),
People ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356 (1980), and
County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186 (1987), that gubernatorial
action be consistent with the fundamental purposes and the intent of
the bill, I hereby return House Bill 2271 entitled "AN ACT concerning
regulation of professions," with my specific recommendations for
change.
House Bill 2271 would protect the public in a variety of ways by
setting standards of qualifications, education, training and experience
for individuals who would like to practice massage therapy in Illinois.
This is a worthwhile goal and one that I fully support.
In order for the new regulations of this profession to be both
effective and efficient, the same rules should apply throughout the
state. The City of Chicago currently regulates massage establishments
and massage services. A concern has been raised that given the
effective date of this bill, and other references in the bill to when
individuals must be licensed by the state Department of Professional
Regulation, there could be a period of time when these individuals
would not be licensed.
This bill would not prevent the City of Chicago from continuing to
regulate massage establishments. In the case of the actual individuals,
a single statewide standard is the right public policy, and in order to
ensure that there are no gaps in regulatory coverage, I am making the
following recommendations for change:
On page 13, line 13, by replacing "The" with "Beginning January 1,
2004, the"; and
On page 13, line 15, by replacing "A" with "Beginning January 1,
2004, a".
[November 7, 2002] 32
With these changes, House Bill 2271 will have my approval. I
respectfully request your concurrence.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
August 2, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Governor by Article IV,
Section 9(e) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and re-affirmed by
the People of the State of Illinois by popular referendum in 1974, and
conforming to the standard articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in
People ex Rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 Ill. 2d 242 (1972), Continental
Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Zagel, 78 Ill. 2d 387 (1979),
People ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356 (1980), and
County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill.2d 186 (1987), that gubernatorial
action be consistent with the fundamental purposes and the intent of
the bill, I hereby return House Bill 4074 entitled, "AN ACT in relation
to criminal law," with my specific recommendation for change.
House Bill 4074 amends the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 to
allow retired police officers to become trained as electronic criminal
surveillance officers in order to conduct court authorized
non-consensual electronic criminal surveillance. The bill defines
retired police officer and prohibits the retired officer from carrying
a firearm at any time while carrying out their electronic surveillance
duties.
Under current law only specially trained and certified law
enforcement officers on active duty can carry out court authorized
non-consensual electronic criminal surveillance. The current
Electronic Criminal Surveillance law requires the State Police to train
and certify the officers. There are three levels of training and
certification:
(1) Electronic Criminal Surveillance Officer I (ECSO I) is
certified to (i) prepare petitions for the authority to intercept
private oral communications in accordance with the provisions of
electronic surveillance law; (ii) intercept and supervise the
interception of private oral communications; (iii) handle,
safeguard, and use evidence derived from such private oral
communications; and (iv) operate and maintain equipment used to
intercept private oral communications.
(2) Electronic Criminal Surveillance Officer II is certified to
carry out ECSO I duties, plus to install, maintain and remove
non-consensual electronic criminal surveillance devices when court
authorized non-consensual entry of property is not required.
(3) Electronic Criminal Surveillance Officer III is certified to
carry out ECSO I and ECSO II duties, plus when authorized by the
courts to enter property to install, maintain or remove
non-consensual electronic criminal surveillance devices. Currently
only law enforcement officers assigned to a dedicated electronic
criminal surveillance unit may apply for ECSO III training and
certification.
It is my understanding that during the legislative process, House
Bill 4074 was described as allowing retired police officers, who are
properly trained and certified by the State Police, to carry out
33 [November 7, 2002]
Electronic Criminal Surveillance Officer I duties of monitoring
intercepted communications. I fully support that purpose, which will
free up police officers to carry out other more pressing duties.
However, nothing in House Bill 4074 limits retired officers at ECSO I
duties or allows the State Police to decline to train retired police
officers at ECSO II and ECSO III levels. I believe it is important
that this legislation be so limited to avoid any confusion. Also, I do
not believe that retired police officers, who by the terms of this bill
are prohibited from carrying a firearm, should conduct the ECSO II and
ECSO III duties. There are not a large number of non-consensual
electronic surveillance operations carried out each year, so there is
not any pressing need for anyone other than active duty police officers
to carry out ECSO II and ECSO III duties. The intent of House Bill
4074 can be fully satisfied by limiting retired officers to currently
defined Electronic Criminal Surveillance Officer I duties.
