102ND GENERAL ASSEMBLY
State of Illinois
2021 and 2022
HB5431

 

Introduced 1/31/2022, by Rep. Deanne M. Mazzochi

 

SYNOPSIS AS INTRODUCED:
 
725 ILCS 5/103-5  from Ch. 38, par. 103-5

    Amends the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Provides that a trial may not be delayed absent consent by the person or persons charged merely because of COVID-19, but that consent may not be unreasonably withheld. Provides that to stop or suspend a trial in progress or to not timely commence a trial that has been scheduled requires an individual quarantine order, medical order, or active infection of COVID-19 in the judge, a juror, a witness, a party, or legal counsel. Provides that the court may make reasonable efforts and accommodations for a trial in progress to stop or suspend the trial for a limited time or take other remedial measures that are in the best interests of the trial participants' health and safety, including, but not limited to, severing charges or persons, revisions to witness order, or seating of alternate jurors, but measures shall not include obligating the person or persons charged to modify legal counsel or obligating the accused to not call a witness in defense. Provides that the remedy for a violation of this subsection is securing injunctive relief to resume trial and, if the person or persons charged are granted the injunction to resume the trial, the moving party or parties shall be afforded reasonable costs and attorney's fees. Effective immediately.


LRB102 25078 RLC 35355 b

 

 

A BILL FOR

 

HB5431LRB102 25078 RLC 35355 b

1    AN ACT concerning criminal law.
 
2    Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois,
3represented in the General Assembly:
 
4    Section 5. The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 is
5amended by changing Section 103-5 as follows:
 
6    (725 ILCS 5/103-5)  (from Ch. 38, par. 103-5)
7    (Text of Section before amendment by P.A. 101-652)
8    Sec. 103-5. Speedy trial.)
9    (a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged
10offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within
11120 days from the date he or she was taken into custody unless
12delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for
13fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act, by a
14fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand
15trial, by a continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of
16this Act after a court's determination of the defendant's
17physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal.
18Delay shall be considered to be agreed to by the defendant
19unless he or she objects to the delay by making a written
20demand for trial or an oral demand for trial on the record. The
21provisions of this subsection (a) do not apply to a person on
22bail or recognizance for an offense but who is in custody for a
23violation of his or her parole, aftercare release, or

 

 

HB5431- 2 -LRB102 25078 RLC 35355 b

1mandatory supervised release for another offense.
2    The 120-day term must be one continuous period of
3incarceration. In computing the 120-day term, separate periods
4of incarceration may not be combined. If a defendant is taken
5into custody a second (or subsequent) time for the same
6offense, the term will begin again at day zero.
7    (b) Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by
8the court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date
9defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by the
10defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to
11Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an
12adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a continuance
13allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court's
14determination of the defendant's physical incapacity for
15trial, or by an interlocutory appeal. The defendant's failure
16to appear for any court date set by the court operates to waive
17the defendant's demand for trial made under this subsection.
18    For purposes of computing the 160 day period under this
19subsection (b), every person who was in custody for an alleged
20offense and demanded trial and is subsequently released on
21bail or recognizance and demands trial, shall be given credit
22for time spent in custody following the making of the demand
23while in custody. Any demand for trial made under this
24subsection (b) shall be in writing; and in the case of a
25defendant not in custody, the demand for trial shall include
26the date of any prior demand made under this provision while

 

 

HB5431- 3 -LRB102 25078 RLC 35355 b

1the defendant was in custody.
2    (c) If the court determines that the State has exercised
3without success due diligence to obtain evidence material to
4the case and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
5such evidence may be obtained at a later day the court may
6continue the cause on application of the State for not more
7than an additional 60 days. If the court determines that the
8State has exercised without success due diligence to obtain
9results of DNA testing that is material to the case and that
10there are reasonable grounds to believe that such results may
11be obtained at a later day, the court may continue the cause on
12application of the State for not more than an additional 120
13days.
14    (d) Every person not tried in accordance with subsections
15(a), (b) and (c) of this Section shall be discharged from
16custody or released from the obligations of his bail or
17recognizance.
18    (e) If a person is simultaneously in custody upon more
19than one charge pending against him in the same county, or
20simultaneously demands trial upon more than one charge pending
21against him in the same county, he shall be tried, or adjudged
22guilty after waiver of trial, upon at least one such charge
23before expiration relative to any of such pending charges of
24the period prescribed by subsections (a) and (b) of this
25Section. Such person shall be tried upon all of the remaining
26charges thus pending within 160 days from the date on which

 

 

