(725 ILCS 5/102-21) (from Ch. 38, par. 102-21)

Sec. 102-21. Clinical psychologist; court-appointed examiner.

(a) "Clinical psychologist" means a psychologist licensed under the Clinical Psychologist Licensing Act.

(b) "Court-appointed examiner" means a clinical social worker as defined in Section 9 of the Clinical Social Work and Social Work Practice Act.

(Source: P.A. 87-530.)

(725 ILCS 5/102-22)

Sec. 102-22. "Facility director", for the purposes of Article 104, means the chief officer of a mental health or developmental disabilities facility or his or her designee or the supervisor of a program of treatment or habilitation or his or her designee. "Designee" may include a physician, clinical psychologist, social worker, or nurse.

(Source: P.A. 90-105, eff. 7-11-97.)

(725 ILCS 5/102-23)

Sec. 102-23. "Person with a moderate intellectual disability" means a person whose intelligence quotient is between 41 and 55 and who does not suffer from significant mental illness to the extent that the person's ability to exercise rational judgment is impaired.

(Source: P.A. 99-143, eff. 7-27-15.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 103 heading) ARTICLE 103. RIGHTS OF ACCUSED

(725 ILCS 5/103-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-1)

Sec. 103-1. Rights on arrest.

(a) After an arrest on a warrant the person making the arrest shall inform the person arrested that a warrant has been issued for his arrest and the nature of the offense specified in the warrant.

(b) After an arrest without a warrant the person making the arrest shall inform the person arrested of the nature of the offense on which the arrest is based.

(b-5) This subsection is intended to implement and be interpreted consistently with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, to which the United States is a party. Article 36 of that Convention guarantees that when foreign nationals are arrested or detained, they must be advised of their right to have their consular officials notified, and if an individual chooses to exercise that right, a law enforcement official is required to notify the consulate. It does not create any new substantive State right or remedy.

(1) In accordance with federal law and the provisions of this Section, the law enforcement official in charge of a custodial facility shall ensure that any individual booked and detained at the facility, within 48 hours of booking or detention, shall be advised that if that individual is a foreign national, he or she has a right to communicate with an official from the consulate of his or her country. This subsection (b-5) does not create any affirmative duty to investigate whether an arrestee or detainee is a foreign national.

(2) If the foreign national requests consular notification or the notification is mandatory by law, the law enforcement official in charge of the custodial facility shall ensure the notice is given to the appropriate officer at the consulate of the foreign national in accordance with the U.S. Department of State Instructions for Consular Notification and Access.

(3) The law enforcement official in charge of the custodial facility where a foreign national is located shall ensure that the foreign national is allowed to communicate with, correspond with, and be visited by, a consular officer of his or her country.

(c) No person arrested for a traffic, regulatory or misdemeanor offense, except in cases involving weapons or a controlled substance, shall be strip searched unless there is reasonable belief that the individual is concealing a weapon or controlled substance.

(d) "Strip search" means having an arrested person remove or arrange some or all of his or her clothing so as to permit a visual inspection of the genitals, buttocks, anus, female breasts or undergarments of such person.

(e) All strip searches conducted under this Section shall be performed by persons of the same sex as the arrested person and on premises where the search cannot be observed by persons not physically conducting the search.

(f) Every peace officer or employee of a police department conducting a strip search shall:

(1) Obtain the written permission of the police commander or an agent thereof designated for the purposes of authorizing a strip search in accordance with this Section.

(2) Prepare a report of the strip search. The report shall include the written authorization required by paragraph (1) of this subsection (f), the name of the person subjected to the search, the names of the persons conducting the search, and the time, date and place of the search. A copy of the report shall be provided to the person subject to the search.

(g) No search of any body cavity other than the mouth shall be conducted without a duly executed search warrant; any warrant authorizing a body cavity search shall specify that the search must be performed under sanitary conditions and conducted either by or under the supervision of a physician licensed to practice medicine in all of its branches in this State.

