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730 ILCS 5/5-8-1

    (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1)
    (Text of Section before amendment by P.A. 103-825)
    Sec. 5-8-1. Natural life imprisonment; enhancements for use of a firearm; mandatory supervised release terms.
    (a) Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense or in Article 4.5 of Chapter V, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court under this Section, subject to Section 5-4.5-115 of this Code, according to the following limitations:
        (1) for first degree murder,
            (a) (blank),
            (b) if a trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable
        
doubt that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty or, except as set forth in subsection (a)(1)(c) of this Section, that any of the aggravating factors listed in subparagraph (b-5) are present, the court may sentence the defendant, subject to Section 5-4.5-105, to a term of natural life imprisonment, or
            (b-5) A defendant who at the time of the
        
commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or more and who has been found guilty of first degree murder may be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment if:
                (1) the murdered individual was an inmate at
            
an institution or facility of the Department of Corrections, or any similar local correctional agency and was killed on the grounds thereof, or the murdered individual was otherwise present in such institution or facility with the knowledge and approval of the chief administrative officer thereof;
                (2) the murdered individual was killed as a
            
result of the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus, or other public conveyance;
                (3) the defendant committed the murder
            
pursuant to a contract, agreement, or understanding by which he or she was to receive money or anything of value in return for committing the murder or procured another to commit the murder for money or anything of value;
                (4) the murdered individual was killed in the
            
course of another felony if:
                    (A) the murdered individual:
                        (i) was actually killed by the
                    
defendant, or
                        (ii) received physical injuries
                    
personally inflicted by the defendant substantially contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by one or more persons for whose conduct the defendant is legally accountable under Section 5-2 of this Code, and the physical injuries inflicted by either the defendant or the other person or persons for whose conduct he is legally accountable caused the death of the murdered individual; and (B) in performing the acts which caused the death of the murdered individual or which resulted in physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant on the murdered individual under the circumstances of subdivision (ii) of clause (A) of this clause (4), the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the knowledge that his or her acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; and
                    (B) in performing the acts which caused
                
the death of the murdered individual or which resulted in physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant on the murdered individual under the circumstances of subdivision (ii) of clause (A) of this clause (4), the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the knowledge that his or her acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; and
                    (C) the other felony was an inherently
                
violent crime or the attempt to commit an inherently violent crime. In this clause (C), "inherently violent crime" includes, but is not limited to, armed robbery, robbery, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated arson, aggravated stalking, residential burglary, and home invasion;
                (5) the defendant committed the murder with
            
intent to prevent the murdered individual from testifying or participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution or giving material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another; or the defendant committed the murder because the murdered individual was a witness in any prosecution or gave material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another; for purposes of this clause (5), "participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution" is intended to include those appearing in the proceedings in any capacity such as trial judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, investigators, witnesses, or jurors;
                (6) the defendant, while committing an
            
offense punishable under Section 401, 401.1, 401.2, 405, 405.2, 407 or 407.1 or subsection (b) of Section 404 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional killing of the murdered individual;
                (7) the defendant was incarcerated in an
            
institution or facility of the Department of Corrections at the time of the murder, and while committing an offense punishable as a felony under Illinois law, or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional killing of the murdered individual;
                (8) the murder was committed in a cold,
            
calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable expectation that the death of a human being would result therefrom;
                (9) the defendant was a principal
            
administrator, organizer, or leader of a calculated criminal drug conspiracy consisting of a hierarchical position of authority superior to that of all other members of the conspiracy, and the defendant counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or caused the intentional killing of the murdered person;
                (10) the murder was intentional and involved
            
the infliction of torture. For the purpose of this clause (10), torture means the infliction of or subjection to extreme physical pain, motivated by an intent to increase or prolong the pain, suffering or agony of the victim;
                (11) the murder was committed as a result of
            
the intentional discharge of a firearm by the defendant from a motor vehicle and the victim was not present within the motor vehicle;
                (12) the murdered individual was a person
            
