(725 ILCS 207/35)
Sec. 35.
Trial.
(a) A trial to determine whether the person who is the subject
of a petition under Section 15 of this Act is a sexually violent
person shall commence no later than 120 days after the date of the
probable cause hearing under Section 30 of this Act.
Delay is considered to be agreed to by the person unless he or she
objects to the delay by making a written demand for trial or an oral demand for
trial on the record. Delay occasioned by the person temporarily suspends
for the time of the delay the period within which a person must be tried.
If the delay occurs within 21 days after the end of the period within which a
person
must be tried, the court may continue the cause on application of the State
for not more than an additional 21 days beyond the period prescribed.
The court
may grant a continuance of the trial date for good cause upon its
own motion, the motion of any party or the stipulation of the
parties, provided that any continuance granted shall be subject to Section
103-5 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.
(b) At the trial on the petition it
shall be competent to introduce evidence of the commission by the respondent of
any number of crimes together with whatever punishments, if any, were imposed.
The petitioner may present expert
testimony from both the Illinois Department of Corrections evaluator and the
Department of Human Services psychologist.
(c) The person who is the subject of the petition, the person's
attorney, the Attorney General or the State's Attorney may request
that a trial under this Section be by a jury. A request for a
jury trial under this subsection shall be made within 10 days
after the probable cause hearing under Section 30 of this Act. If
no request is made, the trial shall be by the court. The person,
the person's attorney or the Attorney General or State's Attorney,
whichever is applicable, may withdraw his or her request for a
jury trial.
(d) (1) At a trial on a petition under this Act, the |
| petitioner has the burden of proving the allegations in the petition beyond a reasonable doubt.
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(2) If the State alleges that the sexually violent
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| offense or act that forms the basis for the petition was an act that was sexually motivated as provided in paragraph (e)(2) of Section 5 of this Act, the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged sexually violent act was sexually motivated.
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(e) Evidence that the person who is the subject of a petition
under Section 15 of this Act was convicted for or committed
sexually violent offenses before committing the offense or act on
which the petition is based is not sufficient to establish beyond
a reasonable doubt that the person has a mental disorder.
(f) If the court or jury determines that the person who is the
subject of a petition under Section 15 is a sexually violent
person, the court shall enter a judgment on that finding and shall
commit the person as provided under Section 40 of this Act. If
the court or jury is not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that
the person is a sexually violent person, the court shall dismiss
the petition and direct that the person be released unless he or
she is under some other lawful restriction.
(g) A judgment entered under subsection (f) of this Section on
the finding that the person who is the subject of a petition under
Section 15 is a sexually violent person is interlocutory to a
commitment order under Section 40 and is reviewable on appeal.
(Source: P.A. 91-875, eff. 6-30-00; 92-415, eff. 8-17-01.)
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