(h) Any peace officer or employee who knowingly or intentionally fails to comply with any provision of this Section, except subsection (b-5) of this Section, is guilty of official misconduct as provided in Section 103-8; provided however, that nothing contained in this Section shall preclude prosecution of a peace officer or employee under another section of this Code.

(i) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as limiting any statutory or common law rights of any person for purposes of any civil action or injunctive relief.

(j) The provisions of subsections (c) through (h) of this Section shall not apply when the person is taken into custody by or remanded to the sheriff or correctional institution pursuant to a court order.

(Source: P.A. 99-190, eff. 1-1-16.)

(725 ILCS 5/103-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-2)

Sec. 103-2. Treatment while in custody.

(a) On being taken into custody every person shall have the right to remain silent.

(b) No unlawful means of any kind shall be used to obtain a statement, admission or confession from any person in custody.

(c) Persons in custody shall be treated humanely and provided with proper food, shelter and, if required, medical treatment without unreasonable delay if the need for the treatment is apparent.

(Source: P.A. 101-652, eff. 7-1-21.)

(725 ILCS 5/103-2.1)

Sec. 103-2.1. When statements by accused may be used.

(a) In this Section, "custodial interrogation" means any interrogation during which (i) a reasonable person in the subject's position would consider himself or herself to be in custody and (ii) during which a question is asked that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.

In this Section, "place of detention" means a building or a police station that is a place of operation for a municipal police department or county sheriff department or other law enforcement agency, not a courthouse, that is owned or operated by a law enforcement agency at which persons are or may be held in detention in connection with criminal charges against those persons.

In this Section, "electronic recording" includes motion picture, audiotape, or videotape, or digital recording.

(a-5) An oral, written, or sign language statement of a minor, who at the time of the commission of the offense was under 18 years of age, is presumed to be inadmissible when the statement is obtained from the minor while the minor is subject to custodial interrogation by a law enforcement officer, State's Attorney, juvenile officer, or other public official or employee prior to the officer, State's Attorney, public official, or employee:

(1) continuously reads to the minor, in its entirety and without stopping for purposes of a response from the minor or verifying comprehension, the following statement: "You have the right to remain silent. That means you do not have to say anything. Anything you do say can be used against you in court. You have the right to get help from a lawyer. If you cannot pay for a lawyer, the court will get you one for free. You can ask for a lawyer at any time. You have the right to stop this interview at any time."; and

(2) after reading the statement required by paragraph (1) of this subsection (a-5), the public official or employee shall ask the minor the following questions and wait for the minor's response to each question:

(A) "Do you want to have a lawyer?"

(B) "Do you want to talk to me?"

(a-10) An oral, written, or sign language statement of a minor, who at the time of the commission of the offense was under 18 years of age, made as a result of a custodial interrogation conducted at a police station or other place of detention on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly shall be presumed to be inadmissible as evidence in a criminal proceeding or a juvenile court proceeding for an act that if committed by an adult would be a misdemeanor offense under Article 11 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or a felony offense under the Criminal Code of 2012 unless:

(1) an electronic recording is made of the custodial interrogation; and

(2) the recording is substantially accurate and not intentionally altered.

(b) An oral, written, or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of a custodial interrogation conducted at a police station or other place of detention shall be presumed to be inadmissible as evidence against the accused in any criminal proceeding brought under Section 9-1, 9-1.2, 9-2, 9-2.1, 9-3, 9-3.2, or 9-3.3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or under clause (d)(1)(F) of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code unless:

(1) an electronic recording is made of the custodial interrogation; and

(2) the recording is substantially accurate and not intentionally altered.

(b-5) Under the following circumstances, an oral, written, or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of a custodial interrogation conducted at a police station or other place of detention shall be presumed to be inadmissible as evidence against the accused, unless an electronic recording is made of the custodial interrogation and the recording is substantially accurate and not intentionally altered:

(1) in any criminal proceeding brought under Section 11-1.40 or 20-1.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if the custodial interrogation was conducted on or after June 1, 2014;

(2) in any criminal proceeding brought under Section 10-2, 18-4, or 19-6 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if the custodial interrogation was conducted on or after June 1, 2015; and

(3) in any criminal proceeding brought under Section 11-1.30 or 18-2 or subsection (e) of Section 12-3.05 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if the custodial interrogation was conducted on or after June 1, 2016.