HB5431- 4 -LRB102 25078 RLC 35355 b

1judgment relative to the first charge thus prosecuted is
2rendered pursuant to the Unified Code of Corrections or, if
3such trial upon such first charge is terminated without
4judgment and there is no subsequent trial of, or adjudication
5of guilt after waiver of trial of, such first charge within a
6reasonable time, the person shall be tried upon all of the
7remaining charges thus pending within 160 days from the date
8on which such trial is terminated; if either such period of 160
9days expires without the commencement of trial of, or
10adjudication of guilt after waiver of trial of, any of such
11remaining charges thus pending, such charge or charges shall
12be dismissed and barred for want of prosecution unless delay
13is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness
14ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness
15hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness for trial, by a
16continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act
17after a court's determination of the defendant's physical
18incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal; provided,
19however, that if the court determines that the State has
20exercised without success due diligence to obtain evidence
21material to the case and that there are reasonable grounds to
22believe that such evidence may be obtained at a later day the
23court may continue the cause on application of the State for
24not more than an additional 60 days.
25    (f) Delay occasioned by the defendant shall temporarily
26suspend for the time of the delay the period within which a

 

 

HB5431- 5 -LRB102 25078 RLC 35355 b

1person shall be tried as prescribed by subsections (a), (b),
2or (e) of this Section and on the day of expiration of the
3delay the said period shall continue at the point at which it
4was suspended. Where such delay occurs within 21 days of the
5end of the period within which a person shall be tried as
6prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e) of this Section,
7the court may continue the cause on application of the State
8for not more than an additional 21 days beyond the period
9prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e). This subsection
10(f) shall become effective on, and apply to persons charged
11with alleged offenses committed on or after, March 1, 1977.
12    (g) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section to
13the contrary, a trial may not be delayed absent consent by the
14person or persons charged merely because of COVID-19. However,
15consent may not be unreasonably withheld. To stop or suspend a
16trial in progress or to not timely commence a trial that has
17been scheduled requires an individual quarantine order,
18medical order, or active infection of COVID-19 in the judge, a
19juror, a witness, a party, or legal counsel. The court may make
20reasonable efforts and accommodations for a trial in progress
21to stop or suspend the trial for a limited time or take other
22remedial measures that are in the best interests of the trial
23participants' health and safety, including, but not limited
24to, severing charges or persons, revisions to witness order,
25or seating of alternate jurors, but measures shall not include
26obligating the person or persons charged to modify legal

 

 

HB5431- 6 -LRB102 25078 RLC 35355 b

1counsel or obligating the accused to not call a witness in
2defense.
3    The remedy for a violation of this subsection is securing
4injunctive relief to resume trial. If the person or persons
5charged are granted the injunction to resume the trial, the
6moving party or parties shall be afforded reasonable costs and
7attorney's fees.
8(Source: P.A. 98-558, eff. 1-1-14.)
 
9    (Text of Section after amendment by P.A. 101-652)
10    Sec. 103-5. Speedy trial.)
11    (a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged
12offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within
13120 days from the date he or she was taken into custody unless
14delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for
15fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act, by a
16fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand
17trial, by a continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of
18this Act after a court's determination of the defendant's
19physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal.
20Delay shall be considered to be agreed to by the defendant
21unless he or she objects to the delay by making a written
22demand for trial or an oral demand for trial on the record. The
23provisions of this subsection (a) do not apply to a person on
24pretrial release or recognizance for an offense but who is in
25custody for a violation of his or her parole, aftercare

 

 

HB5431- 7 -LRB102 25078 RLC 35355 b

1release, or mandatory supervised release for another offense.
2    The 120-day term must be one continuous period of
3incarceration. In computing the 120-day term, separate periods
4of incarceration may not be combined. If a defendant is taken
5into custody a second (or subsequent) time for the same
6offense, the term will begin again at day zero.
7    (b) Every person on pretrial release or recognizance shall
8be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 160 days from
9the date defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by
10the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant
11to Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an
12adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a continuance
13allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court's
14determination of the defendant's physical incapacity for
15trial, or by an interlocutory appeal. The defendant's failure
16to appear for any court date set by the court operates to waive
17the defendant's demand for trial made under this subsection.
18    For purposes of computing the 160 day period under this
19subsection (b), every person who was in custody for an alleged
20offense and demanded trial and is subsequently released on
21pretrial release or recognizance and demands trial, shall be
22given credit for time spent in custody following the making of
23the demand while in custody. Any demand for trial made under
24this subsection (b) shall be in writing; and in the case of a
25defendant not in custody, the demand for trial shall include
26the date of any prior demand made under this provision while