For these reasons, I hereby return House Bill 4074 with the
following specific recommendation for change:
on page 2, line 34, after the period, by inserting the following:
"A retired law enforcement officer may be certified by the Illinois
State Police only to (i) prepare petitions for the authority to
intercept private oral communications in accordance with the
provisions of this Act; (ii) intercept and supervise the
interception of private oral communications; (iii) handle,
safeguard, and use evidence derived from such private oral
communications; and (iv) operate and maintain equipment used to
intercept private oral communications.".
With this change, House Bill 4074 will have my approval. I
respectfully request your concurrence.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
August 21, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Governor by Article IV,
Section 9(e) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and re-affirmed by
the People of the State of Illinois by popular referendum in 1974, and
conforming to the standard articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in
People ex Rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 Ill. 2d 242 (1972), Continental
Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Zagel, 78 Ill. 2d 387 (1979),
People ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356 (1980), and
County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186 (1987), that gubernatorial
action be consistent with the fundamental purposes and the intent of
the bill, I hereby return House Bill 4179, entitled "AN ACT in relation
to criminal law," with my specific recommendations for change.
House Bill 4179 amends the Criminal Code to amend the offense of
aggravated assault concerning emergency medical technicians (EMTs) and
other medical assistance personnel. It deletes the requirement that the
EMT must be an employee of a municipality or other governmental unit.
This legislation also ensures that employees of a police or sheriff's
department engaged in the performance of authorized duties are
protected under the aggravated assault and aggravated battery laws.
This legislation also increases the penalty for aggravated assault of
[November 7, 2002] 34
an emergency medical technician when a firearm is used from a Class A
misdemeanor (up to 1 year in county jail and/or fine up to $2,500) to a
Class 4 felony (1 to 3 years in prison and/or fine up to $25,000).
Emergency medical technicians, as well as police officers and
firefighters, have a difficult job. The same holds true for employees
of a police department. Any protection that these professions can
receive from crimes committed against them is important because we
depend on these public safety professions to protect us. The least we
can do is protect them and penalize those who prevent the performance
of their duties. I do not disagree with the purpose of such legislation
to equalize such offenses as aggravated assault or aggravated battery
when the victim is an EMT or employee of a law enforcement agency.
However, there are some inconsistencies in language of this legislation
that need to be corrected. Both of the aggravated assault and
aggravated battery statutes have sections that reference "official
duties", as opposed to "authorized" which is the language being used in
this legislation. Furthermore, there were some inadvertent errors that
must be corrected. To ensure consistency, clarify other provisions, and
prevent court challenges, I recommend the changes set forth below.
In addition, because of the importance of this legislation, I
request that the effective date of this legislation be amended as to
have the original effective date as this legislation had when it came
to my desk. Any amendatory veto action would move the effective date to
June 1, 2003, unless otherwise stated. Thus, I also recommend that this
legislation state the effective date as January 1, 2003.
For these reasons, I return House Bill 4179 with the following
recommendations for change:
On page 3, lines 10 and 14, by replacing "official" each time it
appears with "official"; and
On page 4, line 20, by replacing "authorized" with "official"; and
On page 8, line 13, by inserting "engaged" after "department"; and
On page 8, line 14, by replacing "authorized" with "official"; and
On page 9, by inserting after line 12 the following:
"Section 99. Effective date. This Act takes effect on January 1,
2003.".
With these specific recommendations for change, House Bill 4179
will have my approval. I respectfully request your concurrence.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
August 2, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Governor by Article IV,
35 [November 7, 2002]
Section 9(e) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and re-affirmed by
the People of the State of Illinois by popular referendum in 1974, and
conforming to the standard articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in
People ex Rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 Ill. 2d 242 (1972), Continental
Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Zagel, 78 Ill. 2d 387 (1979),
People ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356 (1980), and
County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186 (1987), that gubernatorial
action be consistent with the fundamental purposes and the intent of
the bill, I hereby return House Bill 4938 entitled "AN ACT concerning
State records, " with my specific recommendations for change.
