HB3506 - 104th General Assembly
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| 1 | AMENDMENT TO HOUSE BILL 3506 | ||||||
| 2 | AMENDMENT NO. ______. Amend House Bill 3506 by replacing | ||||||
| 3 | everything after the enacting clause with the following: | ||||||
| 4 | "Section 1. Short title. This Act may be cited as the | ||||||
| 5 | Artificial Intelligence Safety and Security Protocol Act. | ||||||
| 6 | Section 5. Legislative findings and purpose. The General | ||||||
| 7 | Assembly finds and declares: | ||||||
| 8 | (a) Artificial intelligence, including new advances in | ||||||
| 9 | generative artificial intelligence, has the potential to | ||||||
| 10 | catalyze innovation and the rapid development of a wide range | ||||||
| 11 | of benefits for Illinoisans and the Illinois economy, | ||||||
| 12 | including advances in medicine, climate science, and | ||||||
| 13 | education, and to push the bounds of human creativity and | ||||||
| 14 | capacity. | ||||||
| 15 | (b) If not properly subject to human controls, future | ||||||
| 16 | development in artificial intelligence may also have the | ||||||
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| 1 | potential to be used to create novel threats to public safety | ||||||
| 2 | and security, including by enabling the creation and the | ||||||
| 3 | proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as | ||||||
| 4 | biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, as well as weapons | ||||||
| 5 | with cyber-offensive capabilities. | ||||||
| 6 | (c) If not properly subject to human controls, future | ||||||
| 7 | artificial intelligence models may be able to cause serious | ||||||
| 8 | harm with limited human intervention. | ||||||
| 9 | (d) This State has an essential role in fostering | ||||||
| 10 | transparency, security, and reasonable care in the development | ||||||
| 11 | of the most powerful artificial intelligence systems, in order | ||||||
| 12 | to protect the safety, health, and economic interests of this | ||||||
| 13 | State. | ||||||
| 14 | (e) Actions taken by large developers that reduce consumer | ||||||
| 15 | prices for access to foundation models, increase the ability | ||||||
| 16 | of artificial intelligence safety and security researchers to | ||||||
| 17 | conduct research, increase interoperability between foundation | ||||||
| 18 | models produced by different large developers, improve the | ||||||
| 19 | ability for small businesses to use foundation models, and | ||||||
| 20 | promote privacy of user inputs to foundation models provide | ||||||
| 21 | important societal benefits. | ||||||
| 22 | Section 10. Definitions. As used in this Act: | ||||||
| 23 | "Adverse employment action" means an action that a | ||||||
| 24 | reasonable employee would find materially adverse. For the | ||||||
| 25 | purpose of this definition, an action is materially adverse if | ||||||
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| 1 | it could dissuade a reasonable worker from disclosing or | ||||||
| 2 | threatening to disclose information protected under Section | ||||||
| 3 | 30. | ||||||
| 4 | "Artificial intelligence model" means an engineered or | ||||||
| 5 | machine-based system that varies in its level of autonomy and | ||||||
| 6 | that can, for explicit or implicit objectives, infer from the | ||||||
| 7 | input it receives how to generate outputs that can influence | ||||||
| 8 | physical or virtual environments. | ||||||
| 9 | "Critical risk" means a foreseeable and material risk that | ||||||
| 10 | a large developer's development, storage, or deployment of a | ||||||
| 11 | foundation model will result in the death of, or serious | ||||||
| 12 | injury to, more than 100 people, or more than $1,000,000,000 | ||||||
| 13 | in damage to rights in money or property, through an incident | ||||||
| 14 | of the following types: | ||||||
| 15 | (1) the creation and release of a chemical, | ||||||
| 16 | biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon; | ||||||
| 17 | (2) a cyber-attack conducted by or assisted by a | ||||||
| 18 | foundation model; or | ||||||
| 19 | (3) a foundation model engaging in conduct that, | ||||||
| 20 | would, if committed by a human, constitute a crime | ||||||