with a disability and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a person with a disability. For purposes of this clause (12), "person with a disability" means a person who suffers from a permanent physical or mental impairment resulting from disease, an injury, a functional disorder, or a congenital condition that renders the person incapable of adequately providing for his or her own health or personal care;
                (13) the murdered individual was subject to
            
an order of protection and the murder was committed by a person against whom the same order of protection was issued under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986;
                (14) the murdered individual was known by the
            
defendant to be a teacher or other person employed in any school and the teacher or other employee is upon the grounds of a school or grounds adjacent to a school, or is in any part of a building used for school purposes;
                (15) the murder was committed by the
            
defendant in connection with or as a result of the offense of terrorism as defined in Section 29D-14.9 of this Code;
                (16) the murdered individual was a member of
            
a congregation engaged in prayer or other religious activities at a church, synagogue, mosque, or other building, structure, or place used for religious worship; or
                (17)(i) the murdered individual was a
            
physician, physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice registered nurse;
                (ii) the defendant knew or should have known
            
that the murdered individual was a physician, physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice registered nurse; and
                (iii) the murdered individual was killed in
            
the course of acting in his or her capacity as a physician, physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice registered nurse, or to prevent him or her from acting in that capacity, or in retaliation for his or her acting in that capacity.
            (c) the court shall sentence the defendant to a
        
term of natural life imprisonment if the defendant, at the time of the commission of the murder, had attained the age of 18, and:
                (i) has previously been convicted of first
            
degree murder under any state or federal law, or
                (ii) is found guilty of murdering more than
            
one victim, or
                (iii) is found guilty of murdering a peace
            
officer, fireman, or emergency management worker when the peace officer, fireman, or emergency management worker was killed in the course of performing his official duties, or to prevent the peace officer or fireman from performing his official duties, or in retaliation for the peace officer, fireman, or emergency management worker from performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a peace officer, fireman, or emergency management worker, or
                (iv) is found guilty of murdering an employee
            
of an institution or facility of the Department of Corrections, or any similar local correctional agency, when the employee was killed in the course of performing his official duties, or to prevent the employee from performing his official duties, or in retaliation for the employee performing his official duties, or
                (v) is found guilty of murdering an emergency
            
medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic, ambulance driver or other medical assistance or first aid person while employed by a municipality or other governmental unit when the person was killed in the course of performing official duties or to prevent the person from performing official duties or in retaliation for performing official duties and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was an emergency medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistant or first aid personnel, or
                (vi) (blank), or
                (vii) is found guilty of first degree murder
            
and the murder was committed by reason of any person's activity as a community policing volunteer or to prevent any person from engaging in activity as a community policing volunteer. For the purpose of this Section, "community policing volunteer" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2-3.5 of the Criminal Code of 2012.
            For purposes of clause (v), "emergency medical
        
technician - ambulance", "emergency medical technician - intermediate", "emergency medical technician - paramedic", have the meanings ascribed to them in the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act.
            (d)(i) if the person committed the offense while
            
armed with a firearm, 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;
            (ii) if, during the commission of the offense,
        
the person personally discharged a firearm, 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;
            (iii) if, during the commission of the offense,
        
the person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person, 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.
        (2) (blank);
        (2.5) for a person who has attained the age of 18
    
years at the time of the commission of the offense and who is convicted under the circumstances described in subdivision (b)(1)(B) of Section 11-1.20 or paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of Section 12-13, subdivision (d)(2) of Section 11-1.30 or paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of Section 12-14, subdivision (b)(1.2) of Section 11-1.40 or paragraph (1.2) of subsection (b) of Section 12-14.1, subdivision (b)(2) of Section 11-1.40 or paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of Section 12-14.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, the sentence shall be a term of natural life imprisonment.
    (b) (Blank).
    (c) (Blank).
    (d) Subject to earlier termination under Section 3-3-8, the parole or mandatory supervised release term shall be written as part of the sentencing order and shall be as follows:
        (1) for first degree murder or for the offenses of
    