(b-10) If, during the course of an electronically recorded custodial interrogation conducted under this Section, the accused makes a statement that creates a reasonable suspicion to believe the accused has committed an offense other than an offense required to be recorded under subsection (b) or (b-5), the interrogators may, without the accused's consent, continue to record the interrogation as it relates to the other offense notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. Any oral, written, or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of an interrogation under this subsection shall be presumed to be inadmissible as evidence against the accused in any criminal proceeding, unless the recording is substantially accurate and not intentionally altered.

(c) Every electronic recording made under this Section must be preserved until such time as the defendant's conviction for any offense relating to the statement is final and all direct and habeas corpus appeals are exhausted, or the prosecution of such offenses is barred by law.

(d) If the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation in violation of this Section, then any statements made by the defendant during or following that non-recorded custodial interrogation, even if otherwise in compliance with this Section, are presumed to be inadmissible in any criminal proceeding against the defendant except for the purposes of impeachment.

(e) Nothing in this Section precludes the admission (i) of a statement made by the accused in open court at his or her trial, before a grand jury, or at a preliminary hearing, (ii) of a statement made during a custodial interrogation that was not recorded as required by this Section, because electronic recording was not feasible, (iii) of a voluntary statement, whether or not the result of a custodial interrogation, that has a bearing on the credibility of the accused as a witness, (iv) of a spontaneous statement that is not made in response to a question, (v) of a statement made after questioning that is routinely asked during the processing of the arrest of the suspect, (vi) of a statement made during a custodial interrogation by a suspect who requests, prior to making the statement, to respond to the interrogator's questions only if an electronic recording is not made of the statement, provided that an electronic recording is made of the statement of agreeing to respond to the interrogator's question, only if a recording is not made of the statement, (vii) of a statement made during a custodial interrogation that is conducted out-of-state, (viii) of a statement given in violation of subsection (b) at a time when the interrogators are unaware that a death has in fact occurred, (ix) of a statement given in violation of subsection (b-5) at a time when the interrogators are unaware of facts and circumstances that would create probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense required to be recorded under subsection (b-5), or (x) of any other statement that may be admissible under law. The State shall bear the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that one of the exceptions described in this subsection (e) is applicable. Nothing in this Section precludes the admission of a statement, otherwise inadmissible under this Section, that is used only for impeachment and not as substantive evidence.

(f) The presumption of inadmissibility of a statement made by a suspect at a custodial interrogation at a police station or other place of detention may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was voluntarily given and is reliable, based on the totality of the circumstances.

(g) Any electronic recording of any statement made by an accused during a custodial interrogation that is compiled by any law enforcement agency as required by this Section for the purposes of fulfilling the requirements of this Section shall be confidential and exempt from public inspection and copying, as provided under Section 7 of the Freedom of Information Act, and the information shall not be transmitted to anyone except as needed to comply with this Section.

(Source: P.A. 98-547, eff. 1-1-14; 99-882, eff. 1-1-17.)

(725 ILCS 5/103-2.2)

Sec. 103-2.2. Prohibition of deceptive tactics.

(a) In this Section:

"Custodial interrogation" means any interrogation during which (i) a reasonable person in the subject's position would consider himself or herself to be in custody and (ii) during which a question is asked that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.

"Deception" means the knowing communication of false facts about evidence or unauthorized statements regarding leniency by a law enforcement officer or juvenile officer to a subject of custodial interrogation.

"Place of detention" means a building or a police station that is a place of operation for a municipal police department or county sheriff department or other law enforcement agency, not a courthouse, that is owned or operated by a law enforcement agency at which persons are or may be held in detention in connection with criminal charges against those persons.