| 21 | specified under the Criminal Code of 2012 that requires | ||||||
| 22 | intent, recklessness, or gross negligence, or the | ||||||
| 23 | solicitation or aiding and abetting of the crime, if that | ||||||
| 24 | conduct occurs with limited human intervention. | ||||||
| 25 | For the purposes of this definition, a harm inflicted by | ||||||
| 26 | an intervening human actor does not result from the large | ||||||
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| 1 | developer's activities unless those activities make it | ||||||
| 2 | substantially easier or more likely for the actor to inflict | ||||||
| 3 | the harm. | ||||||
| 4 | "Deploy" means to use a foundation model or to make a | ||||||
| 5 | foundation model foreseeably available to one or more third | ||||||
| 6 | parties for use, modification, copying, or combination with | ||||||
| 7 | other software, except as reasonably necessary for developing | ||||||
| 8 | the foundation model or evaluating the foundation model or | ||||||
| 9 | other foundation models. | ||||||
| 10 | "Employee" means any individual permitted to work by a | ||||||
| 11 | large developer. "Employee" includes any corporate officers of | ||||||
| 12 | the large developer and any contractors, subcontractors, and | ||||||
| 13 | unpaid advisors involved with assessing, managing, or | ||||||
| 14 | addressing critical risk. | ||||||
| 15 | "Foundation model" means an artificial intelligence model | ||||||
| 16 | that: | ||||||
| 17 | (1) is trained on a broad data set; | ||||||
| 18 | (2) is designed for generality of output; and | ||||||
| 19 | (3) can be adapted to a wide range of distinctive | ||||||
| 20 | tasks. | ||||||
| 21 | "Large developer" means a person that has: | ||||||
| 22 | (1) developed a foundation model with a quantity of | ||||||
| 23 | computing power that costs at least $5,000,000 when | ||||||
| 24 | measured using prevailing market prices of cloud computing | ||||||
| 25 | in the United States at the time that training of the | ||||||
| 26 | foundation model commences; and | ||||||
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| 1 | (2) within the immediately preceding 12 months, | ||||||
| 2 | developed one or more foundation models using a total | ||||||
| 3 | quantity of computing power that costs at least | ||||||
| 4 | $100,000,000 as measured by the average cost of an | ||||||
| 5 | equivalent amount of cloud computing in the United States | ||||||
| 6 | at the time the computational power was used. | ||||||
| 7 | "Retaliatory action" means an adverse employment action or | ||||||
| 8 | the threat of an adverse employment action by a large | ||||||
| 9 | developer or a large developer's agent to penalize or any | ||||||
| 10 | non-employment action that would dissuade a reasonable worker | ||||||
| 11 | from disclosing information under this Act. "Retaliatory | ||||||
| 12 | action" includes, but is not limited to: | ||||||
| 13 | (1) taking, or threatening to take, any action that | ||||||
| 14 | would intentionally interfere with an employee's ability | ||||||
| 15 | to obtain future employment or post-termination | ||||||
| 16 | retaliation to intentionally interfere with a former | ||||||
| 17 | employee's employment; | ||||||
| 18 | (2) taking, or threatening to take, any action | ||||||
| 19 | prohibited by subsection (G) of Section 2-102 of the | ||||||
| 20 | Illinois Human Rights Act; or | ||||||
| 21 | (3) contacting, or threatening to contact, United | ||||||
| 22 | States immigration authorities, or otherwise reporting, or | ||||||
| 23 | threatening to report, an employee's suspected or actual | ||||||
| 24 | citizenship or immigration status or the suspected or | ||||||
| 25 | actual citizenship or immigration status of an employee's | ||||||
| 26 | family or household member to a federal, State, or local | ||||||
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| 1 | agency. | ||||||
| 2 | "Retaliatory action" does not include: | ||||||
| 3 | (1) conduct undertaken at the express and specific | ||||||
| 4 | direction or request of the federal government; | ||||||
| 5 | (2) truthful, performance-related information about an | ||||||
| 6 | employee or former employee provided in good faith to a | ||||||
| 7 | prospective large developer at the request of the | ||||||