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault if committed on or before December 12, 2005, 3 years;
        (1.5) except as provided in paragraph (7) of this
    
subsection (d), for a Class X felony except for the offenses of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault if committed on or after December 13, 2005 (the effective date of Public Act 94-715) and except for the offense of aggravated child pornography under Section 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, or 11-20.1 with sentencing under subsection (c-5) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if committed on or after January 1, 2009, 18 months;
        (2) except as provided in paragraph (7) of this
    
subsection (d), for a Class 1 felony or a Class 2 felony except for the offense of criminal sexual assault if committed on or after December 13, 2005 (the effective date of Public Act 94-715) and except for the offenses of manufacture and dissemination of child pornography under clauses (a)(1) and (a)(2) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if committed on or after January 1, 2009, 12 months;
        (3) except as provided in paragraph (4), (6), or (7)
    
of this subsection (d), for a Class 3 felony or a Class 4 felony, 6 months; no later than 45 days after the onset of the term of mandatory supervised release, the Prisoner Review Board shall conduct a discretionary discharge review pursuant to the provisions of Section 3-3-8, which shall include the results of a standardized risk and needs assessment tool administered by the Department of Corrections; the changes to this paragraph (3) made by this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly apply to all individuals released on mandatory supervised release on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly, including those individuals whose sentences were imposed prior to the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly;
        (4) for defendants who commit the offense of
    
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, or criminal sexual assault, on or after December 13, 2005 (the effective date of Public Act 94-715), or who commit the offense of aggravated child pornography under Section 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, or 11-20.1 with sentencing under subsection (c-5) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, manufacture of child pornography, or dissemination of child pornography after January 1, 2009, the term of mandatory supervised release shall range from a minimum of 3 years to a maximum of the natural life of the defendant;
        (5) if the victim is under 18 years of age, for a
    
second or subsequent offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse or felony criminal sexual abuse, 4 years, at least the first 2 years of which the defendant shall serve in an electronic monitoring or home detention program under Article 8A of Chapter V of this Code;
        (6) for a felony domestic battery, aggravated
    
domestic battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, and a felony violation of an order of protection, 4 years;
        (7) for any felony described in paragraph (a)(2)(ii),
    
(a)(2)(iii), (a)(2)(iv), (a)(2)(vi), (a)(2.1), (a)(2.3), (a)(2.4), (a)(2.5), or (a)(2.6) of Article 5, Section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections requiring an inmate to serve a minimum of 85% of their court-imposed sentence, except for the offenses of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault if committed on or after December 13, 2005 (the effective date of Public Act 94-715) and except for the offense of aggravated child pornography under Section 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, or 11-20.1 with sentencing under subsection (c-5) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if committed on or after January 1, 2009 and except as provided in paragraph (4) or paragraph (6) of this subsection (d), the term of mandatory supervised release shall be as follows:
            (A) Class X felony, 3 years;
            (B) Class 1 or Class 2 felonies, 2 years;
            (C) Class 3 or Class 4 felonies, 1 year.
    (e) (Blank).
    (f) (Blank).
    (g) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act and of Public Act 101-652: (i) the provisions of paragraph (3) of subsection (d) are effective on July 1, 2022 and shall apply to all individuals convicted on or after the effective date of paragraph (3) of subsection (d); and (ii) the provisions of paragraphs (1.5) and (2) of subsection (d) are effective on July 1, 2021 and shall apply to all individuals convicted on or after the effective date of paragraphs (1.5) and (2) of subsection (d).
(Source: P.A. 102-28, eff. 6-25-21; 102-687, eff. 12-17-21; 102-694, eff. 1-7-22; 102-1104, eff. 12-6-22; 103-51, eff. 1-1-24.)
 