"Protected person" means: a minor who, at the time of the commission of the offense, was under 18 years of age; or a person with a severe or profound intellectual disability.

(b) An oral, written, or sign language confession of a protected person made as a result of a custodial interrogation conducted at a police station or other place of detention on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly shall be presumed to be inadmissible as evidence against the protected person making the confession in a criminal proceeding or a juvenile court proceeding for an act that if committed by an adult would be a misdemeanor offense under Article 11 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or a felony offense under the Criminal Code of 2012 if, during the custodial interrogation, a law enforcement officer or juvenile officer knowingly engages in deception.

(c) The presumption of inadmissibility of a confession of a protected person at a custodial interrogation at a police station or other place of detention, when such confession is procured through the knowing use of deception, may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntarily given, based on the totality of the circumstances.

(d) The burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of proving that a confession was voluntary shall be on the State. Objection to the failure of the State to call all material witnesses on the issue of whether the confession was voluntary must be made in the trial court.

(Source: P.A. 102-101, eff. 1-1-22; 103-341, eff. 1-1-24.)

(725 ILCS 5/103-3)

Sec. 103-3. (Repealed).

(Source: P.A. 102-28, eff. 6-25-21. Repealed by P.A. 102-694, eff. 1-7-22.)

(725 ILCS 5/103-3.5)

Sec. 103-3.5. Right to communicate with attorney and family; transfers; presumption of inadmissibility.

(a) Persons who are in police custody shall have the right to communicate free of charge with an attorney of his or her choice and members of his or her family as soon as possible upon being taken into police custody, but no later than 3 hours of arrival at the first place of detention. Persons in police custody must be given access to use a telephone via a landline or cellular phone to make 3 telephone calls.

(b) In accordance with Section 103-7, at every police facility where a person is in police custody, a sign containing at minimum, the following information in bold block type must be posted in a conspicuous place:

(1) a short statement notifying persons who are in police custody of their right to have access to a phone within 3 hours of being taken into police custody; and

(2) that persons who are in police custody have the right to make 3 phone calls within 3 hours of being taken into custody, at no charge.

(c) In addition to the information listed in subsection (b), if the place of detention is located in a jurisdiction where the court has appointed the public defender or other attorney to represent persons who are in police custody, the telephone number to the public defender or other attorney's office must also be displayed. The telephone call to the public defender or other attorney must not be monitored, eavesdropped upon, or recorded.

(d) If a person who is in police custody is transferred to a new place of detention, that person's right to make 3 telephone calls under this Section within 3 hours of arrival is renewed.

(e) Statements made by a person who is detained in police custody in violation of this section are presumed inadmissible in court as evidence. The presumption of inadmissibility may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was voluntarily given and is reliable, based on the totality of the circumstances. As used in this subsection, "totality of the circumstances" includes, but is not limited to, evidence that law enforcement knowingly prevented or delayed a person's right to communicate or failed to comply with the requirements of this Section.

(f) The 3-hour requirement under this Section shall not apply while the person in police custody is asleep, unconscious, or otherwise incapacitated or an exigent circumstance prevents the officers from timely complying with this Section. If this occurs, it must be documented within the police report detailing the exigent circumstance. Once the exigent circumstance ends, the right to make 3 phone calls within 3 hours resumes.

(g) In accordance with this Section, the following records shall be maintained: (i) the number of phone calls the person made while in custody; (ii) the time or times the person made phone calls; and (iii) if the person did not make any phone calls, a statement of the reason or reasons why no calls were made.

(h) For purposes of this Section, "place of detention" means a building or a police station that is a place of operation for a municipal police department or county sheriff department or other law enforcement agency, other than a courthouse, that is owned or operated by a law enforcement agency, or other building, such as a school or hospital, where persons are held in detention in connection with criminal charges against those persons.

(Source: P.A. 102-694, eff. 1-7-22.)