| 8 | prospective large developer; or | ||||||
| 9 | (3) conduct undertaken if specifically required by | ||||||
| 10 | State or federal law. | ||||||
| 11 | "Safety and security protocol" means a set of documented | ||||||
| 12 | technical and organizational protocols used by a large | ||||||
| 13 | developer to manage critical risks that describes in detail: | ||||||
| 14 | (1) how, if at all, the large developer excludes | ||||||
| 15 | certain foundation models from being covered by its safety | ||||||
| 16 | and security protocol when those foundation models pose | ||||||
| 17 | limited critical risks; | ||||||
| 18 | (2) thresholds at which critical risks would be deemed | ||||||
| 19 | intolerable and justifications for these thresholds and | ||||||
| 20 | what the large developer will do if one or more thresholds | ||||||
| 21 | are surpassed; | ||||||
| 22 | (3) the testing and assessment procedures the large | ||||||
| 23 | developer uses to investigate critical risks and how these | ||||||
| 24 | tests account for the possibility that a foundation model | ||||||
| 25 | could evade the control of its large developer or user or | ||||||
| 26 | be misused, modified, executed with increased | ||||||
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| 1 | computational resources, or used to create another | ||||||
| 2 | foundation model; | ||||||
| 3 | (4) the procedure the large developer will use to | ||||||
| 4 | determine whether and how to deploy a foundation model | ||||||
| 5 | when doing so poses critical risks; | ||||||
| 6 | (5) the physical, digital, and organizational security | ||||||
| 7 | protections the large developer will implement to prevent | ||||||
| 8 | insiders or third parties from accessing foundation models | ||||||
| 9 | within the large developer's control in a manner that is | ||||||
| 10 | unauthorized by the large developer and could create | ||||||
| 11 | critical risk; | ||||||
| 12 | (6) any safeguards and risk mitigation measures the | ||||||
| 13 | large developer uses to reduce critical risks from its | ||||||
| 14 | foundation models and how the large developer assesses | ||||||
| 15 | their efficacy and limitations; | ||||||
| 16 | (7) how the large developer will respond if a critical | ||||||
| 17 | risk materializes or is imminently about to materialize; | ||||||
| 18 | (8) the procedure that the large developer uses to | ||||||
| 19 | determine whether to conduct additional assessments for | ||||||
| 20 | critical risk when it modifies or expands access to its | ||||||
| 21 | foundation models or combines its foundation models with | ||||||
| 22 | other software and how the assessments are conducted; | ||||||
| 23 | (9) the conditions under which the large developer | ||||||
| 24 | will report incidents relevant to critical risk that have | ||||||
| 25 | occurred in connection with one or more of its foundation | ||||||
| 26 | models and the entities to which the large developer will | ||||||
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| 1 | make those reports; | ||||||
| 2 | (10) the conditions under which the large developer | ||||||
| 3 | may or will make modifications to its safety and security | ||||||
| 4 | protocol; | ||||||
| 5 | (11) the parts of the safety and security protocol, if | ||||||
| 6 | any, that the large developer believes provide sufficient | ||||||
| 7 | scientific detail to allow for the independent assessment | ||||||
| 8 | of the methods used to generate the results, evidence, and | ||||||
| 9 | analysis, and to which experts, if any, unredacted | ||||||
| 10 | versions are made available; and | ||||||
| 11 | (12) any other role, if any, financially disinterested | ||||||
| 12 | third parties play in the implementation of the other | ||||||
| 13 | items of this definition. | ||||||
| 14 | "Supervisor" means any individual who has the authority to | ||||||
| 15 | direct and control the work performance of the affected | ||||||
| 16 | employee or any individual who has managerial authority to | ||||||
| 17 | take corrective action concerning critical risk in accordance | ||||||
| 18 | with Section 30. | ||||||
| 19 | Section 15. Safety and security protocol. | ||||||
| 20 | (a) A large developer shall produce, implement, follow, | ||||||