    (Text of Section after amendment by P.A. 103-825)
    Sec. 5-8-1. Natural life imprisonment; enhancements for use of a firearm; mandatory supervised release terms.
    (a) Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense or in Article 4.5 of Chapter V, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court under this Section, subject to Section 5-4.5-115 of this Code, according to the following limitations:
        (1) for first degree murder,
            (a) (blank),
            (b) if a trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable
        
doubt that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty or, except as set forth in subsection (a)(1)(c) of this Section, that any of the aggravating factors listed in subparagraph (b-5) are present, the court may sentence the defendant, subject to Section 5-4.5-105, to a term of natural life imprisonment, or
            (b-5) A defendant who at the time of the
        
commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or more and who has been found guilty of first degree murder may be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment if:
                (1) the murdered individual was an inmate at
            
an institution or facility of the Department of Corrections, or any similar local correctional agency and was killed on the grounds thereof, or the murdered individual was otherwise present in such institution or facility with the knowledge and approval of the chief administrative officer thereof;
                (2) the murdered individual was killed as a
            
result of the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus, or other public conveyance;
                (3) the defendant committed the murder
            
pursuant to a contract, agreement, or understanding by which he or she was to receive money or anything of value in return for committing the murder or procured another to commit the murder for money or anything of value;
                (4) the murdered individual was killed in the
            
course of another felony if:
                    (A) the murdered individual:
                        (i) was actually killed by the
                    
defendant, or
                        (ii) received physical injuries
                    
personally inflicted by the defendant substantially contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by one or more persons for whose conduct the defendant is legally accountable under Section 5-2 of this Code, and the physical injuries inflicted by either the defendant or the other person or persons for whose conduct he is legally accountable caused the death of the murdered individual; and (B) in performing the acts which caused the death of the murdered individual or which resulted in physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant on the murdered individual under the circumstances of subdivision (ii) of clause (A) of this clause (4), the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the knowledge that his or her acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; and
                    (B) in performing the acts which caused
                
the death of the murdered individual or which resulted in physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant on the murdered individual under the circumstances of subdivision (ii) of clause (A) of this clause (4), the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the knowledge that his or her acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; and
                    (C) the other felony was an inherently
                
violent crime or the attempt to commit an inherently violent crime. In this clause (C), "inherently violent crime" includes, but is not limited to, armed robbery, robbery, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated arson, aggravated stalking, residential burglary, and home invasion;
                (5) the defendant committed the murder with
            
intent to prevent the murdered individual from testifying or participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution or giving material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another; or the defendant committed the murder because the murdered individual was a witness in any prosecution or gave material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another; for purposes of this clause (5), "participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution" is intended to include those appearing in the proceedings in any capacity such as trial judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, investigators, witnesses, or jurors;
                (6) the defendant, while committing an
            
offense punishable under Section 401, 401.1, 401.2, 405, 405.2, 407 or 407.1 or subsection (b) of Section 404 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional killing of the murdered individual;
                (7) the defendant was incarcerated in an
            
institution or facility of the Department of Corrections at the time of the murder, and while committing an offense punishable as a felony under Illinois law, or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional killing of the murdered individual;
                (8) the murder was committed in a cold,
            
calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable expectation that the death of a human being would result therefrom;
                (9) the defendant was a principal
            
administrator, organizer, or leader of a calculated criminal drug conspiracy consisting of a hierarchical position of authority superior to that of all other members of the conspiracy, and the defendant counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or caused the intentional killing of the murdered person;
                (10) the murder was intentional and involved
            
the infliction of torture. For the purpose of this clause (10), torture means the infliction of or subjection to extreme physical pain, motivated by an intent to increase or prolong the pain, suffering or agony of the victim;
                (11) the murder was committed as a result of
            
the intentional discharge of a firearm by the defendant from a motor vehicle and the victim was not present within the motor vehicle;
                (12) the murdered individual was a person
            
with a disability and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a person with a disability. For purposes of this clause (12), "person with a disability" means a person who suffers from a permanent physical or mental impairment resulting from disease, an injury, a functional disorder, or a congenital condition that renders the person incapable of adequately providing for his or her own health or personal care;
                (13) the murdered individual was subject to
            