(725 ILCS 5/103-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-4)

Sec. 103-4. Right to consult with attorney.

Any person committed, imprisoned or restrained of his liberty for any cause whatever and whether or not such person is charged with an offense shall, except in cases of imminent danger of escape, be allowed to consult with any licensed attorney at law of this State whom such person may desire to see or consult, alone and in private at the place of custody, as many times and for such period each time as is reasonable. When any such person is about to be moved beyond the limits of this State under any pretense whatever the person to be moved shall be entitled to a reasonable delay for the purpose of obtaining counsel and of availing himself of the laws of this State for the security of personal liberty.

(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)

(725 ILCS 5/103-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-5)

Sec. 103-5. Speedy trial.)

(a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he or she was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court's determination of the defendant's physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal. Delay shall be considered to be agreed to by the defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by making a written demand for trial or an oral demand for trial on the record. The provisions of this subsection (a) do not apply to a person on pretrial release or recognizance for an offense but who is in custody for a violation of his or her parole, aftercare release, or mandatory supervised release for another offense.

The 120-day term must be one continuous period of incarceration. In computing the 120-day term, separate periods of incarceration may not be combined. If a defendant is taken into custody a second (or subsequent) time for the same offense, the term will begin again at day zero.

(b) Every person on pretrial release or recognizance shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court's determination of the defendant's physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal. The defendant's failure to appear for any court date set by the court operates to waive the defendant's demand for trial made under this subsection.

For purposes of computing the 160 day period under this subsection (b), every person who was in custody for an alleged offense and demanded trial and is subsequently released on pretrial release or recognizance and demands trial, shall be given credit for time spent in custody following the making of the demand while in custody. Any demand for trial made under this subsection (b) shall be in writing; and in the case of a defendant not in custody, the demand for trial shall include the date of any prior demand made under this provision while the defendant was in custody.

(c) If the court determines that the State has exercised without success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may be obtained at a later day the court may continue the cause on application of the State for not more than an additional 60 days. If the court determines that the State has exercised without success due diligence to obtain results of DNA testing that is material to the case and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such results may be obtained at a later day, the court may continue the cause on application of the State for not more than an additional 120 days.

(d) Every person not tried in accordance with subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this Section shall be discharged from custody or released from the obligations of his pretrial release or recognizance.

(e) If a person is simultaneously in custody upon more than one charge pending against him in the same county, or simultaneously demands trial upon more than one charge pending against him in the same county, he shall be tried, or adjudged guilty after waiver of trial, upon at least one such charge before expiration relative to any of such pending charges of the period prescribed by subsections (a) and (b) of this Section. Such person shall be tried upon all of the remaining charges thus pending within 160 days from the date on which judgment relative to the first charge thus prosecuted is rendered pursuant to the Unified Code of Corrections or, if such trial upon such first charge is terminated without judgment and there is no subsequent trial of, or adjudication of guilt after waiver of trial of, such first charge within a reasonable time, the person shall be tried upon all of the remaining charges thus pending within 160 days from the date on which such trial is terminated; if either such period of 160 days expires without the commencement of trial of, or adjudication of guilt after waiver of trial of, any of such remaining charges thus pending, such charge or charges shall be dismissed and barred for want of prosecution unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness for trial, by a continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court's determination of the defendant's physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal; provided, however, that if the court determines that the State has exercised without success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may be obtained at a later day the court may continue the cause on application of the State for not more than an additional 60 days.

(f) Delay occasioned by the defendant shall temporarily suspend for the time of the delay the period within which a person shall be tried as prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e) of this Section and on the day of expiration of the delay the said period shall continue at the point at which it was suspended. Where such delay occurs within 21 days of the end of the period within which a person shall be tried as prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e) of this Section, the court may continue the cause on application of the State for not more than an additional 21 days beyond the period prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e). This subsection (f) shall become effective on, and apply to persons charged with alleged offenses committed on or after, March 1, 1977.

(Source: P.A. 101-652, eff. 1-1-23.)