House Bill 4938 amends the State Records Act to include "digitized
electronic material" and "databases" in definition of "record," and
exempts "blank forms" from the definition of "record". House Bill 4938
makes changes regarding inspection and copying of certain records
covered by the State Records Act. House Bill 4938 provides that the
Auditor General shall audit agencies for compliance with the provisions
of this Act and shall report findings to both the agency and the
Secretary of State.
The legislation also makes it a Class 4 felony to knowingly and
without authority alter, destroy, deface, remove or conceal any public
record. The legislation also adds similar language to Section 3 of the
State Records Act to prohibit records from being mutilated, destroyed,
transferred, removed, or otherwise damaged or disposed of, except as
provided by law. However, the current Section 24 of the State Records
Act makes any violation of Section 3 a Class B misdemeanor. These two
provisions have a penalty conflict, since both cover nearly the same
type of prohibited conduct but have different penalties. When
different penalties apply to offenses with the same elements, the
courts are constitutionally required to apply only the lower penalty.
Therefore, the new Class 4 felony penalty may be partially or totally
invalidated by the addition to Section 3. I propose changes that will
remove the conflict and make the Class 4 felony the applicable penalty.
For these reasons, I hereby return House Bill 4938 with the
following specific recommendations for change:
on page 2, by replacing line 29 with the following:
"Sec. 3. Records as property of State.
(a) All records"; and
on page 3, by replacing line 5 with the following:
"prohibited by law.
(b) Reports and records of the obligation,"; and
on page 13, line 22, by inserting "subsection (b) of" after "of".
With these changes, House Bill 4938 will have my approval. I
respectfully request your concurrence.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
August 16, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Governor by Article IV,
Section 9(e) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and re-affirmed by
the People of the State of Illinois by popular referendum in 1974, and
conforming to the standard articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in
People ex Rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 Ill. 2d 242 (1972), Continental
[November 7, 2002] 36
Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Zagel, 78 Ill. 2d 387 (1979),
People ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356 (1980), and
County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186 (1987), that gubernatorial
action be consistent with the fundamental purposes and the intent of
the bill, I hereby return House Bill 5610 entitled "AN ACT in relation
to vehicles," with my specific recommendation for change.
House Bill 5610 provides an exemption to the Illinois Vehicle Code,
which currently prohibits driving on sidewalks, to allow the use of
electric personal assistive mobility devices on sidewalks in Illinois.
By removing state restrictions against the use of the electric personal
assistive mobility devices on sidewalks, HB 5610 provides a framework
in which these devices may be used on sidewalks in Illinois. However,
since HB 5610 does not specifically defer to local regulation, HB 5610
effectively mandates that the use of electric personal assistive
mobility devices be allowed throughout the state. This is inconsistent
with current practice for the use of roller blades, bicycles, etc. and
unnecessarily supercedes local control over sidewalk use. From the
House and Senate floor debate it is clear that the legislature did not
intend to preclude or pre-empt Home Rule powers, but merely intended to
remove state restrictions against use of electric personal assistive
mobility devices on sidewalks. It is essential that the State preserve
local communities' right to permit, restrict, or prohibit the use of
such devices as they deem appropriate in their respective communities.
For this reason, I hereby return House Bill 5610 with the following
recommendation for change:
on page 1, line 6, by replacing "Section" with "Sections 11-208.2 and
"; and
on page 1, by inserting between lines 12 and 13 the following:
"(625 ILCS 5/11-208.2)
Sec. 11-208.2. Limitation on home rule units. The provisions of
this Chapter of this Act limit the authority of home rule units to
adopt local police regulations inconsistent herewith except pursuant to
Sections 11-208, and 11-209, 11-1005.1, 11-1412.1, and 11-1412.2 of
this Chapter of this Act."; and
on page 1, line 18, by inserting after the period the following:
"Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to limit or preempt the
authority of any home rule or non-home rule unit of local government
from regulating or prohibiting the use of electric personal assistive
mobility devices."; and
on page 1, line 25 by inserting after the period the following:
"Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to limit or preempt the
authority of any home rule or non-home rule unit of local government
from regulating or prohibiting the use of electric personal assistive
mobility devices."; and
on page 2, line 2, by inserting "device" after "mobility"; and
on page 2, line 3, by inserting after the period the following:
"Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to limit or preempt the
authority of any home rule or non-home rule unit of local government
from regulating or prohibiting the use of electric personal assistive
mobility devices.".