an order of protection and the murder was committed by a person against whom the same order of protection was issued under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986;
                (14) the murdered individual was known by the
            
defendant to be a teacher or other person employed in any school and the teacher or other employee is upon the grounds of a school or grounds adjacent to a school, or is in any part of a building used for school purposes;
                (15) the murder was committed by the
            
defendant in connection with or as a result of the offense of terrorism as defined in Section 29D-14.9 of this Code;
                (16) the murdered individual was a member of
            
a congregation engaged in prayer or other religious activities at a church, synagogue, mosque, or other building, structure, or place used for religious worship; or
                (17)(i) the murdered individual was a
            
physician, physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice registered nurse;
                (ii) the defendant knew or should have known
            
that the murdered individual was a physician, physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice registered nurse; and
                (iii) the murdered individual was killed in
            
the course of acting in his or her capacity as a physician, physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice registered nurse, or to prevent him or her from acting in that capacity, or in retaliation for his or her acting in that capacity.
            (c) the court shall sentence the defendant to a
        
term of natural life imprisonment if the defendant, at the time of the commission of the murder, had attained the age of 18, and:
                (i) has previously been convicted of first
            
degree murder under any state or federal law, or
                (ii) is found guilty of murdering more than
            
one victim, or
                (iii) is found guilty of murdering a peace
            
officer, fireman, or emergency management worker when the peace officer, fireman, or emergency management worker was killed in the course of performing his official duties, or to prevent the peace officer or fireman from performing his official duties, or in retaliation for the peace officer, fireman, or emergency management worker from performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a peace officer, fireman, or emergency management worker, or
                (iv) is found guilty of murdering an employee
            
of an institution or facility of the Department of Corrections, or any similar local correctional agency, when the employee was killed in the course of performing his official duties, or to prevent the employee from performing his official duties, or in retaliation for the employee performing his official duties, or
                (v) is found guilty of murdering an emergency
            
medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic, ambulance driver or other medical assistance or first aid person while employed by a municipality or other governmental unit when the person was killed in the course of performing official duties or to prevent the person from performing official duties or in retaliation for performing official duties and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was an emergency medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistant or first aid personnel, or
                (vi) (blank), or
                (vii) is found guilty of first degree murder
            
and the murder was committed by reason of any person's activity as a community policing volunteer or to prevent any person from engaging in activity as a community policing volunteer. For the purpose of this Section, "community policing volunteer" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2-3.5 of the Criminal Code of 2012.
            For purposes of clause (v), "emergency medical
        
technician - ambulance", "emergency medical technician - intermediate", "emergency medical technician - paramedic", have the meanings ascribed to them in the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act.
            (d)(i) if the person committed the offense while
            
armed with a firearm, 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;
            (ii) if, during the commission of the offense,
        
the person personally discharged a firearm, 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;
            (iii) if, during the commission of the offense,
        
the person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person, 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.
        (2) (blank);
        (2.5) for a person who has attained the age of 18
    
years at the time of the commission of the offense and who is convicted under the circumstances described in subdivision (b)(1)(B) of Section 11-1.20 or paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of Section 12-13, subdivision (d)(2) of Section 11-1.30 or paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of Section 12-14, subdivision (b)(1.2) of Section 11-1.40 or paragraph (1.2) of subsection (b) of Section 12-14.1, subdivision (b)(2) of Section 11-1.40 or paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of Section 12-14.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, the sentence shall be a term of natural life imprisonment.
    (b) (Blank).
    (c) (Blank).
    (d) Subject to earlier termination under Section 3-3-8, the parole or mandatory supervised release term shall be written as part of the sentencing order and shall be as follows:
        (1) for first degree murder or for the offenses of
    