| 21 | and conspicuously publish a safety and security protocol. If a | ||||||
| 22 | large developer makes a material modification to the safety | ||||||
| 23 | and security protocol, the large developer shall conspicuously | ||||||
| 24 | publish those modifications no later than 30 days after the | ||||||
| 25 | effective date of those modifications. | ||||||
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| 1 | (b) No less than every 90 days, a large developer shall | ||||||
| 2 | produce and conspicuously publish a transparency report. The | ||||||
| 3 | transparency report shall cover the period between 120 and 30 | ||||||
| 4 | days before the submission of the transparency report `and | ||||||
| 5 | include the following: | ||||||
| 6 | (1) the conclusion of any risk assessments made | ||||||
| 7 | pursuant to the large developer's safety and security | ||||||
| 8 | protocol during the reporting period; | ||||||
| 9 | (2) if different from the preceding reporting period, | ||||||
| 10 | for each type of critical risk, an assessment of the | ||||||
| 11 | relevant capabilities in whichever of the large | ||||||
| 12 | developer's foundation models, whether deployed or not, | ||||||
| 13 | would pose the highest level of that critical risk if | ||||||
| 14 | deployed without adequate safeguards and protections; and | ||||||
| 15 | (3) if the large developer has deployed a foundation | ||||||
| 16 | model or a modified version of a foundation model during | ||||||
| 17 | the reporting, that would, if deployed without adequate | ||||||
| 18 | safeguards and protections, pose a higher level of | ||||||
| 19 | critical risk than any of the large developer's existing | ||||||
| 20 | deployed foundation models: | ||||||
| 21 | (A) the grounds on which, and the process by | ||||||
| 22 | which, the large developer decided to deploy the | ||||||
| 23 | foundation model; and | ||||||
| 24 | (B) any safeguards and protections implemented by | ||||||
| 25 | the large developer to mitigate critical risks. | ||||||
| 26 | (c) A large developer shall record and retain for a period | ||||||
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| 1 | of no less than 5 years any specific tests used and test | ||||||
| 2 | results obtained as part of any assessments of critical risks, | ||||||
| 3 | including sufficient detail for qualified third parties to | ||||||
| 4 | replicate the testing. | ||||||
| 5 | (d) A large developer shall not knowingly make false or | ||||||
| 6 | materially misleading statements or omissions in or regarding | ||||||
| 7 | documents produced under this Section. | ||||||
| 8 | Section 20. Redactions. | ||||||
| 9 | (a) If a large developer publishes documents in order to | ||||||
| 10 | comply with this Act, the large developer may make redactions | ||||||
| 11 | to those documents that are reasonably necessary to protect | ||||||
| 12 | the large developer's or auditor's trade secrets, public | ||||||
| 13 | safety, or the national security of the United States or to | ||||||
| 14 | comply with any federal or State law. If a large developer | ||||||
| 15 | redacts information in a document, the large developer shall: | ||||||
| 16 | (1) retain an unredacted version of the document for | ||||||
| 17 | at least 5 years and allow the Attorney General to inspect | ||||||
| 18 | the unredacted version of the document upon request; and | ||||||
| 19 | (2) describe the character and justification of the | ||||||
| 20 | redaction in any published version of the document, to the | ||||||
| 21 | extent permitted by the concerns that justify redaction. | ||||||
| 22 | (b) In addition to a large developer's redactions, the | ||||||
| 23 | auditor may also redact information using the same procedure | ||||||
| 24 | described in subsection (a) for information that the large | ||||||
| 25 | developer is required to publish in accordance with subsection | ||||||
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| 1 | (c) of Section 25 before the publication of that information. | ||||||
| 2 | Section 25. Audits. | ||||||
| 3 | (a) At least once every calendar year, a large developer | ||||||
| 4 | shall retain a reputable third-party auditor to produce a | ||||||
| 5 | report assessing the following: | ||||||
| 6 | (1) whether the large developer has complied with its | ||||||