 

 

HB5431- 8 -LRB102 25078 RLC 35355 b

1the defendant was in custody.
2    (c) If the court determines that the State has exercised
3without success due diligence to obtain evidence material to
4the case and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
5such evidence may be obtained at a later day the court may
6continue the cause on application of the State for not more
7than an additional 60 days. If the court determines that the
8State has exercised without success due diligence to obtain
9results of DNA testing that is material to the case and that
10there are reasonable grounds to believe that such results may
11be obtained at a later day, the court may continue the cause on
12application of the State for not more than an additional 120
13days.
14    (d) Every person not tried in accordance with subsections
15(a), (b) and (c) of this Section shall be discharged from
16custody or released from the obligations of his pretrial
17release or recognizance.
18    (e) If a person is simultaneously in custody upon more
19than one charge pending against him in the same county, or
20simultaneously demands trial upon more than one charge pending
21against him in the same county, he shall be tried, or adjudged
22guilty after waiver of trial, upon at least one such charge
23before expiration relative to any of such pending charges of
24the period prescribed by subsections (a) and (b) of this
25Section. Such person shall be tried upon all of the remaining
26charges thus pending within 160 days from the date on which

 

 

HB5431- 9 -LRB102 25078 RLC 35355 b

1judgment relative to the first charge thus prosecuted is
2rendered pursuant to the Unified Code of Corrections or, if
3such trial upon such first charge is terminated without
4judgment and there is no subsequent trial of, or adjudication
5of guilt after waiver of trial of, such first charge within a
6reasonable time, the person shall be tried upon all of the
7remaining charges thus pending within 160 days from the date
8on which such trial is terminated; if either such period of 160
9days expires without the commencement of trial of, or
10adjudication of guilt after waiver of trial of, any of such
11remaining charges thus pending, such charge or charges shall
12be dismissed and barred for want of prosecution unless delay
13is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness
14ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness
15hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness for trial, by a
16continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act
17after a court's determination of the defendant's physical
18incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal; provided,
19however, that if the court determines that the State has
20exercised without success due diligence to obtain evidence
21material to the case and that there are reasonable grounds to
22believe that such evidence may be obtained at a later day the
23court may continue the cause on application of the State for
24not more than an additional 60 days.
25    (f) Delay occasioned by the defendant shall temporarily
26suspend for the time of the delay the period within which a

 

 

HB5431- 10 -LRB102 25078 RLC 35355 b

1person shall be tried as prescribed by subsections (a), (b),
2or (e) of this Section and on the day of expiration of the
3delay the said period shall continue at the point at which it
4was suspended. Where such delay occurs within 21 days of the
5end of the period within which a person shall be tried as
6prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e) of this Section,
7the court may continue the cause on application of the State
8for not more than an additional 21 days beyond the period
9prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e). This subsection
10(f) shall become effective on, and apply to persons charged
11with alleged offenses committed on or after, March 1, 1977.
12    (g) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section to
13the contrary, a trial may not be delayed absent consent by the
14person or persons charged merely because of COVID-19. However,
15consent may not be unreasonably withheld. To stop or suspend a
16trial in progress or to not timely commence a trial that has
17been scheduled requires an individual quarantine order,
18medical order, or active infection of COVID-19 in the judge, a
19juror, a witness, a party, or legal counsel. The court may make
20reasonable efforts and accommodations for a trial in progress
21to stop or suspend the trial for a limited time or take other
22remedial measures that are in the best interests of the trial
23participants' health and safety, including, but not limited
24to, severing charges or persons, revisions to witness order,
25or seating of alternate jurors, but measures shall not include
26obligating the person or persons charged to modify legal

 

 

HB5431- 11 -LRB102 25078 RLC 35355 b

1counsel or obligating the accused to not call a witness in
2defense.
3    The remedy for a violation of this subsection is securing
4injunctive relief to resume trial. If the person or persons
5charged are granted the injunction to resume the trial, the
6moving party or parties shall be afforded reasonable costs and
7attorney's fees.
8(Source: P.A. 101-652, eff. 1-1-23.)
 
9    Section 95. No acceleration or delay. Where this Act makes
10changes in a statute that is represented in this Act by text
11that is not yet or no longer in effect (for example, a Section
12represented by multiple versions), the use of that text does
13not accelerate or delay the taking effect of (i) the changes
14made by this Act or (ii) provisions derived from any other
15Public Act.
 
16    Section 99. Effective date. This Act takes effect upon
17becoming law.