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault if committed on or before December 12, 2005, 3 years;
        (1.5) except as provided in paragraph (7) of this
    
subsection (d), for a Class X felony except for the offenses of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault if committed on or after December 13, 2005 (the effective date of Public Act 94-715) and except for the offense of aggravated child pornography under Section 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, or 11-20.1 with sentencing under subsection (c-5) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if committed on or after January 1, 2009, and except for the offense of obscene depiction of a purported child with sentencing under subsection (d) of Section 11-20.4 of the Criminal Code of 2012, 18 months;
        (2) except as provided in paragraph (7) of this
    
subsection (d), for a Class 1 felony or a Class 2 felony except for the offense of criminal sexual assault if committed on or after December 13, 2005 (the effective date of Public Act 94-715) and except for the offenses of manufacture and dissemination of child pornography under clauses (a)(1) and (a)(2) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if committed on or after January 1, 2009, and except for the offense of obscene depiction of a purported child under paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of Section 11-20.4 of the Criminal Code of 2012, 12 months;
        (3) except as provided in paragraph (4), (6), or (7)
    
of this subsection (d), for a Class 3 felony or a Class 4 felony, 6 months; no later than 45 days after the onset of the term of mandatory supervised release, the Prisoner Review Board shall conduct a discretionary discharge review pursuant to the provisions of Section 3-3-8, which shall include the results of a standardized risk and needs assessment tool administered by the Department of Corrections; the changes to this paragraph (3) made by this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly apply to all individuals released on mandatory supervised release on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly, including those individuals whose sentences were imposed prior to the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly;
        (4) for defendants who commit the offense of
    
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, or criminal sexual assault, on or after December 13, 2005 (the effective date of Public Act 94-715), or who commit the offense of aggravated child pornography under Section 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, or 11-20.1 with sentencing under subsection (c-5) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, manufacture of child pornography, or dissemination of child pornography after January 1, 2009, or who commit the offense of obscene depiction of a purported child under paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of Section 11-20.4 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or who commit the offense of obscene depiction of a purported child with sentencing under subsection (d) of Section 11-20.4 of the Criminal Code of 2012, the term of mandatory supervised release shall range from a minimum of 3 years to a maximum of the natural life of the defendant;
        (5) if the victim is under 18 years of age, for a
    
second or subsequent offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse or felony criminal sexual abuse, 4 years, at least the first 2 years of which the defendant shall serve in an electronic monitoring or home detention program under Article 8A of Chapter V of this Code;
        (6) for a felony domestic battery, aggravated
    
domestic battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, and a felony violation of an order of protection, 4 years;
        (7) for any felony described in paragraph (a)(2)(ii),
    
(a)(2)(iii), (a)(2)(iv), (a)(2)(vi), (a)(2.1), (a)(2.3), (a)(2.4), (a)(2.5), or (a)(2.6) of Article 5, Section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections requiring an inmate to serve a minimum of 85% of their court-imposed sentence, except for the offenses of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault if committed on or after December 13, 2005 (the effective date of Public Act 94-715) and except for the offense of aggravated child pornography under Section 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, or 11-20.1 with sentencing under subsection (c-5) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if committed on or after January 1, 2009, and except for the offense of obscene depiction of a purported child with sentencing under subsection (d) of Section 11-20.4 of the Criminal Code of 2012, and except as provided in paragraph (4) or paragraph (6) of this subsection (d), the term of mandatory supervised release shall be as follows:
            (A) Class X felony, 3 years;
            (B) Class 1 or Class 2 felonies, 2 years;
            (C) Class 3 or Class 4 felonies, 1 year.
    (e) (Blank).
    (f) (Blank).
    (g) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act and of Public Act 101-652: (i) the provisions of paragraph (3) of subsection (d) are effective on July 1, 2022 and shall apply to all individuals convicted on or after the effective date of paragraph (3) of subsection (d); and (ii) the provisions of paragraphs (1.5) and (2) of subsection (d) are effective on July 1, 2021 and shall apply to all individuals convicted on or after the effective date of paragraphs (1.5) and (2) of subsection (d).
(Source: P.A. 102-28, eff. 6-25-21; 102-687, eff. 12-17-21; 102-694, eff. 1-7-22; 102-1104, eff. 12-6-22; 103-51, eff. 1-1-24; 103-825, eff. 1-1-25.)