With these changes, House Bill 5610 will have my approval. I
respectfully request your concurrence.
37 [November 7, 2002]
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
July 16, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Governor by Article IV,
Section 9(e) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and re-affirmed by
the People of the State of Illinois by popular referendum in 1974, and
conforming to the standard articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in
People ex Rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 Ill. 2d 242 (1972), Continental
Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Zagel, 78 Ill. 2d 387 (1979),
People ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356 (1980), and
County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186 (1987), that gubernatorial
action be consistent with the fundamental purposes and the intent of
the bill, I hereby return House Bill 5652, entitled "AN ACT in relation
to criminal law," with my specific recommendations for change.
House Bill 5652 contains three separate provisions. The first would
amend the Unified Code of Corrections to provide that a defendant
convicted of cannabis trafficking or controlled substance trafficking
may receive only a maximum of 4.5 days of good conduct credit for each
month of his or her sentence of imprisonment. Secondly, House Bill 5652
would further amend the Unified Code of Corrections to add certain
reckless homicide offenses involving drugs or alcohol and 2 or more
deaths to the list of offenses for which a prisoner may not receive the
additional good conduct credit that is provided for participation in
drug abuse and certain other correctional programs. Finally, this bill
would amend the Criminal Code of 1961 to clarify that the offense of
aggravated robbery only applies if the offender had no firearm or other
dangerous weapon in his or her possession when he or she committed the
robbery.
The latter two of these provisions are needed technical changes to
insure that the law is applied fairly and equitably. However, the first
provision, which would add cannabis trafficking and controlled
substance trafficking to the "Truth-In-Sentencing" law (TIS) poses
several problems.
First, when TIS was first considered, it was known that funds were
not available to cover all criminal offenses because of costs of
incarceration associated with the longer time spent in prison under the
Truth-In-Sentencing law. Since covering only some offenses with TIS
raises constitutional proportionality questions, this risk was
minimized by the decision to cover only the most serious criminal
offenses with TIS. This led to TIS for crimes committed against the
person such as murder, criminal sexual assault, armed robbery, etc.
Since TIS was enacted in 1996 only one new offense has been added, and
that was aggravated arson last year due to its inherent
life-endangering nature. Because cannabis and controlled substance
trafficking is not a violent crime against the person, including it in
a category with only the most violent crimes against the person raises
potential constitutional issues.
Furthermore, the Federal "Violent Offender
[November 7, 2002] 38
Incarceration-Truth-in-Sentencing" (VOI-TIS) program, which provided
funds to states to pay for additional incarceration costs and prison
construction costs brought on by increasing prison time was
discontinued last year. As discussed, adding drug trafficking to TIS
would seem to be a significant departure from the original intent of
VOI-TIS and would have a significant fiscal impact particularly given
that federal funds are no longer available to pay for any of the
existing Truth-In-Sentencing offenses, let alone new offenses.
This one component of the bill accounts for the full $3.3 million
fiscal impact (over ten years) that the Department of Corrections
estimates would result from the enactment of this bill as written.
While proponents of this change are likely to argue that the violent
nature of most drug trafficking warrants its inclusion in the
Truth-In-Sentencing laws, it is difficult to justify spending more
money on longer prison terms for drug offenders at the same time that
funds are being cut at both the federal and state level for
incarceration and prison construction. Moreover, there is a growing
consensus that treatment programs, not longer incarceration, may offer
better results in combating the scourge of narcotics. Further, as noted
earlier, the fiscal impact becomes even more difficult to justify when
one considers the inconsistency that this provision would bring to the
current list of Truth-In-Sentencing offenses which would include only
the most violent crimes.
Finally, the current trafficking offenses already double the
minimum time in prison from what the sentence would be for the actual
delivery of that amount of cannabis or controlled substance to a
person. Consequently, under current law the sentence for high-end
amounts of controlled substances under the trafficking law is a minimum
30 years imprisonment, which means at least 15 years served (less six
months of potential meritorious good time). Requiring that 85% of the
30 years or 25.5 years be served in prison for drug trafficking would
result in a longer minimum sentence and length of stay than the minimum
sentence and length of stay for murder, which are both only 20 years.