| 7 | safety and security protocol and any instances of | ||||||
| 8 | noncompliance; | ||||||
| 9 | (2) any instances where the large developer's safety | ||||||
| 10 | and security protocol has not been stated clearly enough | ||||||
| 11 | to determine whether the large developer has complied; and | ||||||
| 12 | (3) any instances where the auditor believes the large | ||||||
| 13 | developer may have violated subsection (d) of Section 15 | ||||||
| 14 | or Section 20. | ||||||
| 15 | (b) A large developer shall allow the third-party auditor | ||||||
| 16 | access to all materials produced to comply with this Act and | ||||||
| 17 | any other materials reasonably necessary to perform the | ||||||
| 18 | assessment required under subsection (a). | ||||||
| 19 | (c) No later than 90 days after the completion of the | ||||||
| 20 | third-party auditor's report required under subsection (a), | ||||||
| 21 | the large developer shall conspicuously publish the report. | ||||||
| 22 | (d) In conducting the audit, the auditor shall employ or | ||||||
| 23 | contract one or more individuals with expertise in corporate | ||||||
| 24 | compliance and one or more individuals with technical | ||||||
| 25 | expertise in the safety of foundation models. | ||||||
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| 1 | Section 30. Whistleblower protections. | ||||||
| 2 | (a) A large developer that has one or more employees in | ||||||
| 3 | this State shall provide a reasonable internal process through | ||||||
| 4 | which an employee may anonymously disclose information to the | ||||||
| 5 | large developer if the employee believes in good faith that | ||||||
| 6 | information indicates that the large developer's activities | ||||||
| 7 | pose critical risk, including a monthly update to the person | ||||||
| 8 | who made the disclosure regarding the status of the large | ||||||
| 9 | developer's investigation of the disclosure and the actions | ||||||
| 10 | taken by the large developer in response to the disclosure. | ||||||
| 11 | (b) The disclosures and responses of the process required | ||||||
| 12 | by subsection (a) shall be maintained for a minimum of 7 years | ||||||
| 13 | after the date when the disclosure is made to the large | ||||||
| 14 | developer or the response to the disclosure is made by the | ||||||
| 15 | large developer. Each disclosure and response shall be shared | ||||||
| 16 | with the officers and directors of the large developer who do | ||||||
| 17 | not have a conflict of interest no less frequently than once | ||||||
| 18 | every fiscal quarter. | ||||||
| 19 | (c) A large developer that has one or more employees in | ||||||
| 20 | this State shall not make, adopt, or enforce any rule, | ||||||
| 21 | regulation, or policy preventing an employee from disclosing | ||||||
| 22 | information to a government or law enforcement agency if the | ||||||
| 23 | employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information | ||||||
| 24 | discloses that the large developer's activities pose critical | ||||||
| 25 | risk. | ||||||
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| 1 | (d) A large developer that has one or more employees in | ||||||
| 2 | this State shall not take retaliatory action against an | ||||||
| 3 | employee for disclosing or threatening to disclose information | ||||||
| 4 | to a government or law enforcement agency information related | ||||||
| 5 | to an activity, policy, or practice of the large developer, | ||||||
| 6 | where the employee has a good faith belief that the activity, | ||||||
| 7 | policy, or practice of the large developer poses critical | ||||||
| 8 | risk. | ||||||
| 9 | (e) A large developer that has one or more employees in | ||||||
| 10 | this State shall not take retaliatory action against an | ||||||
| 11 | employee for disclosing or threatening to disclose to any | ||||||
| 12 | supervisor, principal officer, or board member, information | ||||||
| 13 | related to an activity, policy, or practice of the large | ||||||
| 14 | developer if the employee has a good faith belief that the | ||||||
| 15 | activity, policy, or practice creates critical risk. | ||||||
| 16 | (f) A large developer that has one or more employees in | ||||||
| 17 | this State shall not threaten any employee with any act or | ||||||
| 18 | omission if that Act or omission would constitute retaliatory | ||||||
| 19 | action against the employee under this Section. | ||||||
| 20 | (g) It is a defense to any action brought under this | ||||||
| 21 | Section that the retaliatory action was predicated solely upon | ||||||
| 22 | grounds other than the employee's exercise of any rights | ||||||
| 23 | protected under this Section or the Whistleblower Act. | ||||||
| 24 | (h) This Section does not apply to a disclosure that would | ||||||
| 25 | constitute a violation of attorney-client privilege. | ||||||
| 26 | (i) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to | ||||||
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| 1 | invalidate or limit any protection afforded to employees or | ||||||
| 2 | any obligation imposed on employers, including those that are | ||||||
| 3 | large developers, under the Whistleblower Act. | ||||||
| 4 | Section 35. Enforcement of safety and security protocols. | ||||||
| 5 | (a) The Attorney General may bring a civil action against | ||||||
| 6 | a large developer that violates Sections 15 or 25. A large | ||||||
| 7 | developer found guilty of violating Sections 15 or 25 may be | ||||||
| 8 | assessed a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000,000. In | ||||||
| 9 | calculating the civil penalty assessed under this subsection, | ||||||
| 10 | a court shall consider the severity of the violation and | ||||||
| 11 | whether the violation resulted in, or could have resulted in, | ||||||
| 12 | the materialization of a critical risk. | ||||||
| 13 | (b) The Attorney General may seek injunctive or | ||||||
| 14 | declaratory relief for any violation of this Act. The Attorney | ||||||
| 15 | General may also seek injunctive relief if a large developer's | ||||||
| 16 | activities present an imminent threat of catastrophic harm to | ||||||
| 17 | the public. | ||||||
| 18 | (c) In determining whether a large developer's act or | ||||||
| 19 | omission breached its common law duty to take reasonable care | ||||||
| 20 | with respect to critical risks, the following considerations | ||||||
| 21 | are relevant but not conclusive: | ||||||
| 22 | (1) the quality of the large developer's safety and | ||||||
| 23 | security protocol and the extent of the large developer's | ||||||
| 24 | adherence to it; | ||||||
| 25 | (2) whether, in quality and implementation, the large | ||||||
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| 1 | developer's investigation, documentation, evaluation, and | ||||||
| 2 | management of critical risks was inferior, comparable, or | ||||||
| 3 | superior to other large developers of foundation models | ||||||
| 4 | that may pose comparable critical risk; | ||||||
| 5 | (3) the extent to which the large developer | ||||||
| 6 | responsibly informed the public of critical risks posed by | ||||||
| 7 | its foundation models; and | ||||||
| 8 | (4) whether the societal benefit produced by the large | ||||||
| 9 | developer's act or omission outweighed the associated | ||||||
| 10 | critical risk. | ||||||
| 11 | Section 40. Enforcement of whistleblower protections. | ||||||
| 12 | (a) Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to | ||||||
| 13 | believe that any large developer has engaged in a practice | ||||||
| 14 | prohibited by Section 30, the Attorney General may, pursuant | ||||||
| 15 | to the authority conferred by Section 6.3 of the Attorney | ||||||
| 16 | General Act, initiate or intervene in a civil action in the | ||||||
| 17 | name of the People of the State in any appropriate court to | ||||||
| 18 | obtain appropriate relief. | ||||||
| 19 | (b) Before initiating an action, the Attorney General may | ||||||
| 20 | conduct an investigation and may: | ||||||
| 21 | (1) require a large developer to file a statement or | ||||||
| 22 | report in writing, under oath or otherwise, as to all | ||||||
| 23 | information the Attorney General may consider necessary; | ||||||
| 24 | (2) examine under oath any person alleged to have | ||||||
| 25 | participated in, or with knowledge of, the alleged | ||||||
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| 1 | violation; or | ||||||