Some judges have already criticized the trafficking provisions as too
harsh. Our state's prisons are already overcrowded with drug offenders
who may be serving more time than warranted by the offense and adding
these drug trafficking provisions to our Truth-In-Sentencing laws only
creates the risk of the courts invalidating Illinois' other TIS
provisions. For these reasons, I return House Bill 5652 with the
following recommendations for change:
on page 1, line 29, by replacing "Sections 3-6-3 and 5-4-1" with
"Section 3-6-3"; and
on page 4, by deleting lines 11 through 20; and
on page 5, by replacing "or" with "or"; and
on page 5, by replacing lines 17 through 21 with "date of this
amendatory Act of the 92nd General Assembly."; and
on pages 6, by replacing lines 15 through 18 with "Assembly, or
first degree murder, a Class X"; and
on page 10, by deleting lines 16 through 33; and
by deleting all of pages 11 through 16; and
on page 17, by deleting lines 1 through 24.
With these specific recommendations for change, House Bill 5652
will have my approval. I respectfully request your concurrence.
Sincerely,
39 [November 7, 2002]
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
JESSE WHITE - Secretary of State
November 7, 2002
To the Honorable Speaker of the House:
Sir:
In compliance with the provisions of the Constitution of the State
of Illinois, I am forwarding herewith the enclosed House Bills, as
vetoed by the Governor together with his objections.
HOUSE BILLS
4397
4466
5004
5278
5961
Respectfully,
s/Jesse White
Secretary of State
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
July 25, 2002
To The Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Pursuant to Article IV, Section 9(b) of the Illinois Constitution
of 1970, I hereby veto and return House Bill 4397 entitled "AN ACT
concerning municipalities."
House Bill 4397 amends the Illinois Municipal Code to provide that
certain municipalities may adopt, by ordinance or resolution, at least
180 days prior to the first municipal election following the
municipality's receipt of the new federal decennial census results,
certain numbers of aldermen depending on population.
I fully support the provisions in House Bill 4397; however, I have
already signed into law Senate Bill 1635 that contains identical
provisions.
For this reason, I hereby veto and return House Bill 4397.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
[November 7, 2002] 40
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
July 19, 2002
To The Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Pursuant to Article IV, Section 9(b) of the Illinois Constitution
of 1970, I hereby veto House Bill 4466 entitled "AN ACT in relation to
education."
House Bill 4466 seeks to restore the categorical system of special
education certification that has been altered by the federal courts. It
seeks to establish seven categories of certification, including serious
emotional disturbance; learning disabilities; autism; mental
retardation; orthopedic (physical) impairment; traumatic brain injury;
and other health impairments. The bill also requires the State Teacher
Certification Board to issue certificates based upon the qualifications
for the appropriate areas.
Today, however, I have already signed into law Senate Bill 1777
which is identical to this bill.
For this reason, I hereby veto and return House Bill 4466.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
July 19, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Pursuant to Article IV, Section 9(b) of the Illinois Constitution
of 1970, I hereby veto House Bill 5004 entitled "AN ACT in relation to
crime victims."
House Bill 5004 amends the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses
Act and the Open Parole Hearings Act to require the Prisoner Review
Board (the Board) to establish a toll-free telephone number for a small
number of crime victims to call regarding parole of an offender. The
bill allows a victim of domestic violence or sexual assault to give
information to the Board over the toll-free number for consideration at
the parole hearing of the person who committed the crime against the
victim. The crimes covered by the bill are felonies that involve sexual
assault, domestic battery, aggravated domestic battery, violation of an
order of protection, or other felony that involved force or violence
against a household member.
House Bill 5004 is well intentioned, but does not enhance our
existing victims' rights laws. The bill only applies to a few inmates,
because it is limited to inmates still serving a prison sentence under
the indeterminate parole system that was abolished for offenses
committed after 1977. With current file information, the Department of
Corrections found only 34 inmates clearly covered by this bill, though
41 [November 7, 2002]
a few others could potentially be included as well. Current law affords
these and all other victims in parole cases, not just domestic violence
or sexual assault related cases, the right to be notified in advance of
their offender's parole hearing. Today, a victim can submit information
to the Board for use in the parole hearing by letter, film, videotape,
recording, or other electronic means. The victim may also attend the
hearing in person if they so choose. This includes the spouse, parent
or child of a victim that was killed in the offense. According to the
Prisoner Review Board, all victims and interested parties who still
file parole protests, now after well over 25 years in most cases, are
accustomed to the existing procedures for objecting to parole. Most
choose to appear before the Board to object in person believing that a
personal appearance is more forceful than a letter or phone call, which
suggests that few victims would avail themselves of this new system.
Finally, there is established by law a statewide notification
system for victims and witnesses to check the status of inmates,
including those under the parole system. Implemented in early May, the
Illinois Automated Victim Notification (VINE) system is a fully
automated service that immediately notifies registered users via
telephone, pager, e-mail, fax or letter of any change in an offender's
custody status. It also provides access to a live person to assist
callers with using the system. Many agencies, including the Board, can
utilize this system to fulfill any duties regarding providing
notification to crime victims and witnesses.
Therefore, I believe current law affords all victims easy and
effective ways to provide and receive information from the Prisoner
Review Board regarding inmates up for parole and the additional
expenditure required to establish and operate this toll-free number is
unnecessary.
For these reasons, I hereby veto and return House Bill 5004.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
July 25, 2002
To The Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Pursuant to Article IV, Section 9(b) of the Illinois Constitution
of 1970, I hereby veto House Bill 5278, entitled "AN ACT in relation to
the regulation of professions."
House Bill 5278 amends the Plumbing License Law to require the
original registration fee or registration renewal fee for a plumbing
contractor to be set at $100. Public Act 92-338, effective August 10,
2001, amended the Plumbing License Law to require that all plumbing
contractors register with the Department of Public Health annually,
submit proof of bonding and insurance, and pay an annual registration
fee. The Department of Public Health was given the authority to set the
fees for registration and renewal by administrative rule. The
Department has set the fees, by rule, at $100 for both the initial
registration and the annual renewal. Since the fee level now in place
is exactly the same as the fee level that would be set if House Bill
[November 7, 2002] 42
5278 became law, the bill no longer serves its original purpose and
would add unnecessary language to the statute.
For this reason, I hereby veto and return House Bill 5278.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
STATE OF ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SPRINGFIELD, 62706
GEORGE H. RYAN
GOVERNOR
August 16, 2002
To the Honorable Members of the
Illinois House of Representatives
92nd General Assembly
Pursuant to Article VI, Section 9(b) of the Illinois Constitution
of 1970, I hereby veto House Bill 5961 entitled "AN ACT concerning well
water."
House Bill 5961 creates the Contaminated Well Water Revolving Loan
Program Fund to be administered by the Illinois Department of Public
Health. The state-wide program would provide loans of up to $30,000 to
help homeowners with contaminated water wells obtain an alternative
water well source. These interest-free loans would be repaid over a
thirty-year period.
House Bill 5961 originated because of water well quality problems
in Downers Grove, Illinois. While I support the concept of House Bill
5961 and believe it would be a useful tool in fighting private water
well contamination, it was passed without identifying a funding source
for either the loans or additional administrative costs associated with
the program. Because I believe this is a very serious problem, my
office has worked diligently with the area legislators and the
officials in Downers Grove and nearby communities to address the
specific water quality problems in the area. To this end, I recently
approved House Bill 6061, which included $2 million earmarked
specifically to help provide and alternative water source to those
affected homeowners in most need of immediate relief. Additionally, I
recently signed Senate Bill 2072 into law to assure notification of
affected homeowners as a further means of reducing future problems.
These recent actions have rendered House Bill 5961 unnecessary.
Futhermore, with the State's current fiscal situation, I am not in
favor of creating another program that places additional pressure on an
already strained State revenue stream.
For these reasons, I hereby veto and return House Bill 5961.
Sincerely,
s/GEORGE H. RYAN
Governor
At the hour of 12:15 O'CLOCK P.M., Representative Poe moved that
the House do now adjourn.
The motion prevailed.
And in accordance therewith and pursuant to SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION
81, the House stood adjourned until Tuesday, November 19, 2002, at 1:00
o'clock p.m.
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