| 2 | (3) issue subpoenas or conduct hearings in aid of any | ||||||
| 3 | investigation. | ||||||
| 4 | (c) Service by the Attorney General of any notice | ||||||
| 5 | requiring a large developer to file a statement or report, or | ||||||
| 6 | of a subpoena upon any large developer, shall be made: | ||||||
| 7 | (1) personally by delivery of a duly executed copy | ||||||
| 8 | thereof to the person to be served or, if a person is not a | ||||||
| 9 | natural person, in the manner provided in the Code of | ||||||
| 10 | Civil Procedure when a complaint is filed; or | ||||||
| 11 | (2) by mailing by certified mail a duly executed copy | ||||||
| 12 | thereof to the person to be served at the person's last | ||||||
| 13 | known abode or principal place of business within this | ||||||
| 14 | State or, if the person is not a natural person, in the | ||||||
| 15 | manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure when a | ||||||
| 16 | complaint is filed. The Attorney General may compel | ||||||
| 17 | compliance with investigative demands under this Section | ||||||
| 18 | through an order by any court of competent jurisdiction. | ||||||
| 19 | (d)(1) In an action brought under this Act, the Attorney | ||||||
| 20 | General may obtain, as a remedy, monetary damages to the | ||||||
| 21 | State, restitution, and equitable relief, including any | ||||||
| 22 | permanent or preliminary injunction, temporary restraining | ||||||
| 23 | order, or other order, including an order enjoining the | ||||||
| 24 | defendant from engaging in a violation, or order any action as | ||||||
| 25 | may be appropriate. The Attorney General may request, and the | ||||||
| 26 | court may grant, any remedy available under Section 45 to the | ||||||
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| 1 | employee or employees affected by the violation. Additionally, | ||||||
| 2 | the Attorney General may request and the court may impose a | ||||||
| 3 | civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 for each repeat violation | ||||||
| 4 | within a 5-year period. For purposes of this Section, each | ||||||
| 5 | violation of this Act for each employee that the large | ||||||
| 6 | developer took or threatened to take retaliatory action | ||||||
| 7 | against shall constitute a separate and distinct violation. | ||||||
| 8 | (2) A civil penalty imposed under this subsection shall be | ||||||
| 9 | deposited into the Attorney General Court Ordered and | ||||||
| 10 | Voluntary Compliance Payment Projects Fund. | ||||||
| 11 | Section 45. Civil damages for employees. If a large | ||||||
| 12 | developer takes any retaliatory action against an employee in | ||||||
| 13 | violation of Section 30, the employee may bring a civil action | ||||||
| 14 | against the large developer for all relief necessary to make | ||||||
| 15 | the employee whole, including but not limited to the | ||||||
| 16 | following, as appropriate: | ||||||
| 17 | (1) permanent or preliminary injunctive relief; | ||||||
| 18 | (2) reinstatement with the same seniority status that | ||||||
| 19 | the employee would have had, but for the violation; | ||||||
| 20 | (3) back pay, with interest of 9% per annum up to 90 | ||||||
| 21 | calendar days from the date the complaint is filed and | ||||||
| 22 | front pay; | ||||||
| 23 | (4) liquidated damages of up to $10,000; | ||||||
| 24 | (5) compensation for any costs incurred as a result of | ||||||
| 25 | the violation, including litigation costs, expert witness | ||||||
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| 1 | fees, and reasonable attorney's fees; and | ||||||
| 2 | (6) additionally, the court shall award a civil | ||||||
| 3 | penalty of $10,000 payable to the employee. | ||||||
| 4 | Section 50. Other duties required by law. The duties and | ||||||
| 5 | obligations imposed by this Act are cumulative with any other | ||||||
| 6 | duties or obligations imposed under other law and shall not be | ||||||
| 7 | construed to relieve any party from any duties or obligations | ||||||
| 8 | imposed under other law and do not limit any rights or remedies | ||||||
| 9 | under existing law. | ||||||
| 10 | Section 97. Severability. The provisions of this Act are | ||||||
| 11 | severable under Section 1.31 of the Statute on Statutes.". | ||||||
